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Preface
The idea for this book began life long ago when I was an undergraduate 
student at the University of Aarhus and formed a reading group with two 
fellow-students to read the third book of Polybius’ Histories in Greek. It 
has come a long way since then: through a Masters thesis on moral values 
in Polybius, a PhD thesis on the changeability of fortune as a moral topos 
in Greek historiography, and much teaching, thinking and writing, to the 
larger and more fundamental topic of Greek historiography as a moral-di-
dactic genre. Along the way I have incurred many debts, and this is the 
place to acknowledge them.
Firstly, I must thank the man without whom none of this would have 
happened: my Greek teacher at Odense Katedralskole, Henrik Nisbeth, 
who showed me the beauty of Greek and the joy of studying Classics. 
Secondly, my surrogate family for seven years of studying at the University 
of Aarhus, the students of Classical Philology from 1995 to 2002, and espe-
cially the members of my Polybius reading group, Jesper Thomsen Lemke 
and Thomas Hemming Larsen. From those same years, I am grateful to my 
teachers Erik Ostenfeld, who hired me as editorial assistant and introduced 
me to the world of academic publishing, and Marianne Pade, who didn’t 
laugh when I said I wanted to study for a PhD, and who supported my 
decision to do so abroad. I must also thank Mogens Herman Hansen, who, 
although he had never taught me, helped me make contact with a potential 
PhD supervisor in Britain and supported my application.
During my PhD years at Royal Holloway, University of London, I was 
magnificently supported on an academic and a personal level both by my 
supervisor, Lene Rubinstein, and by her husband, Jonathan Powell. My 
PhD examiners, Tim Cornell and Tim Rood, encouraged me to think I 
could take the topic further.
As for the present book itself, I am immensely grateful to those scholars 
and friends who read through the manuscript or parts of it and  commented 
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on it at various stages: Emily Baragwanath, Alexander Meeus, Chris 
Pelling, Ian Ruffell, Catherine Steel and Kathryn Tempest. The result is 
infinitely better because of them, and any imperfections it contains are, of 
course, entirely my own responsibility. I also owe a debt of gratitude to 
colleagues at the University of Glasgow and elsewhere who have helped 
me clarify my thoughts on various aspects of the argument and suggested 
new ways of looking at it, especially Christopher Burden-Strevens, Art 
Eckstein, John Marincola, John Moles and Jan Stenger.
Finally, I want to end the list of acknowledgements as it began: with a 
man without whom the book would never have happened – my husband, 
Morten. Without his love, patience, equal sharing of parenting responsibil-
ities, and more than equal sense of humour, I would not have been able to 
write a single chapter.
Introduction
τοῖς δ᾽ ἱστορικοῖς διὰ πολλὰ ἀνάγκη τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα μετὰ σπουδῆς 
ἐντυγχάνειν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν λόγων τὸ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πράξεων καὶ εὐτυχιῶν 
καὶ δυστυχιῶν οὐ κατὰ λόγον μόνον, ἀλλὰ ἐνίοτε καὶ παρὰ λόγον ἀνδράσι τε 
καὶ πόλεσι συμβαινουσῶν σφόδρα ἀναγκαῖον πολιτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ 
πράττειν προαιρουμένῳ. ὁ γὰρ πλεῖστα ἑτέροις συμβάντα ἐπιστάμενος ἄριστα 
οἷς αὐτὸς ἐγχείρει διαπράξεται καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνόντων ἀσφαλῶς, καὶ οὔτε εὖ 
πράττων παρὰ μέτρον ἐπαρθήσεται, δυσπραγίαν τε πᾶσαν οἴσει γενναίως διὰ 
τὸ μηδ᾽ ἐν οἷς εὖ ἔπραττεν ἀνεννόητος εἶναι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβολῆς.
But as for the historians, for many reasons the statesman must read them 
attentively, because, even apart from the speeches they contain, it is most 
essential that the statesman, the man who chooses to conduct public affairs, 
should be experienced in events and successes and failures, which happen not 
only in accordance with reasonable expectation, but also at times contrary 
to it, to both men and states. For it is the man with the widest knowledge 
of what has happened to others who will carry out his own undertakings 
in the best way and as safely as possible in the circumstances, and who will 
both avoid becoming unduly arrogant in his good fortune and bear every 
misfortune nobly because he remains aware even in his good fortune that his 
situation might well change to the opposite. (Dio Chrysostom 18.9; transla-
tion modified from Cohoon)
In this way Dio of Prusa, writing in the first century ad and nicknamed 
Chrysostom, ‘golden-tongued’, for his eloquence, encourages men of pol-
itics to read history. Dio explicitly intends the history-reading statesman 
to learn from the narratives of the past. More precisely, he assumes that 
the reader will become better at handling state affairs from reading about 
‘successes and failures’ that have happened in the past to ‘both men and 
states’. He also expects that reading history will teach the statesman to 
avoid arrogance in times of success and undignified behaviour in times of 
misfortune because the historical narratives will show him that such situ-
ations are often quickly reversed. Those are strikingly concrete results to 
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expect from reading a text. The idea that you can learn how to behave and 
how to think about your life from reading history also assumes a number 
of things which seem far from given to a modern reader of historiography; 
for instance, that human beings and their situations are sufficiently alike in 
the past and the present for the past to be instructive, and that it is actually 
practically possible to learn from the experiences of others.
The idea is commonplace in ancient literature. Wherever we look, we 
find historiographers referring to the didactic usefulness of their works 
and readers of historiography expecting to learn something from them. 
For instance, when Cicero writes to his brother Quintus advising him 
about how to be a good provincial governor and takes it upon himself to 
tell Quintus which of his legati he should trust the most, he singles out one 
named Tubero because he is a writer of history and so ‘could select from 
his own Annals many whom he would both like to and be able to imitate’ 
(multos ex suis annalibus posse deligere quos velit et posit imitari, Cic. Q 
Fr. 1.1.3). In a more theoretical vein, Lucian, the second-century ad satirist 
and literary critic, spends an entire essay on How to Write History admon-
ishing the would-be historiographer to write for the utility rather than the 
pleasure of his readers, implying that standards have slipped somewhat in 
this respect in recent years. The most famous expression of this idea of his-
toriography as a didactic genre is no doubt Cicero’s designation of history 
as magistra vitae, the teacher of life.1
The usefulness these consumers of historiography had in mind was 
partly practical and political: Dio Chrysostom says that a statesmen will 
manage affairs more ‘safely’ if he reads history, and Cicero wants Tubero 
to be of practical use to Quintus in his governorship. But it is also partly 
moral: Dio’s statesman will learn to avoid arrogance and to bear changes 
to his fortunes ‘nobly’, and Tubero can be relied upon, Cicero implies, to 
treat the provincials with respect and keep his hands off their property. For 
a reader like Plutarch, who has much to say about the proper way to write 
history in his essay The Malice of Herodotus, good historiography is char-
acterised by providing appropriate and positive examples for emulation, 
rather than, say, by its analysis of historical causes and motives.
Such a view of historiography as a genre concerned with the moral edi-
fication of its readers has, in fact, been the norm for much of the genre’s 
1 The famous epithet forms part of a rhetorical question, aimed more at glorifying the 
orator than history: Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magis-
tra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur? (‘And 
history, the witness of passing times, the light of truth, the life of remembrance, the teacher 
of life, the message-bearer of antiquity – whose voice if not an orator’s could entrust her to 
immortality?’, Cic. Orat. 2.36). It became the watchword of history writing in the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance (see Landfester 1972, Spiegel 2002 and Findlen 2002).
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history. In the Middle Ages, Gregory of Tours filled his History of the 
Franks with examples of good and bad behaviour as a corrective for his 
readers in the violent times of Merovingian France, and the Venerable Bede 
composed a didactic history which showed how the sinful Britons had been 
overcome by the pious Anglo-Saxons.2 In the Renaissance, Machiavelli 
fused moral and political edification in a manner similar to that of the 
ancient historiographers when he assumed in his preface to The History 
of Florence that the purpose of historiography is to ‘delight and teach’ 
and be ‘useful to citizens who govern republics’.3 During the same years, 
Guicciardini began his History of Italy with a preface about the usefulness 
of politico-moral exempla which closely imitates ancient models:
From a knowledge of such occurrences, so varied and so grave, everyone 
may derive many precedents salutary both for himself and for the public 
weal. Thus numerous examples will make it plainly evident how mutable 
are human affairs, not unlike a sea whipped by winds; and how pernicious, 
almost always to themselves but always to the people, are those ill-advised 
measure of rulers who act solely in terms of what is in front of their eyes; 
either foolish errors or shortsighted greed. (Francesco Guicciardini, The 
History of Italy, prologue)4
Even in the Enlightenment, which is often considered the seedbed of the 
modern discipline of history, some of the greatest works of historiography 
were written with the didactic aim of producing useful models for behav-
ior, moral and political.5
None of these historiographers, however – ancient, medieval, Renaissance 
or Enlightenment – conceived of their works as in any sense ‘untrue’. They 
all believed that they were uncovering the truth about the past and serving 
2 Spiegel (2002), Hanning (1966: 44–62), Burrow (2009: 197–226).
3 ‘These two causes (with all respect to them) appear to me wholly unworthy of great 
men, because if anything in history delights or teaches, it is what is presented in full detail. 
If any reading is useful to citizens who govern republics, it is that which shows the causes of 
the hatreds and factional struggles within the city, in order that such citizens having grown 
wise through the sufferings of others, can keep themselves united’ (Machiavelli 1989: 1031; 
translation by A. Gilbert).
4 On the moral didacticism of Renaissance historiography see also Landfester (1972), 
Hampton (1990), Koselleck (2004) and Burke (2011).
5 See e.g. the preface to Voltaire’s History of Charles XII, which explicitly frames the 
work as a guide to rulers (1957: 55). His essay ‘Nouvelles Considérations sur l’Histoire’ is a 
satiric attack on ‘useless’ antiquarian historiography and concludes with stating that ancient 
history may be morally useful, but only a ‘political and philosophical’ history of recent 
times which investigates the ‘basic vice and dominant virtue of a nation’ can be practically 
useful (1957: 46–9). For a discussion of Voltaire as a historian concerned partly with moral 
didacticism (although she does not use this phrase) of a neo-Classical kind see O’Brien (1997: 
21–55). For a good overview of Enlightenment historiography, with a useful bibliography, 
see Wright (2002).
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a didactic purpose at the same time.6 This began to change only with the 
rise of historicism in the late eighteenth century. Historians now began 
to stress the uniqueness of the events and situations they were describing 
and, by extension, their uselessness as examples and models for the future.7 
Didactic historiography was further discredited by the spread of positivism 
from the sciences to the increasingly professionalised discipline of history 
in the nineteenth century, when historians began not only to think of their 
task as conducting ‘scientific’ research and presenting its results in the 
clearest, least prejudiced, least adorned and least moralising way possible, 
but also to insist that this was the only way to produce a truthful account 
of the past. The most famous formulation of this, which came to be seen 
as a prescription for history writing, is Leopold von Ranke’s falsely modest 
‘To history has been given the function of judging the past, of instructing 
men for the profit of future years. The present attempt does not aspire to 
such a lofty undertaking. It merely wants to show how, essentially, things 
happened (wie es eigentlich gewesen).’8 This ideal of historical ‘objectivity’ 
spread like wildfire from Germany to the rest of Europe and America and 
came to hold sway over the discipline of history for almost 150 years.9 
Under the influence of this scientificising of history several generations of 
readers and writers of history have now grown up to consider it the goal of 
historiography to present things ‘as they really happened’ and ‘let the facts 
speak for themselves’ with no didactic agenda. In Classics, this has made 
scholars place Thucydides (and, to a lesser extent, Polybius) on a pedestal 
unreachable by any other ancient historiographers. It has also turned ‘mor-
alising’ into a dirty word used only of historians whose works have been 
perceived to be substandard, such as Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, 
6 See e.g. Polyb. 1.14.6–8 and Machiavelli’s defence of his truthfulness in his dedication of 
The History of Florence to Pope Clement VII (1989: 1029–30).
7 The foundational work is Herder, ‘Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte’ (2002 [1774]), 
but it was only turned into an ‘ism’ in retrospect; see Meinecke (1972 [1959]: 1v–lvi). 
Koselleck (2004 [1967]) offers a now classic analysis of the move away from the idea of 
history as teacher, arguing that it was replaced with ‘the discovery of the uniqueness of his-
torical processes and the possibility of progress’ (p. 36) brought on by the French Revolution.
8 Von Ranke (1973), preface to the 1824 edition of Histories of the Latin and Germanic 
Nations 1494–1535. For the translation of eigentlich as ‘essentially’ see Iggers’ ‘Introduction’ 
to von Ranke (1973: xix–xx). For the adoption of a misunderstood version of the Rankean 
ideal in Britain and America see Iggers’ ‘Introduction’ and Novick (1988: 24–31).
9 For its British incarnation see the inaugural lecture of J. B. Bury (1903) in Bury (1930), 
e.g ‘this view, which ascribed to [history] at best the function of teaching statesmen by 
analogy, at worst the duty of moral edification, prevailed generally till the last century’ (pp. 
8–9) and ‘Girded with new strength [history] has definitely come out from among her old 
associates, moral philosophy and rhetoric; she has come out into a place of liberty; and has 
begun to enter into closer relations with the sciences which deal objectively with the facts of 
the universe’ (p. 11). For a lucid account of how the idea of objectivity spread in the USA, 
see Novick (1988: 1–108). 
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or of a particular branch of Hellenistic historiography originating with 
the influence of the rhetorician Isocrates over his historiographer pupils 
Theopompus and Ephorus.10
A change has happened in the discipline of history over the last few 
decades. The possibility of complete objectivity has been questioned since 
the 1930s, but the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s gave the question-
ing increased seriousness and sophistication. Today, after four decades 
of postmodern philosophy of history, most writers of history accept that 
such an ideal is impossible to reach, but argue that it should still be aimed 
for.11 Some even accept Hayden White’s argument that the chaotic events 
of real life only become historical narrative through a process of invention 
and emplotment, and that the historian needs to be explicit about his or 
her narrativisation of events.12 Classicists have been a lot happier to accept 
this approach to historiography than have historians, and a wave of schol-
arship using sophisticated narratological tools to analyse works of ancient 
historiography has appeared.13 So far, however, none has faced the issue of 
the pervasive moralising of the ancient historiographers head on.
This needs to change. If we are going to understand ancient historiogra-
phy, as a literary genre and as a collection of invaluable historical sources, 
we need to begin to take its claims to moral-didactic value seriously. 
Taking my cue from Hayden White’s provocative statement that historical 
narratives are ‘verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented 
as found’ (1978: 82, his emphasis) and his insistence that narrative shape is 
given to the past only through a process of emplotment necessarily driven 
10 For Xenophon as moralising and therefore inferior see Westlake (1966–7) and Grayson 
(1975); for Diodorus see e.g. Drews (1962), Hornblower (1981) and Stylianou (1998). For 
the moralising, rhetorical and inferior nature of Hellenistic historiography generally see e.g. 
Usher (1969), Walbank (1990), Meister (1990: esp. 80–1), Luce (1997: 108), Gehrke (2001: 
299). Even Pownall (2004), whose study is dedicated to uncovering ‘the moral use of history 
in fourth-century prose’, considers such moralising suspect, presenting her project as ‘an 
examination of the tendency of certain Greek historians of the fourth century b.c. to sacrifice 
accuracy, relevance, and impartiality to the presentation of moral exempla’ (p. v). For all of 
ancient historiography blemished by moralising see Grant (1995).
11 The argument between the postmodernists and those who believe in more or less 
radical versions of historical objectivity is still ongoing and bitter. Classic works are Carr 
(2001 [1961]) and Elton (1967) (both before the postmodern turn), White (1973, 1978, 1987) 
and Evans (1997, 2014). Some more recent contributions: Jenkins (2003, 2009), Zagorin 
(2009 [2000]), Coleman (2009 [2002]), Ankersmit (2012).
12 White (1973, 1978, 1980, 1987). An acceptance of this premise has led some 
 twenty-first-century historians to experiment with a deliberate mixture of traditional histor-
ical narrative and creative writing; see the five special issues of Rethinking History (2010–14).
13 E.g. on Herodotus: Dewald (1987), Marincola (1987) and Baragwanath (2008); on 
Thucydides: Hornblower (1994) and Rood (1998); on Xenophon: Gray (1989, 2007); on 
Polybius: Miltsios (2013); on Diodorus: Hau (forthcoming). See also more generally de Jong 
et al. (2004), de Jong and Nunlist (2007).
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by a ‘moralising impulse’,14 I argue that the moral-didactic agenda of the 
ancient works of history does not diminish their worth as history any more 
than the worth of twentieth-century works of history is impaired by their 
various agendas and emplotments – Marxist, feminist, longue durée or 
otherwise. At least most of the ancient historiographers are explicit about 
their moral agenda. Once we have studied the moral-didactic practice of 
the ancient historiographers in detail, in the Conclusion we shall turn to 
considering whether there may even be lessons that twenty-first-century 
writers of history could take from it.
CHOICE OF MATERIAL
This study discusses the Histories of Herodotus, the History of Thucydides, 
the Hellenica of Xenophon, the Histories of Polybius, the Bibliotheke 
Historike of Diodorus Siculus, and a selection of fragmentary works of 
history from the Classical and Hellenistic period. The reasoning behind 
this choice of material is as follows: Herodotus and Thucydides are essen-
tial for any discussion of a Greek historiographical tradition. Polybius 
and Diodorus are the only two reasonably well-preserved historiogra-
phies from the Hellenistic period, before the Greek and Roman traditions 
become irrevocably entangled in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The choice 
to include Xenophon’s Hellenica, but not his Anabasis (apart from a few 
comparative remarks at the end of Chapter 6), rests on their belonging to 
different subgenres (by modern definition) of historiography: the Anabasis 
follows a single group of people through their travels and experiences and 
is (primarily) focalised through a single participant, which makes it a very 
different reading experience from the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Polybius and Diodorus, and indeed from Xenophon’s Hellenica, all of 
which shift their focus and focalisation from people to people and from 
one political leader or faction to another as they narrate their stories of 
international war and politics. Similar considerations have guided my 
choice of what fragmentary historiographies to include: the Alexander 
historians, who continued the tradition of the Anabasis, have been left out 
of the investigation, and so have works of local history and monographs 
on single wars. In practice, this means that the focus of this study, after 
Herodotus and Thucydides, remains on what has recently been termed 
‘continuous history’, namely international history with a Greek (or Greek 
14 For the theory of emplotment see White (1973, 1978); for the ‘moralising impulse’ 
see White (1980). Throughout this study I use the word ‘emplotment’ in the weak sense of 
‘endowing historical events with a plot’, as an almost-synonym of ‘narrativisation’, without 
committing to White’s argument that there are only four types of plot in works of historiog-
raphy, i.e. comedy, tragedy, satire and farce. 
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Sicilian) focus which picks up where a predecessor has left off and expects 
to be picked up and continued in its turn, and to a certain degree on ‘uni-
versal history’, that is, world history.15 The investigation ends at Diodorus 
Siculus because he stands on the threshold between the Greek and Roman 
historiographical traditions, which then start to conflate.
It is perhaps also necessary to explain the persistent use throughout 
this study of the word ‘historiographer’ instead of ‘historian’ to refer to 
the ancient authors that are our subjects of investigation. The intention is 
not to denigrate the ancient works of history or to deny that their authors 
did historical research, but to emphasise that this is a study of the literary 
representations of the results of that research. The moral didacticism is, 
after all, a part neither of the historical events that form the topic of the 
ancient historiographers’ research nor of that research itself (although a 
tendency to think about historical questions in moralistic terms may affect 
the sorts of questions the historian asks of his or her material), but of the 
literary form in which it was presented, and much of this study is devoted 
to analysing how it manifests itself by means of literary techniques. The 
choice of ‘historiographers’ over ‘historians’ also helps to avoid confusion 
with modern historians working on the ancient past, who are also com-
monly termed ‘ancient historians’. Finally, it neatly sidesteps the question 
of whether one can legitimately call a ‘compiler’ like Diodorus Siculus a 
historian; a historiographer he definitely was.
MORAL DIDACTICISM AND TECHNIQUES 
OF MORALISING
This book examines the earliest works of European historiography from 
the point of view of moral didacticism. In no way does it wish to deny that 
an important purpose of these works was to explain what had happened 
in the past; rather, it argues that the two purposes, moral didacticism and 
historical explanation, are not mutually exclusive.
Throughout this book, moral didacticism is to be understood in a broad 
sense, as a strategy employed by an author to teach the reader something 
about the ethical implications of various human actions and behaviours. 
15 This is not to imply that these are terms of fixed genres; they are simply useful short-
hands for modern-day scholars to use when thinking about the traditions in which the 
ancient historiographers saw themselves, and what predecessors they imitated. For ‘con-
tinuous histories’ see Tuplin (2011). These works were often titled Hellenica, sometimes 
(in the case of Duris of Samos and perhaps Hieronymus of Cardia) Macedonica or Sicelica. 
The genre of Sicelica was regarded by its authors not as local history, but as a parallel to 
Hellenica (cf. Jacoby 1955: 480–1, 535–6, and Walbank 1989–90: 44); the same was certainly 
true of Macedonica. For the fluid concept of ‘universal history’ see Alonso-Núñez (1990), 
Liddel and Fear (2010) and Marincola (2011). 
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Such strategies can be action-directing, that is, aiming to influence a read-
er’s actions or behaviour, or thought-directing, that is, aiming to influence 
the way a reader thinks about the world and the way of behaving in it. 
Often it is both. Cognitive linguistics has now confirmed what Classicists 
have always known, that a reader’s understanding of a text is established 
on a number of different levels, from the choice and position of individual 
words and syntactical constructions to the structure and phrasing of nar-
rative episodes.16 This makes it imperative to study moral didacticism not 
just as a phenomenon that happens in the explicit representation of his-
torical characters as exempla (Latin) or paradeigmata (Greek), examples 
for emulation or avoidance, but as a large number of different strategies 
employed by authors at every level of the text with different degrees of 
explicitness. Throughout this book, the term ‘moral didacticism’ will be 
used to cover the overall purpose and practice of teaching something of 
moral significance, while the term ‘moralising’ will be reserved for the way 
in which the moral didacticism is pursued.
As the Dio Chrysostom passage with which we began illustrates, moral 
didacticism was intimately bound up with political didacticism in ancient 
thought. Political views and moral views necessarily go hand in hand for 
any person in any age, but this was perhaps even more true in antiquity: 
if anyone had asked Plato whether he was writing political philosophy 
or ethics, he would have been shocked that they could think of divid-
ing the two. The close relationship between politics and ethics is also 
demonstrated by Aristotle’s confident statement in his introduction to the 
Nicomachean Ethics that politics is a science concerned with morality and 
justice (τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται: Eth. Nic. 
1094a18). It seems clear that neither the writers nor the readers of histori-
ography generally distinguished between political philosophy and ethics. 
In the chapters that follow we shall sometimes try to make the distinction 
in order to understand the thought behind the moralising fully, but equally 
often we shall accept that they are two sides of the same coin and resist an 
artificial separation.
It will be useful to set out a basic typology of moralising techniques as 
a starting point for analysing and discussing the moral-didactic strategies 
of a given text. By doing this I do not mean to suggest that moralising is 
carried out in a schematic way by the Classical and Hellenistic historiog-
raphers, or that all instances of moralising will fit neatly into one type; the 
terminology is simply a baseline, which provides a useful starting point for 
examining the variations of moralising displayed across a range of material 
and for comparing different approaches.
16 See e.g. Fludernik (1993, 2003), Herman (2002, 2003) and Dancygier (2011).
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Firstly, moralising takes place on a spectrum from more to less explicit 
and can be prescriptive or descriptive. Explicitly prescriptive moralising 
which sets up specific rules, such as ‘this example teaches us never to act 
arrogantly in good fortune’, is found at one end of the spectrum. Next to it 
is found equally explicit descriptive moralising, which is just as clear about 
the moral lesson it is trying to teach, but lets the reader draw his own con-
clusion about how to apply it in his own life, such as ‘thus his wicked ways 
led to a fitting death’. Further down the spectrum are found types of moral-
ising that are a lot less explicit about their lessons. Few would dispute, for 
instance, that the story of Solon and Croesus in Herodotus book 1 teaches 
some kind of moral lesson, but it is difficult to draw a clear message about 
how to behave from it. Rather, the reader is supposed to take away a 
general lesson about happiness, arrogance, the ephemeral nature of wealth 
and power, and the ultimate powerlessness of human beings. This type of 
moralising is implicit, descriptive and thought-directing – exploratory, we 
could say, rather than expository17 – and a large part of the present book 
will be concerned with analysing how exactly such passages impact on a 
reader. In practice, only a fraction of the moralising found in Greek histo-
riography is explicit and an even smaller portion is prescriptive.
For that reason, a more useful way to define moralising techniques 
in our material is to distinguish between moralising that takes place in 
pauses in the narrative (which is most often explicit) and moralising that 
takes place in the course of the narrative of events itself (which is most 
often implicit). Here it is necessary first to define ‘narrative of events’. It is 
now commonplace to distinguish between a text’s story and its discourse, 
that is, between the events narrated and the narration.18 This distinction 
works well for both fictional and historical narratives. Thus, we can talk 
of Thucydides’ ‘story’ of the fall of Plataea without implying that any part 
of that story is fictitious; it is simply a way of referring to the events that 
according to Thucydides took place during and leading up to Plataea’s 
fall. However, in historiography much more than in (most) fiction, there 
is a third element, namely the running commentary provided by the 
 historian-narrator. This commentary is technically part of the discourse and 
takes place in narrative pauses, that is, when the narrator pauses the story 
in order to provide analysis, evaluation, background information or the 
17 The terms ‘expository’ and ‘exploratory’ moralising have been used by Pelling (1995) in 
a study which explores Plutarch’s moralising spectrum and stresses the blurred line between 
descriptive and prescriptive (or ‘protreptic’ ) moralising.
18 This distinction is formalist in origin and is the basic tool of narratology. ‘Story’ and 
‘discourse’ are also called ‘fabula’ and ‘sjuzet’. De Jong and her followers operate with a 
tripartite structure of ‘fabula’, ‘story’ and ‘discourse/text’.
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like.19 Because of the frequency of such pauses in ancient historiography 
and their frequent use for purposes of moral didacticism, this study will 
regularly make use of the terms ‘narrative of events’ and ‘narrative pauses’ 
to distinguish these two parts of the discourse.
Most explicit moralising, then, takes place in narrative pauses. It is 
useful to distinguish between moralising digressions and guiding moral-
ising. Moralising digressions come in many different styles, but common 
to most of them is that they are connected with a specific episode of the 
narrative at their beginning and end, but stray far away from it in the 
middle. Here they often generalise about human behaviour or certain types 
of events, or discuss earlier or later episodes of history brought to the nar-
rator’s mind by the events just narrated. Digressions in the Classical and 
Hellenistic historiographers seem broadly to be triggered by five different 
motivating factors: a desire to evaluate morally actions or events in the nar-
rative, a desire to explain actions or events (e.g. by providing a background 
story or motivation), a desire to philosophise about human behaviour or 
the course of history on the basis of narrated events, a desire to polemicise 
against others who have got certain facts wrong, and a purely associative 
desire to tell a story brought to mind by the events narrated. All of these 
five types of digressions can contain moralising. Guiding moralising takes 
the form of moralising introductions and conclusions to narrative epi-
sodes, or occasionally a moralising comment in the middle of an episode, 
which we can call ‘concomitant moralising’. It may range in length from a 
sentence or two telling the reader how to interpret an episode,20 to a much 
longer stretch of text,21 and the borderline between these and moralising 
19 The distinction between historiography and fiction has been much discussed (see e.g. 
Barthes 1986 [1967], White 1978, 1980, Cohn 1990, 1999, Doležel 1999, Lippert 2009) and is 
too complex to enter into here, except to note that this ‘commentary track’ seems to me to 
be an important part of any formal distinction. Vercruysse (1990), in an analysis of program-
matic passages in Polybius, calls the two modes discours narratif and discours commentatif.
20 E.g. ‘And so these men died meeting a fitting end to life, and especially because of their 
unlawful behaviour towards Aratus’ (οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τυχόντες καταστροφῆς 
ἐξέλιπον τὸν βίον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν εἰς Ἄρατον γενομένην ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀσέλγειαν: Polyb. 
5.28.9).
21 E.g. ‘fortune, as if on purpose, demonstrating its power to other human beings by 
what had happened to these men. For the things which they themselves had been expecting 
imminently to suffer at the hands of their enemies she granted them to do themselves to those 
enemies a very short time later. And the Aetolians, in suffering this unexpected disaster, 
taught everyone never to deliberate about the future as if it has already happened and never 
firmly to expect things which may yet possibly turn out otherwise, but to allot a portion to 
the unexpected in all matters since we are human, and especially in war’ (τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ 
ἐπίτηδες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις συμβαινόντων ἐνδεικνυμένης τὴν αὑτῆς 
δύναμιν. ἃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοὶ προσεδόκων ὅσον ἤδη πείσεσθαι, ταῦτα πράττειν αὐτοῖς 
ἐκείνοις παρέδωκεν ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τῇ παραδόξῳ 
χρησάμενοι συμφορᾷ πάντας ἐδίδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἤδη 
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digressions is fluid. The basic difference is that guiding moralising stays 
focused on a particular episode and guides the reader’s interpretation of 
that episode, whereas moralising digressions use the episode as a spring-
board to moralise on wider or more general issues.
However, much of the moralising of the Greek historiographers takes 
place not in narrative pauses, but in the course of the narrative of events 
itself. Such moralising is largely implicit and takes a variety of different 
forms, which will not be described in any detail here; rather the practice of 
each historiographer will be fully discussed in the relevant chapters. The 
following overview is simply meant to provide a sense of the variety in the 
means of moralising employed by the Classical and Hellenistic historiog-
raphers, and to introduce the basic terminology which will be used in the 
analysis.
The simplest form of moralising is the use of evaluative phrasing to 
colour a reader’s moral interpretation of an episode. Closely related to this 
technique and often used in tandem with it is moralising by internal eval-
uation, that is, when the reader is told what certain characters in the story 
think about an incident or behaviour. The degree to which a reader takes 
such an evaluation as a model for how to respond is affected by the extent 
to which the character(s) in question has or have been set up by the narra-
tor as a moral authority. Strong internal authorities may be characters who 
are frequently or emphatically praised by the narrator, characters who are 
closely connected with the action evaluated or the character committing 
it, or a character who is supposed to be the author’s younger self (such as 
‘Polybius’ in the last books of Polybius’ Histories).
An extension of the internal evaluation is moralising in speeches deliv-
ered by characters. A reader is, of course, not justified in assuming that 
the views expressed by a character in any literary work, historical or fic-
tional, are those of the author, and so speeches in such a work can never 
be straightforwardly moral-didactic. Rather, the reader’s perception of the 
moral message depends on a number of factors including the moral author-
ity of the speaker, the reception of the speech by its internal audience,22 and 
the degree to which it corresponds to other moralising in the work. Closely 
related to, and sometimes incorporating, speeches, the moral vignette is 
an exploratory way of presenting the reader with situations that call for a 
moral response. Moral vignettes are scenes played out in ‘real time’, often 
described with visual details, and almost always featuring direct speech 
γεγονότος, μηδὲ προκατελπίζειν βεβαιουμένους ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀκμὴν ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν ἄλλως 
γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ παραδόξῳ πανταχῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, μάλιστα δ᾽ἐν τοῖς 
πολεμικοῖς: Polyb. 2.4.3–5).
22 The importance of the internal reception of the speech for the reader’s response to it is 
well noted by Foster (2012).
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by one or more characters. The utterance can be a single sentence, often 
witty or punchy, or a speech of varying length. The moral of the vignette 
is usually left unexpressed; it is picked up by the reader from the moral 
authority of the characters involved and from the correspondence between 
the vignette and the surrounding narrative. Sometimes the lesson is deliber-
ately multifaceted or ambiguous.
Another set of moralising techniques gain effect by encouraging the 
reader to see connections between different parts of the text. Thus, juxta-
position of information can be an effective way of making a moral point,23 
as can deliberate contrasts between behaviours.24 Finally, the correlation 
between action and result, that is, the way the narrative shows some types 
of behaviour leading to success and some to failure, is a powerful tool of 
moralising because it is intimately bound up with each historiographer’s 
representation both of historical causation and, more generally, of how the 
world works.
A third type of moral didacticism takes place neither in the course of the 
narrative of events nor in narrative pauses, but on the overarching, struc-
tural level of a work. When reading a literary work such as an ancient work 
of history from cover to cover, patterns and repetitions become obvious 
and demonstrate to the reader how the world of this story works. Such 
patterns and repetitions are what mainly contribute to the emplotment of 
a series of events into a story, and they very often carry moral lessons.25
It may well be asked in what way moralising as subtle as what has 
just been described can be didactic. I would suggest that we think of the 
moralising in narrative pauses as lecturing, and of moralising in the nar-
rative of events as conditioning. While the moralising digressions, and on 
a smaller scale the guiding moralising, discuss moral topics and explain 
to the reader why he should consciously consider some behaviours right 
and others wrong, narratives using more implicit techniques condition the 
reader unconsciously to respond positively or negatively to certain kinds 
of behaviour. Such conditioning is most effective when the framework 
is already in place, that is, when the evaluative vocabulary reinforces the 
moral didacticism expressed explicitly elsewhere in the work. The effec-
tiveness is further enhanced when the moral stance taken by the narrator is 
23 E.g. ‘During the seven days that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty ships, the 
Corcyraeans continued to slaughter those of their own citizens whom they considered to be 
their enemies’ (ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, 
Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον: Thuc. 3.81).
24 E.g. the contrast between the loyal-unto-death Phliasians and the fickle Euphron in 
Xen. Hell. 7.2–3.
25 The selection and structuring of events are what White (1980) says are necessarily 
driven by a ‘moralising impulse’.
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traditional and dominant (or at least theoretically dominant) in the read-
er’s own society. Such correspondence with popular/traditional morality 
also works to build a bond between narrator and narratee and bolster the 
narrator’s authority. Indeed we shall see that the Hellenistic historiogra-
phers generally use moralising in the narrative of events only to reinforce 
traditional and widely held moral attitudes and discuss more controver-
sial moral issues in moralising digressions. The Classical historiographers, 
however, regularly offer moral dilemmas in the narrative of events.
INTENDED AUDIENCE
In order to understand the moral didacticism of the works under scrutiny 
we need to ask who it is intended for. Thucydides says that he is writing 
for ‘those who want to understand clearly the events of the past and the 
future’, implying that a clear understanding of past events will help the 
reader to understand events in his own present.26 (Here it is probably 
necessary to explain my use of the pronoun ‘he’. By using ‘he’ to refer to 
ancient readers, I intend to reflect the incontrovertible fact that the ideal or 
intended readers of ancient historiographers were male. It is not meant as a 
statement about who actually read the works in question, although I would 
assume that the majority of real ancient readers of historiography were, in 
fact, male. Today, the readership of ancient historiography is obviously 
very different from its intended one.)
Thucydides says nothing about how far his future readers are expected 
to be involved in politics, but his politico-military focus and the citizen-run 
democracy in which he lived make it likely that he imagined his readership 
to be primarily those whose actions could make a difference on the political 
and/or military scene. Polybius, more explicitly, says that he is writing for 
statesmen and generals, and he seems to imagine these as partly Greeks 
living in a reality dominated by Rome, partly Romans finding themselves 
underprepared masters of a world steeped in Greek traditions.27 Diodorus 
is the first of our authors explicitly to aim his work not just at political and 
military leaders, but at a broader part of the population: in his preface, 
he declares that historiography makes ‘private citizens worthy of lead-
ership’ and ‘prepares soldiers to face danger more readily’, showing – or 
 pretending? – that he expected even such lowly individuals to read his work 
(Diod. Sic. 1.1.5).
Even Thucydides and Polybius must have known, however, that in 
26 ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις 
κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως 
ἕξει (Thuc. 1.22.4).
27 See e.g. Polyb. 1.1.5, 1.3.7–10, 6.11.3–8.
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reality not all their readers would be the prime movers and shakers of 
the world, and their didacticism is not aimed exclusively at these. Their 
mor alising is based on the belief that it is possible not just to learn from 
the past, but to learn from the past experiences of others in different 
life- situations from one’s own.28 When Polybius moralises on the actions 
of kings such as Eumenes of Cardia and Perseus of Macedon, he is not 
writing exclusively for an intended readership of kings; rather he is expect-
ing his non-royal readers to learn from larger-than-life paradeigmata. The 
same is certainly true of Herodotus’ moral-didactic use of the Persian 
kings and most probably also of Thucydides’ narrow focus on a handful 
of Athenian and Spartan statesmen rather than the much larger number 
who were actually active during the Peloponnesian War. In this respect the 
moral didacticism of historiography resembles that of Classical Athenian 
tragedy.
Another pertinent question is why readers should follow the moral 
recommendations. What will they get out of it? This might seem like 
the wrong question to ask: after the influence of two thousand years of 
Christianity we are conditioned to think that morally good actions are only 
truly good if they are performed for no other reason than because it is ‘the 
right thing to do’. But although such moral behaviour with no pay-off is 
sometimes praised or recommended by the ancient historiographers, most 
of them do in fact make an effort to show that those who behave morally 
tend to be rewarded, if not by outright practical success, then by obtain-
ing a good reputation among their contemporaries or, if nothing else, by 
posthumously earning the immortal praise of history and possibly divine 
approval, a heroic type of reward celebrated by Homer. The fact that there 
are significant differences between the historiographers in terms of the 
rewards envisioned, and the degree of certainty with which rewards can 
be expected, is an indication of their profoundly different ways of viewing 
the world. This will be a theme of later chapters; for now, it is important 
to note that the fact that morally correct behavior is rewarded, and that 
people sometimes engage in it with an eye to those rewards, does not in the 
eyes of the ancient historiographers take anything away from the praise-
worthiness of the actions.
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND OTHER GENRES
Historiography was, of course, not the only genre with moral-didactic 
impact in Classical and Hellenistic Greece. The practice of offering moral 
instruction through story-telling goes back, like everything else in Greek 
28 The slippage in intended readership can be seen in Polybius’ second preface at 3.4.
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literature, to Homer, although his moral lessons are always implicit. 
Herodotus says that the Greeks learned their ideas of religion from Homer 
and Hesiod (Hdt. 2.53), and even in the fourth century bc a man could 
still be deemed morally proficient on the basis of having memorised the 
Homeric poems (Xen. Symp. 3.5–6).29 From these epics people could learn 
that strength and courage in battle would be rewarded with immortal 
glory, that human beings are at the mercy of the gods and must show them 
respect, and that forgiveness is ultimately better than revenge. However, 
other lessons were less apt for a civilised society, and it was certainly not 
expected that anyone would imitate Odysseus in either his deceit of friends 
or his killing of the suitors. In fact, many of the moral codes followed 
(or broken) by Homeric heroes are so different from those governing the 
actions of characters in historiography and the lives of its readers that any 
lessons absorbed may well have been inapplicable or counterproductive in 
practice.30
Explicitly didactic poetry survives in its earliest form in Hesiod, but his 
collection of pious and practical advice is still very different from what we 
later see in historiography. The moralising of historiography, however, has 
strong affinities with three other genres: elegiac poetry, epinician poetry 
and Athenian tragedy.
Elegiac poetry comes the closest to historiography in that its moralising 
is often explicit, supposedly relates to the real world, and is concerned 
with similar virtues and vices to its historiographical counterpart.31 Like 
historiography, it also blends moral and political didacticism to a degree 
where it becomes meaningless to try to distinguish the two. However, 
three features set it apart (beyond the obvious fact that elegiac moralising 
is cast in poetic language and written in metre). Firstly, where (universal, 
continuous) historiography is characterised by a multiplicity of theatres of 
action and offers moralising in the context of the behaviour of people of 
a variety of nationalities in many geographically different locations, the 
moralising of elegy is securely embedded in its own civic context, bound 
by a distinct polis and a unique political context. It moralises on the condi-
tion of ‘the city’ and the behaviour of factions within it (Solon, Theognis), 
29 Even if Xenophon’s portrayal of Niceratus is ironic and meant to show that his 
‘wisdom’ is pure pompousity (Hobden 2005, Hau 2012), the exchange still demonstrates the 
role that the Homeric poems played in popular thought and morality. 
30 Adkins (1960, 2011) still seems to me to be generally right about this even if studies 
such as Zanker (1994) show that there are lessons of cooperation as well.
31 Explicitly moral-didactic: ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει: Solon F 4.30–2. 
Similar lessons to historiographical moralising: Archil. 114W (the good commander), 128W 
(moderation in both good and bad fortune); Callinus 1W and Tyrtaeus 10W (courage on 
the battlefield); Thgn. 39–52 (greed and injustice), 129–30 and 133–42 (the changeability of 
fortune), 143–4 and 151–2 (divine justice).
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on the actions of a named tyrant (Alcaeus) or the condition of its fighting 
citizens (Callinus, Tyrtaeus), and the events, the moralising, the narra-
tor and the narratee all belong to the single community of a single city.32 
Correspondingly, the range of actions moralised on is limited to those of 
personal or national importance and does not include the kind of actions 
associated with interstate warfare, such as diplomatic negotiations and 
the treatment of captives and the defeated, which loom large in the moral 
didacticism of the historiographers. Secondly, the narrator of most elegiac 
poetry is a much more present and personality-infused ‘I’ than the covert 
narrator of post-Herodotean historiography.33 Thirdly, the moralising of 
elegiac poetry is usually generalised, often in the form of gnomai, which is 
only one of the registers of historiographical moralising, and not a domi-
nant one.
Gnomai are also characteristic of the other type of lyric poetry that 
engages with moral didacticism in a way similar to that of historiogra-
phy, namely epinician poetry. In epinicia, the gnomai often function as 
the moral to a lengthy narrative of events, in a manner parallel to some 
of the explicit moralising seen in Hellenistic historiography, although the 
relationship between narrative and moral is usually rather less obvious in 
praise poetry.34 With equal frequency, the moral of epinician narratives 
is left unstated, however, and is for the reader to extract from the jux-
taposition of mythological stories or of myth and contemporary events. 
Such moralising by juxtaposition and patterning is a characteristic of early 
historiography, especially Herodotus, but also Thucydides, as we shall see 
in later chapters. A further intriguing parallel between epinician poetry 
and historiography is that both deal with real, historical people, and often 
with those who are still living. This lays epinician poetry open to criti-
cism for flattery or personal enmity, as contemporary historiography was, 
and indeed we see Pindar (but not Bacchylides) laying claim to objectivity 
and truthfulness in his application of praise and blame just like some of 
the historiographers, most explicitly Polybius.35 Importantly, however, the 
epinician narrators never use a living person as a negative paradeigma. For 
that purpose they use mythological characters and, in the case of Pindar, 
generalised entities such as ‘envious people’ or ‘the greedy’.36 Overall, it is 
naturally the case that epinician poetry – commissioned by wealthy clients 
32 For the connection between moralising and community-building in lyric poetry see 
Griffith (2009).
33 The ‘I’ of elegiac poetry has attracted much scholarship in recent years; see e.g. Carey 
(1986), Irwin (2006), Stehle (2006).
34 For gnomai in epinician poetry see Stenger (2004), Boeke (2007).
35 For claims to truth and objectivity in Pindar see Pratt (1993: 115–30).
36 For Pindar on ‘envious people’ see Boeke (2007: 87–90).
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desiring that their kleos be sustained -- is less interested in negative than 
positive paradeigmata.37
Athenian tragedy is less obviously moralising than either elegiac or 
epinician poetry, but most twenty-first-century scholars would agree 
that the plays are in some way didactic.38 The lessons taught by tragic 
plays are generally more complex, multilayered and obscure than those 
found in historiography. In Sophocles’ Antigone, for instance, there are 
lessons to learn about the unfathomable power of the gods versus the 
limited power of human beings, but also about family, gender roles, 
the cost of rebelling against autocratic power, the hard choices a leader 
must make, and the process of healing a community after civil war. The 
lessons are thought-directing rather than action-directing, and some may 
resist calling them lessons at all and prefer to talk about the ‘meaning’ 
or ‘impact’ of the play. In its multilayeredness and lack of prescriptions 
for behaviour the moral didacticism of such tragedies resembles that 
of Herodotus, and to a lesser extent Thucydides and Xenophon – not 
coincidentally, the historiographers contemporary with the surviving 
tragedies – as we shall see in the relevant chapters. What distinguishes 
the moral didacticism of Classical historiography from that of tragedy 
is above all its setting in the supposedly real and mostly contempo-
rary or near-contemporary world, which makes the moralising more 
immediately applicable for the reader, even if it does not explicitly tell 
him what action to take.39 Aristotle famously said that tragedy deals 
more with universal concerns and historiography more with particular 
instances of behaviour.40 However, this distinction only holds true up to 
a point, as Aristotle’s ‘more’ (μᾶλλον) indicates: extrapolation from the 
particular situations moralised on by historiographers to more universal 
observations about human nature and behaviour is sometimes explicitly 
encouraged;41 at other times the specific events are explicitly offered by 
the historiographical narrator as instances illustrating generalising moral 
maxims.42 This interplay between the specific and the universal is also a 
37 See Pratt (1993: 128–9).
38 The earliest surviving expression of the idea of tragedy as didactic is Aristophanes’ 
Frogs. The question of what it is that tragedy teaches has played a large part in scholarly 
analyses of both individual tragedies and tragedy as a genre since the 1980s, but the fact that 
it is didactic is now more or less the communis opinio. It has more recently been succinctly 
restated by Griffith (2011: 2).
39 For tragedy as fiction or make-believe see Zeitlin (1980) and Ruffell (forthcoming).
40 ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ 
φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ 
καθόλου, ἡ δ᾽ ἱστορία τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγει (Arist. Poet. 1451b). For tragedy as dealing with 
universals see also Taplin (1986).
41 E.g. Thuc. 1.22.4, 3.82.2; Polyb. 1.35, 2.4.3–5.
42 E.g. Diod. Sic. 14.1–2
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feature of the moral didacticism in elegy and, more prominently, epini-
cian poetry.
Interestingly, the moral didactic themes are similar across genres: the 
changeability of fortune and powerlessness of human beings are common 
themes of lyric poetry and tragedy as well as historiography (Herodotus 
and lyric poetry are particularly similar in their moral themes, perhaps 
unsurprisingly considering their close proximity in time); courage, modera-
tion and piety are virtues in all genres, and greed, brutality and impiety are 
equally universal vices. Even some standard metaphors such as the winds 
of fortune and the ship of state are repeated across genres. Moralising 
in historiography was not an isolated genre feature, then, but was part 
of what connected historiography with its society, a way of creating a 
 fellow-feeling between author and reader by placing them in a common 
world of well-known and generally accepted values.43
STRUCTURE
One of the central arguments of this book is that moral didacticism was 
not an add-on to ancient historiography invented by rhetorically degener-
ate Hellenistic authors,44 but an integral feature of the genre from its very 
inception. In order to show this effectively, the investigation begins with 
an analysis of the moralising of Polybius and Diodorus in the Hellenistic 
period, which is for a large part explicit and obvious (although often 
ignored by scholars who find it an embarrassing blemish on Polybius and 
an indication of inferior worth in Diodorus).45 This analysis will allow us 
to get a detailed impression of a vast range of moralising techniques, tropes 
and themes, against the background of which we can more easily examine 
the more subtle moralising of the Classical historiographers. In this way 
we shall see that while there were change and development in the moral 
didacticism of the genre over time, there were also continuity and shared 
values, both on a moral and on a literary level.
Chapters 1–2 and 4–6 are thus author chapters: Polybius, Diodorus, 
43 In this sense, the moralising works like the moralising in oratory, but oratory is gener-
ally not didactic; i.e. it does not aim seriously to educate its audience, only to persuade them; 
hence its absence from the preceding discussion. A partial exception is the funeral speech, 
which can combine memorialisation with exhortation to follow the example of the fallen in 
a way similar to some of the explicit moralising found in Diodorus.
44 The idea that Hellenistic historiography is ‘rhetorical’ and therefore inferior to 
Classical historiography is remarkably hard to kill despite the growing acceptance of the 
importance of narrative, and thereby ‘rhetoric’, in historiography generally. See e.g. such 
otherwise insightful studies as Gehrke (2001), Pownall (2004) and Bleckmann (2005), nicely 
counter-argued by Parmeggiani (2011).
45 See e.g. Walbank (1938, 1957: 19) and Hornblower (1981).
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Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. Each chapter discusses first the 
approach to moral didacticism announced in the work’s preface and pro-
grammatic statements, then the techniques by which moralising is carried 
out, and thirdly the moral lessons the reader is meant to take away. Within 
this structure there is room for variation: Chapter 2 contains a discus-
sion of Diodorus’ handling of sources, and Chapter 6 compares the moral 
didacticism of the Hellenica with that of Xenophon’s other works in order 
to draw some conclusions on the nature of specifically historiographical 
moral didacticism. Throughout the chapters there will be an emphasis 
on comparing the practice of the different historiographers and drawing 
out what can be said to be the essential features of moral didacticism in 
Classical and Hellenistic historiography.
Chapters 3 and 7 examine the possible remnants of moralising in the 
fragments of some of the most well-known but less well-preserved ancient 
historiographers. Chapter 3 covers the Hellenistic works of Timaeus of 
Tauromenium, Duris of Samos, Phylarchus (of Athens?), Agatharchides 
of Cnidus and Posidonius of Apamea. Chapter 7 deals with the Classical 
works of the so-called Oxyrhynchus Historian, Ephorus of Cyme and 
Theopompus of Chios. The selection is based on the number and nature 
of references to these historiographers in their successors and in other 
authors, which it is hoped reflect their importance for the development of 
the genre of historiography. The discussion of each historiographer begins 
with an overview of the nature of preserved ‘fragments’ and then proceeds 
to investigate what we can plausibly tell about the presence or absence 
of moral didacticism in the work, its moral lessons, and the moralising 
techniques used. Although it is impossible to draw firm conclusions about 
what the original text of these works looked like, the analysis indicates 
a genre that had an important moral-didactic dimension throughout the 
period under investigation. Chapter 7 on fragmentary Classical histori-
ographers also considers the change in moralising techniques which took 
place between the Classical and Hellenistic periods and discusses how this 
came about.
The book as a whole aims to show how the ‘moralising impulse’ iden-
tified as essential for the narrativising of history by Hayden White has 
shaped the narrative at every level of the best-known works of Greek 
historiography, making moral didacticism an integral part of each work 
without which it could not exist. In the Conclusion, I shall turn to the 
larger question of what good historiography is, and argue that the strong 
moral-didactic strain is a strength of Greek historiography rather than a 
weakness.





Polybius is our starting point because he is obviously, explicitly and una-
shamedly a moral-didactic historian. He repeatedly stresses that the purpose 
of studying the past is to learn lessons that will be of use in the present. This 
is recognised by most Polybius scholars, but there is a widespread tendency 
to think of these lessons as purely practical rather than moral: Pédech, in 
his monumental La Méthode Historique de Polybe, devotes chapters to 
Polybius’ notions of psychology and his rhetorical method of comparison, 
but only touches on his moral didacticism in passing; Walbank says that 
Polybius saw history as ‘a way to attain practical ends by learning lessons’; 
Sacks in his monograph on Polybius’ views on historiography argues that 
his practical didacticism so far outweighs his moral didacticism that the 
latter ‘ought to be considered random digressions without historiographi-
cal import’; and even two otherwise excellent – and very different – more 
recent monographs on Polybius, by McGing and Maier, largely ignore 
the moralising aspect.1 In this way the moralist Polybius has been played 
down in favour of the image of the practical, pragmatic and often rather 
cynical Polybius, who wrote a ‘handbook for statesmen’ with digressions 
on such amoral topics as fire-signalling and how to calculate the needed 
length of scaling ladders.
This image, with which the present study wants to take serious issue, is 
often coupled with the equally dubious idea that Polybius wrote his work 
partly to justify his ‘collaboration’ with Rome and only used moral outrage 
to cloak his partisanship.2 There is no denying that Polybius shows political 
bias: he is obviously sympathetic to Achaea and scornful of the Aetolians, 
1 Pédech (1964); Walbank passim, e.g. (1965, 1972: 58 and passim, 1977); Sacks (1980: 
136); McGing (2010); Maier (2012). Also Petzold (1969), despite recognising the moral tenor 
of some of Polybius’ didactic digressions, focuses on the practical didacticism.
2 E.g. Aymard (1940), Walbank (1965, 1974), Dubuisson (1990), Ferrary (1988: 265–
348), Green (1990: 269–85).
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and also often sides with Rome against its opponents. However, his bias is 
commonly exaggerated: Polybius is not simply a blind approver of every-
thing Roman.3 Furthermore, as already argued in the Introduction, moral 
views and political views do not exist in separate spheres, but feed off each 
other. Polybius supported the Achaean League because he had been born 
into its leading circles, but also because he believed that the League’s laws 
were the most morally just of any political organisation he knew (2.38). 
When he wrote his work, he did not distinguish between his moral and 
political views, as surely most of us do not in our day-to-day lives.4 He 
aimed to instruct his readers in the right way to think and act in the world, 
and this included practical, political and moral instruction. The significant 
exception to the trend of disregarding Polybius’ moralising is Eckstein, 
who has devoted a lively and well-argued monograph to arguing against 
the view of Polybius as a hypocritical moralist.5 Eckstein demonstrates 
conclusively that Polybius was not a ‘Machiavellian’ historian who judged 
historical people only on the basis of their success or his own political bias, 
but the polemical focus of Eckstein’s book means that he does not provide 
a rounded picture of moral messages in the Histories. The present study 
aims to arrive at such a full picture, and then to compare this picture with 
the moral didacticism of other surviving texts of Greek historiography.
This chapter will therefore examine Polybius’ moralising techniques and 
messages with one eye fixed on his text and the other on the texts of the 
historiographical tradition with which we shall be comparing his Histories. 
Polybius holds pride of place in this study because his moralising lessons 
and techniques cover almost the full range displayed across the genre. For 
this reason, his Histories works well both as an introduction to the subject 
and our approach and as a benchmark against which to compare his prede-
cessors and successors in the genre. The chapter begins with an examination 
of Polybius’ prefaces and programmatic statements in order to determine 
the role that he ascribes to moral didacticism in his narratorial voice; then 
we shall turn to Polybius’ narrative and examine his moralising techniques, 
using and expanding the terminology established in the Introduction. This 
will be followed by an overview of Polybius’ moral lessons and some pre-
liminary thoughts on the typicality and distinctiveness of these in compari-
son with other Hellenistic and Classical historiographers.
3 Eckstein (1995). Erskine (2000) and Champion (2004) have shown that Polybius to a 
certain extent regarded the Romans as barbarians.
4 In a good, more recent paper on the rhetorical nature of the Histories Thornton (2013) 
consistently talks about Polybius wanting to teach ‘political’ lessons to his readers, in the 
process labelling ‘political’ several messages which I would call ‘moral’.
5 Eckstein (1995). 
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PREFACES AND PROGRAMMATIC STATEMENTS
Characteristically of Polybius’ elaborate and at times long-winded style, 
the work begins with a lengthy paraleipsis (i.e. a statement that one will not 
talk about something, which at the same time talks about it):
Εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλελεῖφθαι συνέβαινε τὸν 
ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἔπαινον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ προτρέπεσθαι πάντας 
πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ παραδοχὴν τῶν τοιούτων ὑπομνημάτων διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν 
ἑτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων 
πράξεων ἐπιστήμης. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐ τινὲς οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἔπος 
εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει κέχρηνται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι 
παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας 
μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης 
μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν, 
δῆλον ὡς οὐδενὶ μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων 
ταυτολογεῖν, ἥκιστα δ᾽ ἡμῖν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν πράξεων, ὑπὲρ ὧν 
προῃρήμεθα γράφειν, ἱκανόν ἐστι προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμῆσαι πάντα καὶ 
νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὴν ἔντευξιν τῆς πραγματείας.
If it was the case that praise of the practice of history had been passed over 
by those who before me have written about events, it would perhaps be nec-
essary to urge everyone to study and approve of such records because there 
is no readier correction for human beings than knowledge of the actions of 
the past. But when not just some writers to a certain extent, but so to speak 
every single one of them,6 have made use of this argument, insisting that the 
truest education and training for civic engagement is learning derived from 
history, and that the most vivid and indeed only teacher of how to bear 
the vicissitudes of fortune with dignity is being reminded of the suddenly 
changed circumstances of others, then clearly no one, least of all I, would 
think it appropriate to repeat what has been said well and by many. The 
unexpected nature of the events which I have chosen to write about will be 
sufficient to encourage and exhort everyone, young and old alike, to engage 
with their study. (Polyb. 1.1.1–4)7
This is a self-conscious narrator’s elaborate way of saying that he intends 
to follow in the footsteps of his generic predecessors: what is traditionally 
6 I adopt Parmeggiani’s (2014) reading of πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει as a unit, 
meaning ‘all of them from beginning to end so to speak’, i.e. ‘so to speak every single one 
of them’. I do not, however, agree with his interpretation of what Polybius says about his 
predecessor’s practice of praising historiography as being critical or exasperated: note that 
Polybius says they have said it ‘well’ (καλῶς: 1.1.3), and that he says it would be necessary 
for him to say it if they had not already done so (1.1.1). The phrase is a rhetorical paraleipsis. 
Polybius is setting up his own project not in contrast with that of his predecessors, but in 
continuation of it: the ‘unexpected nature’ (τὸ παράδοξον: 1.1.3) of his topic will captivate 
his readers’ interest, thus making his moral lessons go down more easily.
7 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
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the purpose of historiography is the purpose of his Histories too. That 
purpose is didacticism by exemplar, or paradeigmata, a word often used by 
Polybius, although not in this passage. Instead Polybius here calls the study 
of history the ‘education’ (παιδείαν) and ‘training’ (γυμνασίαν) for civic 
engagement (τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις) and then more specifically identifies 
the knowledge of the peripeteiai, or sudden reversals of fortunes, of histor-
ical characters as the ‘teacher’ in the art of bearing such vicissitudes with 
dignity (γενναίως). The idea of history as teacher dominates the passage. 
The teaching seems to have two subjects: some unspecified content that 
will be useful for civic life, and the peripeteiai of historical characters, 
which has the moralistic purpose of teaching readers to act with dignity 
even when struck by such unforeseen reversals. It is worth emphasising 
that Polybius takes this (moral-)didactic purpose entirely for granted; for 
him, this is what historiography does. This is important, because it shows 
that moral didacticism was the norm of the genre in the second century bc. 
We shall return to this in later chapters.
The preface is followed by two introductory books offering a relatively 
brief narrative of the First Punic War, intended as background knowledge 
(προκατασκεύη) for the more detailed treatment of the Second Punic War 
in books 3–15. At the end of the background narrative, Polybius offers 
a ‘second preface’. Here he sets out his purpose in continuing the work 
beyond his originally intended end-date of 167 bc:
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ αὐτω̂ν τω̂ν κατορθωμάτων ἢ καὶ τω̂ν ἐλαττωμάτων ἱκανὴν 
ἐνεδέχετο ποιήσασθαι τὴν διάληψιν ὑπὲρ τω̂ν ψεκτω̂ν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἐπαινετω̂ν 
ἀνδρω̂ν καὶ πολιτευμάτων, ἐνθάδε που λήγειν ἂν ἡμα̂ς ἔδει καὶ καταστρέφειν 
ἅμα τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας ῥηθείσας πράξεις 
κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχη̂ς πρόθεσιν. [. . .] ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐκ αὐτοτελει ̂ς εἰσιν οὔτε περὶ 
τω̂ν κρατησάντων <οὔτε περὶ τω̂ν> ἐλαττωθέντων αἱ ψιλω̂ς ἐξ αὐτω̂ν τω̂ν 
ἀγωνισμάτων διαλήψεις, διὰ τὸ πολλοι̂ς μὲν τὰ μέγιστα δοκου̂ντ’ εἰν̂αι 
τω̂ν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοι̂ς χρήσωνται, τὰς μεγίστας 
ἐπενηνοχέναι συμφοράς, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας, 
ὅταν εὐγενω̂ς αὐτὰς ἀναδέξωνται, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν του̂ συμφέροντος 
περιπεπτωκέναι μερίδα, προσθετέον ἂν εἴη ταῖς προειρεημέναις πράξεσι τήν 
τε τῶν κρατούντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν 
ὅλων, τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχας καὶ διαλήψεις.
If, therefore, it was possible to judge adequately from the very successes 
and failures of people and states whether they should be criticised or, on the 
contrary, praised, then I should stop and should end my narrative and my 
project here at the last-mentioned events as was my original intention . . . 
But as the judgements formed about both the victors and the defeated solely 
on the basis of their actions during the conflicts themselves are incomplete – 
because, for many people, what seems to be the greatest victories, when they 
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are not handled properly, have turned into the greatest disasters, and, for a 
few, the most stunning catastrophes, when they are borne with dignity, have 
often turned into some kind of advantage – I must add to the aforemen-
tioned events what was the attitude of the conquerors and how they ruled 
the world, as well as the reactions and attitudes of the rest. (Polyb. 3.4.1–6)
Thus, the second preface, to an even greater degree than the first, is about 
not just didacticism, but moral didacticism. The purpose of historiography 
is to help the readers form an opinion of historical characters and to deal 
out ‘praise and blame’ to them – not just for the sake of the people praised 
or criticised – who are, indeed, most often long dead – but for the sake of 
the readers.8 In that way, the historiographer offers the historical charac-
ters as moral examples, paradeigmata, which, with his help, his readers 
can use as guidance for how to behave in the world.9 It is characteristic of 
Polybius’ moral judgements that they have a practical dimension: judge-
ments on victors and the defeated are incomplete because the way victory 
and defeat are handled can turn even the former into a disaster (συμφοράς) 
and the latter into an advantage (του̂ συμφέροντος). From this passage 
it is impossible to see whether the ‘disaster’ and ‘advantage’ are meant 
in literal, practical terms or in a figurative, moral sense, and we shall see 
below that the two most often go hand in hand in Polybius’ Histories. The 
intertwining of the moral and the practical becomes more pronounced 
in the rest of the second preface. Here the usefulness of the Histories (τὸ 
ὠφέλιμον: 3.4.8) is said to consist in providing the information needed for 
contemporariy readers to decide whether Roman rule is to be shunned or 
accepted (φευκτὴν ἢ τοὐναντίον αἱρετὴν: 3.4.7), and for future readers in 
order to decide whether it is praiseworthy and worth emulating or blame-
worthy (ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν: 3.4.7). The implication is that the 
Histories will allow both contemporary and future readers to pass moral 
judgement on Rome, but that contemporary readers might be able to trans-
late that judgement into practical action.10
 8 Many passages in Polybius assume that posthumous fame in the pages of history will 
be pleasing to the people who attain it although they are long dead: 2.7, 2.58–9, 3.22–32, 
4.20–1, 7.13.2–14.6, 8.35–6, 10.2–5, 15.21.
 9 It has been argued (Walbank 1972: 157–83) that the judgement on Rome’s use of power 
and the subjects’ response to it is just an excuse for Polybius to add material he had collected 
while watching historical events from the sidelines in Rome. I would argue that the fragmen-
tary state of his last ten books makes it impossible for us to judge to what extent Polybius 
did or did not deliver on his promise of helping the reader to make this judgement, and I see 
no reason to doubt that the purpose he presents in his second preface is sincere. Even if it is 
not, it shows that such a purpose was a valid and probably not uncommon one for a work 
of history. 
10 The narrative of Rome’s rise to power offered in the Histories suggests – as far as we 
can judge considering the depressingly fragmented state of the crucial last ten books – that 
Roman rule is in fact at the time of writing an irreversible fact, so that ‘shunning’ it can only 
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Polybius’ Histories has more pauses in the narrative of events than any 
other preserved Classical or Hellenistic work of history. In these narrative 
pauses, the narrator communicates directly with the narratee, providing 
a much fuller commentary on the events than is offered by any other his-
toriographical narrator of the period. A relatively large number of these 
passages deal with the practice and purpose of writing history, and they 
provide us with a unique insight into the plan behind the work.11 What is 
strikingly obvious from these purpose passages is the repeated insistence 
on the usefulness of the Histories to its readers.12 It has been common for 
Polybian scholars to stress the practical nature of this usefulness,13 and 
it is true that some of the programmatic passages spring from didactic 
digressions with a practical bent.14 However, other passages focus on the 
intellectual benefit derived from studying history,15 and a significant pro-
portion focus exclusively on the moral benefit of reading the Histories, 
such as 1.35, which extols the wisdom one can acquire from the vicarious 
experience of reading about the misfortunes of others. Significantly, most 
programmatic passages in Polybius give the impression that the practi-
cal and the moral benefit are inseparable. An example is 1.65.6–9, where 
Polybius gives as his reasons for recounting the Mercenary War that (1) it 
is the perfect example of a ‘truceless war’ (intellectual benefit), (2) it shows 
the dangers of employing mercenaries and demonstrates what precautions 
lead to disaster while ‘accepting’ it can be fruitful if one strives to keep as much  autonomy as 
possible. Eckstein (1995: 194–236) offers an excellent analysis of Polybius’ message about this 
balancing act for political leaders of Greek states. Ferrary (1988: 139–43) and Baronowski 
(2011: 159–62) take a less nuanced view of Polybius’ judgement on Roman rule (that it was 
overall benevolent and hence to be chosen/accepted) and hence of this passage. Ferrary has a 
good discussion of the moral implications of αἱρετὴν (1988: 341–2).
11 E.g. 1.1, 1.2.8, 1.4.11 , 1.13.11–13, 1.14, 1.35, 1.57.3, 1.65.7–9, 2.14.1, 2.35, 2.38.1, 
2.56–8, 2.61, 3.1.5, 3.4, 3.31, 3.32.6, 3.47–8, 3.57–9, 3.118.10–12, 4.40.1–2, 5.75.1–6, 6.2.5–6, 
9.2.5, 10.21.8, 11.1a, all of book 12, 16.12, 16.20, 16.28. Polybius’ programmatic passages 
have been discussed by Sacks (1980) with a focus on historiographical theory and practical 
didacticism.
12 Polyb. 1.2.8, 1.4.11, 1.13.6, 1.57.3, 1.65.7–9, 2.14.1, 2.35, 2.38.1, 2.56.11–12, 3.1.5, 3.31, 
3.118.10–12, 6.2.8, 11.19a, 12.25b.2, 39.8.7. Polybius’ insistence on the usefulness of learning 
(see also 3.4.1–12 and 11.20.6) has been connected with Stoic influence, especially by von 
Scala (1890: 201–3), but the distinction between the pleasure and utility in literature goes 
back much further than Stoicism and is seen in, among others, Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle. 
See Walbank (1990) with references to previous scholarship.
13 See note 1, this chapter.
14 Such as 2.35, which justifies the detailed treatment of the history of the Celts by its 
usefulness for teaching readers not to fear barbarians too much, and 3.31, which justifies the 
lengthy discussion of the responsibility for the Second Punic War by its usefulness as material 
for political speeches in the reader’s present.
15 Such as 1.4.11, which extols the unique ability of universal history to give readers a 
complete understanding of the world, and 2.14.1, which justifies an ethnographic digression 
with its necessity for understanding the march of Hannibal.
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should be taken (practical benefit), (3) it demonstrates the great difference 
in character between barbarians and civilised men (moral benefit), and 
(4) it provides the causal background to the Second Punic War (explan-
atory reason). Similarly, when 10.21 discusses the importance of includ-
ing biographical sketches in historiography because such characterisations 
encourage readers to emulate famous men, it is clear that the emulation 
is meant to encompass both practical actions and moral characteristics. 
Polybius did not draw a distinction between the different types of benefit 
he was offering, and he would most probably have been surprised and 
shocked to find that his modern readers have attempted to divorce his prac-
tical lessons from any sense of morality.
What is abundantly clear from the programmatic passages is the intended 
usefulness of the Histories, and not just or even primarily as a repository of 
facts and knowledge, but as a learning tool for the improvement (διόρθωσις: 
1.1.1 and frequently) of human life. If we ignore this aspect of his work, we 
seriously misread it. It is equally clear that this improvement is supposed 
to be both practical and moral, with no real distinction between the two.
A CHARACTERISATION OF POLYBIUS’  MORALISING
This section examines and describes Polybius’ moral-didactic techniques 
for the purpose of comparison with those of other Hellenistic and Classical 
historiographers in later chapters. The description also aims to give a 
reader unfamiliar with Polybius or unused to looking at his work from 
this angle an impression of his moralising. For this reason passages are 
frequently quoted (and translated). We shall begin with a quick overview 
of the distribution of moralising in the Histories and then continue with an 
analysis of the moralising techniques using the terminology established in 
the Introduction.
Distribution
The Histories was once a magnificent forty-volume work; it now survives 
only in a fragmentary state. Books 1–5 are completely extant, as is a good 
chunk of book 6 and substantial parts of 7–18. Then it becomes more 
patchy. There is less moralising in the first two books of the Histories 
than in the following complete and partially preserved ones. This is no 
doubt due to the summary nature of their narrative, which suits their 
function as background material for the main narrative. In the extremely 
fragmentary books 19–40 moralising is a dominant feature, to the extent 
that some stretches of fragments are purely moralising with very little 
narrative of events in between. This is due to the nature of two of the six 
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Constantinian epitomes in which the ‘fragments’ are preserved: one is about 
‘virtues and vices’ (De Virtutibus et Vitiis) and the other contains ‘sayings’ 
(De Sententiis), which also often have a moral bearing.16 Although these 
moralising passages will have been less dominating in the original work, 
where they functioned merely as a running commentary on the narrative of 
events, the fact that they were there at all is revealing of Polybius’ method 
and intention. There is no reason to believe that his moralising practice in 
the now fragmentary books differed from his practice in the non-prefatory 
and more substantially preserved books 3–18.
Moralising in Narrative Pauses
Much of Polybius’ moralising is explicit and takes place in pauses in his 
narrative of events. As we saw in the Introduction, moralising in such 
pauses can be divided into moralising digressions, which use the narrative 
as a starting point for making more general moralising observations, and 
guiding moralising, which introduces, concludes or accompanies narrative 
episodes in order to tell the reader how to interpret them in moral terms. 
Polybius uses both frequently.
Polybius’ moralising digressions can be long (e.g. 4.20–1, 3.22–32, all 
of book 6) or quite short (e.g. 4.81.12–14, 8.12.6–8). Their narrative func-
tions fall into three categories: explanatory, offering extra information 
and discussion to explain the narrative, including introducing a character 
new to the story, explaining motives, and providing background stories 
for events; evaluative, that is, passing judgement, entirely or partly moral, 
either on a character or on actions or events; and philosophical, treating 
the story of events as a springboard for musing about bigger questions.17 
In all of these he often includes a polemical element and argues against his 
predecessors on points of detail or interpretation. Polybius does not use 
associative digressions, as far as can be seen from his extant text. Most 
often the digression’s connection with the surrounding narrative is clear 
at the beginning, then the middle part strays far away from the immediate 
story situation before returning to the situation at hand again at the end. 
A return to the narrative of events is often signalled by means of the par-
ticle πλήν, or the combination πλὴν τότε. Some evaluative digressions are 
extended obituaries, that is, moral discussions of a historical individual’s 
16 Equally, there is a preponderance of passages concerning embassies to the Senate and 
various Greek cities because a third epitome was a collection of passages on embassies. For 
the Constantinian excerpts see Moore (1965: 126–70) and Walbank (1979: 1–62).
17 When the text is fragmented and the moralising digression survives in isolation, which 
is often the case in books 7ff., it is often not possible to determine its original connection with 
its context with certainty.
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character and/or actions, placed at the point of his death in the narrative 
(e.g. Philopoemen, 23.12; Hannibal, 23.13; and Scipio Africanus the Elder, 
23.14). These tend to stay more tightly on topic than other moral-didactic 
digressions as they focus on their protagonist throughout and rarely spend 
time on extended comparisons or generalisations.18
A typical example of a moralising digression in Polybius’ Histories is 
1.81.5–11, provoked by the brutal way in which the mercenaries of the 
Mercenary War treated their captives:19
διόπερ εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὐκ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν ὀκνήσειεν ὡς οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καί τινα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἑλκῶν καὶ φυμάτων 
ἀποθηριοῦσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τελέως ἀβοήθητα γίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς 
ψυχάς. ἐπί τε γὰρ τῶν ἑλκῶν, ἐὰν μὲν θεραπείαν τοῖς τοιούτοις προσάγῃ τις, 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐνίοτε ταύτης ἐρεθιζόμενα θᾶττον ποιεῖται τὴν νομήν· ἐὰν δὲ πάλιν 
ἀφῇ, κατὰ τὴν ἐξ αὑτῶν φύσιν φθείροντα τὸ συνεχὲς οὐκ ἴσχει παῦλαν, ἕως 
ἂν ἀφανίσῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ταῖς τε ψυχαῖς παραπλησίως τοιαῦται πολλάκις 
ἐπιφύονται μελανίαι καὶ σηπεδόνες ὥστε μηδὲν ἀσεβέστερον ἀνθρώπου μηδ᾽ 
ὠμότερον ἀποτελεῖσθαι τῶν ζῴων. οἷς ἐὰν μὲν συγγνώμην τινὰ προσάγῃς 
καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, ἐπιβουλὴν καὶ παραλογισμὸν ἡγούμενοι τὸ συμβαῖνον 
ἀπιστότεροι καὶ δυσμενέστεροι γίνονται πρὸς τοὺς φιλανθρωποῦντας· ἐὰν δ᾽ 
ἀντιτιμωρῇ, διαμιλλώμενοι τοῖς θυμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ἀπειρημένων ἢ δεινῶν 
ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀναδέχονται, σὺν καλῷ τιθέμενοι τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν· τέλος 
δ᾽ ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως 
ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα νομιστέον ἔθη μοχθηρὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἐκ 
παίδων κακήν, συνεργὰ δὲ καὶ πλείω, μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν 
προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεονεξίας. ἃ δὴ τότε συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ 
σύστημα τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν.
Therefore, considering these events one would not hesitate to say that it is 
not only the bodies of human beings and some of the ulcers and tumours 
that have come about in them which can become aggravated and ultimately 
beyond healing, but also, and much more, their souls. For, in the case 
of ulcers, if one applies treatment to such diseases, they are sometimes 
irritated by this very thing and spread more quickly; but if, on the other 
hand, one leaves them alone, on the basis of their own nature they con-
tinue their destruction unremittingly without cessation until they do away 
with their victim. Likewise in the case of men’s souls, such black spots and 
putrefactions grow on them that in the end no animal is more impious and 
more cruel than man. If one applies some forgiveness and kindness to such 
persons, they believe what has happened to be a plot and a deception and 
become more suspicious and hostile towards those who are exercising kind-
ness; but if one retaliates, in their passionate rivalry there is no unspeakable 
atrocity they will not commit, considering such daring to be in the category 
of what is honourable. In the end, they turn into beasts and discard human 
nature. This condition must be believed to originate in most part from bad 
18 Pomeroy (1989) offers a good analysis of Polybius’ ‘death notices’, short and long.
19 Underlined phrases are discussed in the text following extracts.
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habits and bad upbringing from childhood, but there are many contributory 
causes, and the most important of them is the constant abusiveness and 
greed of their leaders. That was what happened at that time to the com-
munity of mercenaries, and to an even larger degree to their commanders. 
(Polyb. 1.81.5–11)
The function of this moralising digression is explanatory: it attempts to 
explain the inhuman behaviour of the rebellious mercenaries. Typically 
for Polybian moral-didactic digressions it is connected to its surrounding 
narrative by thin bridges at the beginning (εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων) and end 
(τότε), but in between it generalises about larger moral themes. In this case 
the moral content is psychological: Polybius is generalising about human 
nature and behaviour. In this particular passage it is interesting to note the 
extended medical comparison between tumours in the body and diseases of 
the mind or soul; such medical similes are one of Polybius’ favourite ways 
of explaining the human psyche.20 It is also worth noting the causal rela-
tionship Polybius describes: the mercenaries have been made inhumanly 
brutal by three factors: bad habits (ἔθη μοχθηρά), bad education from 
childhood (τροφὴν ἐκ παίδων κακήν), and the abuse and unjust treatment 
they have suffered at the hands of their greedy Carthaginian superiors (τῶν 
προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεονεξίας).While the two first causes are interest-
ing in the light of modern psychological and pedagogical thinking, the third 
cause, and the one that Polybius identifies as the most important one of the 
three (μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν), foreshadows a moral theme with great 
political and military consequences that will be important throughout the 
Histories, namely the correlation between the way a leader – be he a ruler 
of a city or country or a military commander – treats his subjects/soldiers 
and the way they come to behave. This will be discussed further below. At 
no point is the digression prescriptively didactic, but it is not hard to make 
the jump: if brutal treatment renders soldiers brutal, anyone in command 
should strive to treat his men humanely. Moreover, this cause-and-effect 
link is likely also to be true in other relationships in life, which a reader 
might want to recall when thinking about how to treat his slaves or educate 
his children.
Like this digression, most moral-didactic digressions in the Histories are 
descriptively didactic. However, in about a fourth of the digressions pre-
scriptive advice is given to the reader, often at the end. Often, this advice 
is combined with a justification of why the narrator has taken the liberty 
to digress, or to digress at such length. The cases for inclusion are often 
practically didactic: 2.7 is included in order to teach people never to admit 
20 See e.g. 13.2.2, where greed is compared to dropsy. Such medical comparisons are 
common in both Plato and the Stoics; see Walbank (1957: ad loc.).
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a garrison stronger than themselves into their city; 4.20–1 should teach the 
Arcadians not to ignore the civilising factor of music. Equally often, the 
digressions are intellectually didactic, most often in the sense that they aim 
to provide readers with a just view of a difficult issue: 4.20–1 also aims to 
give readers a true picture of Arcadia that does not blame the region for the 
crimes of one city; the famous digression on the Roman–Carthaginian trea-
ties, 3.22–32, is allegedly there to make sure everyone knows the truth about 
the causes of the war in order to provide background knowledge for political 
actions in the present (3.31); and the digressions on the characters of the two 
Scipios (the Elder at 10.2–5 and the Younger at 31.25–30) are justified by the 
desire to make the reader credit these men with their own successes rather 
than ascribing those to fortune. However, coming at the end of complex 
moral discussions – or heated moral rants – these purpose statements often 
seem reductionist: 2.7 is surely there not only to teach a practical lesson 
about rejecting offers of barbarian garrisons, but also to teach the reader 
about the importance of taking moral responsibility for one’s actions and 
not blaming fortune for one’s own mistakes; and 3.22–3.32 does not just 
provide some idea of the characters of the Carthaginians and Romans that 
a reader can draw on for knowledge of how to deal with these two peoples 
in his own present, but offers a full and complex discussion of the legal and 
moral responsibility for the Second Punic War. Likewise, the digressions on 
the characters of the two Scipios are meant to have a practical and moral 
influence on the reader’s life as models for emulation.
Common to all the moral-didactic digressions of Polybius, regardless 
of their topic, are colourful, emotional language, heated rhetorical ques-
tions and expressions of aporia, expressions of wonder or exhortations to 
wonder, similes, generalisations, and analogies, often with medical condi-
tions or animals.21 In other words, they are designed to persuade and use all 
the rhetorical tools available to a well-educated Hellenistic Greek.
The shorter form of moralising in narrative pauses, guiding moralising, 
also occurs with great frequency in the Histories, in the form of intro-
ductory, concluding and concomitant remarks steering a reader’s inter-
pretation of specific episodes. Sometimes this guiding moralising contains 
proleptic remarks about how a character’s future fate is a consequence 
of his moral or immoral behaviour. The shortest version is a sentence or 
two;22 such brief conclusions often follow upon the death of a character 
21 E.g. brutality compared with tumours at 1.81 quoted above, greed compared with 
dropsy at 13.2.2, Philip V and Antiochus III compared with predatory fish at 15.20.
22 E.g. 1.84.10 (concomitant), 2.9.6, 3.19.9–11 (concluding/proleptic), 3.116.9, 4.34.2 
(concomitant), 4.67.2–4, 4.80.4, 4.81.5, 5.39.6, 5.56.13, 5.76.11 (all concluding), 6.58.1 (intro-
ductory), 11.39.15–16 (concluding), 14.5.15 (concluding), 15.21.1 (introductory), 15.33.10 
(concomitant), 27.2.10 (concluding), 27.16.1 (introductory). 
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and function as miniature obituaries commenting on the deservedness of 
the death or on the qualities of the dead character.23 Some slightly longer 
passages of guiding moralising are simply more explanatory,24 but some 
use generalising remarks about human behaviour to make their points 
about specific instances of the historical narrative, such as this introduction 
to an episode of Aetolian political infighting:25
μήποτε γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἀδικήματα τῶν κοινῶν, ἀλλὰ πλήθει 
μόνον καὶ μεγέθει τῶν συμβαινόντων. καὶ γὰρ κατ’ ἰδίαν τὸ τῶν ῥᾳδιουργῶν 
καὶ κλεπτῶν φῦλον τούτῳ μάλιστα τῷ τρόπῳ σφάλλεται, τῷ μὴ ποιεῖν 
ἀλλήλοις τὰ δίκαια, καὶ συλλήβδην διὰ τὰς εἰς αὑτοὺς ἀθεσίας. ὃ καὶ τότε 
συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλούς.
For public crimes differ from private ones only in the extent and quantity 
of their results. For also in the private sphere the most common cause of the 
downfall of the whole tribe of criminals and thieves is the fact that they do 
not treat each other with justice, and, in short, their faithlessness towards 
each other. This was what happened also to the Aetolians at that point. 
(Polyb. 4.29.4)
Most of these passages of guiding moralising are descriptive and do nothing 
more than tell the reader what to think about the events narrated. Some, 
however, become prescriptive and draw out an explicit moral lesson for 
the reader.26 A few briefly recap events narrated earlier and then introduce 
their continuation.27 Despite their differences, all of these passages are still 
essentially guides to the narrative, which ensure that the reader does not go 
astray in the understanding of the text, but comes away from his reading 
with the correct moral evaluation of every character and event and, conse-
quently, with a strong sense of how to live his own life according to a moral 
compass. This forceful and frequent guidance is one of the main ways in 
which Polybius tries to fulfil his promise of writing a work useful for the 
moral improvement of his readers.
23 Typical examples are 3.116.9, 5.39.6 and 5.56.13. For a good discussion see Pomeroy 
(1989).
24 E.g. 1.64.5–6 (concluding), 2.57.8 (concluding), 3.105.8–10 (concomitant), 4.17.1–2 
(concomitant), 4.35.4 (concomitant), 8.12.6–8 (concluding), 15.25.1 (introductory?), 15.33.6 
(concomitant), 16.23.3–4 (concomitant), 16.30.2–3 (introductory), 18.53.1–4 (introduc-
tory?), 18.54.8–12 (concluding), 20.11.9–10 (concluding/proleptic), 27.8.9–10 (concomitant), 
28.14.1–2 (introductory), 29.22.2 (concomitant), 30.12 (introductory?).
25 Other generalising examples are 1.17.11–12 (concomitant), 1.62.4–6 (introductory), 
1.67.4–6 (concomitant), 4.87.3–4 (concomitant), 5.26.12–13 (concomitant), 13.5.4–6 (intro-
ductory), 15.17.1–2 (introductory), 18.33.4–7 (introductory). 
26 E.g. 1.35.1–3 (concluding), 2.4.3–5 (concluding, quoted on p. 51), 4.35.14–15 (prolep-
tic), 8.21.10–11 (concluding).
27 E.g. 16.13 picking up the narrative of Nabis, tyrant of Sparta. 
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Moralising in the Narrative of Events
Beside the explicit moralising in digressions and guiding passages, Polybius 
employs a number of more subtle types of moralising integrated into his 
narrative of events.
Evaluative phrasing is ubiquitous in the Histories, but is more pervasive 
in some passages than in others. A typical example is the narrative of the 
beginning of the revolt of Achaeus against Seleucus III:
Σέλευκος γὰρ ὁ νέος ὡς θᾶττον παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν, πυνθανόμενος 
Ἄτταλον πᾶσαν ἤδη τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου δυναστείαν ὑφ᾽ αὑτὸν 
πεποιῆσθαι, παρωρμήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν. ὑπερβαλὼν 
δὲ μεγάλῃ δυνάμει τὸν Ταῦρον, καὶ δολοφονηθεὶς ὑπό τ᾽ Ἀπατουρίου 
τοῦ Γαλάτου καὶ Νικάνορος, μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον. Ἀχαιὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν 
ἀναγκαιότητα τὸν φόνον αὐτοῦ μετῆλθε παραχρῆμα, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικάνορα 
καὶ τὸν Ἀπατούριον ἀποκτείνας, τῶν τε δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων 
φρονίμως καὶ μεγαλοψύχως προέστη. τῶν γὰρ καιρῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ, καὶ 
τῆς τῶν ὄχλων ὁρμῆς συνεργούσης εἰς τὸ διάδημα περιθέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν 
οὐ προείλετο ποιῆσαι, τηρῶν δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῶν 
υἱῶν, ἐνεργῶς ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀνεκτᾶτο τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πᾶσαν. 
τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων αὐτῷ παραδόξως εὐροούντων, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν Ἄτταλον εἰς 
αὐτὸ τὸ Πέργαμον συνέκλεισε, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πάντων ἦν ἐγκρατής, ἐπαρθεὶς 
τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι παρὰ πόδας ἐξώκειλε. καὶ διάδημα περιθέμενος καὶ βασιλέα 
προσαγορεύσας αὑτὸν βαρύτατος ἦν τότε καὶ φοβερώτατος τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ 
Ταύρου βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν· ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα τότε Βυζάντιοι πιστεύσαντες 
ἀνεδέξαντο τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους καὶ Προυσίαν πόλεμον.
As soon as the young Seleucus had succeeded to the kingship, he learned 
that Attalus had already brought all the land on this side of the Taurus 
under his rule, and so he was eager to assert his own claim. He crossed the 
Taurus with a large army, but was treacherously murdered by Apaturius the 
Galatian and Nicanor. Achaeus immediately avenged his murder because of 
their kinship, and when he had killed Nicanor, Apaturius and their accom-
plices, he commanded the army and ruled the country intelligently and 
high-mindedly. Indeed, when he had the chance and the impulse of the 
mob was making it easy for him to assume the diadem, he chose not to 
do this, but to guard the kingdom for Antiochus, the younger of the sons. 
With speed and efficiency he marched upon the land this side of Taurus and 
regained it. But when his campaign had been unexpectedly successful, as he 
had shut up Attalus in Pergamum itself and had become master of the rest 
of the country, he became elated by his good fortune and ran aground head 
over heels. Having assumed the diadem and proclaimed himself king, he 
was the most oppressive and terrifying of the kings and rulers this side of 
the Taurus. This was the man in whom the Byzantines especially trusted at 
that point when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias. 
(Polyb. 4.48.7–13)
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This is a straight narrative of events with no explicit moralising attached. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the passage, the reader knows very well that 
Achaeus is a good man corrupted by success, that his initial refusal of the 
royal title is the right way to behave, and that it was wrong of him to change 
his mind later. This impression is created by Polybius’ use of morally eval-
uative phrasing. Firstly, the adverbs φρονίμως and μεγαλοψύχως tell the 
reader that Achaeus’ conduct before his great successes is admirable, both 
on intellectual (φρονίμως) and on moral (μεγαλοψύχως) grounds. Then, 
when his success is growing and his troops urge him to assume the diadem, 
the designation of those troops as τῶν ὄχλων ensures that the reader cannot 
sympathise with them.28 Moreover, the action of egging on Achaeus to 
rebel is ascribed not to the mob of soldiers, but to their emotional impulse, 
τῆς τῶν ὄχλων ὁρμῆς, placing their efforts in the category of the irrational 
and dangerous. There is thus no doubt that Achaeus’ refusal is the only 
right response. When he goes on to conduct the campaign ἐνεργῶς, the 
reader can only be impressed: ἐνεργῶς is not a moral word, but belongs 
to the category of words expressing military efficiency, something always 
admired by Polybius; and the fact that Achaeus pursues the war of his 
king ‘with speed and efficiency’ just after having refused the opportunity 
to replace this king marks him out as a stout and loyal soldier. Finally, 
when Achaeus changes his mind and adopts the royal title anyway, the 
decision is explained by his being ‘elated by his good fortune’ (ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς 
εὐτυχήμασι), putting him in the same irrational and dangerous category 
as the soldier-mob, and with a striking ship-metaphor he is said to have 
run ‘aground head over heels’ (παρὰ πόδας ἐξώκειλε). The moralising is 
entirely implicit, but the reader is left in no doubt about how to evaluate 
the episode.
Closely connected with evaluative phrasing and often employed in 
tandem with it is internal evaluation of the actions of a historical char-
acter through the eyes of his contemporaries. This usually takes the form 
of a brief concluding statement, often in the shape of a participial phrase 
such as ‘being thought to have handled matters in a generous and kingly 
manner’ (δόξας μεγαλοψύχως καὶ βασιλικῶς τοῖς πράγμασις κεχρῆσθαι: 
8.23.5) or ‘seeming to have given wise and timely advice’ (φανέντος δὲ 
φρονίμως αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς οἰκείως συμβουλεύειν: 15.19.8). We are 
not told to whom the protagonists of the two passages seemed kingly and 
wise respectively, but the evaluation is not contradicted, and so the reader 
is left to deduce that the thoughts of the unspecified contemporaries were, 
in fact, sound. In other cases the narrator is explicit about whose evalua-
28 Walbank (1957: ad loc.) is surely right that the derogatory phrase here refers to 
Achaeus’ soldiers, not the common people.
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tion he is passing on, whether it is that of the ‘moderate men’ or ‘the many’ 
(33.18.10–11), and the intended reader, who belongs to the same social 
class as Polybius, is certainly not supposed to agree with ‘the many’. Often 
such internal evaluations particularly blur the moral and the practical as 
the approval of the internal audience in turn bolsters the position of the 
leader who behaved so well.
A complex use of this technique can be seen at 36.9, where Polybius 
reports four different contemporary views about the justice or injustice 
of the Roman destruction of Carthage and leaves the reader free to think 
through the details of each view and then make up his own mind about 
which one to agree with. Such open-ended moral didacticism is unique 
in (the extant part of) the Histories, and it is most probably partly due 
to Polybius’ personal circumstances: Carthage had been destroyed by his 
friend and benefactor Scipio the Younger, and had he agreed with it, he 
would no doubt have said so and have turned the action into a moral 
paradeigma as he did with so many of Scipio’s other actions. As it stands, 
the lack of narratorial conclusion is most easily explained by Polybius 
disapproving of the destruction of the city, but being too loyal a friend to 
state that in so many words. At the same time, by giving the reader four 
different views, all based on sound arguments, Polybius is demonstrating 
how complicated it can be to evaluate morally the actions of historical and 
contemporary people: it all depends on what criteria you use and what you 
think is fair. By not taking sides, Polybius is both leaving it up to the reader 
to decide whom he agrees with, and inviting him to think about and evalu-
ate his own criteria for moral evaluation.29 This passage gives a glimpse of 
the delicate tightrope Polybius must have walked as the friend and adviser 
of the increasingly powerful Scipio, but it also shows how important the 
moral-didactic dimension of the Histories was to him and how conscious 
he was of the different techniques available to fulfil it.
An extended version of internal evaluation is speeches delivered by char-
acters in the work. Polybius employs this type of moralising less than 
the Classical historiographers, as we shall see in Part II, but even for him 
speeches are an important vehicle for demonstrating how moral principles 
can apply to specific situations. Speeches in the Histories are invariably 
political. They take place in Assemblies of Greek cities or city-leagues 
(such as the Achaean League), at peace conferences and before the Roman 
29 The lack of narratorial conclusion has led to fierce scholarly debate over Polybius’ 
own standpoint. The debate is still live, as demonstrated by the fact that the two anonymous 
readers of this chapter for Edinburgh University Press both offered their own, mutually 
contradictory, interpretations of the passage. One of these interpretations is partly adopted 
here. See Hau (2006: 84–7) for a summary of the debate and a more detailed discussion of 
the passage.
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Senate.30 Only four speeches in the extant text are given completely in 
direct discourse (5.104, 9.28–31, 9.32–9, 11.4–6); many more are offered in 
a combination of direct and indirect discourse.31 The task of figuring out 
whether or not to agree with a speech is rarely difficult in the Histories. 
Most often the speech or the speaker is endorsed by the narrator either 
before the speech begins (5.103.9, 30.31.2) or at its end (11.10.1); or we are 
told that the audience at the Assembly or Senate thought well of it or him, 
which should lead the reader to do so too (18.3.1, 21.31.6, 30.31.18). Some 
speakers are portrayed so positively throughout the Histories that explicit 
narratorial endorsement of their speech is unnecessary. For instance, when 
Philopoemen, who is praised in no fewer than four evaluative digressions,32 
speaks about the dishonour of offering and taking bribes at 20.12, the 
reader needs no narratorial steer in order to understand that his words 
are meant to carry moral authority.33 Furthermore, this and some other 
speeches echo moral attitudes explicitly expressed by the narrator else-
where (on bribes see 4.35.14–15 and 18.35), which makes it natural to read 
them as reinforcing the moral didacticism, even when there is no explicit 
endorsement of the speech by narrator or listeners. This is the case, for 
example, of the speech by Scipio the Elder to Carthaginian ambassadors 
after the Battle of Zama where he explains that he will treat them mildly, 
not for their sake, but for the sake of his own and Rome’s honour (corre-
sponding to guiding moralising at 27.8.9–10), and also of the fragment of 
a speech by Aemilius Paullus on the importance of staying humble even in 
great success at 29.20 (corresponding to guiding moralising at 8.21.10–11 
and 29.22.2, and a moralising digression at 29.21; the two latter passages 
were probably closely connected with the speech in the unfragmented orig-
inal text).
The most effective type of moralising integrated into the narrative of 
the Histories, however, is correlation between action and result. This type 
of moralising is displayed when the Achaean League is uniquely success-
ful in uniting the Peloponnese because they act on the basis of ἰσηγορία, 
30 The preponderance of ambassadors’ speeches is due to the fact that many of the frag-
ments of the last books of the Histories have been handed down in an epitome on embassies; 
the amount of space they take up compared with the rest of Polybius’ narrative would look 
less disproportionate if we had more of those books.
31 For discussions of Polybius’ speeches see Pédech (1964: 254–302), Wooten (1974), 
Champion (1997), Thornton (2013). Discussions tend to focus on the issue of sources and 
authenticity and usually take their point of departure from Polybius’ statement about the 
duty of the historiographer to report speeches truthfully (Polyb. 36.1.7).
32 At 10.21–4, 11.10, 21.32c and 23.12.
33 Likewise the speeches of Scipio the Elder and Aemilius Paullus, mentioned in this same 
paragraph, and the speech of Flamininus about the principle of treating the defeated enemy 
with mildness at 18.37. An interesting case is the speech of Polybius as a character in his own 
work at 28.7, which should presumably also be understood as authoritative.
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παρρησία, ἰσότης and φιλανθρωπία (2.38.6 and 9) rather than for their 
own gain (2.37.9), and when Philip V is the ‘darling of Greece’ (κοινός τις 
οἷον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 7.11.8) as long as he behaves with 
moderation and integrity, but as his behaviour changes for the worse, he 
loses the loyalty of the Greeks and is ultimately defeated by Rome (4.77, 
7.11.10–12, 7.13). In other words, those who behave according to the moral 
code propounded by the narrator are successful whereas those who behave 
immorally come to grief. This type of moralising runs as a thread through 
the Histories. Thus, just as Scipio Africanus the Elder easily wins over the 
Spanish allies of the Carthaginians by treating them with respect (10.17–19, 
10.35–6, 10.38), a host of kings and commanders treat various people well 
(their own troops/subjects or their defeated opponents) and are rewarded 
with honours and loyalty (e.g. Hiero, 1.8–9; Antigonus Gonatas, 2.70; 
Hannibal, 3.13.8). The principle is made clear in a couple of moralising 
digressions: 7.11 on how Philip’s fortunes changed when he changed his 
behaviour for the worse, and 10.36 on how the Carthaginians have alien-
ated their Iberian allies by only treating them well until they had them 
under their control, and then changing their conduct.34
The force of this moral didacticism comes especially from the fact that 
the principle underlies much of the narrative of the Histories even when 
it is not explicitly expressed, and it has much wider implications than a 
ruler or commander’s treatment of his inferiors. Sometimes it is easy for 
Polybius to show that those he considers the morally better people also 
come off better in the course of history: the moral Romans are victorious 
over the lawless Illyrians (2.2–12), the despicable courtier Apelles is finally 
foiled in his schemes and executed (4.76–5.28), Philip V is victorious as long 
as he follows a moral code (4.77, 4.82, 7.11), and Greece not only deserved 
to be conquered by Rome, but was actually saved by it from a morass of 
immorality (38.18). Likewise, on the macro-level, the main theme of the 
work is the causes of Rome’s rise to world domination, and Polybius shows 
that such power came to Rome primarily because it deserved it: Rome’s 
admirable constitution, the courage, self-discipline and high-mindedness 
of Rome’s leaders, and the simple fact that everyone else was much less 
morally deserving all make Rome’s achievement practically explicable as 
well as morally just. Sometimes, however, it is harder to demonstrate that 
the world works in such a satisfying fashion: in order to make his father, 
Lycortas, get his own back from the Achaean politicians who defeated him 
in politics and got his son deported, Polybius has to tell a story about how 
the statues of the hated politicians were put into storage and the statues of 
Lycortas carried out into the light by the people at the end of the Achaean 
34 I have discussed this latter passage and the principle it embodies in detail in Hau (2006). 
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War, long after the death of Lycortas himself (36.13). And, more pro-
nounced, when the supremely moral Philopoemen is executed by poison in 
captivity, the narrator goes out of his way in his obituary to argue that his 
downfall was due not to any defect in virtue, but to unforeseeable fortune, 
tyche (23.12).
In these situations this principle that ‘the good win and the bad lose’ 
is close to the surface of the Histories; at other times it disappears. There 
is no sense of a moral victor or the immoral defeated in the narratives of 
either the First or the Second Punic War,35 and the narrative of the last ten 
books seems to show Rome increasing its strength by a string of political 
decisions which are collectively labelled immoral (31.10.7) and are some-
times individually presented as such (30.18.7, 31.21.6–8).36 Nevertheless, 
the overall impression a reader gets of the world of the Histories is that, 
by and large, moral behaviour leads to political and military success. This 
moralising technique is, in contrast with the other techniques outlined 
above, based on the contents of the story rather than on the form of the dis-
course. Thus it can be said to be both a moralising technique and a moral 
lesson, and for that reason we shall reserve more detailed discussion until 
the analysis of Polybius’ moral messages below.
Moral-Didactic Techniques Working Together
A typology of moral-didactic techniques is useful for investigating and 
explaining exactly how Polybius fulfils the moral-didactic purpose of his 
work. At the same time, however, it runs the risk of presenting moral 
didacticism in Polybius as piecemeal and fragmented. That would be far 
from the truth. In any section of the Histories the different techniques work 
together to create a coherent historical narrative with a strong moral bent 
and clear moral lessons. An example is the narrative of Philip V’s siege of 
Abydus (16.29–34).
The episode begins with a non-moralising digression on the geographi-
cal position of Abydus and Sestus (16.29). Then the beginning of the siege is 
narrated in one sentence (16.30.1) before the next sentence tells the reader 
35 End of First Punic War: 1.62–4, where the Carthaginians are defeated in practice, 
but not in spirit (1.62.1) and their general is praised (1.62.4–6). End of Second Punic War: 
15.16–19; Hannibal is praised at 15.16.5–6, and his defeat explained as due to ‘random 
chance’ (ταὐτόματον) which made him face an opponent ‘stronger’ (κρείττονος) than himself. 
36 Polybius’ attitude to Roman foreign policy in the years 167–145 bc, while he was on 
the one hand living in the city against his will (only really true until 149) and on the other 
became ever closer friends with Scipio the Younger and his friends and family, has been 
much discussed. The most important contributions are Walbank (1965, 1972: 157–83, 1974, 
1977), Musti (1978), Ferrary (1988: 276–318), Eckstein (1995: 194–236), Champion (2004), 
McGing (2010: 129–68) and Baronowski (2011).
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what to look out for in the narrative to follow: not the siege engines or 
siege works, but the dignity (τὴν γενναιότητα) and remarkable courage (τὴν 
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐψυχίας) of the besieged (16.30.2–4). This is introductory 
moralising. The next two chapters tell the story of the siege, marking the 
increasingly desperate resistance of the Abydenes with occasional evalu-
ative terms in order to remind the reader where his sympathies are sup-
posed to lie (‘stoutly’, ἐρρωμένως: 16.30.4; ‘bravely’, εὐψύχως: 16.30.5). 
The Abydenian decision, when Philip refuses to come to terms, to entrust 
some of their elders with killing the women and children and burning the 
ships and valuables, while they themselves fight to the death, could easily 
have been presented as a monstrous resolution. Here, however, it is cast in 
a heroic light with the decision being made ‘unanimously’ (ὁμοθυμαδόν: 
16.31.4) and sanctified with sacrifices (16.31.6–7). It is rounded off with 
a conclusion (16.31.8) that stresses the foresight and authority of the 
Abydene citizens, their willingness to fight to the death and the destruction 
wrought by the Macedonians, and the unjust violence of their attackers.37 
Then the action is paused for a moralising digression (16.32), which praises 
the courage of the Abydenes, compares it favourably with the desperate 
courage shown by other peoples in similar situations (16.32.1–4), and crit-
icises fortune (τῇ τύχῃ) for letting those other peoples be victorious, but 
allowing not only the Abydenes to be defeated, but also their women and 
children to fall into the hands of Philip despite the men’s efforts to prevent 
this (16.32.5–6).38 After the digression the narrative is taken up again, 
now with more evaluative vocabulary as the Abydenes fight so desperately 
that Philip is forced to withdraw his troops at nightfall (16.33.1), but are 
then betrayed by two of the elders in charge of the women and children, 
who ‘sacrificed what was honourable and admirable about the citizens’ 
resolution for the sake of their own ambition’ (κατέβαλον τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ 
θαυμάσιον τῆς τῶν πολιτῶν προαιρέσεως διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐλπίδας: 16.33.4) 
and handed over their charges to Philip. The focus then moves first to King 
Attalus of Pergamum and then to the Romans, who both send ambassa-
dors to tell Philip to desist from the siege (16.34.1–7). After this interlude 
to show how Philip’s actions are condemned by the outside world – or at 
least by the part of the outside world which has been set up by Polybius 
37 ‘Having ratified this [i.e. the decision to kill the women and children] they stopped 
counter-mining against the enemy and came to such a decision that whenever the cross-
wall fell, they would fight till the end on its ruins against their attackers and die there’ 
(ταῦτα δ’ἐπικυρώσαντες τοῦ μὲν ἀντιμεταλλεύειν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπέστησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοιαύτην 
γνώμην κατέστησαν ὥστ’ ἐπειδὰν πέσῃ τὸ διατείχισμα, τότ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ πτώματος διαμάχεσθαι καὶ 
διαποθνήσκειν πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους: Polyb. 16.31.8).
38 I have discussed Polybius’ view of tyche elsewhere (Hau 2011) and would here main-
tain that the reader is not supposed to take the criticism literally, but simply to see the expres-
sion as an outcry against the occasional injustice of historical events. 
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as moral authorities – the taking of the city is skipped over in a participial 
phrase (ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος κυριεύσας τῆς πόλεως). The narrative then focuses 
on the suicides taking place all over the fallen city, which move Philip to 
grant the citizens three days to end their own lives, and concludes with a 
passage that again stresses the courage and resolve of the Abydenes.39 In 
this way the different moralising techniques work together to highlight the 
courage and uprightness of the Abydenes (and, by contrast, the villainy of 
Philip) and turn it into an exemplum for the reader to admire and, if nec-
essary, emulate.
The moralising techniques are tools for Polybius to use in his moral- 
didactic mission. He uses them skilfully, sometimes individually, some-
times in forceful combinations. There are very few pages of the Histories 
that do not contain some form of moralising. We might say that moral 
didacticism is the framework that gives shape to the historical narrative as 
well as the lens through which the events are presented.
MORAL LESSONS OF POLYBIUS
Having analysed the means by which Polybius attempted to educate his 
readers morally, we now turn to the content of his moral lessons. For the 
sake of clarity we shall consider these under five headings: combining 
the morally right with the practically advantageous; the ability to handle 
the vicissitudes of fortune; the good commander; the good king; and the 
good man. Under the last three headings are discussed messages concerning 
the virtues and vices most associated with the three categories of historical 
characters. Such a division is to a certain extent artificial, as the lessons 
often overlap and reinforce each other in practice, and I shall attempt 
to make the main points of contact between them clear as the discussion 
progresses.
Combining the Morally Right with the Practically Advantageous
A characteristic feature of much of Polybius’ moral didacticism is the way 
in which the morally right tends to go hand in hand with the practically 
advantageous. The use of the concepts of ‘the good’ (τὸ καλόν/τὸ δίκαιον) 
39 οἱ δ’ Ἀβυδηνοί, προδιειληφότες ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς στάσιν, καὶ νομίζοντες 
οἷον εἰ προδόται γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἠγωνισμένων καὶ τεθνεώτων, οὐδαμῶς 
ὑπέμενον τὸ ζῆν . . . οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ὥρμων ἀμελλήτως κατὰ συγγενείας ἐπὶ τὸν θάνατον 
(‘The Abydenes, having decided beforehand for their own sake to carry out their original 
decree and believing themselves to be like traitors to those who had fought and died for their 
country, were in no way trying to remain alive . . . All the rest were hurrying to bring about 
their own deaths without delay, family by family’: 16.34.11–12).
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and ‘the advantageous’ (τὸ συμφέρον/τὸ ὠφέλιμον) in some passages of 
the Histories has been used to connect Polybius with Stoicism, but what 
is striking about the Histories is exactly that the two are so rarely con-
trasted and are much more often seen to work together.40 This stress on 
the practical advantages of morally correct behaviour is part of what has 
earned him a reputation as a cynical pragmatist, but this view only sees 
half the picture. For Polybius, practical advantage should not be sought at 
the expense of morality, but naturally results from moral behaviour, thus 
providing another reason for pursuing such behaviour. This does not make 
him a cynical pragmatist, but a material moralist.
An extended example of a didactic paradeigma in the Histories which 
intertwines practical and moral arguments is 5.9–12, the passage where 
Polybius most extensively discusses the ‘laws of war’.41 The moralising is 
provoked by Philip V’s sacking of the Aetolian city of Thermus. Polybius 
first narrates the Macedonian troops’ severe ravaging of the surrounding 
countryside and looting of extremely wealthy city houses, culminating in 
their burning of all the valuables they cannot carry with them (5.8). This 
narrative is remarkable for its entirely neutral vocabulary and complete 
lack of narratorial criticism. But when Polybius then goes on to describe 
the looting of the temples and destruction of sacred objects, he introduces 
this narrative with the statement:
Καὶ ἕως μὲν τούτου πάντα κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους καλῶς καὶ δικαίως 
ἐπράττετο· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πῶς χρὴ λέγειν οὐκ οἶδα.
And until now everything had been done justly and honourably according to 
the laws of war; but as for what happened afterwards, I do not know how 
to relate it. (Polyb. 5.9.1)
There follows a narrative of the Macedonian destruction of temples and 
votive offerings, carried out because Philip and his associates were beside 
themselves with rage (παράστασις) over the Aetolian sacking of Dium 
and believed that they were only taking just revenge (ὡς δικαίως ταῦτα 
πράττοντας καὶ καθηκόντως: 5.9.6). This is rounded off with a moralising 
40 Connection with Stoicism: Hirzel (1882), von Scala (1890: 201–3), Walbank (1957 ad 
3.4.10). As Walbank recognises, the contrast is much older than the Stoics; it is a topos in 
Thucydides’ speeches and extant Athenian oratory. In Polybius, τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον 
are contrasted in speeches at 8.11.7 and 24.12.2 and in the fragments 21.32c (which may well 
also be from a speech) and 15.24.6. Passages in Polybius where the good and the advanta-
geous are parallel or said to work in unison: 3.4.10, 3.107.8, 7.3.4 (speech), 9.32.11 (speech), 
31.30.1.
41 For Polybius’ rules of war see also 23.15. Von Scala’s opinion (1890: 321–4) that 
Polybius was inspired by the Peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum in these views may well be 
right. 
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conclusion which becomes at the same time the introduction to a lengthy 
evaluative digression:
ἐμοὶ δὲ τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτων. εἰ δ’ ὀρθὸς ὁ λόγος, σκοπεῖν ἐν μέσῳ 
πάρεστι, χρωμένους οὐχ ἑτέροις τισίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οἰκίας ταύτης 
παραδείγμασιν.
I am of the opposite opinion from them. And it is possible to examine objec-
tively whether my argument is right by using no other examples than those 
from this very house. (Polyb. 5.9.6–7)
The message, although so far unexpressed, must be that it is acceptable to 
ravage the enemy’s land and cities, but unacceptable to destroy temples.
A comparison with Antigonus Doson, Philip II and Alexander the Great 
follows (5.9.8–10.8). In a – moral – mental skip from impiety to brutality, 
Polybius first employs the two former individuals as examples of conquer-
ors who treated the defeated with mildness and magnanimity (ἐπιεικείας καὶ 
φιλανθρωπίας: 5.10.1; τῇ δ’ εὐγνωμοσύνῃ καὶ μετριότητι: 5.10.2; τῆς αὑτοῦ 
πρᾳότητος καὶ καλοκαγαθίας: 5.10.3; τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ: 5.10.4). Antigonus is 
said to have been honoured for his restrained behaviour not just in Sparta, 
but throughout Greece even after his death (5.9.10) – not exactly a practical 
result perhaps, but a pleasing reward for moral behaviour, and one which 
often accrues to those Polybian victors who avoid abusing the defeated 
(more about this below). In the case of Philip II, his magnanimity after the 
Battle of Chaeronea is explicitly said to have led to a practical advantage: 
by this behaviour he won over the Athenians more effectively than he 
could have done by force and thus ‘by a small expense through his political 
shrewdness achieved his greatest success’ (μικρᾷ δαπάνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν 
τὴν μεγίστην πρᾶξιν κατειργάσατο: 5.10.4). The topic of destruction of 
sacred buildings is reintroduced by the mention of Alexander the Great, 
who is praised for leaving the temples of Thebes and Persia untouched 
and only destroying non-sacred buildings (5.10.6–8). We are not told what 
practical results he achieved by this; the example is left to reflect badly on 
Philip V on purely moral grounds.
Polybius then makes the comparison explicit (5.10.9–11) and states that 
Philip V should have emulated his predecessors in their magnanimity. 
However,
τοιγαροῦν τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτηδεύων τῆς ἐναντίας 
ἔτυχε παρὰ πᾶσι δόξης.
Therefore, as he practised the opposite behaviour to the aforementioned 
kings, he met with the opposite reputation from everybody. (Polyb. 5.10.11)
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As with Antigonus Doson, the reputation is thought of as a natural result of 
a man’s actions, and it is considered sufficiently important to be mentioned 
as a desirable or non-desirable result depending on the type of reputation. 
This is true throughout the Histories,42 and Polybius always assumes that 
a reputation is an accurate reflection of a man’s actions and nature. Thus, 
here, he is clearly not suggesting that it would be acceptable to burn down 
temples as long as one could do it in secret; rather, in his world, being 
thought to be something or having a reputation for being something is the 
same as being it.43
In 5.11.3, the discussion moves from the particular to the universal, and 
Polybius gives his ‘law of war’:
τὸ μὲν γὰρ παραιρεῖσθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ καταφθείρειν φρούρια, λιμένας, 
πόλεις, ἄνδρας, ναῦς, καρπούς, τἄλλα τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, δι’ ὧν τοὺς 
μὲν ὑπεναντίους ἀσθενεστέρους ἄν τις ποιήσαι, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα πράγματα 
καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς δυναμικωτέρας, ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκάζουσιν οἱ τοῦ πολέμου 
νόμοι καὶ τὰ τούτου δίκαια δρᾶν· τὸ δὲ μήτε τοι̂ς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐπικουρίαν 
μέλλοντα μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν παρασκευάζειν μήτε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐλάττωσιν πρός γε 
τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον ἐκ περιττοῦ καὶ ναούς, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ἀνδριάντας καὶ 
πᾶσαν δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν λυμαίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι 
τρόπου καὶ θυμοῦ λυττῶντος ἔργον; οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀπωλείᾳ δεῖ καὶ ἀφανισμῷ τοῖς 
ἀγνοήσασι πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ διορθώσει καὶ μεταθέσει 
τῶν ἡμαρτημένων, οὐδὲ συναναιρεῖν τὰ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν, 
ἀλλὰ συσσῴζειν μᾶλλον καὶ συνεξαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀναιτίοις τοὺς δοκοῦντας 
ἀδικεῖν. τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν 
ἀκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους· βασιλέως δὲ τὸ 
πάντας εὐ ̂ ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαπώμενον, 
ἑκόντων ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ προστατεῖν.
To take away from the enemy and to destroy his forts, harbours, cities, 
men, ships, crops, and all other similar things through the removal of which 
one might make the enemy weaker and strengthen one’s own situation and 
campaign plans, these actions are forced upon us by the laws and justice of 
war. But to vandalise uselessly temples as well as statues and all such items 
without thereby aiding one’s own affairs in the slightest and without weak-
ening the enemy in the relevant war – how can one not say that this is the 
action of a raving mad character? Good men should wage war on the igno-
rant not to destroy them utterly, but to change their behaviour and correct 
their errors, and they should not destroy the innocent along with the guilty, 
but rather save those who seem to have done wrong along with the inno-
cent. For a tyrant does evil and rules his subjects through fear, hated by and 
42 See e.g. 15.22.2–3, 22.14.1–4 and 31.23–30.
43 See Eckstein (1995: 149–50). I frequently walk past a hairdresser’s window that 
proudly proclaims ‘A Reputation For Excellence Since 1956’. In the twenty-first century too, 
we are sometimes supposed to understand that a reputation for excellence is the same as true 
excellence.
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hating his subjects, but a king does good to everyone, is loved because of 
his benefactions and kindness, and rules as a leader over the willing. (Polyb. 
5.11.3–6)
We are now explicitly told that destroying the land and practically useful 
buildings of the enemy is not only allowed but, in fact, necessary accord-
ing to the ‘laws of war’ and also quite acceptable (ἀναγκάζουσιν οἱ του̂ 
πολέμου νόμοι καὶ τὰ τούτου δίκαια). If the victor destroys sacred buildings 
and objects, however, this is the sign of a sick mind. This neatly illustrates 
the close connection between the practically advantageous and the morally 
right in the Histories: it is fine to push one’s own advantage by destroying 
the land, buldings and men of the enemy, but one should not destroy any-
thing just for the sake of destroying it. Presumably there is also a religious 
reason for avoiding the destruction of sacred property, but that is not 
spelled out (and we shall return to Polybius’ lessons on piety below). It is 
worth noting that Polybius’ ‘rules of war’ pose a very different distinction 
from the rules of the Geneva Convention, which stresses the difference 
between military personnel and equipment, which are legitimate targets, 
and the civilian population and their homes, which are not. Polybius, living 
in an age where many soldiers were still citizen soldiers and an army had to 
live off the land, considers civilian homes and fields acceptable targets, and 
only religous buildings out of bounds.
Even more interesting, however, is the way in which Polybius slides from 
talking in concrete terms about allowed and off-limit targets to (in 5.11.5–
6) expressing much more general sentiments, which seem only tangentially 
related to his first point. The prescriptively moralising statement that good 
men should wage war not to destroy their enemies, but to ‘correct their 
errors’ seems slightly out of kilter with the apparently religously moti-
vated rules of war just laid out. How much less is an enemy destroyed 
if one razes every building to the ground except his temples? Even more 
confusingly, the second part of the prescription, that rather than destroy-
ing the innocent along with the guilty, the guilty should be spared so as 
not to harm the innocent, seems much closer to the Geneva Convention 
than to the Hellenistic laws of war Polybius has just propounded. It seems 
that, as in the paradeigmatic section about Antigonus Doson, Philip II and 
Alexander the Great, Polybius slides easily and unconsciously between 
a discussion of the destruction of buildings and crops to a discussion of 
general brutality on the part of the victor.
The slippage becomes obvious in the final sentence of the quoted passage, 
which states the time-honoured maxim that a tyrant rules through wicked 
deeds and fear and is hated whereas a king rules through benefactions and 
kindness and is loved. We have now evidently moved from the immediate 
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actions of a victor when overrunning a country to the long-term behaviour 
of a conqueror who intends to keep and rule his conquest. Considering the 
age of Roman conquest in which Polybius wrote, it is not surprising that 
the two situations were closely connected in his mind, but it reveals the 
close connection between the practical and the moral good in the Histories: 
although the initial, concrete lecturing on the laws of war, which was 
directly provoked by an incident in the narrative, condemns the destruction 
of religious buildings on the basis that this does not bring any concrete 
advantage, and thus seems to prioritise practical benefit over morality in a 
hierarchy of virtues, this hierarchy changes as the digression moves further 
and further away from the narrative of the incident that sparked it. No 
practical advantage is mentioned as attaching to the maxim that one should 
not aim to destroy one’s enemies, and the practical advantage of the good 
king (being loved by his subjects, who will then not revolt) is just a pleasant 
by-product of his morally good behaviour, which is an end in itself.
In the last paragraph of the digression (5.11.7–12.4), Polybius returns to 
Philip V and imagines counterfactually what would have been the reaction 
of the Aetolians if Philip had refrained from destroying their temples:44 
they would have condemned themselves, but admired Philip (αὑτω̂ν μὲν 
καταγινώσκειν, τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ θαυμάζειν) for his kingli-
ness and nobility (βασιλικω̂ς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως: 5.12.1) and have yielded to 
him. This may seem a slightly naive assumption to a cynical reader, but it 
shows how ingrained the idea that morally good conduct leads to practi-
cally good results is in the moral framework of the Histories.
Polybius concludes, in a rhetorically balanced passage that beautifully 
combines the practical with the moral:
καὶ μὴν τό γε νικῆσαι τοὺς πολεμίους καλοκαγαθίᾳ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις οὐκ 
ἐλάττω, μείζω δὲ παρέχεται χρείαν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις κατορθωμάτων. οἷς μὲν 
γὰρ δι’ ἀνάγκην, οἷς δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἰκουσιν οἱ λειφθέντες· καὶ τὰ μὲν 
μετὰ μεγάλων ἐλαττωμάτων ποεῖται τὴν διόρθωσιν, τὰ δὲ χωρὶς βλάβης πρὸς 
το βέλτιον μετατίθησι τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας.
Surely, to conquer one’s enemies by honourable and lawful behaviour is 
more, not less, useful than victories won by use of arms. For in the one 
case, the survivors yield from necessity, in the other from choice; and in the 
one case the correction of behaviour is achieved alongside great disadvan-
tages, in the other the behaviour of the wrongdoers is changed to the better 
without harm. (Polyb. 5.12.2–3)
Conquering without the use of arms is easier and cheaper, but also 
more honourable. The practical and the moral purpose are so closely 
44 On the role of such counterfactuals in Polybius see Maier (2013).
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 intertwined that it is impossible to see where one ends and the other begins. 
Such combining of the moral and the practical is a distinctive feature of 
Polybius’ writing. Many of the characters who earn the highest praise 
in the Histories are men who, in the eyes of Polybius, acted morally and 
thereby won advantages for themselves (e.g. Scipio the Elder acting as the 
moderate victor at New Carthage at 10.17–19, and Scipio the Younger 
training for political life at 31.25–30), and some of the most famous pas-
sages of the work are lengthy didactic digressions which combine the two 
aspects: 3.22–32 on the legal and moral responsibility for the Second Punic 
War, and all of book 6 on the moral and practical excellence of the Roman 
constitution.
In moral-didactic terms, that means that the reader of the Histories is 
taught that it usually pays to be good. It also means that moral advice 
and practical advice are often intermingled in prescriptive passages, par-
ticularly those that deal with how to be a good military commander (see 
below).
The Ability to Handle the Vicissitudes of Fortune
In the preface to the Histories, quoted above, Polybius states that the study 
of history is both ‘the truest education and training for civic engagement’ 
and ‘the most vivid and indeed only teacher of how to bear the vicissitudes 
of fortune with dignity’. This is an announcement of a twofold didac-
tic purpose: partly to offer practical and moral advice specifically for the 
politician, partly to provide moral examples to follow and avoid for the 
private person who finds himself a victim of shifting fortunes. In schol-
arship on Polybius it is the first purpose that has received by far the most 
attention. However, it is surely of no little interest that the – at first glance 
rather more limited and entirely moral – lesson of how to bear the ups 
and downs of life with dignity occupies as important a place in Polybius’ 
purpose statement as the broader lesson, both practical and moral, of how 
to engage in political life.
The theme is also prominent in the second preface, where the narra-
tor, as we have seen above (p. 26), explains that he cannot end his work 
in 167 bc as originally envisioned because the reader would be unable 
to ‘form a considered opinion’ (ποιήσασθαι τὴν διάληψιν) about people 
and states on the basis of their successes (τω̂ν κατορθωμάτων) and fail-
ures (τω̂ν ἐλαττωμάτων) alone. Such an opinion can only be formed on 
the basis of the manner in which the two parties handled their respective 
success and misfortune. It is clear from the use of the nouns κατόρθωμα 
and ἐλάττωμα that Polybius here thinks of success and failure primarily in 
military terms, as victory and defeat. More specifically, the last ten books 
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of the Histories are supposed to offer the reader a sound basis for ‘forming 
a considered opinion’ about how Rome handled the good fortune that was 
world dominance, and how the conquered states handled their correspond-
ing misfortune.
The fact that the theme of human ability to cope with good and bad 
fortune is central to both of Polybius’ prefaces shows that it was at the 
heart of what he wanted to do with his Histories. No other ancient histori-
ographer puts this theme front and centre to the same degree. Throughout 
the Histories the theme permeates the work at every level. It also figures in 
programmatic statements outside of the prefaces (1.35), and it lies at the 
heart of Polybius’ fascination with the Roman constitution, which shows 
its worth in that it prevents the state from growing overconfident in good 
fortune (Polyb. 6.18.5–6). It is a frequent topic in speeches delivered by 
characters (e.g. the speeches of Scipio and Hannibal to each other after the 
Battle of Zama, 15.6.4–8.14), and it is the most common topic for explicit 
moralising in the work as a whole.45 Perhaps surprisingly when seen from 
the point of view of modern readers, the focus is more often on the ability 
to bear success than to bear misfortune. In the world of the Histories the 
temptation to overstep the boundaries when successful is quite simply the 
one thing that most often leads human beings astray from the path of 
morality.46 The mistake is so common that success, especially political or 
military success, becomes a sort of test, which most men fail by becoming 
arrogant and abusive, and only a few pass by staying humble and humane.
The first explicit moralising on a character’s handling of changeable for-
tunes is 1.35. This is the conclusion to the story of how the Roman consul 
M. Atilius Regulus first defeats the Carthaginians in battle and arrogantly 
offers them such harsh conditions that they decide to fight on, whereupon 
he himself is defeated in battle and taken captive by the Carthaginians:
᾿Εν ᾧ καιρῷ πολλά τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπισημαινόμενος εὕροι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν 
τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ 
μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον ἐφάνη πᾶσιν τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου 
συμπτωμάτων· ὁ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον οὐ διδοὺς ἔλεον οὐδὲ συγγνώμην τοῖς 
πταίουσιν παρὰ πόδας αὐτὸς ἤγετο δεησόμενος τούτων περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
σωτηρίας.
45 Passages moralising explicitly on how to handle good and bad fortune: 1.35.1–3, 2.2–4, 
3.31.2–4, 4.48.5–13, 5.46.6–7, 6.2.5–6, 6.10, 6.18.5–6. 6.44, 8.20.8–12, 8.21.10–11, 9.42.5–8, 
10.17.6–19, 10.40, 11.2, 15.6.3–8.14, 15.17.4, 18.33.4–7, 18.37, 25.3.9–10, 27.8.8–9, 29.20, 
30.6–9, 36.4.9–5.5. 
46 The importance of bearing good fortune with moderation is propounded so often in 
the Histories that Walbank (1957: 19) terms it ‘the same trite homily’ repeated with ‘monot-
onous regularity’.
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If one distinguishes correctly, it is possible to find in this situation much to 
contribute to the correction of human life. Because of what happened to 
Marcus, everyone at the time saw clearly that fortune should be distrusted, 
especially in times of success. For he who only a little before had not offered 
pity or mercy to the defeated was almost immediately himself led away to 
beg for his own life from these same people. (Polyb. 1.35.1–3)
This prescriptively moralising conclusion makes the narrative of Regulus 
a didactic paradeigma and an interpretative template for the many similar 
stories that follow.47 The passage links back to the implicitly moralis-
ing narrative of Regulus’ earlier treatment of the ambassadors from the 
defeated Carthaginians (1.31). Here, Regulus was said to make ‘harsh 
demands’ (τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων: 1.31.6; τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρκου: 
1.31.7) because he believed that he had already won the final victory (ὡς 
ἤδη κεκρατηκὼς τῶν ὅλων: 1.31.6). In this he was clearly mistaken, and his 
mistake leads to his own undoing, demonstrating that, in typical Polybian 
fashion, it would have been more advantageous to have behaved with mod-
eration and humility. Despite the fact that Regulus’ situation was quite 
different from that of the men he had previously humiliated – they were 
ambassadors negotiating on behalf of their threatened city; Regulus is a 
captive, but his city is not under direct threat – the narrator makes it sound 
as if he has swapped places with the men he previously humiliated: ‘he who 
only a little before . . . was almost immediately himself led away to beg for 
his own life from these same people’. The result is an emphasis on the strik-
ing, paradoxical or ironic in the change in Regulus’ circumstances, which 
gives it an air of a dramatic peripeteia.
Regulus thus fails the test of good fortune. So does the rebel Achaeus, 
whose adoption of the royal title was used as an example of moralising 
by means of evaluative vocabulary above (pp. 35–6). His capture and exe-
cution by Antiochus III later earn a moralising conclusion admonishing 
the reader to trust no one easily (μηδενὶ πιστεύειν ῥᾳδίως) and not to be 
boastful in success (μὴ μεγαλαυχεῖν ἐν ταῖς εὐπραγίαις) because, ‘being 
human’, we need always to be prepared for everything (πᾶν δὲ προσδοκᾶν 
ἀνθρώπους ὄντας: 8.21.11). Similarly, the Aetolians are turned into a neg-
ative paradeigma in 2.2–4. Here they lay siege to the city of Medium, and 
when the city is on the verge of giving in just before the annual election 
of the Aetolian strategos, the retiring strategos claims his right before the 
Aetolian Assembly to a part of the spoils when the city falls. The Assembly 
decides that both the retiring and the new strategos will have their part, 
47 It seems that the laudatory Regulus legend of the Roman tradition, seen most famously 
in Hor. Carm. 3.5 and Cic. Off. 3.99, had not yet taken root at the time of Polybius; see Leach 
(2014). 
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and that both names will be inscribed on the victory dedication. Shortly 
afterwards the Medionians receive help from the Illyrians, who overwhelm 
the Aetolian lines and liberate the city. The Medionians celebrate and ded-
icate the captured arms to the gods with a mocking inscription mentioning 
both the retired and the new Aetolian strategos. The narrator concludes:
τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις 
συμβαινόντων ἐνδεικνυμένης τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν. ἃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν 
αὐτοὶ προσεδόκων ὅσον ἤδη πείσεσθαι, ταῦτα πράττειν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις 
παρέδωκεν ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τῇ 
παραδόξῳ χρησάμενοι συμφορᾷ πάντας ἐδίδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι περὶ 
τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἤδη γεγονότος, μηδὲ προκατελπίζειν βεβαιουμένους ὑπὲρ 
ὧν ἀκμὴν ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν ἄλλως γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ παραδόξῳ 
πανταχῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.
Fortune, as if on purpose, demonstrating its power to other human beings 
by what had happened to these men. For the things which they themselves 
had been expecting imminently to suffer at the hands of their enemies she 
granted them to do themselves to those enemies a very short time later. And 
the Aetolians, in suffering this unexpected disaster, taught everyone never to 
deliberate about the future as if it has already happened and never to expect 
firmly things which may yet possibly turn out otherwise, but to allot a 
portion to the unexpected in all matters since we are human, and especially 
in war. (Polyb. 2.4.3–5)
Again we see the sudden change in circumstances attributed to fortune 
(tyche), and again we have a reminder that we are only human and thus 
cannot know the future. As in the Regulus passage, there is also a deliber-
ate mirroring of previous success with present misfortune (the inscription 
on the shields mocking the decree of the Aetolians), and it is hinted that 
an abusive or overconfident victor is brought low exactly because of his 
abusiveness or overconfidence. These features are all typical of Polybius’ 
moralising on the topic of the changeability of fortune and human ability 
to cope with it. It is important to point out, however, that Polybius – in 
contrast with Diodorus, as we shall see in the next chapter – never explic-
itly says that such actions or attitudes are punished by tyche or the divine; 
the closest he gets is saying that it ‘looked as if’ tyche had punished the 
overconfident (2.4.3, 1.86.7, 20.7.2).48 Nonetheless it is a fact, and a very 
didactic one, that characters in the Histories who do not know how to 
handle good fortune with moderation usually come to sticky ends.49
While most characters in the Histories fall into the trap of becoming 
overconfident in good fortune, there are a heroic few who avoid the pitfall. 
48 Contra Roveri (1982: 322), who uses 2.4.3–5 as an example of tyche acting as punisher. 
For a discussion of the concept of tyche in Polybius see Hau (2011).
49 See e.g. 1.35.1–3, 2.2–4, 4.48.5–13 with 8.20, 5.46.6–7 with 5.48, 25.3.9–10.
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The first conspicuous example (in the extant text) is Scipio Africanus the 
Elder. After his victories over the Carthaginians in Iberia the former allies 
of the Carthaginians come over to his side in droves, and they address him 
as ‘king’. Scipio is here in a situation similar to that of Achaeus, but he 
handles the situation rather better, and tells the Iberians that ‘he wanted 
to be called kingly by everyone and to truly live up to that, but that he did 
not want to be king or to be called king by anyone’.50 The narrator then 
launches into an evaluative digression in praise of this action, stating that 
it proves Scipio’s ‘greatness of soul’ (μεγαλοψυχία) that he did not accept 
what tyche offered him (10.40.6). It is even more impressive, the narrator 
says, that Scipio rejected the temptation later in life when he was the con-
queror of the entire world and was hailed as king everywhere, and this truly 
shows to what degree ‘Scipio surpassed other men in greatness of soul’.51
The two other characters who conspicuously avoid the trap are Aemilius 
Paullus and his adopted son, grandson of Scipio the Elder, Scipio Africanus 
the Younger. Both of these express the Polybian message in a speech deliv-
ered to fellow-Romans using a defeated enemy as an example of the change-
ability of fortune: Scipio the Younger points to the surrendered Carthaginian 
statesman Hasdrubal and declares that this demonstrates the power of tyche 
and teaches that human beings should not become overconfident (μηδέποτε 
λέγειν μηδὲ πράττειν μηδὲν ὑπερήφανον ἄνθρωπον ὄντα: 38.20); Aemilius 
Paullus expresses the doctrine in more detail when presenting the captured 
Perseus to the Senate (in an example of a speech that gains its didactic 
authority from corresponding to narratorial moralising elsewhere in the 
work, 29.20). Both of these examples spring from the type of situation that 
most often sparks Polybian moralising on the right way to handle good 
fortune, namely scenes of the victorious general. In these situations the ques-
tion of how to behave in great success becomes a question of how to treat 
the defeated and/or captives, and the challenge – which most victors fail – is 
to show mildness and magnanimity because of a realisation that we are all 
human beings and subjects of unstable fortune.52 A corollary of such an 
awareness of one’s humanity, with its limited control and its solidarity with 
other human beings, is that the victor treats the defeated mildly, not because 
they deserve it, but because this is the way to preserve his own honour and 
enhance his own glory (see especially 15.17.4). This then becomes a way of 
breaking the circle of revenge dictated by traditional Greek morality.53
50 βούλεσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν, βασιλεύς γε μὴν οὔτ᾽ 
εἶναι θέλειν οὔτε λέγεσθαι παρ᾽ οὐδενί: 10.40.5.
51 τοσοῦτον ὑπερέθετο μεγαλοψυχίᾳ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους: 10.40.9.
52 Examples are: 9.42–5–8, 10.17–19, 15.4.6–12, 15.17.4, 22.16.
53 Such ‘victor-after-the-victory scenes’ have been discussed in detail as a type-scene in 
Greek historiography more generally in Hau (2008).
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An interesting variation on the paradeigma of the good, moderate victor 
is the crying general. The most famous example is Scipio the Younger at 
the burning of Carthage. In a short fragment found in the Constantinian 
excerpts Scipio and Polybius, as a character in his own work, are watch-
ing the flames together, and Scipio exclaims ‘Polybius, this is a glorious 
moment, but somehow I fear and foresee that some day someone else 
will give this same order with regard to my country.’54 The quotation is 
followed by an enthusiastic endorsement by the narrator, who labels the 
ability to keep in mind, at the moment of victory, the instability of human 
fortune and the possibility that it may be turned around in the future ‘a 
characteristic of a great man and one worthy of remembrance’ (μεγάλου 
καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου μνήμης: 38.21.3). From the later historian 
Appian55 we have testimony about what the rest of the scene looked like. 
In a passage which professes to be a summary of Polybius, Scipio cries for 
his enemy (δακρῦσαι καὶ φανερὸς γενέσθαι κλαίων ὑπὲρ πολεμίων) and 
quotes the Iliad 6.448-9, which predicts the fall of Troy, as an allegory for 
the future fall of Rome. It is probably safe to assume that the narratorial 
endorsement in the original Histories encompassed both the Homeric quo-
tation and the tears beside the first exclamation.56 Earlier in the Histories, 
Antiochus III bursts into tears when looking at the captured rebel Achaeus 
(8.20.9–10), who has been threatening his rule for years. The narrator com-
ments: ‘This happened to him, I think, because he saw how unexpected and 
impossible to guard against events caused by tyche can be.’57 Thirdly, in 
Diodorus 27.6.1, which almost certainly used Polybius as a source, Scipio 
the Elder cries at the sight of the captured Syphax.58
It seems that tears at the sight of a defeated enemy are an appropriate 
response in Polybius. The tears must be provoked by pity for the van-
quished, but the pity seems closely bound up with an intellectual and 
emotional realisation that fortunes are changeable and that the same fate 
may at some time in the future strike the victor himself (or his country). 
This is a different sort of pity from the one encouraged by Christianity, 
which does not rely on any sense that a similar fate may strike the pitier, 
and is strongly connected with compassion; but it is closely related to 
the Aristotelian description of pity as an emotion felt for someone 
54 ‘ὦ Πολύβιε,’ ἐφ́η ‘καλὸν μέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπ́ως ἐγὼ δέδια καὶ προορῶμαι μή ποτέ τις 
ἀλ́λος τοῦτο τὸ παράγγελμα δώσει περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πατρίδος·: 38.21.1.
55 App. Pun. 132, included in the Loeb edition of Polybius as 38.22.
56 For a cogent argument about which one of the three versions of this passage to accept 
as Polybius’ original see Walbank (1979: ad loc.).
57 τοῦτο δ' ἔπαθεν ὁρῶν, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸ δυσφύλακτον καὶ παράλογον τῶν ἐκ τῆς τύχης 
συμβαινόντων: 8.20.10.
58 The tears of Scipio are briefly discussed by Brink and Walbank (1954: 104), who argue 
that this response marks him out in the Histories as a ‘sensitive Hellenist’.
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similar to oneself  suffering something that might conveivably happen to 
oneself.59
We may wonder whether the crying victor is perhaps a way for the 
historiographer to make otherwise criticisable behaviour towards the 
defeated (such as burning their city) or the captured (such as executing 
them, perhaps after parading them in a triumph) into something that can 
be praised and used as a positive moral paradeigma, but Polybius may not 
have thought about it in such cynical terms. He may have considered the 
execution of enemy leaders such as Perseus and Syphax, and perhaps even 
the burning of Carthage (although see above, p. 37), a military necessity to 
ensure the safety of the victor’s own city, much as the burning of farmland 
and the killing of the inhabitants were considered acceptable in the ‘rules 
of war’ passage discussed above. In that case, the difference between a 
humble and an overconfident victor becomes the perpetrating or avoid-
ance of extra, unnecessary harm to the captives, and the state of mind in 
which the burning of the city was executed. That is, if Scipio the Elder 
had tortured and humiliated Syphax, or if Scipio the Younger had laughed 
and joked while burning Carthage, they would have been made into nega-
tive paradeigmata.60 As it is, the tears and the expressed awareness of the 
changeability of fortune make them positive ones.
Considering the emphasis in the Histories on the changeability of fortune 
and the right way to handle success, we might expect an equally codified 
system for how to cope with misfortune. In fact, moralising on the ability 
or inability to handle misfortune and defeat is significantly less frequent. 
The most explicit paradeigma is Philip V after his defeat at Cynoscephalae . 
In an evaluative digression the narrator expresses his surprise that someone 
who did not know how to behave in success could handle defeat so well 
(18.33.1–4). Three specific actions of Philip are praised: that he has done 
everything he could to win the battle, that he makes an effort to gather 
the survivors, and that he burns the royal correspondence in order not to 
implicate anyone else in his downfall. What is admired is Philip’s ability to 
show forethought even in this extreme situation by exercising some degree 
of damage control instead of fleeing in panic. In other words, Philip is 
praised for keeping his head in misfortune and for not taking others with 
him in his fall.
Such cool-headed, rational behaviour in defeat is generally admired in 
the Histories. Various peoples are praised for not panicking and for stand-
59 Arist. Rh. 2.8 1385b. For a lucid discussion of this view of pity see Pelling (2012).
60 In practice, considering Polybius’ friendship with the younger Scipio and his Roman 
readership, this might have been difficult. If Polybius had wanted to criticise either Scipio’s 
behaviour as victor, he would have had to do it subtly, in a similar way to his questioning of 
the justice of destroying Carthage in 36.9 (see above, p. 37).
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ing by their principles even in defeat. Thus, after their defeat by Regulus, 
the Carthaginians refuse his unreasonable conditions γενναίως (1.31.8); 
after Cannae the Roman Senate prevents the populace from panicking 
and considers their options ἀνδρωδῶς (3.118.7); and after a defeat in the 
Social War the Achaeans keep standing by their allies and bear the disaster 
γενναίως (4.15.5): each situation functions as a paradeigma contributing 
to the purpose Polybius declared for his work in his preface. Similarly, but 
more dramatically, individuals are usually praised for their ability to accept 
when they are beaten and for their courage in facing the consequences, 
be they forced negotiations (Hamilcar Barca, 1.62.3–6), compliance with 
harsh demands (Hannibal, 15.19.8; Mago the Bruttian, 36.4.9–5.5) or 
even death (Cleomenes, 5.38–9; Hasdrubal, 11.2). A fragment from De 
Virtutibus et Vitiis is a lengthy evaluative digression contrasting good and 
bad behaviour in extreme political misfortune (30.6–9). It discusses the 
actions of the Greek statesmen who had opposed Rome and were faced 
with the consequences after the Battle of Pydna. Some committed suicide 
and are elaborately praised by the narrator (30.7.1–4). Others, who had 
never been openly on the side of Perseus, faced charges and resourcefully 
defended themselves in court. They are also praised, if a little less enthu-
siastically (30.7.5–8). A third category, however, panicked, accused others 
in order to save themselves, and fled from one corner of the Greek world 
to the other, thereby bringing other people into danger by asking for pro-
tection, until they were finally apprehended and executed. This category 
is turned into a detailed and scornful negative paradeigma (30.8–9). They 
are criticised not for being on the wrong side or for failing in their political 
endeavours (as argued by Walbank 1965), but for not having the courage 
to take responsibility for their own actions and face the consequences.61
The overall message is that human beings cannot control the world, that 
we may all be brought to the extremes of good and bad fortune in our lives, 
but that we can control our own reactions to such events and that we must 
bear either with equal dignity (the γενναίως of the preface). In success this 
means staying humble and humane; in disaster it means keeping a clear 
61 This passage is lucidly discussed by Eckstein (1995: 40–3), whose excellent book 
offers a discussion of many aspects of Polybius’ moralising and connects it with biographical 
details of Polybius’ life. He concludes that Polybius’ moral stance is that of the traditional 
Greek elite, and that his main message is an exhortation to his fellow-aristocrats, Greek and 
Roman, to combine this ethos with the courage to take significant action and live with its 
consequences. It will become clear from the analysis offered below that I largely agree with 
Eckstein on the traditional nature of Polybius’ views, although I believe that there are two 
significant exceptions to it. Likewise I agree that courage to take action and live with its 
consequences was one of Polybius’ moral messages, but taking this as his only message is 
too narrow a view of a long and complex text. The passage is also well discussed by Petzold 
(1969: 59–60). 
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head and carrying on if possible, or facing the consequences unflinchingly 
if there is no other way out.
Courage, Reason and the Good Commander
Apart from the ability to handle success, the two virtues most often praised 
in the Histories are courage and reason. Let us begin with the more tradi-
tional virtue, namely courage.
The courage to face defeat which has been discussed above fits into 
a larger Polybian didactic message about taking responsibility for one’s 
actions. Into this category fall several passages which blame a people for 
its own disaster, such as the digression castigating the Epirotes for allow-
ing a garrison stronger than their own city and made up of barbarians 
(2.7.5–12), and the famous digression on why the Greek catastrophe of 
145 bc was worse than the Carthaginian one of 146 bc (answer: because 
they could not blame it on fortune, but only on their own folly, 38.1–3). 
Passages such as these show that Eckstein is right to take the courage to 
face the consequences of one’s actions as one of the major moral lessons a 
reader is supposed to draw from the Histories.62
More traditional, physical courage of the type shown on the battle-
field is equally prominent in the didactic programme of the Histories. The 
nouns τόλμα, ἀνδρεῖα, εὐψυχία and γενναιότης as well as their adjective and 
adverb cognates, proliferate in battle descriptions and are clearly meant 
to be worthy of imitation (see e.g. 3.116–117). The repeated instances of 
such characteristics making the difference between victory and defeat,63 or 
between a city’s being lost or saved,64 amount to implicit moralising by the 
correlation between behaviour and result. The fierce but futile resistance 
against Philip V by the citizens of Abydus discussed above (pp. 40–2 is the 
exception that proves the rule: in the moralising digression that precedes 
the treachery of the elders and thereby the fall of the city and the mass 
suicide of the citizens, the narrator states that:
διὸ καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀβυδηνῶν περιπετείας μέμψαιτο τῇ τύχῃ, διότι 
τὰς μὲν τῶν προειρημένων συμφορὰς οἷον ἐλεήσασα παραυτίκα διωρθώσατο, 
περιθεῖσα τὴν νίκην ἅμα καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν τοῖς ἀπηλπισμένοις, περὶ δ᾽ 
Ἀβυδηνῶν τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν.
Therefore one might well blame fortune for the dramatic change in the 
Abydenes’ situation because she, as if in pity, immediately set right the fates 
of the aforementioned peoples and brought about victory and salvation for 
62 Eckstein (1995: passim, esp. 210–25, 272–83).
63 See e.g. 1.53.13, 2.33.7 with 2.32.9–10, 5.4.6–13.
64 See e.g. 1.36.7, 2.9.1–6, 4.57.2–58, 5.76.11.
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those who had lost all hope, but for the Abydenes she held the opposite 
judgement. (Polyb. 16.32.5)
Polybius clearly thinks that the Abydenes should have been saved by their 
bravery, and the fact that they were not is so inexplicable that it can only 
be put down to the work of fortune.65 Usually in the Histories, courage is 
one of the main qualities needed for success, not only in individual battles, 
but also in the long term. Thus, one of the main benefits of the Roman 
constitution is that it instils courage into its citizens (6.52–5), and it is this 
constitution that has won Rome world supremacy (6.2.8–10).
On an individual level, courage is displayed conspicuously by the major 
heroes of the Histories (Philopoemen. 2.67–9; Scipio the Younger, 31.29’ 
35.4), and is a stock characteristic of any good man, listed along with 
other qualities such as – typically – good birth, generosity, moderation 
and intelligence.66 At the opposite end of the spectrum, cowardice is one 
of the vices typically listed for any bad character in the Histories, along 
with other undesirable qualities such as laziness, greed and effeminacy 
(e.g. Agathocles, 15.34; Prusias, 36.15). Some major villains, however, are 
brave, but morally corrupt: Antiochus III displays bravery at 11.39.15–16, 
but turns into a villain at 15.20; Philip V is described as courageous at 
4.77–8 and turns bad at 7.11. The Celtic barbarians are inherently brave,67 
but are ultimately ineffective because their bravery is not tempered with 
reason (2.35.2–3). A good man in the Histories needs a combination of 
courage and reason, steered by a moral compass.
Likewise, a good military commander in the Histories needs to be brave, 
but to hold his courage in check with reason. Reason is particularly empha-
sised in two of the work’s longest digressions, one offering general thoughts 
about the qualities that make a good commander (9.12–20; the context is 
lost) and one focusing particularly on the qualities of Scipio Africanus the 
Elder (10.2–5). The digression on the generic good commander is obvi-
ously didactic, but less obviously moralising. The digression begins with 
the statement that success is possible in every military endeavour if one 
acts with reason (σὺν νῷ: 9.12.1) and that fewer things are achieved in war 
‘in the open and with force’ (προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας) than ‘with trickery 
and good timing’ (μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ: 9.12.2). It continues to state 
that most mistakes are due to a commander’s ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and 
65 A possibly parallel case is 16.22a, a fragment extolling the courage of the inhabitants 
of Gaza, according to the epitomiser in connection with the narrative of Antiochus III’s 
sacking of the city. It is, however, impossible to see whether the narrator in the original text 
had anything to say about the futility of the bravery displayed here.
66 See e.g. 21.9, 22.22, 31.11–14.
67 See e.g. 1.78.1–9, 2.30.7, 22.21.
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carelessness/inactivity (ῥᾳθυμίας), with no mention of courage or cow-
ardice (9.12.4). Then the advice gets more specific: a commander must 
be secretive (9.13.1–5), must know how to calculate the length and time 
of marches (9.13.6), how to choose the right time for the execution of his 
plans (9.13.7) and how to select suitable signals and countersignals as well 
as accomplices (9.13.9). He needs first- and second-hand knowledge of the 
terrain (9.14.1–4) and theoretical knowledge of astronomy and geometry 
(9.14.5–15 and 20). There are plenty of things that cannot be foreseen – the 
examples given are all instances of extreme weather – so the commander 
has a duty to foresee at least the ones that can be (9.16.4). Examples are 
then given of military stratagems which have failed through a lack of fore-
sight or the incompetence of the commander (9.17–19). The failures are 
labelled with moral terms (αἰσχρῶς: 9.18.3; μετ’ αἰσχύνης: 9.18.9), which 
demonstrates once again the extent to which the moral and the practical 
converge in Polybius’ didacticism.
At the end of the digression, a reader is left with the impression that the 
good commander in Polybius’ Histories is a creature entirely of the mind, 
with no room for emotion or morality. This impression is strengthened 
by a digression in the following book which serves to introduce Scipio 
Africanus the Elder into the narrative. This digression begins on a polemi-
cal note with the statement that people are bound to get the wrong impres-
sion about this great man because existing accounts of his life are very 
wide of the mark (10.2.1–3). The problem, it turns out, is that people gen-
erally ascribe Scipio’s successes partly to divine influence or good fortune, 
whereas they were really due to his own intelligence (10.2.4–13). Polybius 
goes on to argue this case by narrating two incidents from Scipio’s youth. 
The second incident is the notorious case where Scipio makes a rational 
calculation (λογιζόμενος: 10.4.3) of his brother’s best chances of gaining 
the aedileship and then lies to his mother and pretends to have received 
a divine dream, which she proceeds to help him fulfil (10.4.1–5.8).68 The 
first incident, however, is interesting for what it shows about the inter-
play between courage and reason in the ideal Polybian commander: here, 
Scipio, on his very first military campaign as a 17-year old, sees his father 
in danger on the battlefield and charges his attackers alone ‘with reckless 
daring’ (παραβόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς: 10.3.5). He saves his father and thereby 
gains a reputation for bravery, but then in subsequent years, when the fate 
of Rome depends on him, only rarely (σπανίως: 10.3.7)69 exposes himself 
to danger. ‘This’, concludes the narrator, ‘is the characteristic of a com-
68 This has grated on the sensibilities of many modern scholars; see e.g. Pédech (1964: 
222–3) and Walbank (1967: ad loc.).
69 σπανίως is a conjecture for the πάντως of the manuscript, which would give the oppo-
site meaning and make the sentence nonsensical. See Walbank (1967: ad loc.).
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mander not trusting in fortune, but possessing intelligence’ (ὅπερ ἴδιόν 
ἐστιν οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύοντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἡγεμόνος: 10.3.7).
On the basis of especially these two digressions, Pédech has argued that 
Polybius valued pure, rational pragmatism over moral considerations and 
traditional Greek values. Pédech argues that the heroes of the Histories, 
especially Hannibal, Scipio Africanus and Philopoemen, come off as very 
similar because they all show the qualities that Polybius admired, namely 
primarily cold, rational calculation. As the work progresses into events 
Polybius himself had experienced, these heroes become fewer and further 
between because the historical characters he had actually met could not 
so easily be fitted into this preconceived mould.70 There is some truth 
in this, but it is not the whole truth, as Eckstein has clearly shown.71 
Firstly, Polybius nowhere says that the commander must never participate 
in the fighting, only that he should choose his battles carefully. This is even 
true in the digression where he compares the Roman general Marcellus, 
who got himself killed in battle ‘more like a fool than like a general’ 
(ἀκακώτερον ἢ στρατηγικώτερον: 10.32.7), and Hannibal, who managed 
to stay alive through many years of dangerous campaigning (10.32.7–33.8): 
the message is that a general should participate only in major engagements 
where ‘everything is at risk’ (οἷς συμπάσχει τὰ ὅλα: 10.32.9). Secondly, 
Polybius often expresses great admiration for commanders who fight in 
the front line even when that leads to their death. Eckstein gives as prime 
example the narrative of how Philopoemen, after routing the mercenaries 
of the Spartan tyrant Machanidas, leaves the battlefield in order to hunt 
down the tyrant and face him in single combat (11.17–18). The story is 
told with much evaluating phrasing, and the reader is clearly meant to 
admire the victorious, heroic Philopoemen. However, such behaviour by a 
military commander, especially of a newly instituted and still fragile force, 
can hardly be called calculated or well-reasoned. As contributory evidence 
Eckstein adds the death in battle of Hamilcar Barca (2.1.7–8), the last battle 
of the Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus (16.5) and the wounding in battle 
of Antiochus III (10.49), all narrated with admiration and approval by the 
Polybian narrator.
As Eckstein observes, it is possible to reconcile these heroic narratives 
with the digressions that focus on a commander’s rational intelligence: 
Polybius’ message is clearly that a military commander needs to possess 
a combination of courage and intelligence, and that he needs the latter 
in order to decide when the time is right to display the former. In fact, 
Polybius’ Hannibal and Scipio Africanus are both excellent examples of 
70 Pédech (1964: 216–29).
71 Eckstein (1995: 28–40).
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commanders who successfully combine these two traits.72 The exception 
that proves the rule is Aratus the Elder, whose unique combination (τὴν 
ἰδιότητα τῆς φύσεως: 4.7.11) of acute mental abilities and daring in strata-
gems with cowardice in the face of battle presents enough of a problem for 
Polybius to devote a special digression to its discussion (4.7.11–8).
It is surely significant, however, that calculating reason is stressed as the 
prime quality of a good commander in theoretical, polemical digressions of 
high rhetoric, whereas courage and a commander’s presence on the battle-
field remain important in the narrative of events and short praise passages. 
It seems that Polybius was prepared to argue the case for pure reason in 
strong tones where he felt it was polemically important, that is, as part of a 
debate about the nature of Scipio’s successes (unfortunately we do not have 
the context of the digression on the good commander, so we do not know 
what sparked it), but that he was equally happy to present the heroic 
actions of commanders in the battle line as positive paradeigmata when 
not contesting a specific point.73 It may be going too far to say that Polybius 
advocated one type of behaviour with his head and another with his heart, 
but it is a fact that the moral lessons of his Histories had room for both.
A few further qualities round off the good commander. These are 
perhaps best seen through their opposites, in a digression on the impor-
tance for a commander of knowing the moral weaknesses of his opponent 
(3.81). The potential weaknesses are: carelessness (ῥαθυμίαν) and lack of 
initiative (ἀργίαν), drunkenness (τὴν πρὸς τὸν οἶνον ἐπιθυμίαν), addiction 
to sex (τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁρμάς) and – singled out as the most dangerous 
vices for a commander – cowardice and stupidity (δειλία καὶ βλακεία). 
Then, as most useful for the enemy and most risky for the commander’s 
own side, there is added the group of rashness (προπέτεια), over-boldness 
(θρασύτης) and unthinking passion (θυμὸς ἄλογος) along with vanity and 
delusion (κενοδοξία καὶ τῦφος). In the narrative of events, most of these 
play a part: carelessness and lack of initiative are the main flaws of Hanno 
(νωθρῶς: 1.74.2 and 13), rashness that of the much-maligned Minucius 
(τόλμαν: 3.104.8–9) and unthinking passion that of Flaminius (θυμοῦ 
πλήρης: 3.82.2), who occasioned the digression. No one in the extant text 
gets killed as a direct result of his vanity, but several generals are castigated 
for being all show and no substance (e.g. Aristocrates of Rhodes, 33.4).74 
72 Hannibal, 3.17, 3.69.12–14, 3.78.5–79; Scipio Africanus, 10.2–5 (as discussed above) 
and 10.13–14.
73 This is parallel to his use of tyche, which is treated as a force of no account in compar-
ison with human reason in polemical passages, as a predestining force in rhetorical passages 
and as a figure of speech in the narrative of events. See Hau (2011).
74 Other good generals are: Fabius, 3.89.2–3 (intelligently cautious); Aemilius Paullus, 
3.106.11 (courageous and intelligent) and 3.116.9–11 (dutiful and brave); Diophanes of 
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Drunkenness and an addiction to sexual pleasures are never (in the extant 
text) shown to affect a battle, but are typical characteristics of the bad 
ruler, as we shall see below. On the positive side, Hannibal is repeatedly 
praised for taking good care of his soldiers with the result that they remain 
unfailingly loyal to him even under extreme circumstances,75 but other-
wise the relationship between the commander and his men is not one that 
receives a lot of attention, a fact which distinguishes Polybius significantly 
from the other soldier-historian of this study, Xenophon.
The Good King: Benefactions, Non-Violence and 
Moderate Living
Just like military commanders, kings play a large part in Polybius’ Histories 
and are often turned into moral paradeigmata.76 Hellenistic kings were, of 
course, also military commanders, and for this reason they are regularly 
praised for having or criticised for lacking both courage and intelligence. 
They did, however, need many more qualities besides, and Polybius is 
pleasingly consistent in which ones to recommend to his readers.
This can be seen from a comparison of three evaluative digressions prais-
ing good kings: Hiero II of Syracuse (7.8.1–8), Eumenes II of Pergamum 
(32.8) and Massinissa of Numidia (36.16). To begin with Hiero: he won 
power entirely by his own talents (7.8.1) and without harming any of his 
citizens (7.8.2) and maintained it in the same way (7.8.3), which the nar-
rator labels ‘the most unexpected thing of all’ (ὃ πάντων παραδοξότατον: 
7.8.3). Indeed there were no plots against him throughout his fifty-four-
year-long rule (7.8.4). This is posited as the reason why Hiero could rule 
without killing or exiling citizens (γάρ: 7.8.4), but in the didactic world of 
the Histories it is fair to assume that causation also works the other way: he 
treated his citizens well, and they rewarded him with loyalty. The tyrant is 
then praised for having done great benefactions to the Greeks in an attempt 
to win a great reputation (εὐεργετικώτατος καὶ φιλοδοξότατος γενόμενος 
εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας: 7.8.6) and thereby won great fame for himself and good-
will towards his city (μεγάλην μὲν αὑτῷ δόξαν, οὐ μικρὰν δὲ Συρακοσίοις 
Megalopolis, 21.9 (physical strength and bravery); Opimius, 33.10.4–11(intelligence). Other 
bad generals are: Tiberius, 3.70.7 (ambitious and overconfident); Flaminius, 3.80, 3.81.12–
82.8, 3.83.6–84.15 (overconfident and incompetent); Antiochus III at Raphia; 5.85.11–13 
(young and inexperienced). 
75 See e.g. 3.14.2–4, 3.60.1–7, 11.19.4.
76 As discussed in the Introduction to this study, that does not mean that only kings 
could learn from their examples. It is entirely possible to adapt the positive characteristics of 
Polybian kings to fit the private circumstances of any reader, and the main lesson – that good 
kings win praise and fame in the pages of history while bad ones are blackened forever – is 
a salutary one.
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εὔνοιαν: 7.8.6). Finally, although he lived amidst luxury, he managed to 
stay moderate (σώφρονος: 7.8.8) and thereby kept mentally and physically 
fit into old age.77
Eumenes and Massinissa do not quite map on to this template because 
they were both born to power, but their achievements are nevertheless 
similar, both to those of Hiero and to those of each other. In all cases, 
the king’s greatest achievement is said to be increasing the wealth 
of his country, for Eumenes by adding territory (32.8.3–4), in the case 
of Massinissa by turning desert into farmland (36.16.7–9). The second of 
Eumenes’ great deeds is his benefactions towards the Greeks, which he, 
like Hiero, performed φιλοδοξότατος (32.8.5). The fact that Eumenes and 
Hiero carried out their benefactions with an eye to their resulting fame 
is portrayed as a positive, not a negative. As with Antigonus Doson and 
Philip V (see above, pp. 44–5), the reputation is assumed to reflect reality, 
and there is nothing wrong with gaining a practical advantage from per-
forming morally good deeds; in fact, if the world works as it should, the 
good deeds should automatically result in such an advantage. The third is 
the fact that Eumenes kept his three brothers loyal throughout his reign, a 
parallel to Massinissa and his family enjoying mutual εὔνοια (36.16.6), and 
perhaps to the loyalty Hiero enjoyed from his subjects. To an even greater 
degree than Hiero, Massinissa is praised for preserving his bodily strength 
into old age (36.16.1–5) while Eumenes’ loss of physical strength is made 
up for by stressing his continued brilliance of mind (32.8.1). On the basis of 
these praise passages a pattern emerges: the good Polybian ruler has great 
physical and mental ability and keeps them into old age by moderate living. 
He uses no violence against his subjects, and does not need to because of 
their loyalty. Likewise, his conduct means that his family stays loyal, and 
so his reign is free of plots and scandals. He benefits his own country, but 
also the Greek city-states, and acquires goodwill and fame throughout the 
Greek world.
One characteristic is missing from this list, but occurs often in praise 
of other kings: social skills. Likeability and charm play a large part in the 
characterisations of Cleomenes (πρὸς τὰς ὁμιλίας ἐπιδέξιος: 5.39.6) and 
the young Philip V before he turns to the dark side (χάρις διαφέρουσα: 
4.77.1–4), and Ptolemaeus Philopator is criticised for being unapproacha-
ble (δυσέντευκτον: 5.34.4).78
The list of virtues is confirmed when we look at some examples of bad 
kings. Prusias of Bithynia has one of the fullest obituaries of the Histories 
77 Hiero is also praised explicitly at 1.8.3–5.
78 Other good rulers are: Antigonus Doson, 2.70; Gelon of Syracuse, 7.8.9; Antiochus 
III; 11.39.14–16 (where being a good general makes him a good king); Perseus in the early 
years; 25.3.5–8; Cotys of Thrace, 27.12.
 Polybius 63
(36.15). The narrator begins by admitting that he possessed ‘some intel-
ligence’ (ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ βελτίων: 36.15.1), but then lists only negative 
traits: he was ugly (36.15.1), looking like only ‘half a man’ (36.15.2), 
cowardly in warfare (36.15.2), unable to suffer hardship and effeminate 
in body and soul (32.15.3). He also lacked self-discipline and was prone 
to give in to his bodily desires (36.15.4). Finally, he was uneducated and 
ignorant and had no idea what morality is (τοῦ καλοῦ τί ποτ’ ἔστιν οὐδ’ 
ἔννοιαν εἶχε: 36.15.5). For these reasons (τοιγαροῦν) his subjects grasped 
at any opportunity to overthrow and take vengeance on him (36.15.7). 
In other words, Prusias had an unimposing physique in contrast with the 
impressive bodily strength of Massinissa and, to a lesser degree, Hiero; 
he was cowardly rather than brave and lacked the ability to withstand 
hardship, both fatal flaws in a military commander; and, in contrast with 
the three good kings just discussed, he gave in to the luxury surrounding 
him and did not live moderately. The result was predictable: instead of the 
loyalty of family and subjects, the latter were ready to jump at any chance 
of revolt.79
An additional vice of the bad king is harshness towards his subjects. 
This is a standard trait of the stereotypical tyrant, which makes it so much 
more remarkable that Hiero avoided it. Other rulers suffer from it (Nabis, 
4.81.13; Hermeias, 5.41.4; Hieronymus, 7.7.2; Philip V, 7.13.8, 7.14.3; 
Cleomenes, 9.23.3), but Polybius does not explore in detail what it means, 
and it is never the focus of a moralising digression. We shall return to this 
peculiar absence below. He does, however, make sure that the correlation 
between behaviour and result is completely consistent for his rulers: those 
who treat their subjects well have love, loyalty and support; those who 
treat them harshly are rebelled against. This dynamic is posited as one of 
the basic mechanisms by which constitutions change (and have changed 
since pre-civilised times) at 6.7.
The principle also holds true for the relationship between an imperial 
power and its subject-allies. Thus, in 1.72, the Libyan rebellion against 
Carthage is explained by the harsh way in which the Carthaginians had 
ruled Libya. The theory is expounded in a digression explaining how the 
Romans won Iberia from the Carthaginians, due in large part to the ready 
defection of the natives to the Roman cause. The conclusion to the digres-
sion reads:
79 Other bad rulers are: Ptolemaeus Philopator, 5.34; Hieronymus of Syracuse, 7.4–5; 
Philip V, 7.11, 10.26, 15.22–4; Nabis of Sparta, 13.6, 16.13; Agathocles of Egypt, 15.25.20–2, 
15.34–5; Tlepolemus of Egypt, 16.21; Moagetes of Cibyra, 21.34.1–2; Antiochus IV, 16.1; 
Charops of Epirus, 30.12, 32.5; Hasdrubal (Carthaginian general during Third Punic War). 
38.7–8; Achaean leaders, 38.12–14.
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καίτοι γε προφανοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἤδη τεθεωρημένου διότι κτῶνται 
μὲν ἄνθρωποι τὰς εὐκαιρίας εὖ ποιοῦντες καὶ προτεινόμενοι τὴν ἀγαθὴν 
ἐλπίδα τοῖς πέλας, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων τυχόντες κακῶς ποιῶσι καὶ 
δεσποτικῶς ἄρχωσι τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, εἰκότως ἅμα ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων 
μεταβολαῖς συμμεταπίπτουσι καὶ τῶν ὑποταττομένων αἱ προαιρέσεις. ὃ καὶ 
τότε συνέβη τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.
And yet it is obvious and has often been observed that people obtain pros-
perity by doing good and holding out good expectations to their neighbours; 
but when, having achieved what they desired, they do evil and rule tyranni-
cally over their subjects, then, as one would expect, the attitudes of the sub-
jects change along with the changes in their rulers. This was what happened 
to the Carthaginians at that time. (Polyb. 10.36.6–7)
As so often in the Histories, the morally right behaviour is also the one 
that leads to the greatest advantage: it is right to treat the subjects with 
mildness and fairness, and this is also the way to keep them loyal.80 As in 
this case, the principle generally works to the Romans’ advantage in the 
Histories, but there is a clear warning by example to Roman readers to 
keep up this fair treatment of their subjects. An interesting passage which 
may well show that Polybius thought this warning might be needed is 
24.10.3–6. Here, the Achaean Callicrates advises the Romans to increase 
the power of those Greek politicians who support their decrees and bring 
low those who do not (in the process making Polybius’ father, Lycortas, 
and childhood hero Philopoemen suspect to the Romans), and when they 
follow his advice, they end up with ‘many flatterers, but few true friends’. 
The reader is left to wonder whether the next step in the relationship might 
be the Romans treating their Greek subject-allies with arrogant disdain and 
having a revolt on their hands.
The Good Man: Courage, Moderation and Lack of Greed
A few characters in the Histories are more than just good commanders or 
good kings, they are thoroughly good men. In order to explore what this 
means, we need first to decide who they are.
The most developed characters in the surviving parts of the Histories are 
Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal Barca, Philip V of Macedon, Scipio Africanus 
the Elder, Philopoemen and Scipio Africanus the Younger. Of these, 
Hamilcar is portrayed as a good commander, but we do not get many 
glimpses of the rest of his personality. Hannibal is a paragon of good gener-
alship and is defended by Polybius against the charge of cruelty (9.23–4 and 
80 Polybius’ views on how to exercise imperial power have been discussed in more detail 
by Hau (2006) and Baronowski (2011).
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26), but falls short of the ideal because of his greed (9.25). Philip changes 
from good to bad in the course of the story (7.11). Scipio the Elder seems 
to have been treated very fully in the original, unfragmented Histories; 
however, it is difficult to gain a full picture of his character now because 
the extant parts of the Histories that describe or illustrate it are focused on 
using him as a paradeigma of two things: the power of human intelligence 
contrasted with the mumbo-jumbo of supernatural explanations (10.2 and 
5, discussed above, p. 58) and the nobility and practical advantages of 
staying humble in good fortune (10.17–19 and 40, discussed above, p. 52). 
This leaves us with two candidates, both of whom Polybius knew person-
ally: Philopoemen, strategos of the Achaean League in Polybius’ childhood, 
and Scipio the Younger, Polybius’ friend and benefactor for a large part of 
his adult life.
The part of the Histories dealing with the deeds of Philopoemen is 
unfortunately very fragmented. Usefully, however, the character sketch 
that introduces him into the story is preserved (10.22.4–5). The charac-
ter sketch (which references an encomium already published by Polybius) 
lists four good qualities: endurance and courage (κακοπαθείας καὶ τόλμας: 
10.22.4), both recognisable as key qualities of the good commander, a 
moderate lifestyle (περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιμελής, opposed to πολυτελέστερον ζῇ: 
10.22.5) and unostentatiousness (λιτὸς κατὰ τὴν περικοπήν: 10.22.5). It 
leads into a detailed account of how he turned the neglected Achaean 
cavalry into a crack fighting force (10.23–4).
Scipio Africanus the Younger receives a rather longer introduction 
(31.23–30). Interestingly, this does not describe his character, but demon-
strates it to the reader by means of a detailed scene with dialogue between 
the young Scipio and Polybius-as-a-character (31.23–4), followed by a 
blow-by-blow narrative of how Scipio, with Polybius’ guidance, trains 
himself to become a good man and wins a reputation for it.81 The three 
qualities that are practised and acquired are σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία and 
ἀνδρεῖα: temperance, generosity and courage. Courage has been explored 
above and shown to be of major importance for the characters who consti-
tute positive paradeigmata in the Histories. Temperance, or moderation, 
has also been shown above to be a key virtue of Polybian commanders and 
kings, and was seen to be prominent in the character sketch of Philopoemen. 
81 These chapters have sometimes been represented as a coldly calculated plan of action 
in order to gain Scipio political influence (e.g. Walbank 1979: ad loc.), and it is certainly 
true that this is part of the purpose of Scipio’s behaviour. However, such an interpretation 
only sees half the picture: Polybius is very clear that Scipio did not just gain a reputation for 
temperance, generosity and courage, but actually became temperate, generous and brave. 
This corresponds to Polybius’ use of reputation generally as a reliable barometer for a man’s 
character. See Eckstein (1995: 149–50).
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It is also worth noting that it is the change from a moderate to an extrava-
gant lifestyle that eventually turns democracy into ochlocracy in Polybius’ 
cycle of constitutions, the anakyklosis (ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια: 6.57.6). 
Generosity, however, has so far been left unexplored, and it is necessary to 
look a little further into it.
Actual generosity is demonstrated most conspicuously in the Histories 
by Scipio the Younger in the passage mentioned above. Otherwise, it 
is mainly a trait displayed by military commanders who thereby win 
the loyalty of their troops (Hannibal, 3.13.5–8; C. Cornelius Scipio, 
3.76.13) or a king who thus wins the goodwill of his people (Ortiagon the 
Galatian, 22.21), and it does not seem very high in the didactic hierarchy 
of virtues worth emulating. The μεγαλοψυχία that is praised enthusias-
tically in several passages of the Histories and figures as a key quality of 
the Polybian good man is not active generosity, but a more passive lack 
of greed and an ability to withstand the temptation of getting rich. This 
temptation typically comes from access to the wealth of a subject state or 
conquered territory or from the offer of a bribe. Such lack of greed is the 
subject of an explanatory digression discussing Roman integrity in money 
matters (18.35). The Romans, the narrator states, used to be unbribable, 
but these days that is only true of some of them, most notably Aemilius 
Paullus, who died poor despite having become master of all the wealth 
of the Macedonian kings, and Scipio the Younger, who did not take any 
of the Carthaginian wealth for himself. The unavaricious character of 
Aemilius Paullus is praised extravagantly again in his obituary, where it 
is said to be the ‘greatest evidence of his excellence’ (ὃ μέγιστον εἴποι τις 
ἂν ὑπάρχειν τεκμήριον ἀρετῆς: 31.22.2). Similarly, an Egyptian governor 
of Cyprus, Polycrates, is praised for keeping his hands off the island’s 
wealth (18.55.5–7). In the area of bribes, both Philopoemen’s rejection 
of a Spartan offer of gifts (20.12) and the rejection of a gift from King 
Eumenes by the Achaean League are portrayed very positively (22.7–8). 
On the negative side, the narrator castigates the Romans (in general, no 
names are mentioned) for plundering the wealth of Syracuse when they 
take the city during the Second Punic War, and suggests that, had they left 
it where they found it, they would have ‘made their own country famous 
not for paintings and reliefs, but for dignity and lack of greed' (σεμνότητι 
καὶ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ)’ (9.19.12).
If lack of greed is a prominent virtue in the Histories, greed itself is an 
even more prominent vice. It is termed variously πλεονεξία, φιλαργυρία 
and τὸ πλει̂ον ἐπιθυμία, and it is a stock characteristic of the bad man. 
It is displayed by demagogues (Molpagoras of Chios, 15.21.1–2; Scopas 
of Aetolia, 18.55.1–2; Deinon and Polyaratus of Rhodes, 27.7.1–13) and 
tyrants (wife of Nabis, 18.17). Polybius feels so strongly about the evil 
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of this character trait that he refuses to join in the general praise of the 
courage of Alexander the Aetolian, who, although the wealthiest man of 
his time, refuses to pay his kidnappers and is then fortuitously set free 
by the intervention of Rome. Instead, Polybius declares that ‘in this case 
chance supported his greed so that his idiocy met with universal praise and 
approval’ (τότε ταὐτόματον συνήργησεν πρὸς τὴν φιλαργυρίαν, ὥστε παρὰ 
πᾶσιν ἐπαίνου καὶ συγκαταθέσεως τυχεῖν τὴν ἀλογιστίαν: 21.26.16). This is 
presented as an exception (τότε); elsewhere in the work, in accordance with 
the didactic programme of showing how immoral behaviour leads to neg-
ative results, greed regularly has disastrous outcomes for the greedy: it is a 
major reason for Perseus’ failure (see 28.9, 29.8, and the long digression of 
29.9) and leads to the death of the tyrant Orophernes of Cappadocia (9.11), 
and for armies too focused on plunder, defeat is certain (e.g. Aetolians, 
4.57.2–58.12).
The reason why Polybius so detests greed is perhaps that it so often 
leads people to commit unjust acts. In the Histories, greed leads to wars of 
aggression (e.g. 2.45.1–4, 4.3, 4.6.7–12), betrayal of trust (e.g. 8.16.4–12) 
and fighting among friends (9.11). In the anakyklosis, it is the flaw that 
leads to the fall of first oligarchy (6.8.3–6), then democracy (6.9.4–9). Greed 
is clearly a very common flaw in human beings in Polybius’ world, and thus 
it is one of the things that need to be countered by the good constitution. In 
this respect the Cretan constitution fails spectacularly (6. 46.11–47.6), but 
the Roman constitution succeeds (6.56.1–5), making it also in this regard 
superior to all others.
The good man in the Histories, then, is brave and intelligent, lives a 
moderate life, and displays no signs of greed. He is also a good commander, 
who knows how to combine courage with intelligence, and he never falls 
into the trap of becoming arrogant in the delusion that good fortune will 
last. This is the ideal that a reader of Polybius must aspire to.
Peculiar Absences: Piety and Cruelty
Before we draw this chapter to a close, it is worth pausing to note two 
interesting absences, or near-absences, from Polybius’ templates for good 
and bad behaviour respectively: piety and cruelty. These two character 
traits play a large part in most of the other Greek works of historiography, 
as we shall see in later chapters, but not in Polybius’ Histories. Let us begin 
with piety.
Polybius is notorious for his pragmatic approach to religion. On the 
basis of passages such as the one stressing Scipio the Elder’s own respon-
sibility for his successes and the one praising him for lying to his mother 
about having had a divinely inspired dream (10.2 and 10.5, both discussed 
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above), it is common to claim that Polybius did not value traditional piety.82 
On one level this is clearly true: when in an intellectual, polemical mode 
Polybius regularly argues against traditional religious belief in favour of a 
rational approach to the world. However, it is also important to note that 
he does admit of some situations – mainly weather-related – where it is 
reasonable (εἰκότως, an intellectual word) to try to appease the gods with 
prayers and sacrifices (36.17.2–3, including himself in the first-person verb 
πέμπομεν), and that he seems to have ended his work with a pious prayer 
for his prosperity to last (39.8.1–2).
In tune with his polemical expressions of rationality, Polybius offers 
no moral exempla of such traditional paradigms of piety as the sacrificing 
general or the king consulting an oracle. But piety does figure somewhere 
on his list of moral virtues: we saw above that destruction of sacred build-
ings is always portrayed as wrong,83 and the noun ἀσεβεῖα (‘impiety’) and 
its cognates are used no fewer than fifty-five times in the Histories. These 
words do not, however, always cover such obviously impious actions as 
temple-destruction. They can be used to cover a range of immoral actions 
from the religiously charged breaking of an oath-sworn alliance (8.8, 15.22) 
over the betrayal of one’s city (5.76.11) to general tyrannical behaviour (7.7, 
38.12–13) and military atrocities (2.1.3). In these latter contexts, ἀσεβεῖα is 
often paired with ‘lawlessness’, παρανομία, which seems to indicate that 
Polybius used the term as often in a normative sense as in a religious one. 
This demonstrates where his didactic interest lies: in the political and mil-
itary world of inter-human relationships, not in the relationship between 
human beings and the metaphysical. For that reason, piety plays a very 
small part in his moral didacticism.
On this note, we turn to the other peculiar absence from Polybius’ nega-
tive paradeigmata: cruelty. It is clear from the portrayal of good kings and 
commanders in the Histories that Polybius does not condone cruel treat-
ment either by a ruler of his subjects or by the victorious of the defeated 
or the captured. From the obituaries of Hiero, Eumenes and Massinissa 
we are also, no doubt, meant to understand that these good kings did not 
engage in cruelty in the manner of the stereotypical tyrant. Indeed, this 
is the tenor of the statement in the Hiero passage praising the tyrant for 
having gained and maintained power without murdering or exiling any of 
his fellow- citizens. However, it is interesting that this is not spelled out in 
any of these or other passages praising good kings, and that no adjective 
82 Walbank (1967: ad loc.); Pédech (1966) has the most nuanced discussion. Other key 
passages for this argument are 6.56 and 16.12.9, where Polybius seems to say that religion is 
only useful for keeping the common people in check.
83 See also 4.18.10–12, 4.62, 4.67, 7.13–14, 11.7, 31.9, 32.15. Killing in a temple is also 
condemned (4.35.1–5).
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for ‘cruel’, ‘brutal’ or ‘violent’ is used. Cruelty, in fact, seems to be a moral 
topic of relatively little interest to Polybius.
In the Histories, the adjective ὠμός, the standard word for ‘cruel’ in 
Diodorus (and used copiously by him, as we shall see in the next chapter), 
and its cognates are used twenty-seven times. Interestingly, eleven of these 
are representations of the words of others: three occur in speeches in direct 
or indirect discourse, four in summaries of the statements of other his-
toriographers, and a further four in polemical refutations of Hannibal’s 
alleged cruelty, where the word seems to have been taken over from the tra-
dition. Two more seem to be paraphrases of Polybius by the Constantinian 
excerptor. Three are used to describe uncivilised peoples, and two are 
used of the barbarians fighting in the Mercenary War and the war itself, 
meaning ‘savage’ rather than ‘cruel’.84 Only seven of the remaining nine are 
used to describe individuals or specific acts of individuals: the despicable 
Hermeias (5.41.1 and 3), the wife of the Spartan tyrant Nabis (18.17.4), the 
hated Charops of Epirus (32.5), and three instances of Philip V attacking 
places nominally among his allies.85 The final two instances describe spe-
cific wars.86
A pattern emerges from this overview. Firstly, ὠμός was not a favour-
ite word of Polybius’. Its repeated presence in passages where he engages 
polemically with other historians gives us a clue to why: it seems to have 
beens a favourite expression of the kind of historians Polybius worked hard 
to distinguish himself from, such as Phylarchus (2.56–8) and the Roman 
historians who accused Hannibal of cruelty (9.23–6). These historians 
most probably described the cruel acts of their arch-villains in some detail, 
and Polybius’ arguments to the effect that the acts of alleged cruelty can, 
in fact, be either justified or at least explained by circumstances are part of 
how he profiles himself as a more pragmatic and down-to-earth historian.
Secondly, Polybius prefers to use ὠμός in its sense of ‘savage’ or ‘bar-
baric’ rather than more generically ‘cruel’. In this sense he uses it of the 
barbarian mercenaries of the Carthaginians and the war they fought with 
their former masters, and of three particularly uncivilised peoples.
Thirdly, Polybius does occasionally use the word of individuals and 
their actions, but not lightly. Hermeias, Nabis and his wife, and Charops 
are particularly despicable characters who commit crimes beyond those of 
the average historical villain. Importantly, when the word is used about 
84 Direct discourse: 9.30.2, 11.5.6; indirect discourse: 24.15.3. Paraphrasing the opinions 
of others: 2.56.6, 2.58.14, 7.7.2, 9.22.8. Tradition of Hannibal’s cruelty: 9.23.2, 9.24.8, 9.26.8, 
9.26.11. Paraphrases by the excerptor: 21.34.1, 29.13. Uncivilised peoples: the Cynaetheans, 
4.20.3; the Egyptians, 15.33.10; the Cretans, 24.3.1. The Mercenary War: 1.81.7, 1.88.8. 
85 Philip the V attacks allies: 15.20.4 (with Antiochus III), 15.22.3, 15.23.3.
86 Civil war in Sparta, 4. 35.1–5; the Coele-Syrian War, 14.12.4.
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Philip V, it is not used to describe his character, although Polybius devotes 
no fewer than three digressions to this at different points in the work (7.11, 
10.26, 23.10). Instead it is used to describe those attacks which he commit-
ted in breach of sworn treaties against peoples who were supposed to be his 
allies. That is the kind of behaviour Polybius calls ‘savage’, not Hannibal’s 
killings of civilians (9.23–6) or the revenge exacted on the Mantineans for 
their oath-breaking by the Macedonians and Achaeans (2.56–8).
This tells us something important about Polybius as a moralist. We saw 
above that he offers clear guidelines for what kind of buildings an invad-
ing army should and should not destroy, but also that these guidelines are 
governed by the idea that the invader has the right to destroy everything 
that will help him win the war, including civilian buildings and bodies, 
and should only desist from unnecessary vandalism. A similarly unsenti-
mental idea seems to lie behind Polybius’ guidelines for the use of violence 
more generally: as long as the brutality has a particular military purpose 
(as with Hannibal’s atrocities), or the suffering is deserved (because of 
past crimes, particularly oath-breaking), it can be excused. Thus, some 
horrific acts of deliberate violence are condoned as ‘natural’ in warfare, 
as we have seen above, and Scipio the Elder’s burning of the Carthaginian 
camps near Utica is described in gruesome detail (14.5.10–15) only for the 
narrator to conclude that ‘of all the many brilliant achievements of Scipio 
this seems to me to have been the most glorious and daring of his deeds’.87 
Likewise, the torturing to death of a tyrant (2.59–60) or of an ‘impious and 
lawless’ man is only right (δίκην καθήκουσαν: 18.54). There is an unre-
solved tension here between the repeated and explicit didactic emphasis 
on the importance of staying humble in success and treating the defeated 
humanely, and the occasional narratorial expression of satisfaction with 
a graphically executed revenge. Wars can become too savage, however, 
as happened with the Mercenary War (1.88.8) and the Coele-Syrian War 
(14.12.4), and revenge can go too far, as happened when the Egyptian mob 
literally tore apart Agathocles and his family, labelled as ‘terrible savagery’ 
by the Polybian narrator (δεινή ἡ ὠμότης: 15.33.10).
When Polybius uses evaluative vocabulary to describe acts that could 
be called cruel, such as murders, tortures, exilings and deportations, he 
prefers the adjectives ‘impious’ (ἀσεβής, fifty-five instances), ‘lawless’ 
(παράνομος, sixty instances) and ‘unjust’ (ἄδικος/οὐ δίκαιος, 122 instances) 
and their cognates. This semantic group foregrounds not, like ὠμός and 
its cognates, the unnatural savagery of the action or its emotional impact, 
87 ᾗ καὶ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν διειργασμένων Σκιπίωνι κάλλιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο 
τοὔργον καὶ παραβολώτατον τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων: 14.5.15. See also the same Scipio’s 
brutal quelling of a mutiny at 9.29.5 and the praise of Roman military punishments at 6.37–8. 
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but the breaking of norms. Thus, when the narrator offers a rhetorical 
definition of a tyrant, he says that ‘the very word denotes the height of 
impiety and every injustice and lawlessness towards human beings’ (αὐτὸ 
γὰρ τοὔνομα περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς 
ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας: 2.59.6).88 Another favourite word for 
such transgressions is ἀσέλγεια, which emphasises the perpetrator’s lack 
of self-control (e.g. 7.2, 8.12, 29.13). This choice of focus and vocabulary 
sets Polybius off from other, more sensationalising, Hellenistic moralising 
historiographers such as Diodorus, Timaeus and Phylarchus, as we shall 
see in subsequent chapters.
CONCLUSION
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that moral didacticism is 
an integral part of Polybius' Histories. If we were to cut out the explicitly 
moralising passages, about a fourth of what remains of the work would 
be discarded. Such an exercise would involve not just leaving to one side 
a large number of passionate digressions on moral issues, but also cutting 
out bits of introductory, conclusive and concomitant moralising from the 
narrative of events. Even after such a serious bit of surgery, much of the 
narrative of events would still carry a moral message by means of its evalu-
ative vocabulary and the way that morally good behaviour tends to lead to 
practically good results. Moral didacticism suffuses the Histories at every 
level.
Polybius wanted to write a historical work with a moral purpose, that is, 
a work that presented history in a moral light. Throughout the work he is 
careful to tell the reader what to think about every character, every event, 
and why this is the right response. Some episodes are included or developed 
in detail purely because of their moral-didactic impact. This is the case of 
the lengthy and detailed narrative of Scipio the Elder after his conquest of 
New Carthage (10.16–20), which has been repeatedly referred to above. 
In (the modern understanding of) strictly historical terms, the important 
thing is that Scipio the Elder conquered New Carthage, switched its loyalty 
to Rome and thereby brought an end to Carthaginian ambitions in Iberia. 
However, Polybius spends five chapters after the narrative of the conquest 
giving detailed information about Scipio's distribution of booty, treatment 
of the captives and other locals, and self-control in the face of sexual temp-
tation. These details are only important from a didactic standpoint, and 
not a purely practical one. The same is obviously true of the eight chapters 
on Scipio the Younger's training (31.23–30). Other, less famous, episodes 
88 See also 23.10 on the crimes of Philip V.
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fall into the same category, such as the detailed narrative of how Achaeus 
attempted to escape from Antiochus III with the help of two accomplices, 
who ultimately betrayed him out of greed, proving both the instability of 
human life and the fact that villainous acts such as usurpation generally 
end in disaster (8.16.4–20.7).
Moral didacticism was one of Polybius' reasons for writing the Histories. 
If we refuse to take his moralising seriously, we misread the work. What 
he wrote was, of course, a history of war and politics, but he did it from 
a moral angle. The fact that Polybius was interested in similar subjects 
to those that interested many historians of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century has made many modern readers ignore or denigrate the part of the 
Histories that does not fit with their interests, namely its strong moral tone. 
What Polybius wrote was moral history, a narrative of historical events 
that presents them in a moral light and aims to draw moral lessons from 
them. In the next chapter we turn to a late Hellenistic historiographer who 
was much inspired by Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, to see to what extent he 
followed this creed.
2. Diodorus Siculus
Diodorus may seem an odd choice of focus for an entire chapter. He is 
widely known for having taken over long stretches of text from his sources, 
paraphrasing and summarising, but not adding anything new in terms of 
historical analysis or interpretation. I have argued my point of view on 
Diodorus’ source usage in detail elsewhere, but it is necessary to restate my 
case briefly here before embarking on an analysis of Diodorus’ moralising.1 
It is clear from the sections of Diodorus’ Bibliotheke for which the sources 
are extant that Diodorus generally stayed close to the text of the source, 
that is, he rephrased and abbreviated rather than create a new narrative 
from scratch. This explains why, although Diodorus’ language is similar 
throughout his work,2 his narrative style is uneven, being characterised by 
detached summary in some books in contrast with an emotionally involved 
mixture of summary and scenes in others: it seems that he often took over 
the style and tone as well as the content from his sources.3 In this chapter, 
1 The scholarship on this ‘Diodoran question’ is vast. It mainly falls into two camps: 
the traditionalists who argue that Diodorus more or less ‘copied’ his sources, only changing 
the wording (e.g. Stylianou 1998), and the revisionists who argue that Diodorus did have a 
vision of history which he followed by imbuing his work with certain themes and structures 
not found in his sources (the seminal work is Sacks 1990). My own view falls somewhere in 
between and has been argued in Hau (2009), which also gives a detailed bibliography of the 
scholarship. See also the Introduction to Hau et al. (forthcoming).
2 This has been shown by Palm (1955).
3 E.g. Diod. Sic. 3.2–55 compared with Phot. Bibl. codex 250 summarising 
Agatharchides of Cnidus, and Diod. Sic. books 22–32.26 compared with what remains of 
Polybius’ Histories. Both of these comparisons are less than straightforward, however: the 
former because the work of Agatharchides itself is lost and can only be accessed through 
Photius’ summary (see Chapter 3), and the latter because all of Diodorus 22–32.26 and much 
of Polybius only survive in excerpts collected by epitomisers with other interests at heart 
than the preservation of the original text. Nonetheless, wherever it is possible to compare a 
section of Diodorus closely with its source, such as Diod. Sic. 31.15 with Polyb. 30.18, as I 
have done elsewhere (Hau 2006), both Diodorus’ strong dependence and sporadic changes 
are obvious. 
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we shall examine moralising in the Bibliotheke comprehensively and see 
that Diodorus seems to have followed this working method also in terms 
of moralising: he took over moralising passages from his sources, in some 
cases changing the point slightly, but he does not seem to have written new 
moralising passages from scratch.4 However, we shall also see that there 
is nevertheless a high degree of consistency in the moral lessons offered by 
the Bibliotheke as a whole. The possible reasons for this surprising finding 
will be discussed in the conclusion to the chapter.
It has been a favourite sport of scholars to try to surmise which source(s) 
Diodorus used for each stretch of his narrative. Without entering into the 
finer points of such Quellenforschung, it will be useful here to give a brief 
overview of some of the more certain sources used by Diodorus in different 
parts of the Bibliotheke, as we shall be referring to them time and again 
throughout this chapter, and return to some of them in Chapters 3 and 7. 
The sources used by Diodorus in the early books of the Bibliotheke are still 
much discussed, but something approaching a communis opinio exists for 
some of the middle and later books. Most scholars agree that he probably 
used Timaeus of Tauromenium for the Sicilian narrative of books 13–14 
and 19–21; Ephorus of Cyme for the Greek narrative of books 11 or 12 to 
16.14; an Alexander historian, perhaps Clitarchus, for book 17; possibly 
Hieronymus of Cardia for the narrative of the Successor Wars in books 
18–20; Polybius for at least books 27–32.26; and possibly Posidonius of 
Apamea, the Stoic philosopher, for books 32.27–38.5 His sources for books 
7–10, 16 and 39–40 are too uncertain to be considered here.
That Diodorus’ Bibliotheke is a moralising text no one would deny. The 
work is frequently held up as symptomatic for the kind of Hellenistic his-
toriography deemed less worthy and serious than its Classical counterpart, 
partly because of its moralistic tendency.6 Many have observed that moral 
didacticism seems to have been one of Diodorus’ main purposes with his 
work, but few have taken his moral didacticism seriously enough to try to 
uncover its moral lessons in any detail.7 The most successful treatment is 
4 This conclusion goes contrary to the arguments of most other scholars who have 
taken Diodorus’ moralising seriously: Sacks (1990), Camacho Rojo (1994), Lens Tuero 
(1994), de Morais Mota (2010). None of these face the fact that the moralising is not equally 
distributed in the Bibliotheke. 
5 For a longer discussion of source units and sources in the Bibliotheke, with bibliogra-
phy, see Hau (2009: 174–6). A good overview of sources mentioned by name in the various 
books is Chamoux (1993: xxiii–xxv).
6 E.g. Schwartz (1903), Kunz (1935), Drews (1962), Hornblower (1981), Stylianou 
(1998).
7 Drews (1962) argues that moral didacticism was the main purpose of Diodorus’ 
work and influenced his choice of sources, but does not discuss its contents or techniques. 
Sacks (1990: 24–36) discusses Diodorus’ moralising with the main purpose of arguing that 
Diodorus did not take over every moralising passage from Ephorus. Vial (1977: xiv–xix) and 
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the overview of moralising themes in the Bibliotheke offered by Ambaglio, 
which ends with an eloquent expression of moral didacticism as Diodorus’ 
‘philosophy of history’ (his inverted commas), intimately connected with 
his project of writing universal history.8 The analysis offered in this chapter 
agrees with most of his findings, but goes significantly further.
As in the preceding chapter on Polybius, we shall begin with examining 
Diodorus’ preface and programmatic passages in order to get an idea of 
his theoretical approach to moral didacticism. Then we shall proceed to an 
analysis of his moralising techniques before finally considering his moral 
messages. Throughout, the emphasis will be on Diodorus’ moral didacti-
cism in comparison with that of Polybius and with their predecessors and 
contemporaries (to be examined in subsequent chapters) rather than on 
Diodorus as an isolated phenomenon. For that reason Diodorus’ relation-
ship with his sources is not a problem: if the moralising of the Bibliotheke 
is of his own crafting, it is worth analysing in its own right; if it has been 
taken over from his varied sources, it is evidence that moral didacticism 
was ubiquitous in late Classical and Hellenistic historiography. Both alter-
natives will be kept in mind in the discussion, and we shall return to the 
implications of our findings in the conclusion to the chapter.
PREFACES AND PROGRAMMATIC PASSAGES
Diodorus’ preface is far longer than any other preserved preface of Classical 
or Hellenistic historiography, and most scholars would now agree that he 
wrote it himself even if its ideas are not original.9 It is largely focused 
on moral didacticism.10 The Diodoran narrator begins by stating that we 
owe a debt of gratitude to writers of (universal) history, because they 
benefit human society (τὸν κοινὸν βίον: 1.1.1). Historiography provides 
‘a lesson without danger in the advantageous’ (ἀκίνδυνον διδασκαλίαν 
τοῦ συμφέροντος: 1.1.1) and thereby gives its readers the ‘best experience’ 
(καλλίστην ἐμπειρίαν: 1.1.1). It does this, he continues, by letting them 
Chamoux (1993: lvi–lx) mention moral didacticism as a main purpose. Wirth (1993: 26–9) 
and Camacho Rojo (1994) give examples of moral themes in Diodorus, but do not discuss 
them in any detail. Alganza Roldán (1994) discusses some moralising aspects of Diodorus’ 
battle narratives. De Morais Mota (2010) is mainly a summary of selected passages of 
Diodorus. 
 8 Ambaglio (1995: 109–18). Something similar is argued by Wiater (2006), although he 
focuses on the role of compilation rather than original composition in Diodorus’ ideal of 
universal history.
 9 Burton (1972), Sacks (1990), Chamoux (1993), Ambaglio (1995), Stylianou (1998: 
3–4).
10 For discussions of the preface that focus on Diodorus’ self-representation see Wiater 
(2006) and Hau (forthcoming).
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learn from the experiences of others (1.1.2). Thus, the success or failure 
of others are examples for correction or improvement (πρὸς διόρθωσιν 
παραδείγμασι: 1.1.4), particularly in the varied vicissitudes of life (πρὸς τὰ 
συγκυροῦντα ποικίλως κατὰ τὸν βίον: 1.1.4). A number of parallels with 
Polybius are present in these first four chapters of the Bibliotheke: the 
benefit of history, both practical and moral; the value of vicarious experi-
ence; the use of paradeigmata for the ‘correction’ (διόρθωσις) of the read-
er’s life; and the idea that such moral instruction is particularly valuable 
when one is faced with the vicissitudes of fortune.
So far Diodorus has been talking about learning by exempla, but now 
he turns to another way in which historiography can teach morality: by 
its commemoration of good and bad deeds, history makes leaders and 
soldiers strive for honour, and in general makes bad men ‘turn away from 
the impulse of wickedness’ (1.1.5). This striving to create a good reputa-
tion for oneself in the pages of history is elaborated upon in the next few 
paragraphs, and finally the praise of good men by history is said to be the 
only monument that does not perish over time (1.2.5). This is why history 
is useful and beneficial (χρήσιμα: 2.7). This emphasis on the fame gained in 
written history is again recognisable from Polybius, but in the Bibliotheke 
we see a complete intermingling of the ideas of history as memorial and 
history as teacher. A reader is thought to be willing to learn from history 
precisely because of its function as memorial; only by learning from the 
people history commemorates can a reader ensure his own commemoration 
by later historians.11 Thus, like Polybius, Diodorus expresses his purpose 
in purely didactic terms. There is no mention of preserving the memory of 
the past for its own sake; rather, the memory of the past seems to be good 
for one thing only, namely the emulation to which it spurs contemporary 
readers. Interestingly, more than Polybius, Diodorus connects the didactic 
usefulness of his work intimately with the fact that it is a work of univer-
sal history rather than a monograph or a work about a particular time 
period. In 1.3 he states that ‘the benefit for readers lies in being able to take 
the greatest number of and most varied circumstances’ (κειμένης γὰρ τοῖς 
ἀναγινώσκουσι τῆς ὠφελείας ἐν τῷ πλείστας καὶ ποικιλωτάτας περιστάσεις 
λαμβάνειν) and that ‘from this work it will be possible for each reader to 
take with ease what is useful in his own situation, just as if drawing from 
a large spring’ (ἐξέσται γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν 
ἑτοίμως λαμβάνειν τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μεγάλης ἀρυόμενον πηγῆς).12 
11 Cf. Sacks (1990: 81).
12 Throughout the chapter the utility and benefit of this genre of historiography are 
repeatedly stressed: τὸ συμφέρον: 1.3.1, τῆς ὠφελείας: 1.3.2; ὠφελῆσαι: 1.3.5; εὐχρηστοτάτην: 
1.3.6; χρησιμώτερον: 1.3.8. The connection between utility and universal history in the 
preface has been pointed out also by Wiater (2006). Some scholars have wanted to see Stoic 
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For Diodorus, the didactic worth of his work lies exactly in the fact that it 
encompasses all times and places and can therefore show the reader exam-
ples of how to act in the greatest variety of situations. Although he does not 
say so explicitly, the wide scope also enables him to show the reader what 
types of actions and behaviour are morally good across space and time, and 
how these generally lead to success.13
Outside of the preface, Diodorus has only a few programmatic state-
ments. Some of these come in the prefaces to individual books; sixteen such 
book-prefaces are extant, but these prooemia are notoriously inconsistent, 
and there is disagreement over whether Diodorus wrote them himself of 
copied them from sources.14 The prefaces to books 2 and 3 are mere tables 
of contents. The preface to book 13 is a sort of anti-preface, which justifies 
the absence of prefaces to some books in a long work, and the preface to 
book 37 focuses on arguing that the war narrated in that book, the Italian 
Social War, was the greatest war of all time.
The prefaces to books 12, 14, 18, 19, 26 and 32 are all moralising: each 
offers a generalising statement or moral gnome and argues that it will be 
proved by the events of the following book. Thus, book 12 begins with 
the statement that ‘One may justly be perplexed when thinking about the 
inconstancy of human life’; book 14 with the observation that ‘It is perhaps 
reasonable to hear bad things said about oneself reluctantly; for even those 
whose moral wickedness is completely obvious so that it cannot be denied 
nevertheless are upset when they encounter criticism and try to defend 
themselves against accusations.’15 Regardless of the fact that it would be 
a very reductionist reading that saw the narrative of a given book of the 
Bibliotheke as merely an attempt to teach the lesson propounded by the 
generalising of its preface, the preponderance of this technique shows both 
the importance moral didacticism held for Diodorus every time he wanted 
thought behind Diodorus’ universalism, even going so far as to attribute his main preface 
wholesale to Posidonius (Schwartz 1903, Canfora 1990). 
13 This is what Ambaglio (1995: 118) calls Diodorus’ ‘philosophy of history’.
14 Prefaces are extant for books 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 32 and 37. 
Kunz (1935) offers a detailed analysis of every preface in the Bibliotheke, which is still useful, 
even if her assumption that this can be used to determine from which exact source Diodorus 
‘copied’ each preface is grounded in a ruthlessly optimistic Quellenforschung which is now 
outdated. She includes in her discussion the prefaces to books 21 and 25, which I ignore 
because of the impossibility of knowing whether the brief fragments sometimes assigned 
to these prefaces do in fact come from the proems or from later passages of the books. The 
prefaces are also discussed by Sacks (1990: 9–22), who argues that Diodorus composed all 
of them from scratch.
15 Δικαίως ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε τὸν νοῦν ἐπιστήσας τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ἀνωμαλίᾳ,: 
12.1.1. Πάντας μὲν ἴσως εἰκός ἐστι προσάντως ἀκούειν τὰς καθ’ ἑαυτῶν βλασφημίας· καὶ 
γὰρ οἱ κατὰ πᾶν ἔκδηλον ἔχοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν κακίαν ὥστε μηδ’ ἐξαρνεῖσθαι, ὅμως ψόγου 
τυγχάνοντες διαγανακτοῦσι καὶ λόγους εἰσφέρειν πειρῶνται πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν: 14.1.1. 
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to express the purpose of his work, and the degree to which he considered 
this moralising part of a tradition, whether he wrote the prefaces himself 
or decided to take them over from others: gnomai were a traditional way 
of expressing ethical wisdom used in both poetry and prose since Homer, 
Hesiod and Herodotus. The gnomai in the prefaces were probably not 
composed by Diodorus, but were taken over from this tradition, not nec-
essarily from any one historiographical predecessor, but perhaps from an 
Alexandrian collection of proverbs, or simply from his own mental stock 
of such sayings collected through extensive reading. It is important for our 
understanding of the purpose of the Bibliotheke that the prefaces do not 
claim that the work will break new philosophical ground, but that the nar-
rative of the Bibliotheke exemplifies time-honoured truths expressed (or at 
least expressable) in proverbial maxims.
Only the prefaces to books 4, 5, 15, 16, 17 and 20 are programmatic in the 
sense that they discuss historiographical issues and the way these are resolved 
in the Bibliotheke. Of these, the prefaces to books 5, 16 and 17 concern the 
best way of structuring a work of universal history, again with an eye to its 
usefulness (πάντων μὲν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀναγραφαῖς χρησίμων προνοητέων τοὺς 
ἱστορίαν συνταττομένους: 5.1.1). The preface to book 20 censures historians 
who include too many speeches in their works, apparently on the basis that 
a high proportion of speeches hinders the reader’s enjoyment of the work; 
utility is not mentioned, although a reader who is discouraged from his 
reading because of lack of enjoyment, as envisioned in 20.1.5, will obviously 
derive no benefits from the work.16 Only the prefaces to books 4 and 15 have 
a direct bearing on the didactic purpose of the Bibliotheke.
The preface to book 15 echoes the main preface by stating that:
Παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν εἰωθότες χρῆσθαι τῇ συνήθει τῆς ἱστορίας 
παρρησίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων τὸν δίκαιον 
ἐπιλέγειν ἔπαινον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνωσιν, ἀξιοῦν δικαίας 
ἐπιτιμήσεως, διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου νομίζομεν τοὺς μὲν εὖ πεφυκότας 
πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῷ διὰ τῆς δόξης ἀθανατισμῷ προτρέψεσθαι ταῖς καλλίσταις 
ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσιν, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντας διάθεσιν ταῖς ἁρμοττούσαις 
βλασφημίαις ἀποτρέψειν τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν ὁρμῆς.
Throughout my work I have been accustomed to use the freedom of speech 
customary to historiography, and to praise good men justly for their good 
deeds while thinking it right to criticise the bad justly whenever they commit 
a wrong. Through such a method I believe that those who are by nature 
well suited for moral excellence will be propelled towards undertaking 
16 For discussions of this preface and its relationship to Diodorus’ practice of including 
speeches see Sacks (1990: 93–108), Bravo (1993), Achilli (2012), Baron (forthcoming), Pausch 
(forthcoming).
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the noblest actions because of the possibility of obtaining immortal fame, 
and those who have the opposite disposition will be turned away from the 
impulse to wickedness by the thought of their fitting reputation. (Diod. Sic. 
15.1.1)
The confident belief in the power of his writing to change the behaviour of 
his readers is recognisable from the main preface, but this passage is more 
explicit about the paradeigmata mechanism: praise of historical characters 
is meant to inspire readers to emulation, criticism is meant to scare them 
away from wicked deeds.17 In both cases it is the immortality accorded 
by historiography that is thought to be the spur to action; moralising and 
commemoration go hand in hand.
Commemoration is also the focus of the preface to book 4, which jus-
tifies the inclusion of mythological events in the Bibliotheke. Such events 
are included, says the narrator, because the heroes and demigods have 
performed great deeds (μέγισται καὶ πλεῖσται πράξεις) and benefactions 
(εὐεργεσίας) for mankind and so deserve to be praised in the pages of history 
(ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας λόγος τοῖς καθήκουσιν ἐπαίνοις εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καθύμνησεν: 
4.1.4). The same thought is reiterated in 4.8, which functions as a preface 
to a long narrative of the labours of Heracles. In other words, Diodorus’ 
choice of material is dependent on history’s function as memorial, and it 
is the job of historiography to bestow praise on those who deserve it. The 
prefaces to books 4 and 15, then, express the twin purposes of commem-
oration and didacticism, which we know from the main preface are two 
sides of the same coin.18
Interestingly, we are never told that historiography may have any other 
purpose. This is worth stressing because one might assume, certainly from 
a modern standpoint, that a historian who compiled such an enormous 
amount of information about such a vast time period had at least some 
intention of preserving knowledge of the past for its own sake. If this was 
part of Diodorus’ motivation, he does not mention it in the preserved 
books. The past seems to have value for him only as a treasury19 of useful 
and edifying paradeigmata, which perpetuate the fame or notoriety of their 
protagonists.
17 On the parrhesia of historiography, see Sacks (1990: 33–5, forthcoming). 
18 Outside of prefaces, this dual purpose is referred to at 10.12, 10.21.1, 11.38.6 and 
11.46.1.
19 χρηματιστήριον: Diod. Sic. 1.1.3. This is an extremely unusual word, which can denote 
either a sanctuary or a place where business is conducted. I have chosen ‘treasury’ in order 
to cover both the idea of storage of something precious (like votive offerings in a sanctuary) 
and the idea of valuable transactions. The idea of transaction may well be significant: readers 
go there to interact or ‘do business’ with historical characters of the past and come away not 
monetarily but morally enriched. 
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CHARACTERISATION OF DIODORUS’ MORALISING
Distribution
A large part of the Bibliotheke only exists as paraphrases and quotations 
in later works, known as ‘fragments’. Out of the forty books, 6–10 and 
21–40 are fragmentary. Here, moralising is ubiquitous. As with Polybius, 
the majority of Diodoran fragments have been preserved by excerptors 
who were more interested in moralising anecdotes and sound bites than in 
historical narrative, and the result is an overrepresentation of this material 
among the fragments. Such decontextualised passages can help us establish 
Diodoran moral themes and interests, but their lack of narrative context 
makes them unsuitable as the basis of analysis of his moral-didactic pro-
gramme and techniques. They will therefore only be used as contributory 
evidence.
More interestingly, even the non-fragmentary parts of the Bibliotheke 
are an uneven read. The contents and the historical treatment of events 
vary widely. The first six books are ethnographical and mythological. In 
the ethnographical sections, there is hardly any moralising; customs are 
described, but not evaluated on a moral scale. In the mythological sections, 
moralising is also scarce; where it does occur it mostly takes the form of 
didactic introductions telling the reader how to interpret a story. However, 
a reader consuming the mythological tales from beginning to end would 
have found himself under the influence of a more subtle type of moralising, 
namely the ‘correlation between behaviour and result’ also found in parts 
of Polybius’ Histories. We shall return to this below.
In the historical part of the work, the amount of moralising and the 
techniques used vary between sections, most probably dependent on what 
source Diodorus used. For instance, there is little moralising in the narra-
tive of the Peloponnesian War in books 12–13, but plenty in the narrative 
of the Carthaginian Wars in Sicily in books 13–14.20 Likewise, there is 
little moralising in the narrative of Alexander the Great in book 17 and the 
Successor Wars in books 18–20, and plenty in the narrative of the Sacred 
War in book 16 and of the Sicilian tyrant Agathocles in books 20–1. Such 
variation will be one of the areas of focus for the analysis both of moralis-
ing techniques and of moral messages.
For an explanation of the terminology used in the analysis of Diodorus’ 
moralising techniques the reader is referred to the overview offered in the 
Introduction, and its exemplification in Chapter 1.
20 For a close reading of a passage from each of these two sections that shows the differ-
ence clearly, see Hau (2009).
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Moralising in Narrative Pauses
Much of Diodorus’ moralising takes place explicitly, in narrative pauses. 
He is particularly fond of guiding moralising, which, as in Polybius, can be 
introductory, concomitant or concluding and sometimes proleptically com-
ments on a character’s future fate. This technique is found in all parts of 
the Bibliotheke. These short passages often contain metaphors and similes, 
such as ‘they took the bait, so to speak, for their own destruction’,21 or 
generalising gnomai, such as ‘fortune is good at unexpectedly tripping up 
the arrogant and teaching them not to be too confident about the future’ 
(15.33.3)22 and ‘every act of kindness, if performed freely, bears noble fruit 
in the praise it receives from the beneficiaries; for even if they can’t all repay 
it, at least one of those who have received the kindness sometimes pays it 
back on behalf of all’ (10.16.3).23 Such gnomic expressions are not used by 
Polybius and are distinctive of Diodorus’ moral-didactic style.24 The mem-
orable phrases clearly impressed the Constantinian excerptors, with the 
result that a large number of the surviving fragments are decontextualised 
sententiae. Out of context they tell us nothing more than that such pithy 
expressions were ubiquitous in the Bibliotheke, and that many of their 
themes were recurrent throughout the work.
There are also some prominent and memorable moralising digres-
sions in the work: the encomium of the dead at Thermopylae (11.11), 
the comparison of Themistocles and Gelon of Syracuse (11.23) and of 
Pausanias of Sparta and Aristides of Athens (11.46), the interpretation of 
the Carthaginian defeat at Syracuse as divine punishment (14.76), and the 
obituaries of Pelopidas (15.81.1–4) and Epaminondas (15.88). Diodorus’ 
digressions are generally less well defined than the digressions of Polybius: 
often they are introduced with a brief justification (e.g. ‘we must go back 
in time a little and explain everything from the beginning’: 11.67.1; ‘it 
would be unfitting to pass by the death of this man without according him 
the appropriate praise’: 15.88.1), but the endpoint is left unclear, with the 
digression simply segueing into narrative (e.g. 11.67.7, 15.40.4–5).
The moral-didactic digressions cluster in certain sections of the 
21 καθαπερεὶ δέλεαρ ἔλαβον τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπωλείας: 14.101.3. 
22 ἀγαθὴ γὰρ ἡ Τύχη τοὺς μέγα φρονοῦντας παραδόξως σφῆλαι καὶ διδάξαι μηδὲν ἄγαν 
κατελπίζειν: 15.33.3.
23 πᾶσα χάρις ἀμεταμέλητος οὖσα καλὸν ἔχει καρπὸν τὸν παρὰ τὸν τῶν εὐεργετουμένων 
ἔπαινον· καὶ γὰρ ἂν μὴ πάντες, εἶς γέ τις τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων ἐνίοτε τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων ἀπέδωκε 
χάριν: 10.16.3.
24 This may well have to do with the school practice of writing progymnasmata, often 
including or concluding with a moralising maxim, which seems to have developed in the 
second–first century bc (a thought I owe to Christopher Burden-Strevens in conversation). 
For the tradition of progymnasmata see Kennedy (2003: ix–xiii).
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Bibliotheke; there are eight in book 11 and seven in book 15, against only 
two in book 14 and one in book 17.25 This probably means that Diodorus 
took over these digressions from his sources and that, although he may have 
added to them and altered some details, he did not compose moralising 
digressions from scratch where he found none in his source.26 His digres-
sions can be explanatory, evaluative, philosophical, polemical or associ-
ative – in other words, he uses the entire spectrum of possibilities. None 
of his digressions, moralising or otherwise, are as long as Polybius’ book 
6. The longest digression in the Bibliotheke is 12.11.4–19.3, which sets out 
and praises the laws of Charondas, the lawgiver of Thurii.27 This digression 
functions partly as a description of a ‘marvel’ (θαῦμα – as important to 
Diodorus as to Herodotus), partly as a praise passage of the lawgiver, partly 
as a piece of moral didacticism on all the different actions and vices covered 
by Charondas’ laws. The second-longest digression is 16.61–4, which details 
with relish the divine punishment that befell those who had committed the 
grossest impieties during the Sacred War. In other words, when Diodorus 
does offer long digressions, they usually have a moral-didactic function.
In addition to full-blown moral digressions, Diodorus frequently uses 
very short digressions of one or two sentences, which can perhaps better 
be termed ‘moralising asides’. These asides are closely tied to the narrative 
and add information which in a modern text might have been put in brack-
ets or a footnote. They often outline the character of a historical person in 
a few words:
(οὐκ ἔχων δὲ στρατηγὸν ἀξιόχρεων, μετεπέμψατο Χαβρίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον,) 
ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει καὶ συνέσει στρατγηικῇ διάφορον καὶ δόξαν ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ 
μεγάλην περιπεποιημένον.
(Not having any capable general, he sent for Chabrias the Athenian,) a man 
outstanding in both intelligence and strategic ability and with an established 
reputation for great and noble bravery. (Diod. Sic. 15.29.2)
or give brief background information:
καθόλου γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῇ δυνάμει προκόπτοντες οὐκέτι τοῖς συμμάχοις ὥσπερ 
πρότερον ἐπιεικῶς ἐχρῶντο, ἀλλὰ βιαίως καὶ ὑπερηφάνως ἦρχον. Διόπερ οἱ 
πολλοὶ τῶν συμμάχων τὴν βαρύτητα φέρειν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἀλλήλοις διελέγοντο 
περὶ ἀποστάσεως, καί τινες τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου καταφρονήσαντες κατ’ 
ἰδίαν ἐτάττοντο.
25 11.11, 11.23, 11.26.4–7, 11.38.6, 11.46, 11.58.4–59.3, 11.67, 11.82.1–2, 14.1–2, 14.76, 
15.1.3–5, 15.39.2, 15.44, 15.49, 15.50.2–3, 15.81.1–4, 15.88, 17.38.4–7.
26 This corresponds to my conclusion with regard to Diodorus’ moralising on the 
changeability of fortune in Hau (2009).
27 Its companion piece is 12.20–1 on the laws of Zaleucus of Italian Locri.
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For overall, now when they (the Athenians) were advancing greatly in 
power they no longer treated their allies as well as before, but ruled vio-
lently and arrogantly. For that reason most of their allies felt unable to 
bear the harshness and discussed rebellion with each other, and scorned the 
common Assembly and were making arrangements individually. (Diod. Sic. 
11.70.3–4)
These ‘moral asides’ cannot provide the same level of analysis or moral 
outrage as fully fledged digressions and they do not guide the reader’s 
interpretation of an episode as precisely as guiding moralising. Rather, 
they are used to give the reader a bit of inside information on a character 
or situation without breaking the flow of the narrative. They are extremely 
common in the Bibliotheke and are a large part of what gives the work its 
moralising feel.28
Moralising in the Narrative of Events
The moralising ‘feel’ of Diodorus’ text persists also in the narrative of 
events. One important factor in creating it is his pervasive use of evaluative 
phrasing. Like the narrative of Polybius, much of the narrative of Diodorus 
is adorned with evaluative words and phrases which guide the reader’s 
moral response to the events. This is true of almost all of the Sicilian nar-
rative most probably based on Timaeus (in books 13–14 and 20), and of 
certain passages in all the other parts of the work. It is relatively rare in 
the narrative of Alexander the Great and the Successors in books 17–20, 
where the moralising tends to take the form of moral introductions and 
conclusions with a few digressions. The example below, however, is from 
this part of the work and has been chosen because it perfectly illustrates 
the characteristics of Diodorus’ use of evaluative vocabulary, which is sig-
nificantly less subtle than Polybius’. This is the account of how Olympias, 
mother of Alexander the Great, treats her captured rival Eurydice:
[4] τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον Ὀλυμπιὰς τῶν βασιλικῶν σωμάτων κυριεύσασα 
καὶ χωρὶς κινδύνων τὴν βασιλείαν παραλαβοῦσα τὴν εὐτυχίαν οὐκ ἤνεγκεν 
ἀνθρωπίνως, ἀλλὰ τήν τ᾽ Εὐρυδίκην καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα Φίλιππον τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 
εἰς φυλακὴν καταθεμένη κακουχεῖν ἐπεχείρησε· περιοικοδομήσασα γὰρ 
αὐτῶν ἐν βραχεῖ τόπῳ τὰ σώματα διὰ μιᾶς στενῆς ὑποδοχῆς ἐχορήγει τὰ 
ἀναγκαῖα· [5] ἐπὶ πολλὰς δ᾽ ἡμέρας παρανομήσασα τοὺς ἠτυχηκότας, ἐπειδὴ 
παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἠδόξει διὰ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πάσχοντας ἔλεον, τὸν μὲν 
Φίλιππον προσέταξε Θρᾳξί τισιν ἐκκεντῆσαι, βασιλέα γεγενημένον ἓξ ἔτη 
καὶ μῆνας τέσσαρας, τὴν δ᾽ Εὐρυδίκην παρρησιαζομένην καὶ βοῶσαν αὐτῇ 
μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἤπερ Ὀλυμπιάδι τὴν βασιλείαν ἔκρινε μείζονος ἀξιῶσαι 
τιμωρίας. [6] εἰσέπεμψεν οὖν αὐτῇ ξίφος καὶ βρόχον καὶ κώνειον καὶ 
28 Other examples are 13.76.2, 15.31.3, 15.63.2, 15.64.4, 16.65.2, 16.83.2, 18.28.6.
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συνέταξε τούτων ᾧ βούλοιτο καταχρήσασθαι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, οὔτε τὸ 
προγεγενημένον ἀξίωμα τῆς παρανομουμένης ἐντραπεῖσα τὸ παράπαν οὔτε 
τῆς κοινῆς τύχης εἰς οἶκτον ἐλθοῦσα· [7] τοιγαροῦν τῆς ὁμοίας μεταβολῆς 
τυχοῦσα τῆς ὠμότητος ἀξίαν ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου καταστροφήν. Εὐρυδίκη μὲν 
γὰρ κατευξαμένη παρόντος τοῦ κομίσαντος τῶν ὁμοίων δωρεῶν Ὀλυμπιάδα 
τυχεῖν τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα περιέστειλεν, ἐπιμεληθεῖσα τῶν τραυμάτων ὥς ποθ᾽ 
ὁ καιρὸς συνεχώρει, ἑαυτὴν δ᾽ ἀνακρεμάσασα τῇ ζώνῃ κατέστρεψε τὸν 
βίον, οὔτε δακρύσασα τὴν αὑτῆς τύχην οὔτε τῷ μεγέθει τῶν συμπτωμάτων 
ταπεινωθεῖσα.
(4) When Olympias in this way had got the royal persons into her power 
and had taken over the kingdom without danger, she did not bear her good 
fortune like a human being,29 but she threw Eurydice and her husband, 
Philip, in prison and began to maltreat them. She walled them up in a small 
space and had their necessities ministered to them through one narrow 
passage. (5) When she had unlawfully abused the unfortunate persons for 
many days and was gaining a bad reputation among the Macedonians 
because of their pity for the sufferers, she ordered some Thracians to stab 
Philip, who had been king for six years and four months. But Eurydice, who 
was expressing herself freely and shouting that the kingdom belonged to her 
rather than to Olympias, she judged worthy of a greater punishment. (6) 
So she sent her a sword, a noose, and some hemlock and ordered her to use 
whichever of these she liked to kill herself. She did not feel any regard for the 
former prestige of the unlawfully treated woman at all, nor was she moved 
to pity by common fortune. (7) For that reason, when she met with her own 
similar reversal in fortunes, she ended her life in a manner worthy of her 
cruelty. For Eurydice laid out her husband’s corpse in the presence of the 
attendant, praying that Olympias would meet with similar gifts. When she 
had taken care of his wounds as best she could in the situation, she hanged 
herself by her girdle and ended her life, neither crying over her own fate nor 
brought low by the enormity of her misfortunes. (Diod. Sic. 19.11.4–7)
The passage is introduced with a moral introduction telling the reader to 
consider it an instance of the abuse of good fortune (19.11.4). Negative verbs 
are used of the actions of Olympias (κακουχεῖν: 19.11.4, παρανομήσασα: 
19.11.5), while her victims are termed ‘unfortunate’ (ἠτυχηκότας: 19.11.5). 
By telling the reader what the queen did not do, that is, bear her good 
fortune like a human being (19.11.4) and feel regard for Eurydice’s former 
station and be moved to pity (19.11.6), the narrator implies that these were 
the sentiments and actions one would expect, and so draws attention to 
Olympias’ aberrant behaviour by ‘presentation through negation’.30 (The 
29 For this expression see Hau (2009: 176–7) and below.
30 ‘Presentation through negation’ has been identified by de Jong (1987: 61–8) as a 
Homeric technique of drawing the reader’s attention to significant behaviour or events. It 
has been applied to Thucydides by Hornblower (1994: 152–8) and is common in Diodorus, 
as well as in Xenophon, as we shall see.
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idea here of ‘common fortune’ is typical of such passages in Diodorus and 
will be discussed below, p. 100.) The nobility of Eurydice is stressed by the 
positive verb ‘expressed herself freely’ (παρρησιαζομένην: 19.11.5), which 
in the Bibliotheke is regularly used of those who risk life and limb to speak 
the truth to autocratic rulers.31 In another presentation through negation, 
the information (19.11.7) that Eurydice did not cry or let herself be crushed 
by the weight of her misfortunes makes us understand that such behaviour 
would have been expected and understandable, but that Eurydice was too 
brave and dignified to engage in it. In the middle of the passage, the moral-
ising is strengthened by internal evaluation: the Macedonians, Olympias’ 
own people, feel pity for the captives and think that she has gone too far 
(19.11.5). In addition, towards the end, we get a proleptic statement about 
Olympias’ own death, making it a direct result of her present behaviour 
(τοιγαροῦν: 19.11.7).
By the end of the passage, the reader has not so much been guided to a 
moral reading as been forcefully dragged to it. The narrator does not seem 
to trust his reader to arrive at the obvious conclusion on his own, and so 
the message is made abundantly clear. This is typical of much of Diodorus’ 
moralising and is part of what has alienated him from post-historicism 
readers.
The passage also shows another feature that is typical of Diodorus’ 
moralising: his fascination with scenes of cruelty and suffering. From such 
passages the reader gets the impression that the narrator paints a detailed 
picture of the horror partly because he enjoys provoking a strong reaction. 
This kind of tabloid sensationalism has often been criticised, by modern 
scholars and by other ancient historians: Polybius’ ridiculing of Phylarchus’ 
‘tragic’ style of historiography is notorious (Polyb. 2.56–68). But consid-
ering Diodorus’ sensationalist passages as a means of moral didacticism 
allows us to see them in a new light. There is not just delight in the horror 
stories, but also a focus on pity for the sufferers and a moral lesson to be 
taken away.32 The elaboration of detail has a mimetic rather than a sensa-
tionalist purpose and is intended to make the readers emotionally involved 
in the story, thereby bringing the moral point home more strongly.33
In the passage just quoted, the point is that Olympias has gone too far in 
her revenge and will end up suffering for it. The cruelty (and greed) of the 
perpetrator(s) is a typical message of passages that use pathos to enhance 
their moralising, as are the dignity and courage of the victim(s) and their 
31 E.g. 14.65.4, 17.30.5, 17.80.4, 19.48.5, 28.14. On the theme of freedom of speech in 
Diodorus see Sacks (forthcoming).
32 This is recognised by Chamoux (1993: lxi–lxii).
33 For an excellent discussion of the manipulation of readers’ emotions by ancient 
 historiographers see Marincola (2003).
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immortal fame, or, sometimes, the deservedness of the horrors inflicted. 
The pity of the onlookers is often mentioned and is supposed to guide the 
reader’s emotional response.34 This moralising technique, which we can 
call moralising through pathos, seems to have been common in some other 
Hellenistic historiographers, most notably Agatharchides of Cnidus, as we 
shall see in Chapter 3.
The distribution of moralising through pathos in the Bibliotheke is 
even less balanced than the distribution of digressions. This is doubtless 
partly because this mimetic mode of readerly engagement only works in 
narratives of people similar enough to the intended readers for them to 
feel sympathy and pity (see Arist. Rh. 2.8) and so would not be a viable 
mode for presentation of mythological material. However, even in the non- 
mythological books, moralising through pathos is predominantly found 
in the Sicilian narrative of books 13–14 and 20, which Diodorus proba-
bly based on Timaeus, and in book 17, which deals with Alexander the 
Great and was perhaps based on Clitarchus. This is a strong indication 
that Diodorus took over this type of moralising from his sources where he 
found it, but did not compose it from scratch.
Like Polybius, Diodorus also uses speeches to further his moral didac-
ticism. As in Polybius, speeches in the Bibliotheke gain authority from 
narratorial endorsement (13.102.1–3, 14.25), from the way they are 
received by their internal audience (12.6–16, 14.65–70), or from corre-
spondence between the views they express and narratorial moralising else-
where in the work (13.19–33.1). However, full-length speeches are not 
very common in the Bibliotheke.35 A more usual way for Diodorus to 
make the reader hear the actual words of his characters is by quoting – or 
paraphrasing – their most pithy remarks as part of a vividly described sit-
uation, making the episode into a moralising vignette. It is in the nature of 
such vignettes that they are individually very different, so there is no one 
typical format. An example is the riotous scene of Philip II celebrating his 
victory at Chaeronea with a drinking party, and jeering at his prisoners 
of war until he is reproached ‘with Attic charm’ by the captive Athenian 
orator Demades and changes his behaviour (16.87). Another, more subtle, 
instance is the detailed narrative of Alexander sitting on Darius’ throne 
after his capture of Persepolis and being offered a golden table for a foot-
stool. This makes a captive eunuch burst into tears and comment on the 
changeability of fortune, which in turn makes Alexander worry that he 
34 See e.g. 14.112, 13.57–8, 14.52–3 with 14.46, 17.13, 17.35–6, 17.70, 19.7–8, 20.15.4–6 
and 20.54.
35 There are only four complete full-length speeches in the Bibliotheke: 13.20–7 and 
28–32, 13.52–3, 14.65–9. Some fragments seem to come from speeches: 10.34, 27.13–18, 31.3. 
See Sacks (1990: 93–108) and Pausch (forthcoming).
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may inadvertently have abused his good fortune, only to be reassured by 
Philotas that this is not the case as he meant no harm (17.66.3–7). What the 
vignettes have in common is a setting of the scene, a short speech or sen-
tentia by a character, possibly a reply, and sometimes a result or a response 
to the reply. Interestingly, the didactic interpretation of a vignette is most 
often left open, without any moralising conclusion to guide the reader. In 
this they differ from most other moral-didactic techniques employed by 
Diodorus and come close instead to the famously ambiguous dialogues of 
Xenophon’s Hellenica (see Chapter 6).36
A final type of moral didacticism in the Bibliotheke is equally implicit, 
but dominates by its near-ubiquity and contributes greatly to the work’s 
overall moralising feel. This is the constant and often explicitly empha-
sised correlation between behaviour and result. This moralising technique 
plays an even more dominant role in the Bibliotheke than in Polybius’ 
Histories. Throughout the historical books, good men and mild rulers are 
rewarded with loyalty and success (11.71.2, 15.31.1, 18.28.6) or, if all else 
fails, with immortal fame (14.112.5; discussed below, p. 105), while bad 
men suffer (13.86.1–3, 16.45.4), or at least leave behind them a deservedly 
evil reputation (14.1–2). In the mythological books, kings are loved and 
famed for their mildness and other qualities (e.g. 2.28, 2.38.5, 4.73.6, 
5.78.4), and heroes and gods perform benefactions and are rewarded 
with loyalty and immortal honours (e.g. 1.13.4, 1.20.5, 3.58–9, 4.53.6–7, 
5.71–72.1), while the cruel and impious suffer spectacular punishments 
(e.g. 1.64.5, 3.43.5, 4.74, 5.50.5, 6.7.2–3, 7.5.11). The overall impression 
is clear, even without the narrator’s explicit intervention: good behaviour 
is rewarded, bad behaviour is punished. We shall return to this below as 
such a correlation teaches a moral lesson as much as it constitutes moral-
ising technique.
MORAL LESSONS OF THE BIBLIOTHEKE
The aim of this section is to analyse Diodorus’ moral messages and 
compare them with those of Polybius, in preparation for a comparison 
between Hellenistic and Classical moral didacticism in Part II. Before we 
begin, however, it is necessary to discuss the interpretative implications 
of the differences in narrative style between the ‘mythological’ (1–7) 
and ‘historical’ (8–40) books of the Bibliotheke. Diodorus himself was 
aware that he was doing something different in the early books from 
the later ones, as his preface to book 4 shows: his sources for them were 
36 Other moral-didactic vignettes are 8.18.2, 9.2.2, 9.26–8, 10.25.4, 11.6.1–2, 12.33, 
12.38, 14.25, 15.11, 15.87, 15.93.2.
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 different, and his treatment of the myths was characterised by ‘great 
care’ (ἐπιμέλειαν: 4.1.4) rather than the ‘truth’ (τῆς ἀληθείας) claimed 
for historiography more generally in the main preface (1.2.7–8). This 
corresponds to a difference in moralising techniques between these two 
parts of the Bibliotheke, as we saw above. In fact, it is the entire narra-
tive style that differs between the mythological and historical books: the 
mythological books are characterised by fast-paced summaries, variants 
of the same story, and little emotional involvement, while the historical 
books make copious use of scenes, speech, moralising narrative pauses, 
and evaluative and emotional phrasing. This makes the mythological 
books and the historical books very different reading experiences. These 
differences and Diodorus’ own awareness of them make it reasonable 
to distinguish between the two parts of the work when discussing indi-
vidual moral messages, and this will be done frequently in the following 
analysis. Nonetheless, it will be seen that the moral lessons propounded 
by the two parts of the Bibliotheke largely correspond, and are always in 
support of each other.
Divine Justice
The main moral message of the Bibliotheke seems to be that you get what 
you deserve: the good are rewarded and the bad punished. This correlation 
between behaviour and result has been described above as a moralising 
technique. Here we shall focus on the moral lessons propounded by this 
model of causation, as well as by a large number of passages that make the 
causal relationship explicit. These explicitly moralising passages fall into 
two categories: those that attribute the deserved result to divine influence, 
and passages without such an attribution.
In contrast with the Histories of Polybius, the overall justice of the world 
of the Bibliotheke seems to be largely due to divine influence. The fact that 
the first seven books of the work cover mythological times and largely 
concern themselves with the history of the gods means that no one who 
reads the work from beginning to end can be in any doubt that the reader 
is meant to believe in the existence of divine beings. This is worth stress-
ing, as modern readers all too often make assumptions about the response 
of ancient readers on the basis of their own sharp distinction between the 
‘mythological’ and the ‘historical’ part of ancient works of historiogra-
phy. The distinctions Diodorus draws in the preface to book 4, which we 
discussed briefly above, do not justify taking the historical books more 
seriously in moral terms than the mythological books. The stories of the 
early books of the Bibliotheke show that divine beings take a keen interest 
in human beings, sometimes reward piety and good deeds and, more often, 
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punish impiety and cruelty.37 Only after a hefty dose of this moralistic 
theology does the reader enter into what we today consider the historical 
period, conditioned to expect divine involvement in the interest of justice.
In the ‘historical’ books, divine punishment also figures prominently. 
Sometimes it works on a large scale as a historical explanation, so that 
falling under the control of the Thirty Tyrants is punishment of the 
Athenian demos for wrongfully executing the generals of the Battle of 
Arginusae (13.103.1–2), and the Carthaginians are defeated in the Second 
Carthaginian War because of their impiety and cruelty (14.73–6). At other 
times the divine punishes individuals, such as the generals responsible for 
the robbing of Delphi during the Sacred War (16.61–4), and the tyrant 
Agathocles, who has murdered a guest-friend (20.70) and robbed temples 
(20.101).38 Explicit instances of divine vengeance cluster in certain parts of 
the work and are most frequent in the Sicilian narrative of books 13–14 and 
20–1 (probably based on Timaeus), the narrative of the Sacred War in book 
16 (probably based on Theopompus) and the fragments of books 27–31 
(probably based on Polybius, an oddity which will be discussed below). 
Divine vengeance strikes the Carthaginians more often than anyone else,39 
proving that the concept is closely bound up with the author’s patriotic bias. 
Whether we consider this author Diodorus himself or Timaeus, his likely 
source for these passages, hardly matters for the present purpose: they were 
both Sicilian, and it is not strange if they both had strong anti-Carthaginian 
feelings. Diodorus probably found the references to divine vengeance in 
Timaeus and transferred them to his own work because they suited his own 
attitude both to the history of his own region and to historical causation 
more generally.40
An intriguing feature of many of the instances of superhuman punishment 
in the Bibliotheke is that they in some way mirror the offence. An obvious 
example is 19.103.4–5. Here, some Carthaginians who, during their war 
with the Sicilian Greeks, have captured some innocent Athenian sailors and 
cut off their hands are afterwards captured by the Syracusans and suffer the 
same fate. This is the narrative of their capture and punishment:
δοξάντων δ΄ αὐτῶν ὠμῶς κεχρῆσθαι μηδ΄ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικοῦσι ταχὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον 
αὐτοῖς ἐπεσήμαινεν· εὐθὺ γὰρ τοῦ στόλου τινὲς νῆες ἀποσχισθεῖσαι περὶ τὴν 
37 Divine rewards in 1–6, 3.65, 4.22.5. Divine punishments in 1–6, 3.65, 4.22.4, 4.63.4, 
4.68.2, 4.69.3–5, 4.71, 4.81.5, 5.3.6, 5.55.6–7, 5.71–72.1.
38 Other instances of divine punishment: 6.7.1–3, 7.7, 8.30.1, 13.86.1–3, 14.46.3–4, 14.63, 
14.69.4, 15.24, 16.31.4 , 16.38.6, 16.56.4, 16.56.8, 16.58.5–6, 23.12, 27.4, 27.12, 28.3, 28.7, 
29.15, 29.25, 31.35, 31.45, 32.18, 32.26, 34/35.9, 38/39.6, 38/39.19.
39 In 13.86.1–3, 14.63.1–2, 14.69.4, 14.73.5, 14.74.3, 14.74.4, 14.76, 14.77.4 and 15.24.
40 For an analysis of the narratives of the First and Second Carthaginian Wars in books 
13–14 that clearly shows the divine aspect see Hau (2009: 184–7).
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Βρεττίαν ἑάλωσαν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀγαθοκλέους στρατηγῶν καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον οἱ 
ζωγρηθέντες τῶν Φοινίκων ἔπαθον οἷς ἔπραξαν εἰς τοὺς ἁλόντας.
The divine soon sent them a sign to show that they had seemed to treat 
cruelly men who had done nothing wrong: for immediately some ships 
of their fleet which had been scattered around Brettia were captured by 
Agathocles’ commanders, and those of the Phoenicians who were captured 
alive suffered a similar fate to what they had done to their captives. (Diod. 
Sic. 19.103.5)
Apparently, the sign by which the divine showed the Carthaginians that 
they had acted unjustly is the fact not that they were caught, but that 
they suffered the very same fate as those they had wronged. From a non- 
religious standpoint it could be argued that the Syracusans knew about 
the Carthaginian cruelty to the Athenians, and that the similar treatment 
therefore was a result of their revenge rather than of divine displeasure. 
However, characteristically for the Diodoran narrator, he is in no doubt 
that the talionic punishment is a sign of divine vengeance.
A more elaborate example is 16.64.2, on the fate of two women who 
wore necklaces stolen from Delphi during the Sacred War:
αἱ δὲ τω̂ν ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἡγεμόνων γυναῖκες περιθέμεναι τοὺς χρυσοῦς ἐκ 
Δελφῶν ὅρμους οἰκείας τῆς ἀσεβείας τιμωρίας ἔτυχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸν τῆς 
̔Ελένης γεγενημένον φορέσασα εἰς ἑταιρικὴν αἰσχύνην ἐνέπεσε καὶ τὸ κάλλος 
προέβαλε τοῖς ἐξυβρίζειν προαιρουμένοις, ἡ δὲ τὸν τῆς  ̓Εριφύλης περιθεμένη 
τῆς οἰκίας ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου τῶν υἱῶν ὑπὸ μανίας ἐμπυρισθείσης μετὰ 
ταύτης ζῶσα κατεφλέχθη. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δαιμονίου καταφρονεῖν τολμήσαντες 
τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας ἠξιώθησαν, ὁ δὲ τῷ μαντείῳ 
βοηθήσας Φίλιππος ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἀεὶ μᾶλλον αὐξόμενος τὸ 
τελευταῖον διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβειαν ἡγεμὼν ἀπεδείχθη τῆς Ἑλλάδος 
πάσης καὶ μεγίστην βασιλείαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην περιεποιήσατο.
The wives of the Phocian commanders who had worn the gold necklaces 
from Delphi met with a punishment suitable to their impiety: for the one 
who had worn the necklace that had belonged to Helen sank to the shame 
of a courtesan and exposed her beauty to those who chose to abuse it, and 
the one who had worn the one that had belonged to Eriphyle had her home 
burned down by the eldest of her sons, who had gone mad, and was burned 
alive with it. And so those who had dared to despise the divine were deemed 
by the gods to deserve punishment in the described manner, but Philip, who 
had helped the oracle, from this time onwards always grew more powerful 
and in the end was appointed commander of all Hellas and acquired the 
greatest kingdom in Europe because of his piety towards the divine. (Diod. 
Sic. 16.64.2–3)
The fates of the women have obvious points of similarities with the legends 
of the mythological women whose jewellery they wear, and the οὖν (‘and 
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so’) of the last sentence shows that the reader is meant to see a causal 
connection between these similarities and the divine vengeance. Such tal-
ionic, mirroring or somehow ironic punishment occurs throughout the 
Bibliotheke, but is most frequent in the passages based on Timaeus.41
The final sentence of the passage is one of the most explicit statements 
of divine support in the Bibliotheke: as the temple-robbers are punished, so 
the pious Philip II is rewarded. Such divine support is a noteworthy feature 
of the Bibliotheke – it does not feature in Polybius’ Histories – but it figures 
markedly less often than divine punishment. On the macro-level, Rome con-
quers Philip V and Antiochus III because of divine support earned through 
piety (28.3). On an individual level, some morally good characters have 
the support either of individual deities or, more frequently, of ‘the divine’ 
(τὸ δαιμόνιον), ‘the gods’ (οἱ θεοί) or ‘fortune’ (τύχη), which seem to be 
interchangeable expressions. For instance, the Sicilian hero (of Corinthian 
origin) Timoleon is said to have the support of ‘the divine’ as well as of 
Demeter and Persephone (16.66.1–5) and to win his famous victory by a 
combination of courage and divine support (16.79.5). Likewise, Alexander 
the Great is aided by Athena (17.17.6–18.1), and fortune has a hand in 
his recovery from illness (17.31.6). Also, Alexander’s general Ptolemy is 
saved from his wounds in a way which ‘some’ ascribe to divine providence 
(17.103.7–8), just after the reader has been assured of his general goodness, 
and later enjoys divine favour because of ‘his courage and his honest treat-
ment of all his friends’.42 Most instances of divine support occur in the nar-
rative of Timoleon in book 16 and the narrative of Alexander in book 17. 
In book 11, Delphi escapes plundering by ‘some divine foresight’ (δαιμονίᾳ 
τινὶ προνοίᾳ: 11.14.4), and the same power makes the victory of Gelon 
over the Carthaginians in Sicily and the honourable defeat at Thermopylae 
occur on the same day (11.24.1).43
This unevenness in moralising on a topic as world-defining as divine 
involvement may be infuriating to modern scholars. However, to a reader 
who reads the entire Bibliotheke without paying attention to the difference 
between its parts – which is surely the way Diodorus meant it to be read 
– the fact that divine forces play an explicit role, even if inconsistently, 
in punishing the wicked and supporting a few extraordinary individuals 
delivers a moral message which cannot be misunderstood. (In some ways 
41 Other examples: 14.76, 16.64.2–3, 20.65.2, 20.70.3–4 and 38/39.19.
42 οἱ δὲ θεοὶ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ εἰς πάντας τοὺς φίλους ἐπιείκειαν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων 
παραδόξως αὐτὸν διέσωσαν: 18.28.6
43 The fact that these two are the only references to divine involvement in book 11, 
despite the fact that it contains subjects as conducive to the concept as the Persian Wars and 
Gelon’s war against the Carthaginians, might be a reason for conjecturing that Diodorus did 
not base this part of the Bibliotheke (primarily) on Timaeus.
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this is reminiscent of the situation in Herodotus, where some wicked deeds 
bring about divine vengeance whereas others are left unpunished. We shall 
see this in Chapter 4.)
Even in the parts of the Bibliotheke where there are no explicit refer-
ences to divine justice, the same overall message pertains. In wars, the 
most moral side tends to be victorious: Athens treats its allies harshly and 
is dominated by mob politics, and so is defeated by moderate Sparta in 
the Peloponnesian War (11.70.3–4, 13.102, 15.30.1); the impious temple- 
robbers are defeated by the benefactor of the Greeks, Philip II, in the Sacred 
War (e.g. 16.64.2–3); and the all-round good Ptolemy is the person to come 
out of the Successor Wars most successfully (e.g. 18.28.5–6, 18.33.2–5). 
By the same token, rulers who treat their subjects well are successful (e.g. 
11.26.4–7, 12.50.1–3) while those who mistreat their subjects are rebelled 
against (9.23, 11.44.4–5), and tyrants ‘usually’ meet miserable ends (26.15). 
A step down the pecking order, traitors are often executed by their new 
masters (16.45.4, 19.16.4), and courtiers who plan assassinations end up 
suffering nasty deaths (9.18–19, 17.5.3–5). Whenever a villain meets a sticky 
end, the narrator likes to label it ‘deserved’ or ‘fitting’.44 When he cannot 
point to any physical suffering on the part of evil-doers, the narrator often 
has recourse to the idea that they somehow suffer in retrospect because of 
the evil reputation they gain (10.16.2, 14.1–2) or that they suffer from fear 
of retribution (27.4.8). Likewise, when good characters suffer undeserved 
fates, the narrator sometimes tries to make up for it by dwelling on the 
fame they won by their dignity and courage (14.112).
At regular intervals, the narrator reminds us in pithy gnomai that this 
is how the world works; for example, ‘those who plot evil against others 
usually end up entrapped by their own designs’ (9.29)45 and ‘divine punish-
ment usually follows unjust deeds and brings deserved punishment to the 
perpetrators’ (10.16.2).46 These are some of the sound bites that are often 
preserved out of context (see above).47 However, their presence throughout 
the work shows that this message was high on the list of moral-didactic 
lessons to be learned from the Bibliotheke.
At this juncture it is instructive to compare Diodorus’ version of the 
Atilius Regulus story with that of Polybius. Both historiographers narrate 
the story of the Roman general who treats Carthaginian envoys haughtily 
44 4.27.3, 5.11.4, 11.77.6, 16.31.4, 17.2.1, 18.8.6, 19.48.4, 20.65, 21.16.5, 22.1, 23.19, 27.4, 
29.14, 32.18, 38/39.11.
45 οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων βουλευόμενοί τι φαῦλον ὡς ἐπίπαν ταῖς ἰδίαις ἐπιθυμίαις 
εἰώθασιν ἁλίσκεσθαι: 9.18.
46 ταῖς ἀδίκοις πράξεσιν ὡς ἐπίπαν ἀκολουθεῖ τις νέμεσις οἰκείους τιμωρίας τοῖς 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπιφέρουσα: 10.16.2.
47 E.g. 9.33.1, 10.16.2, 37.17.
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during peace negotiations after a Roman victory in the First Punic War and 
then shortly afterwards suffers defeat and capture. Both take the oppor-
tunity to moralise, but their messages are subtly different. Polybius uses 
the episode to give the prescriptive advice that one should always distrust 
fortune and particularly in success (1.35; see pp. 49–50). Diodorus says that 
Regulus disregarded ‘divine vengeance’ (τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσιν) and suffered 
‘deserved punishment’ (ἀξίᾳ τιμωρίᾳ: 23.12).48 The behaviour the two his-
toriographers want to foster in their readers is clearly the same: respectful 
treatment of envoys and, more generally, a humble and moderate conduct 
even in great success. Their underlying reasons, however, are different: 
Polybius warns that fortune is random and always likely to change, while 
Diodorus predicts that divine forces will deliberately punish wrongheaded 
behaviour. This neatly captures the difference in worldview between the 
Histories and the Bibliotheke.49
However, there is one part of the Bibliotheke where the message of 
universal justice is not strongly present,50 and that is the narrative of the 
Successor Wars in books 18–20, which is, as has been noted above, overall 
less moralising than the rest of the work. Instead, this narrative seems com-
mitted to the idea of human life as influenced by random fortune, tyche.51 
This is seen most clearly in a highly rhetorical digression at 18.59.4–6, 
which begins with the statement that ‘All wondered at the changeability 
and unexpected nature of fortune’ (18.59.4), asks the rhetorical question 
‘who would then trust in the success enjoyed in good fortune and con-
ceive an arrogance too big for human weakness?’ (18.59.5), then proclaims 
paradoxically that ‘therefore it is surprising not if one unforeseen thing 
happens, but if not everything that happens is unexpected’ (18.59.6), and 
finally makes the didactical claim that historiography is the one thing that 
can correct both the arrogance of the fortunate and the desperation of the 
unfortunate (18.59.6). It seems that Diodorus found this carefully crafted 
digression in his source (usually thought to be Hieronymus of Cardia),52 
and was so seduced by the similarity with his own didactic message about 
48 Polybius’ moralising occurs in a digression at the end of the narrative of Regulus’ 
capture; Diodorus’ at the end of the narrative of Regulus’ arrogant treatment of the envoys, 
proleptically predicting his fate. There may well have been a piece of concluding moralising 
in Diodorus as well, but that part of the narrative is lost.
49 It is intriguing that both Diodorus and Polybius choose to make a negative para-
deigma out of Regulus, who is considered a paragon of virtue in the Roman tradition, see 
e.g. Hor. Carm. 3.5 and Cic. Off. 3.99. Diodorus either did not know this version of the story 
or chose to ignore Roman sources in favour of the Greek tradition represented by Polybius. 
See Leach (2014).
50 Divine justice may be at work at 18.20.1, 19.11.7 and 19.48.4.
51 See 18.8.7, 18.20.1, 18.53, 18.59.4–6, 18.67.5.
52 But see Meeus (2013), with references to earlier literature.
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mistrusting good fortune and staying humble in success (see below) that he 
did not notice, or care, that such universal randomness would cancel out 
any claim to universal justice in his narrative world.53
On balance, a less than straightforward picture emerges of Diodorus’ 
source usage with regard to moral didacticism. On the one hand, he seems 
to have let his sources guide him in his choice of episodes to turn into 
moral-didactic paradeigmata and not to have added many (any?) mor-
alising digressions or asides to a largely non-moralising source narrative 
like Hieronymus’. On the other hand, it is clear from the comparison with 
Polybius that he felt free to rewrite any moralising that he found in his 
source in order to express his own views.54 The conclusion must be that 
Diodorus generally cared enough about his moral-didactic programme to 
make an effort in crafting passages that would convey what he considered 
the right message out of source material that was making a different point, 
but that he could also be seduced by a clever turn of phrase to keep one that 
was subtly different. When there was no moralising in his source, he either 
forgot about his moral-didactic agenda or considered writing moralising 
from scratch too much of an effort.55
Overall, then, the narrative world of the Bibliotheke is one where good 
deeds pay and bad deeds are punished, often by means of divine intervention. 
Random fortune, however, also plays a part, and human beings must always 
guard against becoming arrogant in their success. Let us turn now to look at 
this and other lessons about the morally good life taught by the Bibliotheke.
The Virtues
Within the framework of universal justice, the Bibliotheke has plenty of 
advice on how to live a moral life. One thing is conspicuously missing in 
comparison with Polybius, however: moralising digressions on how to be 
a good king or a good military commander, which may well show that 
Diodorus did not take over every moralising passage he found in his sourc-
es.56 In fact, Diodorus does not seem to draw much of a distinction between 
53 Hadley (1996) has argued that Diodorus wrote this passage himself and added it to 
Hieronymus’ account. For my counter-argument see Hau (2009: 180–1).
54 This is also seen in e.g. 28.3 (cf. Polyb. 15.20) and 31.15 (cf. Polyb. 30.18; see Hau 
2006: 91–5), 31.35 (cf. Polyb. 32.15), 32.26 (cf. Polyb. 38.1–4, 12–13).
55 I have argued for a similar conclusion in Hau (2009), but there maintain that Diodorus 
wanted the moralising collected from his sources to speak for itself rather than redacting it 
to suit his own moral-didactic programme. I no longer agree with this. I rather think that 
Diodorus had his own moral-didactic programme and worked towards it when the moralis-
ing of his sources reminded him of it, but tended to forget about it when they did not.
56 Although we cannot be certain, as the part of the Bibliotheke that is based on Polybius 
is fragmentary.
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the virtues needed for a good ruler, a good general and a good private 
person. We shall look first at the virtues he recommends, then at the vices 
he advises the reader to avoid.
Piety
In a world largely ruled by divine forces, the most important human virtue 
can be expected to be piety. That this is indeed the case is established in a 
passage in book 8 (8.15), which is clearly a moralising digression, but has 
been transmitted out of context so that we cannot know which episode pro-
voked it. The digression begins with the pious statement that it is impos-
sible for human beings to honour the divine (τὸ δαιμόνιον) in a worthy 
manner (κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν) and that the only hope we have of avoiding divine 
punishment for this is to show ourselves grateful (εὐχαριστεῖν: 8.15.1). It 
then declares that the difference between the pious and the impious is that 
the former can expect their own prayers to be fulfilled, the latter those of 
their enemies (8.15.2). Piety consists in taking the gods themselves even 
more seriously than one takes their altars and the oaths one swears by them 
(8.15.3). In fact, piety is the one virtue that distinguishes human beings 
from animals (8.15.4). The digression is fragmented, but the final passage 
extant states that piety is even more important for states than for individ-
uals, and that states too can expect to be rewarded for piety and punished 
for impiety (8.15.5).57 The reader is clearly meant to take piety seriously, 
and the urgency of the digression’s tone perhaps shows that Diodorus did 
not expect this to come easily to all of his readers. Piety, however, stays at 
the forefront throughout most of the Bibliotheke.
In a remarkable passage early in the Bibliotheke, Diodorus signals the 
importance of piety programmatically when justifying his lengthy treat-
ment of Heracles. It would be ‘absurd’ (ἄτοπον), he says, to ‘forget’ the 
benefactions of Heracles and ‘not to maintain the pious devotion to 
the god passed down from our forefathers’ (ἡμᾶς δὲ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν μηδὲ 
τὴν πατροπαράδοτον εὐσέβειαν διαφυλάττειν: 4.8.5). In other words, 
it is piety that dictates his decision to narrate the labours of Heracles 
at length despite the difficulty of doing the demigod justice (4.8.1), and 
despite the fact that many of his contemporaries do not believe in the 
truth of the account (4.8.2). The reader is also no doubt meant to remem-
ber the preface to book 4 only a few chapters earlier, where the narrator 
stated that many of his predecessors have avoided narrating the history of 
the gods and  demigods because of the difficulty this entails (4.1.1–2). For 
57 Diodorus also demonstrates his own piety in 15.48.4, where he states that while some 
people attribute earthquakes to natural reasons, ‘the pious’ (οἱ δ’ εὐσεβῶς διακείμενοι) point 
to other ‘plausible reasons’ (πιθανάς τινας αἰτίας), namely divine anger at impiety.
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the Diodoran narrator, the benefactions performed by the divine beings 
necessitate a pious response, in his case by means of commemoration in 
narrative.
This profession of piety is suitable for a historiographer who spends his 
first eight books on prehistorical times and includes the stories of not only 
Heracles, but also Zeus, Dionysus, Demeter, Isis and Osiris, to name only 
the most prominent godheads. It only fits, however, because the narrative 
of the gods is itself pious: although the approach is often euhemeristic, 
there is no sarcasm and no dwelling on divine immorality (in contrast with 
e.g. the treatment by Agatharchides; see p. 156). The gods act primarily 
out of concern for human beings and bring them civilisation and culture.58 
When they are honoured by their beneficiaries, they reward them; when 
they are scorned, they earn the narrator’s approval for punishing the impi-
ous.59 Imitating the gods, human beings in these books hate and rebel 
against the impious (4.68.2) and honour and reward the pious (7.4).
In the ‘historical’ books, piety (εὐσεβεῖα) is often mentioned as one out 
of several virtues of good characters.60 When demonstrated in practice, 
by sparing suppliants (11.91), by showing more consideration for one’s 
country than for oneself (13.102.3) or by refraining from taking revenge 
on envoys (27.12.2), it is praised by the narrator. It is also their basis in 
piety towards the gods that gives Zaleucus’ laws their moral authority 
(12.20). At the opposite end of the scale, impiety tends to lead to disas-
ter, usually brought on by the gods. Thus grave-destruction (13.86.1–3, 
38.7), sacrilege (34/35.9), oath-breaking (16.48.3–6, 20.70, 31.45, 32.18) 
and, above all, temple-robbing (14.63.1–2, 16.38.6, 16.56.4, 16.58.5–6, 
16.61–4, 20.101) are punished with divine vengeance. It is important to 
note, though, that impiety is never the only vice engaged in by Diodoran 
villains: the main perpetrators of impiety, that is, the Carthaginians in 
Sicily, the Phocians during the Sacred War and Agathocles of Syracuse, 
all combine impiety with cruelty and greed, vices which are more likely to 
bring them to grief at the hands of other human beings. We shall consider 
these vices below.
A fragment of book 35 seems to indicate a more pragmatic approach 
to religion akin to what we see in Polybius. It states that it is in society’s 
best interest to maintain a certain superstitious fear of the gods (τὴν ἐκ 
θεῶν δεισιδαιμονίαν) because this is the only way to get people to act justly 
(35.9). Without its context it is impossible to ascertain the significance of 
58 The concept of the gods as culture heroes is discussed by Sacks (1990: 61–82) and 
Sulimani (2011).
59 Piety rewarded: 3.65, 4.21.3, 4.24, 5.4; impiety punished: 3.65, 4.22.4, 4.63.4, 4.81.5, 
5.55.6–7, 6.7.1–3, 7.7, 8.30.1.
60 E.g. 33.5.6, 34/35.33.3, 37.8.2.
 Diodorus Siculus 97
this remark. On the one hand it would not be impossible for Diodorus 
to propound belief in the gods both for its own sake and for the sake of 
societal law and order; on the other hand it might not be beyond him to 
copy the statement out of his source without fully subscribing to it simply 
because it sounds catchy and clever; and finally the statement may have 
been part of a speech uttered by a character and not the narrator’s own 
words.
In short, Diodorus’ concept of piety seems to be entirely traditional. 
What is striking, certainly in comparison with Polybius, is the extent to 
which it is a yardstick not just of narratorial approval, but also of success 
in the world of the Bibliotheke. Differences between parts of the work in 
this respect are slight: despite the fact that spectacular divine vengeance is 
restricted to certain parts (see above) and that the narrative of the Sacred 
War for obvious reasons contains more references to piety and impiety 
than any other historical narrative in the work, the concepts are important 
throughout, and εὐσεβεῖα and ἀσεβεῖα and their cognates are used fre-
quently in every book.
Mildness, kindness and the danger of good fortune
The virtue most often extolled in the Bibliotheke is not piety, however. 
It is mildness, kindness or a generally fair way of treating the people in 
one’s power, expressed by the noun ἐπιείκεια and its almost-synonym 
φιλανθρωπία.
ἐπιείκεια and its cognates occur no fewer than 123 times in the 
Bibliotheke, against only nine times in Polybius’ Histories. In Diodorus, 
this word is used to describe an uneven relationship: it denotes good treat-
ment of those in one’s power, such as that which a ruler shows his subjects, 
or a commander his men, or a victorious general his captives; hence the 
common translation ‘mildness’. It can also denote general approachability 
and sympathetic behaviour by someone in power; hence the other common 
translation, ‘kindness’. φιλανθρωπία and its cognates occur no fewer than 
167 times in the Bibliotheke, against an equally impressive 126 in Polybius’ 
Histories. This is a wider concept than ἐπιείκεια, pertaining not just to rela-
tionships between unequal parties, but also to kindness between equals. In 
the Bibliotheke, however, it is used as a synonym of ἐπιείκεια, and the two 
are often employed in hendiadys.
Throughout the work, mild/kind treatment is repeatedly shown to be 
the way to ensure the loyalty of one’s subjects and the praise of pos terity.61 
Conversely, harsh treatment of subjects repeatedly leads to disloyalty and 
61 2.46.2, 3.61.4, 9.24, 11.26.4–7, 11.67.2, 11.71.2, 12.50.1–3, 19.86.3–5. The mechanism 
is sometimes used deliberately: 11.26.4–7, 15.31.1, 15.57.1.
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revolt.62 The maxim is set out in a gnome in the preface to book 14, 
although in slightly different words: ‘the power of rulers is maintained 
by goodwill and justice, but is dissolved by unjust acts and the hatred of 
the subjects’ (14.2.1).63 Sacks has called it ‘a pattern for the rise and fall of 
empires’ and identified it – correctly, I think – as Diodorus’ own interpre-
tation of history.64 Remarkably, this moral rule holds true for every single 
part of the Bibliotheke, from Egyptian and Ethiopian kings in book 1 (1.60, 
1.68.5) to the divine and heroic rulers of the mythological books (3.61.4, 
4.45.3–5), to Spartan kings (11.44.4–5), Sicilian tyrants (11.67.2, 14.45.1), 
the Athenian and Spartan hegemonies (11.70.3–4, 15.28), the Successor 
kings (19.86.3–5), the Eastern kings of the second century bc (33.18.1, 
34/35.3) and even Roman officials (37.5–6) and rebels (38.22a). This must 
mean that the message that those in power should treat the less powerful 
with mildness and kindness, and that this will in turn enhance and secure 
their power and gain them fame, was at the heart of Diodorus’ didactic 
programme.65 The notion is not new, of course. We have seen that Polybius 
stresses the close correlation between a ruler’s or ruler-state’s treatment of 
his/its subjects and his/its success,66 and we shall see in the next chapter that 
a similar message is found in the Classical historiographers. However, no 
extant work of Classical or Hellenistic Greek historiography puts as much 
emphasis on this moral-didactic point as Diodorus’ Bibliotheke.
62 1.60, 1.64.5, 4.45.3–5, 4.68.2, 9.23, 11.44.4–5, 11.68.7, 11.70.3–4, 14.47.5 and 48.1, 
15.1.3–5, 15.28, 15.61.2–3, 16.40, 17.5.3, 19.89.3, 28.14, 34/35.2.34–40, 34/35.3, 38.22a.
63 αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑπεροχαὶ τηροῦνται μὲν εὐνοίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ, καταλύονται δὲ 
ἀδικήμασι καὶ μίσει τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων: 14.2.1.
64 Sacks (1990: 6, 42–53).
65 An apparent contradiction is 32.2, which states that ‘Those who want dominion over 
others use courage and intelligence to get it, moderation and consideration to extend it, 
and paralysing terror to secure it’ (οἱ τὰς ἡγεμονίας περιποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι κτῶνται 
μὲν αὐτὰς ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ συνέσει, πρὸς αὔξησιν δὲ μεγάλην ἄγουσιν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, 
ἀσφαλίζονται δὲ φόβῳ καὶ καταπλήξει), and which has been used to argue that its author 
(usually considered to be Polybius, from whom Diodorus is then supposed to have copied 
the maxim) condones such rule by terror. I have argued elsewhere that the statement says 
nothing about its author’s attitude to this way of ruling, only about the way he sees rulers 
generally behaving (Hau 2006).
66 Unfortunately a direct comparison of Diodoran passages on this topic with their 
Polybian source passages is not possible, as the fragmentary state of both texts means that 
the passages on which Diodorus based his moralising on the virtue of epieikeia have all been 
lost. The closest match is between Diod. Sic. 30.23 and Polyb. 29.20, which both deal with 
Aemilius Paullus after his defeat and capture of Perseus. It is obvious that Diod. Sic. 30.23 is 
based on Polybius’ account, but of this latter only a short fragment is extant, which quotes 
part of Aemilius’ speech to the Senate about how to bear good fortune with moderation, 
whereas the Diodorus fragment has both this advice (in oratio obliqua) and a concluding 
narratorial evaluation which moralises explicitly on the epieikeia of Aemilius and other 
Romans more generally. Whether or to what extent this conclusion is based on Polybius is 
impossible to determine.
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Closely related to the message that rulers should treat their subjects 
mildly is the message that victorious commanders should treat the defeated 
well. Again, this is not only the morally right way to behave, but also tends 
to lead to loyalty and fame.67 Scenes of victorious generals abound in the 
Bibliotheke, and the narrator is always interested in how they respond 
to their victory.68 In this way, the message of the desirability of mildness 
and the message of the general human inability to bear good fortune with 
moderation become closely connected. An example of this is the narra-
tive of how Scipio Africanus the Elder receives the captive Syphax and 
its moralising conclusion, found in two slightly different versions in the 
Constantinian Excerpts (Diod. Sic. 27.6):
Ὅτι ὁ Σκιπίων παραγενηθέντων πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν περὶ Σόφακα τὸ μὲν 
πρῶτον ἰδὼν τὸν ἄνδρα δεδεμένον ἐδάκρυσε, λογιζόμενος τὴν πάλαι ποτὲ 
μακαριζομένην αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν. μετ’ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον κρίνας ἀνθρώπινα 
φρονεῖν ἐν τοῖς εὐτυχήμασιν ἐπέταξεν αὐτὸν λῦσαι καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν σκηνὴν 
ἀπέδωκε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀκολουθίαν ἔχειν συνεχώρησε· τηρῶν δὲ αὐτὸν 
ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ φυλακῇ φιλανθρώπως ὡμίλει καὶ πολλάκις ἐπὶ δεῖπνα 
παρελαμβάνετο. (Const. Exc. 2(1), pp. 267–8)
Ὅτι Σκιπίων τὸν Σόφακα τὸν βασιλέα αἰχμάλωτον λαβὼν καὶ δεδεμένον 
λύσας φιλανθρώπως ὡμίλει αὐτόν· ᾤετο γὰρ δεῖν τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου 
ἔχθραν μέχρι τοῦ νικᾶν φυλάττειν, εἰς δὲ τύχην αἰχμάλωτον ἀνδρὸς βασιλέως 
γεγονότος μηδὲν ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα· ἐφορᾷ γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸν 
ἀνθρώπινον βίον νέμεσίς τις θεοῦ, ἣ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον φρονοῦντας ταχὺ 
τῆς ἰδίας ἀσθενείας ὑπομιμνήσκει. διὸ καὶ τὸν Σκιπίωνα τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινέσειε 
θεωρῶν πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων φόβον καταπληκτικὸν γενόμενον, ὑπὸ 
δὲ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ἠτυχηκότας ἐλέου τὴν ψυχὴν ἡττώμενον; ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ 
εἰώθασιν οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους φοβεροὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας 
ὑπάρχειν μέτριοι. διὸ καὶ ταχὺ τοῦ Σόφακος ὁ Σκιπίων τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιεικείας 
ἐκομίσατο χάριν. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 356–7)
(That) when Syphax and those with him were brought to Scipio and he first 
saw the man in chains, he burst into tears, thinking about Syphax’s ancient 
prosperity and royal state, now gone. After a little while, deciding to stay 
moderate like a human being in his good fortune, he ordered that Syphax 
should be unchained and gave him his own tent and agreed to letting him 
keep his retinue. Guarding him in free custody he associated with him in a 
friendly way and often invited him for dinner. (Const. Exc. 2(1), pp. 267–8)
(That) when Scipio had taken King Syphax prisoner, he unchained him and 
associated with him in a friendly manner; for he thought it right to keep 
his hostility against his enemy until the point of victory, but when a king 
67 3.72.5–6, 14.105, 17.38.3, 17.76.1–2, 17.91.8, 19.86.3–5
68 I have discussed ‘victor after the victory’ scenes in Diodorus in the context of Greek 
historiography more generally in Hau (2008). 
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had had suffered the fate to become a prisoner of war, not to overstep the 
line, human as he was. For some divine retributive justice, it seems, watches 
over human life, and quickly reminds those who become too arrogant for a 
human being of their own weakness. For that reason, who would not praise 
Scipio, realising that he was a source of terror to the enemy, but that his 
own mind was defeated by pity for the unfortunate? For often those who 
are terrifying to the enemy ranged against them are moderate towards those 
who fall into their power. For that reason Scipio soon obtained Syphax’s 
gratitude for his mildness. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 356–7)
The close connection between mildness/kindness and the ability to stay 
moderate in good fortune is clear: Scipio’s treatment of Syphax is described 
as φιλανθρώπως (twice in the passage above, but probably only once in 
the original passage, here quoted by both excerptors) and τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν 
ἐπιεικείας (27.6.2) and is brought about by his decision to ‘stay moder-
ate like a human being in his good fortune’ (ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἐν τοῖς 
εὐτυχήμασιν: 27.6.1) and ‘not to overstep the line, human as he was’ (μηδὲν 
ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα: 27.6.2).
We recognise the idea from Polybius: good fortune, most often in the 
form of military victory, is a test of a man’s moral integrity, and most people 
fail it. The quoted passage is in all likelihood based on a now lost passage 
of Polybius, and two features of it are typical of the Histories rather than 
of the Bibliotheke: the fact that Scipio cries (see p. 53), and the rhetorical 
question ‘who could fail to praise such a man’ (27.6.2). These two features 
were probably already in Polybius’ version. We also recognise the gratitude 
(χάριν: 27.6.2) that is the result of staying moderate and treating the defeated 
with consideration; this is a topos in both the Histories and the Bibliotheke.
Diodorus, however, has put his own spin on the reason why human 
beings must strive for moderation in success. The repeated stress on Scipio’s 
humanity (ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν: 27.6.1, ἄνθρωπον ὄντα: 27.6.2) and its inher-
ent weakness (ἀσθενείας: 27.6.2), that is, on the fact that he is a human 
being and not a god and is therefore subject to the superhuman powers 
that rule the world, is typical for this sort of passage in the Bibliotheke 
(and we saw it in the passage about Olympias’ mistreatment of Eurydice; 
above, pp. 83–4). The thought is expressed very clearly in the first sentence 
of the conclusion to the episode: ‘For some divine retributive justice, it 
seems, watches over human life, and quickly reminds those who become 
too arrogant for a human being of their own weakness.’ This religious idea 
seems to be in contrast with the didactic programme of Polybius, according 
to which victors should treat the defeated with moderation out of a feeling 
of solidarity based on their shared humanity. The moralising conclusion, 
then, must be an addition of Diodorus’ to whatever he took over from 
Polybius. Likewise, the use of the verb ἐξαμαρτάνειν to express the mistake 
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Scipio would make in mistreating his prisoner shows that the narrator is 
thinking about that mistake in religious terms as a transgression against 
the divine, and is therefore most probably an addition of Diodorus’.69 It is 
also in his work and not in Polybius’ that the reference to ‘human weak-
ness’ repeatedly occurs in connection with the message that one should not 
abuse one’s good fortune.70 The idea seems to be that all human beings are 
helpless in the face of divine powers (including fortune, tyche), and that 
this common helplessness should make us feel solidarity with each other 
and avoid mistreating those who happen to be in our power when we are 
successful. Rather, we should remember that we may well one day end up 
in a similar situation. In some Diodoran passages this idea is combined 
with the thought that human beings share a ‘common fortune’ (see e.g. 
the Olympias/Eurydice passage we encountered earlier, pp. 83–4), which 
sounds closer to the Polybian idea of moderate treatment based on a feeling 
of solidarity and the thought that the roles might have been reversed, but 
could equally well be another way of saying that all human beings are 
equally powerless in the face of superhuman forces.
The admonition to behave moderately towards one’s defeated enemy 
and examples of how this leads to positive results are ubiquitous in the 
Bibliotheke.71 The message is propounded in a prescriptively moralising 
digression in 27.15.3, and at four different junctures the message is deliv-
ered in very similar gnomai stating that ‘forgiveness is preferable to pun-
ishment’.72 Aemilius Paullus and some of his fellow-Romans are said to 
practise this as a deliberate policy, being tough on their opponents, but 
mild towards the defeated (πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑφισταμένους ὄντα βαρὺν ἑαυτόν, 
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κρατηθέντας ἐπιεικῆ: 30.23.2), which is why Rome’s rule 
was not hated (at that time?).73 Very often it is connected with the idea of 
behaving moderately in good fortune.74
69 ἐξαμαρτάνω is used ten times in the Bibliotheke and only once in Polybius’ Histories.
70 E.g. 9.33.3, 10.14.2, 17.38.6, 18.59, 19.11.6, 23.12. For wider discussion of the theme 
of the abuse of good fortune in Diodorus see Hau (2009).
71 3.72.5–6, 4.53.1–3, 16.20.5–6, 11.25.1–2, 11.26.1, 13.19–33.1, 14.105, 15.17.5, 16.87, 
17.38.3–7, 17.59.7, 18.18.4–6, 19.11, 23.12, 27.13–18 (fragments, probably from speeches in 
the Roman Senate about the fate of Carthage after its defeat), 30.23, 31.3 (fragments, prob-
ably from a speech), 31.4
72 9.12.3, 21.9, 21.14.3, 31.3.
73 This echoes the prophecy in Verg. Aen. 8.653 that the Romans must parcere subiectis 
et debellare superbos. By Polybius, the doctrine is put into the mouth of Flamininus in his 
speech to his Greek allies after his victory over Philip V (πολεμοῦντας γὰρ δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς 
ἄνδρας βαρεῖς εἶναι καὶ θυμικούς, ἡττωμένους δὲ γενναίους καὶ μεγαλόφρονας, νικῶντάς γε 
μὴν μετρίους, καὶ πραεῖς καὶ φιλανθρώπους: 18.37.7). This is probably evidence that such a 
policy was deliberately articulated by some Senators of Republican Rome. 
74 11.25.1–2, 11.26.1, 13.19–33.1, 14.105, 15.17.5, 16.87, 17.38.3–7, 17.59.7, 19.11, 23.12, 
27.13–18, 30.23, 31.3, 31.4. 32.23–4.
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The message that one should take care to stay humble in success is, 
however, also expressed in other connections, usually in the context of 
powerful people becoming arrogant and/or abusive and ending up suffer-
ing in return.75 It is especially common in the context of hegemonic powers, 
such as Athens rejecting a Spartan peace offer during the Peloponnesian 
War, which provokes the narrator to a proleptic mention of the defeat 
of Athens (13.53), and in the narrative of the downfall of tyrants, such as 
Dionysius II, which earns a moralising conclusion turning the tyrant into a 
paradeigma for those who become arrogant in success (16.70.2–3). In these 
passages the downfall is usually not explicitly attributed to divine punish-
ment, but the fact that such punishment figures prominently in most parts 
of the Bibliotheke (as established above), and that a downfall is unfailingly 
expected to follow upon abusive behaviour brought on by feeling secure 
in one’s success, makes it natural for a reader to see an element of divine 
punishment of the arrogant.
I have demonstrated elsewhere that moralising on the topic of the dif-
ficulty of coping with good fortune and the dangers of letting it go to 
your head is inconsistent in the Bibliotheke: in some parts, particularly 
those probably based on Timaeus and Polybius, it is pervasive; in others, 
particularly book 17 and the Greek narrative of 18–19, it only shows up 
occasionally.76 Even in these books, however, the theme of the necessity of 
bearing good fortune with moderation is present; just more sporadically 
(e.g. 17.38.4–7, 18.59.3–6, 19.11). The theme was clearly high on Diodorus’ 
list of moral-didactic priorities, even if he did not always superimpose it on 
narratives in his sources that did not already display it.
Courage
As in Polybius’ Histories, so also in Diodorus’ Bibliotheke courage is a 
much-praised virtue and a mark of a good man. Unlike Polybius, however, 
Diodorus only rarely acknowledges that courage has to be tempered with 
intelligence and planning. Only three times is ill-advised courage com-
mented on: in Thebes’ and Tyre’s resistance against Alexander the Great 
(προπετῶς καὶ ἀβούλως: 17.10.1, and ἀνδρειότερον μᾶλλον ἢ φρονιμώτερον: 
17.10.6; γενναιότερον μᾶλλον ἢ φρονιμώτερον: 17.46.5), and in Athens’ 
decision to rebel against Antipater (πρὸς εὐδοξίαν εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ 
συμφέροντος διημαρτηκέν: 18.10.4–5).
Otherwise, courage in the Bibliotheke is usually both an admirable 
and a useful virtue. It wins battles (4.28.3, 11.74.4, 16.4, 31.44, 36.10.1), 
75 4.74, 9.2.2, 9.26–8, 9.33.3, 10.13, 10.14.1, 10.23, 13.53, 14.101.3, 15.33.3, 17.46.6–47, 
17.66.3–7, 18.59.5–6, 19.95.6–7, 20.13.3, 24.9.2–3, 27.1, 31.11. 
76 Hau (2009).
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kingly power (4.73.6, 20.22.6)77 and freedom from tyranny (16.9, 16.12). 
Moreover, Diodorus has a fascination with spectacular courage dis-
played on the battlefield. A rhetorically profuse encomium of the dead at 
Thermopylae takes up a whole chapter of book 11 (11.11), and in battle 
narratives heroic deaths figure prominently. A typical example of such a 
heroic battle episode is the last stand of the Spartan general Mindarus:
συνδραμουσῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς ἕνα τόπον, ὁ μὲν Μίνδαρος οὐ κατεπλάγη 
τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν περὶ Θηραμένην, ἀλλὰ διελόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τοῖς 
μὲν ἡμίσεσιν ἀπήντα τοῖς ἐπιοῦσι, τοὺς δ’ ἡμίσεις αὐτὸς ἔχων, καὶ δεόμενος 
ἑκάστου μὴ καταισχῦναι τὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀξίωμα, καὶ ταῦτα πεζομαχοῦντας, 
ἀντετάχθησαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. περὶ δὲ τῶν νεῶν ἡροικὴν 
συστησάμενος μάχην, καὶ πρὸ πάντων αὐτὸς κινδυνεύων, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀνεῖλε 
τῶν ἀντιτεταγμένων, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἀξίως τῆς πατρίδος ἀγονισάμενος ὑπὸ 
τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἀνῃρέθη. τούτου δὲ πεπτωκότος οἵ τε Πελοπεννήσιοι 
καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι συνέδραμον καὶ καταπλαγέντες εἰς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν.
The forces all converged towards one point, but Mindarus was not struck 
with terror by the influx of Theramenes and his troops. He divided the 
Peloponnesians, met the attackers with one half, and then took the other 
half himself and ranged them against Alcibiades and his troops, exhorting 
each of the men not to disgrace the glory of Sparta, especially in a land- 
battle. He organised a heroic battle by the ships and risked his own life in 
the front line; he killed many of those ranged against him, but in the end he 
was killed by Alcibiades’ troops, having fought in a manner worthy of his 
country. When this man had fallen, the Peloponnesians and all the allies ran 
together and, struck with fear, turned to flight. (Diod. Sic. 13.51.5–6)
Almost every feature of this passage is typical of the heroic battle anecdote 
in Diodorus. It starts off with applying a positive statement or epithet 
to its protagonist: here ‘Mindarus was not struck with terror’, but often 
the protagonist is said to be ‘outstanding’,78 or some group of people, 
often his soldiers, which he surpasses, is specified.79 If the protagonist is a 
Spartan or a Roman, he then thinks of upholding the honour of his father-
land (13.51.5).80 During the battle, his fighting is extolled, usually with 
the adverb λαμπρῶς (‘brilliantly’) or ἡρωικῶς (‘heroically’),81 and called 
‘worthy of his fatherland’ (13.51.6).82 He kills many enemies (13.51.6),83 
77 Adversely, power can be lost be cowardice: 16.70.2–3.
78 12.43.2, 15.17, 15.64.3, 15.80.1, 17.45.6.
79 15.64.3, 16.16.3, 19.72.7–8; see also καὶ πρὸ πάντων αὐτὸς κινδυνεύων: 13.51.
80 14.83.6, 15.64.4, 19.72.7–8.
81 12.43.3, 15.87.1, 17.63.4, 17.45.6.
82 14.83.7.
83 14.83.7, 15.17.1, 15.64.5, 15.80.5.
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but in the end (τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον: 13.51.6)84 he himself is slain.85 In many of 
the episodes, the protagonist is said to strive to be the one to bring about 
victory, even if it cost him his life,86 and he is killed while he is ‘fighting 
heroically’,87 and only after he has been wounded repeatedly.88
In four instances (14.83.6–7 Pisander, 15.64.3–5 Ischolas, 17.45.6 
Admetus, 19.72.7–8 Q. Aulius) the heroic anecdote is the only mention of 
the hero in the Bibliotheke; Diodorus apparently found the instance of the 
heroic death so valuable that it had to be included in his work even if it was 
performed by a character who had otherwise no part to play in the story. 
In three other instances the heroic death is the only event related from the 
battle: 15.33.6 (Phoebidas), where the whole battle takes up just five lines 
of the Loeb text; 16.7.3–4 (Chabrias), which receives six lines; and 16.16.3 
(Philistus), which receives a full paragraph focused solely on Philistus’ 
heroic suicide. These brief scenes are composed of only three elements: (1) 
the general is introduced, (2) the battle is joined, and (3) the general dies 
heroically. In 15.33.6, the defeat of the dying general’s side is hinted at; in 
16.7.3–4 and 16.16.3, he is specifically said to choose death before defeat. 
Other than that, in these three battle narratives the reader is not told which 
side was victorious or why. There is no information about deployment of 
troops or the course of the battle. Clearly, the paradeigma of the heroic 
death of the general held more interest for Diodorus than such military 
facts.
There are fifteen heroic battle episodes in Diodorus, which all follow 
this pattern. Thirteen of them are found in the Greek narrative of books 
11–16, which he is generally believed to have based on the work of Ephorus 
of Cyme.89 This makes it likely that such episodes were characteristic of 
Ephorus, and that Diodorus took over these passages from this author. 
Their similarity in structure and focus may well also go back to Ephorus, 
84 τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον: twice in 13.99, 14.83.7; τέλοs δὲ: 15.80.5.
85 14.83.7, 15.17, 15.64.5, 15.80.5, 17.45.6, 19.72.8.
86 ἔσπευδεν ἐπιφανέστατον ἑαυτῷ περιποιήσασθαι θάνατον: 13.99; πάντα κίνδυνον 
ὑπομένων: 15.55.5; σπεύδων διὰ τῆs ἰδίαs ἀνδρείαs κρῖναι τὴν μάχην ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ὥρμησε τὸν 
̓Αλέξανδρον: 15.80.5.
87 ἀγωνισάμενοs λαμπρῶς: 13.99.5, 14.83.7, 15.33.6; μαχόμενοs ἡρωικῶς: 15.17.1, 15.17.1, 
15.55.5, 17.45.6; ἀριστεύων: 15.80.5
88 13.99, 14.7.3, 15.33.6, 15.55.5, 15.80.5, 15.87.1, 16.7.3.
89 In the narrative based on Ephorus: 12.43.2–3 Brasidas, 13.51.6 Mindarus, 13.99 
Callicratidas (with 13.97.5), 14.83 Pisander, 15.17.1 Leptines, 15.33.6 Phoebidas, 15.64 
Ischolas, 15.69 Chabrias, 15.79.2 and 15.87 Epaminondas, 15.80 Pelopidas, 16.7.3–4 and 
16.16.3 Philistus. (The Leptines and Philistus episodes take place in the Sicilian narrative, 
but are nevertheless most probably based on Ephorus. Diodorus seems for some reason to 
have switched from using Timaeus to using Ephorus as his main source for Sicily at the end 
of book 14. See Schwartz 1903, Meister 1967 and Pearson 1984, 1987; contra Stylianou 1998: 
64–78.) 
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although it is entirely possible that Diodorus extracted these pieces of infor-
mation from fuller battle narratives and thereby created his own heroic 
battle topos. The two heroic battle episodes found outside of the ‘Ephoran’ 
narrative are in books 17 and 19 respectively.90 This could either mean 
that they go back to Diodorus’ sources for those books, who were perhaps 
inspired by Ephorus, or that Diodorus chose to highlight these particular 
instances of heroics in the same way as he had done in the ‘Ephoran’ books 
although they were presented differently in his other sources. Whatever 
the exact relationship between Diodorus’ text and his sources in these 
instances, it is clear that he found heroic death by a general in battle inter-
esting and important and that certain features of such deaths seemed to 
him to be particularly worthy of mention.
When we look at the typical features of these episodes, we realise that 
they are not retold just for cheap thrills: they are not visual, blow-by-blow 
descriptions of the fighting and do not wallow in pathetic details of the gen-
eral’s death. Instead they highlight two things: the general’s courage and his 
patriotism. Courage more than fighting skill is surely what is meant when 
he fights λαμπρῶς or ἡρωικῶς, and courage and patriotism are combined in 
the general’s thoughts about Spartan/Roman honour and his desire to win 
the battle by his own efforts regardless of the cost. It is the repetitiveness 
of the episodes that makes them didactic. The reader is not told explicitly 
that such behaviour is good and noble, or that it benefits the general’s city; 
these causal connections are founding premises for all ancient (and later?) 
ideas of battlefield behaviour and go without saying. The episodes rein-
force the standard ideal, and by their structural and semantic repetitiveness 
drill into the reader the nobility and moral rightness of sacrificing one’s 
life in battle for one’s country. In this way they fulfil the promise to make 
soldiers ‘more ready to face dangers’ of the preface (1.1.5).
Another type of heroic courage showcased by the Bibliotheke is courage 
under torture. These episodes are often narrated more vividly than the 
heroic battle deaths, giving visual details and letting the victim and/or the 
torturer(s) speak in direct speech. Examples are the torturing of the pre- 
Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea by the tyrant Nearchus (10.18), where 
Zeno lures the tyrant to lean close in order to hear a promised confession 
and then bites off his ear, and of the Rhegian general Phyton by the tyrant 
Dionysius I of Syracuse (14.112), where Phyton responds with defiance 
to the report of the killing of his son and earns the respect and sympathy 
of the tyrant’s soldiers for his courage. Such episodes are less frequent than 
the heroic battle episodes, but more memorable because of their vivid, 
90 17.45.6 Admetus, 19.72.7–8 Q. Aulius.
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pathetic style.91 The difference in style could be due to Diodorus’ use of 
different sources: while the heroic battle deaths are primarily found in the 
‘Ephoran’ books, the torture scenes are primarily encountered in book 10, 
whose sources are uncertain, and in the Timaean, Polybian and Posidonian 
sections of the Bibliotheke. It is more likely, however, that the difference is 
due to the fact that the torture scenes are advocating a kind of courage less 
suited to shorthand moralising than the kind displayed in the brief and col-
ourless battle episodes. The courage displayed by the torture victims is less 
patriotic and more individual, and it is chiefly demonstrated through their 
defiant speech acts, which can therefore not be ignored, and which need a 
detailed setting in order to make sense.92
Courage at the point of death, whether in battle, under torture, by 
one’s own hand in order to avoid capture or in any other circumstance, is 
always admired in the Bibliotheke,93 even to the point where it blots out 
any blemishes on a character’s previous moral record. Thus, Olympias 
dies ‘without any ignoble or womanish utterance’ and receives a positive 
(although amoral) obituary (19.51) despite the moralising account of her 
previous mistreatment of Eurydice and Philip, during which her unpleas-
ant death was predicted and called ‘worthy of her cruelty’ (19.11.7), and 
rebellious slaves die ‘heroically’ at their own hands rather than fight in the 
arena (36.10.3).
Justice and Lawfulness
Throughout the Bibliotheke, good men are described as ‘just’ (δίκαιος) 
or ‘excelling in justice’ (διαφέρων δικαιοσύνῃ and similar expressions). 
Especially pervasive in the mythological books, these are labels fitted to a 
range of kings, heroes and gods, from Aegyptus (1.51.4) through Hesperus 
(3.60.2) to Priam (4.32 and 49), Minos (5.78.4) and Zeus (5.71.1).94 Here, 
justice (δικαιοσύνη) is often paired with courage (ἀνδρεία),95 mildness/
kindness (ἐπιείκεια/φιλανθρωπία)96 and, above all, piety (εὐσέβεια).97 
This places justice as the fourth and final virtue that completes Diodorus’ 
91 E.g. 10.17.2–3, 10.18, 14.112, 19.11.4–7, 26.14, 36.10.3.
92 An exception is the scene of the torture of Aristogeiton by Hipparchus at 10.17.2–
3, which reads like a heroic battle death: Aristogeiton is more distinguished than his fel-
low-conspirators, and his courage is extolled without quotation of any speech. The passage 
is fragmentary, however, so the speech and other details may well have been lost.
93 See e.g. 17.84, 18.22, 37.27.
94 1.51.4 Aegyptus, 1.95.1 Amasis, 2.32.2 Cyaxares, 3.60.2 Hesperus, 4.18.3 ‘a certain 
king’ (in Iberia), 4.32 and 4.49 Priam, 5.7.7 Aeolus, 5.8.3 sons of Aeolus, 5.66.4 Cronus, 
5.71.1 Zeus, 5.78.4 and 5.79 Minos, 5.81.5 Macareus, 5.83.4 Tennes, 5.84.2 Rhadamanthus, 
6.6.1 the Dioscuri, 8.30.2 Demonax.
95 5.71.1, 5.78.4, 6.6.1.
96 1.51.4, 1.95.1, 3.60.2, 5.81.5.
97 1.2.2, 1.92.5, 3.60.2, 3.64.7, 4.18.3, 5.7.7, 5.8.3, 4.49.6, 6.6.1.
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picture of the good man. Interestingly, however, ‘just’ is not applied as an 
epithet to those gods and heroes whose stories are told at greatest length, 
that is, Isis and Osiris, Dionysus and Heracles. Instead, these divine pro-
tagonists demonstrate their moral goodness by their actions, specifically 
termed benefactions (εὐεργεσίαι).98 This shows that ‘just’ in this part of the 
work is little more than shorthand, used simply as a stamp of approval on a 
mythological character, whose personality could not be known and whose 
deeds would not be explored in any great detail. The main protagonists of 
the mythological books have more complex personalities, which can be 
surmised from their deeds.
In the historical books, the appellation ‘just’ carries more weight. It is 
only used of characters for whom it is a defining characteristic, such as 
Pittacus, one of the Seven Sages (9.11), Aristides the Just (11.47.2) and 
Callicratidas, ‘the most just man in Sparta’ (13.76.2).99 These men are all 
admired for their justice, which earns them influence and loyalty. In the 
preface to book 14 on the importance for hegemonic states of treating their 
subjects well, justice (δικαιοσύνη) is paired with benevolence (εὐνοῖα) as 
the qualities that preserve such power securely.
In contrast, the antonym ‘unjust’ is used in a consistent manner through-
out the mythological and the historical books of the Bibliotheke. Rather 
than a catch-all term to label any character or action immoral, the adjective 
ἄδικος and its cognates are throughout the work primarily used for actions 
that are unjust in a legal sense, either in the court room or in unwritten 
international law,100 although the verb ἀδικέω is sometimes used to mean 
simply ‘harm’ without a strong sense of legality.101 A fragment of book 
25, possibly from the preface, states that ‘injustice is the metropolis of 
evil’ and praises Epicurus for realising this (25.1).102 There is, however, 
no discussion of what injustice might entail or how it brings about other 
evils. Such lack of reflection is characteristic of the Bibliotheke’s approach 
to both injustice and justice. No extant digression reflects on what actually 
 98 Euergesiai: Isis and Osiris 1.13.1 and 5, 1.17.2, 1.18.6, 1.22.2; Dionysus 3.64.2, 3.66.3, 
3.70.8, 3.72.4; Heracles 4.8.5, 4.15.2, 4.27.4. Heracles is described as a hater and punisher of 
injustice and lawlessness at 4.17.5 and 5.76.1.
 99 Also Cyaxares (9.20.4), Micythus of Zankle 11.66.2, Diomedon 13.102.1, Agesipolis 
15.19.4, and – in the limited area of distributing booty – Viriathes the bandit captain 33.1.
100 E.g. 1.71.1, 1.75, 1.77, 1.79, 2.28.5–7, 2.42.3, 3.12.2, 3.59.3, 4.17.5, 4.43–4, 5.71.1, 
5.76.1, 5.83.4, 8.25.3, 9.13.3, 10.23.1, 11.58.4, 12.56.6, 13.102.3–5, 14.37.7, 14.66.4, 14.113.5, 
15.25, 15.29.6, 16.49.5, 17.30.5, 18.23.4, 18.65.5, 20.10.3, 20.70.4, 20.82.2, 25.2, 28.4.
101 2.40.4, 2.59.3, 3.18.7, 8.15.3, 11.67, 13.67.5, 17.69.9, 19.103.5. In many of these cases 
the harm is or can be perceived to be unjust, but the emphasis seems to be on the hurt rather 
than the injustice.
102 The expression ‘X is the metropolis of evils/evil-doing’ recurs about greed at 21.14a, 
while the main preface claims that history/historiography is the metroplis of philosophy 
(1.2.2). It was clearly a favourite expression of Diodorus’.
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constitutes justice or how this can be determined. This presents a stark 
contrast to Polybius’ Histories, where the justice of various historical acts 
is often discussed at length,103 and it means that the moral message that one 
should act justly remains not only largely implicit in the Bibliotheke, but 
also unnuanced.
If Diodorus’ approach to justice is unreflective, he seems to have thought 
more carefully about law, its importance for human society and how it 
is best constituted. In the mythological books, part of the civilising pro-
gramme of many of the culture heroes consists in setting down laws (1.14.3 
Isis, 2.38.5 Dionysus, 5.5.2 and 5.68.3 Demeter, 5.66.5–6 Cronus, 5.67.4 
Themis, 5.71.1–3 Zeus, 5.78.3 Minos), often said to lead to greater justice 
(1.14.3 Isis, 5.5.2 Demeter, 5.66.5–6 Cronus, 5.71.1–3 Zeus). Lawgiving is 
also mentioned in the preface as one of the many great deeds human beings 
have undertaken under the inspiration of universal history (1.2.1).
In the historical part of the work also, lawgivers are given much space: 
in the fragmentary book 9, in a section apparently dedicated to the Seven 
Sages, the description of Solon as the perfectly virtuous man seems to be 
left over from a longer discussion of his lawgiving (touched on in 9.1.4, but 
the details are left out by the excerptor), and a laudatory anecdote about 
his dedication to his laws is told in 9.4 and again at 9.20 (the repetition is 
due to the passage being preserved with variations by two different excerp-
tors). Likewise, Pittacus of Mytilene receives very positive treatment in 
9.12, where his lawgiving is mentioned among his benefactions, and Bias is 
praised for his justice (9.13). In between Solon and Pittacus are discussed 
the Delphic maxims, according to Diodorus phrased by Chilon, which are 
taken as obscurely expressed laws for behaviour (9.9–11).
In book 12, the longest digression of the Bibliotheke recounts the laws 
of Charondas, praising them repeatedly for their excellence (12.11–19) and 
ending with an anecdote about how this lawgiver’s dedication to his laws 
led to his death. It is followed immediately by a digression on the laws of 
Zaleucus, which are likewise praised, but discussed less extensively (12.20–
1). In book 13, in an episode very similar to the narrative of the death of 
Charondas, Diocles the Sicilian lawgiver dies by his own hand to uphold 
his laws (13.33.2–3 and 35). The connection between law and justice is only 
made explicit occasionally in these lawgiver passages (12.20.3 and 13.35.4), 
but the repeated insistence on the excellence of the laws and of the men 
who made them104 leads the reader to understand that they increased the 
justice of their respective societies.105
103 See e.g. Polyb. 18.13–15 and 36.9.
104 12.11.4, 12.12.3, 12.12.4, 12.15.1, 12.16.2, 12.20.1–3, 13.35.1–2.
105 Diodorus’ fascination with what constitutes just laws is also seen in 15.11, a lively 
anecdote in which three Persian judges explain their reasons for acquitting an alleged traitor.
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These passages seemingly demonstrate a strong Diodoran interest in 
laws and lawgiving, but strangely the interest seems to disappear after the 
narrative of Diocles in book 13. If Diodorus wrote anything on the laws 
of Rome, this passage has been lost. Perhaps, as with the other parts of his 
moral-didactic programme, he took over passages on laws and lawgiving 
whenever he found them in his sources, but did not go in search of supple-
mentary sources to fill the gap when he did not find such information.
Since we have spent some time on Polybius’ ideas about lawful warfare, 
it would be interesting to compare what Diodorus has to say about the 
subject. Whatever he once had to say, however, is now so fragmentary 
that it hardly rewards study. In the late, fragmentary books, there are two 
mentions of the Romans pursuing only just wars (28.3.1, 32.5.1), one of 
them with the explicit comment that this ensures them the support of the 
gods (28.3.1). An example in book 8 from Rome’s early history of how 
the Romans manipulate matters into making their wars just according 
to the letter, if not the spirit, of divine law does not receive narratorial 
comment (8.25), and had perhaps been forgotten by both author and 
reader by the time they reached the narrative of Rome’s wars against 
Philip V and Numantia, in which context the enthusiastic comments 
about bellum justum are found. The expression ‘unjust war’ is used a 
few times in the work,106 but the narrator never puts stress on the point 
and never explains what constitutes an unjust war. More intriguingly, a 
lacunose passage in book 30 seems to be the remnant of a digression on 
the ‘laws of war’:
πᾶς γὰρ πόλεμος ἐκβεβηκὼς τὰ νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅμως ἔχει 
τινὰς ἰδίους καθαπερεὶ νόμους, οἷον ἀνοχὰς μὴ λύειν, κήρυκα μὴ ἀναιρεῖν, 
τὸν τὸ σῶμα αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κατισχύοντος πίστιν <παραδόντα μὴ>107 
τιμωρεῖσθαι.
For, although all warfare is a transgression of human laws and justice, none-
theless it has something like laws of its own, such as not to break a truce, not 
to kill a herald, and not to take vengeance on someone who has surrendered 
his person to the good faith of his conqueror. (Diod. Sic. 30.18.2)
As far as it goes, this statement follows traditional Greek ethics and is 
perfectly in line with Diodorus’ pious moral didacticism: truces, heralds 
and suppliants/surrendered opponents were sacrosanct according to reli-
gious law. It is possible that the original and complete passage held more 
nuanced views, but the fact that it survives in the context of Antiochus III’s 
106 10.23.1, 13.21.2, 13.29.5, 14.113.5, 28.6.1, 30.2.1.
107 The emendation is by van Herwerden and is reproduced by the Belles Lettres edition 
of Diodorus (Fragments vol. III), where the fragment is numbered 30.22b.
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murder of the child-king Ptolemaeus, his nephew, makes it likely that the 
focus remained on the betrayal of the defenceless in one’s power.
Justice in the Bibliotheke, then, is unfailingly a positive quality, even 
if the word is used in an unreflective manner. Laws and lawgiving seem 
to have held special interest for Diodorus, but again we see no reflection 
on the nature of good laws or the correct balance between punitive laws 
and the exercise of that all-important virtue epieikeia. Apart from the 
difference in the use of dikaios and its cognates between the mythologi-
cal and historical books, we see no difference in Diodorus’ approach to 
justice between different parts of the Bibliotheke: the concept is important 
throughout, and the adjective and adverb are used to designate characters 
and actions in every book.
Minor Virtues: Moderation, Education and All the Others
Piety, mildness/kindness, courage and justice are the virtues that receive the 
most attention in the moral didacticism of the Bibliotheke. Beyond these, 
a plethora of other virtues and positive behaviours are presented positively 
at varying intervals.
The traditional virtue of moderation is worth spending a moment on. It 
is extolled explicitly in the context of the Delphic maxims (9.10) and the 
teachings of Pythagoras (10.3.1–3) and is often what tyrannical rulers are 
lacking (12.24–5, 20.104.3–4). It is also a positive characteristic of good 
characters such as Scipio the Younger (27.1). In the mythological sections, 
much like δικαιοσύνη (‘justice’), σωφροσύνη (‘moderation/temperance’) 
seems to be shorthand for goodness, particularly in women and young 
men.108 That it does not always mean simply ‘chastity’ is proved by 3.60.5, 
where the daughters of Atlas are said to excel in moderation (σώφρονας 
διαφερόντως) almost in the same breath as we are told that they slept with 
‘the most renowned heroes and gods’ (3.60.4). The nature of the myths told 
means that Diodorus must necessarily employ different standards for the 
sexual moderation of male characters in this part of the work and in the 
historical parts: Zeus’ and Heracles’ habit of impregnating every mortal 
princess they come across is tacitly accepted while historical rulers are cas-
tigated for indulging their lust (e.g. 20.104.3–4, 26.15). Presumably Zeus’ 
and Heracles’ efforts to populate the world with extraordinary descend-
ants are to be considered among their benefactions,109 which cannot be said 
for the sexual transgressions of historical tyrants.
Like moderation, most of the other virtues of the Bibliotheke are tradi-
108 Titaea 3.57.2, Basileia 3.57.3, Cybele 3.58.2, Marsyas 3.58.3, Athena 3.70.3, Alcmene 
4.9.3, the Atlantides 4.27.2, Medea at the beginning of her marriage 4.54.2, Hippolytus 
4.62.4. 
109 This seems to be implied by 4.14.4.
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tional and expected: gratitude (20.93), dignity (4.13.3, 9.36.4, 17.118.3) and 
– expected from our reading of Polybius – intelligence (4.13.1–2, 5.31.5). 
Other virtues propounded by the Bibliotheke are more surprising: friend-
ship (e.g. 10.8, 16.50.5–8), for instance, is an important virtue in Xenophon, 
but is largely absent from the other historiographers under consideration, 
and education (παιδεία) is not extolled by any of the earlier extant histori-
ographers, while it is often mentioned as a quality of good characters of the 
Bibliotheke along with key virtues such as justice or courage. In the mytho-
logical books, it is a repeated trait of Orpheus (3.65.6 and 4.25.2–3) and the 
Muses (4.4.3, 4.5.4, 4.7.3–4) as well as the guardian of Dionysus (3.70.1). In 
the ethnographic sections, Diodorus repeatedly comments on the level and 
manner of education of various classes of Egyptians and other peoples (e.g. 
1.73.2, 1.92.5), and he mentions paideia as a trait of both Iambulus (2.54.2) 
and a nameless Indian king (2.60.3) who receives him. In the fragmentary 
books of early Greek history, education, and not just wisdom, is mentioned 
as a virtue of the Seven Sages collectively (1.96.1) and individually of Solon 
(3, 9.1.1 and 3) and Pythagoras (10.3.1), and the Delphic maxim ‘know 
thyself’ is interpreted at length as an exhortation to get educated (9.10). 
The description of Pythagorean asceticism offered in 10.7 quickly slips into 
a digressive diatribe against the ‘youth of today’, who cannot be bothered 
with either moderation or education (10.7.3).
In the later historical books, paideia is mentioned as a positive characteris-
tic of all of Greece in the glorious years between the Persian and Peloponnesian 
Wars (12.1.4); Athenian paideia is part of the Syracusan Nicolaus’ argument 
for sparing the Athenians captured at the end of the failed Sicilian Expedition 
(13.27.1), and in the end only the best-educated Athenians are rescued from 
the Syracusan quarries (13.33.1). Paideia – rather than dikaiosyne, as might 
have been expected – is mentioned as the virtue of both Charondas and 
Zaleucus that makes their fellow-citizens choose them as lawgivers (12.11.3 
and 12.20.1), and the summary of the laws of Charondas is interrupted by a 
passionate encomium of paideia in the sense of reading and writing (12.13.1–
3), ending with the lofty gnome: ‘therefore, although admittedly nature is 
the cause of life, the cause of living well is the education that arises from 
reading and writing’ (διὸ καὶ τοῦ μὲν ζῆν τὴν φύσιν αἰτίαν ὑποληπτέον, τοῦ δὲ 
καλῶς ζῆν τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων συγκειμένην παιδείαν). As a virtue, paideia 
is ascribed to various characters, most memorably Epaminondas, whose 
paideia is the reason why he ignores bad omens and marches out confidently 
to win the Battle of Leuctra (15.52.7).110
110 Paideia is also ascribed to Dion (16.20.2), Cephalus of Corinth (16.82.7), Tiberius 
Gracchus (34/35.5.1), Micipsa, son of Massinissa of Numidia (34/35.35), and a Roman of the 
dubious name of Lucius Asyllius or Syllius (37.8.2). 
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Beside these specific virtues, some characters in the Bibliotheke are 
endowed with a mysterious bundle of qualities called ‘all the other virtues’ 
or ‘every other virtue’ (αἱ [ἄλλαι] πᾶσαι ἀρεταῖ or πᾶσα ἀρετή).111 On the 
one hand, this seems to signal a certain laziness on the part of Diodorus, 
who could not always be bothered to enumerate the good qualities of the 
characters with whom he wanted his readers to sympathise. This laziness 
makes it a lot harder to gain any real sense of his characters than of the 
carefully sketched personalities of Polybius’ Histories. On the other hand, 
the use of such an expression shows that the author imagines a fairly fixed 
set of virtues, readily recallable to his readers, to which he can safely refer 
in shorthand without running the risk of being misunderstood, and this says 
something interesting about moral didacticism in Greek historiography in 
the first century bc: it points both to a high degree of similarity in the virtues 
extolled by the genre, and to a large area of overlap with popular morality. 
The historiographers could expect their readers to agree with what they 
described as virtuous and vile, freeing them from any obligation to discuss 
the complexity of moral goodness or any of the qualities that constitute it.
The Vices
The moral-didactic programme of Diodorus features not only virtues and 
behaviours to emulate, but also, and often more memorably, vices and 
behaviours to avoid. The ones that receive the most space are cruelty, greed 
and luxurious living. These vices are often combined, for example, in the 
description of the behaviour of tyrants or the sacking of cities. For the sake 
of clarity, however, we shall examine each one in turn.
Cruelty
In contrast with Polybius, Diodorus has a lot of space for cruelty. Cruelty 
(ὠμότης) and brutality (βιαιότης) are the hallmarks of a tyrant, from 
Astyages the Mede in book 9 over the early Sicilian tyrants Hiero and 
Thrasydaeus (11.53 and 67) and the Athenian Thirty (14.4), to Agathocles 
of Syracuse (see below), Charops of Epirus (31.31) and Diegylis of Thrace 
(33.14).112 For most of Diodorus’ tyrants, their brutality leads to hatred 
111 1.92.5, 2.33.1, 3.61.5, 4.54.2, 5.71.1 Zeus, 5.83.4 Tennes, 9.11.2 Pittacus, 9.22.1 Cyrus 
the Elder, 10.9.9, 10.12.2, 11.46.4, 13.102.1 Diomedon, 16.65.2 Timoleon, and 31.26 Scipio 
the Younger.
112 Cruel tyrants: Astyages 9.23, Cylon 10.11.1, Cambyses 10.14.1, Hipparchus and 
Hippias 10.17, Lucius Tarquinius 10.22, Thrasydaeus 11.53, Hiero and Thrasybulus 11.67, 
the Thirty 14.4.3, Clearchus 14.2.4, Agathocles 19.1.6–8, 19.107, 20.15.4–6, 20.72, 21.16, 
Acrotatus 19.71.1–5, Decius 22.1, Apollodorus 22.5, Hieronymus 22.15, Charops 31.31, 
Demetrius 33.4, Ptolemaeus 33.12, Diegylis 33.14, Attalus 34/35.3, Ptolemaeus Physcon 
33.22, 34/35.14, Zilmius 34/35.12.
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among their subjects, and most often to revolt and loss of power,113 teach-
ing the moral lesson that wickedness does not pay, even on a grand scale.
In fact, Diodorus shows a fascination with cruelty. While in the case of 
some tyrants it is enough for him just to mention the vice, in many cases he 
dwells on it and describes with scandalised relish the exotic punishments 
and tortures devised by his villains. We have seen an example above in 
Dionysius’ torture of Phyton of Rhegium (14.112); other examples include 
the story of Phalaris and the brazen bull (9.19), Diegylis’ habit of chopping 
off and swapping around the limbs of his still living victims (33.14), and the 
many atrocities of Agathocles (19.1.6–8, 19.107, 20.15.4–6, 20.54, 20.71–2). 
There is usually no explicit moralising connected with these pathetic scenes 
of suffering; the scandalised descriptions are left to speak for themselves. 
Such vivid depictions of atrocities may seem to us to be no more than 
tabloid sensationalism, and this is almost certainly the kind of writing on 
which Polybius heaps scorn in his criticism of Phylarchus (Polyb. 2.56–
8); but, tasteless as it may seem to us and to some ancient readers, it 
probably found a dedicated readership, and – in contrast with viewers of 
 twenty-first-century torture horror – the reader is never left in any doubt 
that the cruelty is despicable and an example to be avoided, not followed.
Graphic descriptions of atrocities occur in the context not only of the 
transgressions of tyrants, but also of soldiers sacking a city.114 Typical fea-
tures include the crying and screaming of the victims (13.57.1, 13.89.1) and 
the shouting or egging each other on of the conquerors (13.57.1, 17.13.1, 
19.6.5), the desperate courage of the citizens’ last stand (13.57.2, 17.13.2–3, 
19.6.6), the greed of the invading soldiers and their brutality in getting 
their booty (13.57.2, 17.70.4, 19.7.3), the indiscriminate slaughter (13.57.3, 
13.90.1, 17.13.6, 17.702, 19.6.6–7.2), the disregard for the sanctity of 
temples (13.57.4–5, 13.90.-3, 17.13.6, 19.7.3–4), children and women being 
dragged away as slaves (17.13.3, 17.35.7, 17.70.6), the pity felt by some 
onlookers, imagined or real, for the victims (13.58.1, 17.36.1–2, 19.7.4), the 
changed fortune of the victims, particularly the women (15.58.1–2, 13.89.1–
3, 17.35.4–7, 17.70.3 and 6), allusions to the sexual abuse of captive women 
and girls (13.58.2, 17.35.7, 19.8.3–5), the richness of the spoils (13.90.3–4, 
17.35.2–4, 17.70.2–3) and the number of the dead and captive (13.57.6, 
17.14.1, 19.8.1–2). As with the detailed descriptions of torture, these vivid 
113 Astyages 9.23, Hipparchus and Hippias 10.17, Thrasydaeus 11.53, Thrasybulus 
11.67, the Thirty 14.4.3, Zilmius 34/35.12.
114 Selinus by the Carthaginians 13.57–8, Thebes by Alexander the Great 17.13, the 
Persian camp at Issus by the soldiers of Alexander the Great 17.35–6, Persepolis by the sol-
diers of Alexander the Great 17.70. Very similar are 13.89–90, where the Acragantines leave 
their city before it is sacked by the Carthaginians, and 19.6.5–8.6, where Agathocles’ party 
takes power in Syracuse.
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narratives of the destruction of cities and enslavement of citizens may seem 
tasteless (and 19.8.4 shows that Diodorus was aware that some readers 
might think so), but – apart from probably giving a fair picture of what the 
sacking of a city was really like – they appeal to the pity and sympathy of 
the reader and encourage condemnation of the brutal acts perpetrated by 
the conquerors. It is more than just tear-jerking; it is moralising through 
pathos.
Narratorial condemnation of atrocities does not always take such a 
spectacular form. Sometimes the use of the adjectives ὠμός (cruel) and 
βίαιος (brutal) or their cognates is enough to let a reader know that a 
character or action is a negative paradeigma. Thus Cleon is called ‘ὠμὸς 
καὶ βίαιος’ when pushing for the massacre of the Mytilenians (12.55); the 
Chalcedonians and Byzantines are said to show ὠμότης in their invasion 
of Bithynia (12.82.2); the Spartans demonstrate ὠμότης in demanding the 
handing over of all Athenian exiles to the Thirty (14.6.2); and killing child 
hostages in an armed conflict is termed an ‘action of outstanding cruelty’ 
(πρᾶξιν ὠμότητι διαφεροῦσαν: 37.19.5).115 In an instance of moralising by 
means of correlation between action and result, the brutality of the slave 
masters is shown to be a root cause for the Sicilian Slave War in the long 
and detailed narrative of this revolt (34/35.2).
The Diodoran narrator often seems shocked by the cruelty of the char-
acters in his history; in this he is very different from Polybius’ narratorial 
persona, who can moralise in a passionate voice when he wants to, but 
who much more often comes across as a wry man of the world who has 
seen it all and can no longer be shocked. This may sometimes give the 
Bibliotheke a tabloid feel, but it also brings historical human suffering to 
life and reminds its readers to take pity on sufferers in a way that Polybius’ 
Histories never does.
A striking contrast is presented by the mythological books of the 
Bibliotheke. Here moralising on cruelty is largely absent. Bloody deeds 
abound in the mythologies of Greece and Egypt, but they rarely receive 
narratorial comments. It is particularly noteworthy that Dionysus’ tor-
turing of those who refuse to follow him is described in some detail, but 
without any hint that the reader is supposed to disapprove. Perhaps this 
savage side of the god was considered such an ingrained part of his divine 
nature that criticism was unthinkable for the pious Diodorus. By contrast, 
Apollo’s flaying alive of Marsyas is called ‘excessive revenge’ (τιμωρίαν 
ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν: 5.74.3), and we are told that Apollo himself regretted it and 
destroyed his lyre in penitence (3.59.5 and 5.74.3). Among mortals, only 
the Egyptian king Amasis (in an intriguing departure from the Herodotean 
115 Other examples: 12.82.2, 19.11.7–9, 26.14, 36.11.
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narrative of this king) and the members of the mythical family group of 
Aeetes (Perses, Hecate and Circe) are called cruel (βιαιότερον: 1.60.1; 
various forms of ὠμός: 4.45–47), and their cruelty leads to their downfall. 
The only one to receive a scandalised narratorial outburst is Medea when 
she murders her children (4.54.7). In other words, as we saw with the virtue 
of moderation, there seem to be different standards of morality between 
the mythological and historical books: apparently, cruelty is only really 
worth moralising on in historical time, and most atrocities committed in 
mythology are considered either too distant in time, or legitimate because 
they were committed by gods.
Only very occasionally does the narrator of the Bibliotheke express 
his satisfaction with someone suffering, and almost exclusively when it 
can be presented as divine punishment for previous transgressions such as 
impiety or cruelty (e.g. 16.56.4, 20.65.2). Satisfaction with cruelty inflicted 
as human vengeance only occurs when the revenge is taken by the Sicilian 
Greeks on their Carthaginian neighbours (14.46 and 53). The Diodoran 
narrator does not discuss these actions, and his moral judgement seems 
unreflective.116 He does not, like the Polybian narrator (at least in the 
extant parts of the Bibliotheke), offer any thoughts on situations where 
brutality can be condoned for reasons of war or necessity. The closest he 
gets to such a discussion is the pair of speeches given at Syracuse after the 
failed Sicilian Expedition, debating what to do with the captured Athenians 
(13.20–32). In this instance, the scene-setting for the debate, during which 
the Syracusan people behave like a mob (θορυβοῦντος) and the statesman 
Hermocrates echoes narratorial moralising by saying that ‘more noble than 
victory is bearing victory with moderation’ (κάλλιόν ἐστι τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ τὴν 
νίκην ἐνεγκεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως: 13.19.5), shows that the reader is supposed to 
side with mildness. The passage may well have been mirrored by a debate 
in the Roman Senate over what to do with Carthage after the end of the 
Second Punic War in book 27 (27.13–18), which is now fragmentary.117 This 
debate, in contrast with the Syracusan one, must have ended with a deci-
sion for mildness, and it is a shame that its context is lost so we cannot see 
how Diodorus signalled his agreement. Overall, by delegating the power of 
just vengeance in his narratorial world to the gods, Diodorus largely avoids 
the didactic inconsistency which we saw in Polybius’ Histories between 
the moral lesson that good fortune must not be abused and the idea that 
revenge can be just.
116 Ambaglio (1995: 113) seems right to say that the moralising here ‘disguises and 
 justifies’ the cruelty of the Sicilians. 
117 The context of the fragments is recoverable because of Appian’s narrative of the same 
debate (Pun. 57–61). For a comparison of these two speeches with the ones in the Syracusan 
debate see Sacks (1990: 101–7).
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Greed
If Diodorus differs from Polybius in his emphasis on cruelty as a vice, he is 
much more in tune with him on the topic of another favourite vice, namely 
greed. For most Diodoran tyrants, it is greed (φιλαργυρία or πλεονεξία) 
that leads to (some of) their acts of cruelty: they want the money of the 
wealthy citizens and will happily use murder and torture to get them.118 It 
is also greed that leads to some of the worst atrocities committed during 
the sacking of cities.119 Likewise, the greed of the Carthaginians is respon-
sible for the Iberian silver mines and the hardship suffered there, described 
with incredulous wonder by the Diodoran narrator (5.38.2), and greed is 
also the driving force behind the cruel treatment of Sicilian slaves by their 
masters which leads to the Sicilian Slave War (34/35.2.25–6 and 34–40). 
This causal connection between greed and cruelty is ubiquitous in the 
historical books of the Bibliotheke. Greed also leads to a whole host of 
other types of evil-doing – as the narrator says in 21.1.4a, it is the ‘very 
metropolis of many evils’. It is an almost universal flaw, which mars the 
characters of even otherwise good men such as Pausanias, victor at Plataea 
(11.23.3, 11.46–47), and the Roman Marius in his old age, although his 
youth had been characterised by an impressive lack of greed (37.29). The 
greed of others is therefore naturally a favourite tool for those who want 
to buy loyalty and support: thus the Phocians gain supporters in the early 
stages of the Sacred War by distributing the wealth of Delphi (16.30.2, 
33.3, 37.4), the unlikeable Perdikkas in contrast with the universally liked 
Ptolemy secures loyalty by gifts (18.33.3–5), and Philip II wins over cities 
with bribes rather than weapons (16.54.2–4) in acts of ‘evil socialising’ 
(πονηραῖς ὁμιλίαις: 16.54.4).120
In typical Diodoran fashion, greed also often leads to disaster for the 
greedy. Pausanias and the equally greedy Gylippus are both condemned 
by their fellow-Spartans (11.23.3, 11.46–7, 13.106.10), the Phocian 
Onomarchus is executed by Philip II (16.35.6), and Marius’ greed spells 
disaster not just for himself but for Rome with him (37.29). Similarly, it 
is greed that brings Perseus down (30.19, 30.21, 31.14), and the Delphic 
118 Lucius Tarquinius 10.22, Hiero 11.67, the Thirty 14.2.1, 14.5–7, Agathocles 20.4.8, 
20.72, Apollodorus 22.5.2, Diegylis 33.14. For a discussion of the role played by the attitude 
to money in Diodoran leaders see Bissa (2010).
119 13.57.2, 17.70.4, 19.7.3.
120 Nonetheless, in the next chapter the king’s generosity during symposia held after the 
capture of Olynthus, which is said to win him numerous supporters, is twice termed ‘bene-
factions’ (16.55.4) with no hint that the narrator disapproves. This apparent contradiction is 
symptomatic of Diodorus’ inconsistent attitude to Philip, who is in some passages portrayed 
as a divinely supported saviour of Delphi and Greece and in others as a tyrant who exerts a 
corrupting influence on the Greeks. The usual explanation that he inexpertly combined two 
different sources may well be true. See McQueen (1995: 8–14).
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Oracle predicts to Lycurgus that greed will destroy Sparta in the end 
(7.12.5).121 Greed, in short, is a particularly bad vice in the Bibliotheke and 
only attaches to despicable characters.122
Correspondingly, lack of greed (ἀφιλαργυρία) is, as in Polybius, the 
mark of a noble man. This characterises the Spartan Callicratidas, who 
in contrast with his fellow-citizens Pausanias and Gylippus refuses bribes 
(13.76.2), and it is the defining characteristic of the two Roman heroes 
whom Diodorus has taken over from Polybius, Aemilius Paullus (31.26.1–
2) and Scipio the Younger (31.27). Actual generosity, rather than simply 
lack of greed, plays a slightly larger part in the Bibliotheke than in Polybius’ 
Histories. It is displayed not only by Scipio the Younger (31.27), but also, 
conspicuously and with explicit narratorial approval, by the Sages Pittacus 
(9.12) and Bias (9.13) as well as by the famed Acragantine Tellias (13.83).
The despicability and destructive force of greed are a theme found in all 
parts of the historical books of the Bibliotheke. In the mythological books, 
however, neither greed nor generosity plays any significant part. The only 
god or hero said to possess the vice is Cronus, father of Zeus (3.61.1). 
This absence perhaps reflects the fact that the myths take place in a heroic 
world where motivations are rarely explored, and where typical benefac-
tions consist in inventing agriculture and founding civilisations rather than 
handing out monetary gifts.
Luxury/Degeneration
The third cardinal vice of Diodoran villains is an extravagant and lux-
urious lifestyle, sometimes described in detail, sometimes called simply 
πολυτέλεια or τρυφή. This is characteristic of many of the tyrants of the 
Bibliotheke.123 Likewise, luxurious living is coupled with cruelty and greed 
in the slave masters who cause the Sicilian Slave Revolt (34–5.2.26, 34.34). 
Correspondingly, good rulers and leaders can be praised for not giving in 
to luxury (33.18, 38/39.10).
Despicable though it is, such a lifestyle is also a source of fascination 
to the narrator of the Bibliotheke. Often he combines breathless descrip-
tion of the extravagances with evaluative vocabulary to show that such 
behaviour should only be admired at a distance, but must be considered 
both undignified and un-Greek. This mixture of fascination and condem-
nation can be seen, for example, in a passage describing Alexander the 
Great’s appropriation of Persian customs (17.77.4–7). The passage begins 
121 See also 23.19, 28.4.1.
122 E.g. the ignoble, miserly king Remphis 1.62.5–6, Cronus father of Zeus 3.61.1, Italian 
merchants corrupting the Gauls with wine 5.26.3, greedy and treacherous Roman tribunes 
23.19, the evil king Artaxias of Armenia 31.22, a false friend of Gracchus 34/35.9.
123 Acrotatus 19.71.1–5, Cleonymus 20.104, Hieronymus 26.15, Hasdrubal 32.22.
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with the statement that Alexander now believed that he had secured his 
power over the Persian empire, and so began to ‘emulate Persian luxury 
and the extravagance of the Asian kings’ (ζηλοῦν τὴν Περσικὴν τρυφὴν 
καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῶν Ἀσιανῶν βασιλέων). A description of this luxury 
and extravagance follows, focusing on clothing and the institution of a 
harem of 365 women, including the piquant detail that they would parade 
around the king’s bed every night so that he could decide whom to sleep 
with on each occasion. The narrator is clearly enjoying providing these 
details, and the reader is no doubt expected to enjoy them too. Suddenly, 
however, the tone changes. Following immediately on the information 
about the nightly beauty pageant comes this surprising statement: ‘And 
so Alexander followed these customs rarely and for the most part kept to 
his previous lifestyle, afraid to offend the Macedonians’ (τούτοις μὲν οὖν 
τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος σπανίως ἐχρῆτο, τοις δὲ προϋπάρχουσι κατὰ τὸ 
πλεῖστον ἐνδιέτριβε, φοβούμενος τὸ προσκόπτειν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν: 17.77.7). 
This patently contradicts the introductory statement that Alexander began 
to emulate the luxurious lifestyle of the Persians and the Asian kings, and 
it also raises the question why the narrator would spend time on describing 
costumes and customs which Alexander only rarely used. In fact, it smells 
of backtracking. Alexander the Great is an overwhelmingly positive char-
acter in the Bibliotheke, and so the narrator cannot let the reader imagine 
him descending into a luxury-loving, Eastern way of life, enjoyable though 
the description of such a lifestyle may be.
Eastern luxury is an important part of such barbarian rulers as Semiramis 
(2.13.3–4) – mentioned in the same breath as the juicy and un-Greek detail 
that she refused lawful marriage and instead slept with the most handsome 
of her soldiers and then killed them – her effeminate son Ninyas (2.21) and, 
in historical times, the ever-hated satrap Tissaphernes (14.80.2). It is also 
a feature of the life of the young Oriental Dionysus, before he forms his 
band of women into an army and goes on campaign (almost) like a proper 
Greek (3.64.6–7). The quintessential undignified, luxury-loving king is 
Sardanapallus of Assyria, who receives a chapter-long moralising introduc-
tion ending with the damning statement: ‘Being a man of this character, he 
not only ended his own life ignominiously, but also completely destroyed 
the Assyrian empire, which had been longer-lived than any other in human 
memory’ (2.23).124 The causal connection is explained in the next chapter 
where Sardanapallus’ despicable lifestyle leads his subjects to revolt. It 
does not matter for Diodorus’ moralising stance that Sardanapallus actu-
124 τοιοῦτος δ’ ὢν τὸν τρόπον οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν 
Ἀσσυρίων ἡγεμονίαν ἄρδην ἀνέτρεψε, πολυχρονιωτάτην γενομένην τῶν μνημονευομένων 
(Diod. Sic. 2.23).
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ally puts up a staunch and sensible defence and holds out for a long time; 
the unmanly luxuriousness of his way of life makes him a negative para-
deigma of the fact that luxury (1) is undignified and un-Greek, (2) leads to 
weakness of morals and body, and (3) ultimately leads to disaster.
This three-pronged message is borne out by a number of passages in the 
Bibliotheke. Some narrative passages in the ethnographic sections express 
wonder at peoples who derive extraordinary strength and toughness (the 
Ligurians, 4.20 and 5.39) or a simple nobility (the Britons, 5.21.6 and 5.40) 
from a freedom from luxury; others draw explicit connections between 
increased wealth and luxury on the one hand and degeneration and loss of 
strength and power on the other (the Tyrrhenians, 5.40.4–5; the Spartans, 
7.12.8). In the historical books, an evaluative digression passes scathing 
judgement on Pausanias for turning traitor to his country out of ‘love for 
Persian wealth and luxury’ (ἀγαπήσας τῶν Περσῶν τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν 
τρυφὴν) and ‘imitating Persian luxury and lack of self-discipline’ (τὴν δὲ 
τῶν Περσῶν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφὴν ἐμιμήσατο: 11.46.3). In the second half 
of the digression, the reader is assured that the Spartan brought about 
both his own destruction and his city’s loss of sea-power by his defection 
to barbarian luxury (11.46.4–5). The same causal connection between a 
descent into luxury and loss of power – often by way of degenerate morals 
– is brought out by implicitly moralising narrative passages throughout the 
Bibliotheke.125 Following the same logic, the laws of Zaleucus, which are 
repeatedly praised by the narrator, all rest on the assumption that there 
is a connection between luxury and lax morals, and that both need to 
be guarded against (12.20–1). In the detailed narratives of the sacking of 
cities, discussed above, the luxury of the city and its inhabitants is a topos 
(13.58.1, 13.89.3, 17.35.1–5), which both enhances the pathos of their suf-
fering and functions as an explanation for why the city was worth sacking 
in the first place.
An evaluative digression sparked by a description of Pythagorean doc-
trine deals with the timeless theme of the decadence of contemporary youth 
(10.7.2–3). In the late historical books, presumably based on Posidonius, 
the extravagant lifestyles and moral decadence of Rome’s youth seems to 
have been a major theme (37.2.2–3, 37.3). The fragmentary state of these 
books unfortunately makes it impossible to see how Diodorus used this 
topos, that is, whether it was, as in Polybius, simply a backdrop against 
which to allow a favoured protagonist to shine so much the brighter, or 
whether it was developed into a moral-didactic theme in its own right.
125 19.71.1–5, 26.11, 29.2, 30.17, 32.19, 37.2.2–3. Sacks (1990: 46–52) argues that 
Diodorus’ ‘model of empire’ shows states losing hegemonic power because of harsh treat-
ment of their subjects rather than because of luxury and decadence. It is certainly true that 
ἐπιείκεια carries more explanatory force than τρυφή in the Bibliotheke, but both have a place.
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That extravagant luxury is nevertheless considered an entertaining 
subject is clear from such passages as 8.18–19, which describes the legend-
ary luxury of the Sybarites and reports humorous Sybarite sayings sup-
porting this stereotype (a favourite ancient joke topic, to judge from Ath. 
Deipnosophistae 12); 17.108.4–6, which gives scandalised details of the 
immorally luxurious lifestyle of Alexander the Great’s corrupt treasurer 
Harpalus; and the lengthy, overawed ekphrasis on the wealth of Tellias 
and other Acragantines at 13.82–4, which functions as an ominous fore-
shadow of the imminent destruction of the city by the Carthaginians (13.86 
and 89–90).
The moral theme of the despicability and dangers of a life in luxury is 
present throughout the Bibliotheke, in the mythological, historical and 
ethnographical books. Detailed descriptions of luxury and decadence, 
however, are only present in certain parts of the work, namely book 
8, whose source is uncertain, and in the parts most probably based on 
Timaeus, Clitarchus and Posidonius.
CONCLUSION
On a reading from cover to cover, the extant parts of the Bibliotheke 
teach a simple moral lesson: good men are pious, mild towards those in 
their power, courageous and just, and know how to stay humble in good 
fortune; villains are cruel, impious, greedy and often addicted to a life in 
luxury. Moreover, both heroes and villains generally get what they deserve 
in the end. Teaching this lesson was a main purpose of the Bibliotheke and 
is stated as such in its preface, where it is closely connected with the project 
of writing universal history: only a universal history can offer the reader 
the comprehensive overview that leads to a true picture of how the world 
works, in moral terms or otherwise. And for Diodorus, only moral causa-
tion, driven by divine justice, can make sense of this world. In this sense, 
moral didacticism is certainly Diodorus’ ‘philosophy of history’.126
However, just as the narrative style and moralising techniques vary 
between different parts of the Bibliotheke, so does the intensity of the 
moralising, and different parts of the lesson are dominant in different 
parts of the work. This unevenness is most easily explained by the theory 
that Diodorus took over most of his moralising from his sources, and 
that, although he sometimes changed the tone and adapted the message 
to suit his own view of history, he did not usually compose moralising 
passages from scratch. This tells us something about Diodorus, namely 
that although moral didacticism was apparently important to him – to 
126 So Ambaglio (1995: 118).
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judge from his programmatic statements and the large amount of strong, 
explicit moralising in his work – he was too insecure, absent-minded, 
pressed for time or lazy to compose moralising from scratch. More inter-
estingly, however, it tells us something about the historiographical tradi-
tion in which he was working: it seems that in the first century bc moral 
didacticism was an ingrained part of the genre of historiography. Although 
Diodorus’ sources went about it in different ways and to differing degrees, 
they all engaged in it.
And we may be able to go further. The most explicit and pervasive moral-
ising of the Bibliotheke is found in the parts of the work that are most prob-
ably based on Polybius, Timaeus of Tauromenium (the Sicilian narrative of 
books 13–14 and 19–21) and Posidonius of Apamea (books 32.27–38). The 
moralising found in the parts assumed to be based on Ephorus of Cyme (i.e. 
the Greek narrative of books 12–16.14) and Hieronymus of Cardia (the nar-
rative of the Successor Wars in books 18–20) is much more subtle and less 
world-defining (i.e. in these parts of the Bibliotheke it is less obvious that 
the good thrive and the bad suffer). We may hypothesise that this difference 
reflects a difference in the moralising of those works. Having made this 
observation, it is worth pointing out that, considering this dependence on 
sources, Diodorus’ moral messages are actually surprisingly consistent. We 
may unpick this discovery into three distinct statements:
1. The moralising techniques vary more between parts of the Bibliotheke 
than do the moral lessons.
2. The moral lessons may be unevenly represented, but they are not mutu-
ally contradictory.
3. Most moral lessons are present throughout the work, although each 
message is more dominant in some parts than in others.
Taken together, these observations point to two possible conclusions: 
either Diodorus tidied up contradictory moralising from his sources and 
moulded the passages into a coherent moral-didactic system, or the moral 
lessons in his sources were very similar to begin with; the variation was 
in the detail, which could be changed (as with the moralising on Regulus 
taken over from Polybius) or ignored, and sometimes in the moralising 
techniques. The latter theory is supported by the fact that Diodorus’ moral 
lessons are very similar to the moral lessons propounded by Polybius, 
although they are generally expressed less analytically. If Diodorus often 
did take over his moral lessons from his sources, the Bibliotheke shows that 
not just the phenomenon of moral didacticism but also a canon of moral 
lessons were an established part of the genre of historiography by the first 
century bc.
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Building on this hypothesis, we shall end this chapter with a tenta-
tive overview of what moralising in Diodorus’ now lost sources may have 
looked like, on the basis of the moralising seen in different parts of the 
Bibliotheke. This will then be brought into the discussion of the preserved 
fragments of those sources in Chapters 3 and 7.
Tentative Characterisation of Moralising in Some of 
Diodorus’ Sources
Ephorus of Cyme, whose work Diodorus most probably used for the Greek 
narrative of books 11 or 12 to 16.14, seems to have moralised sparingly, by 
means of a restrained use of moralising phrasing, a few moralising digres-
sions, and some moralising introductions, conclusions and asides. His 
moral lessons seem to have mainly concerned battlefield courage (by means 
of heroic battle narratives and digressions such as the one on the Spartans 
at Thermopylae), justice and the positive effect of mildness/kindness.
By contrast, the Alexander historian, perhaps Clitarchus, whose work 
Diodorus used for book 17, seems to have moralised mainly by means of 
vignettes with speech and pathetic descriptions of atrocities and suffer-
ing, with a heavy-handed use of moralising phrasing in some passages, 
supported by internal evaluation and a few moralising introductions and 
conclusions. His favourite topics seem to have been divine support (for 
Alexander), the positive effect of mildness/kindness and the negative effect 
of luxury.
The source used for the Greek narrative of books 18–20, often assumed 
to be Hieronymus of Cardia, was perhaps the least moralising of Diodorus’ 
sources for the historical period. He seems to have employed evaluative 
phrasing sparingly along with internal evaluation, supplemented by a few 
moralising digressions and asides. He seems to have presented a world gov-
erned by random fortune rather than divine justice, and to have moralised 
on cruelty and on the positive effects of mildness/kindness.
Timaeus of Tauromenium, whose work Diodorus probably used for the 
Sicilian narrative of books 13–14 and 19–21, seems to have been the most 
flamboyantly moralising of Diodorus’ sources. He seems to have used the 
entire toolbox of moralising techniques in order to offer lessons on divine 
justice (including mirroring punishment), human inability to bear good 
fortune, piety, cruelty and the dangers of luxury. Interestingly, mildness/
kindness does not seem to have played a big role in his work.
Posidonius of Apamea, on whose work Diodorus most probably based 
books 32.26–37 and perhaps some of 38–9 of the Bibliotheke, also seems 
to have had a strong moralising voice, although it is hard to tell from the 
fragmentary state of these last books of the Bibliotheke. He seems to have 
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used plenty of evaluative phrasing, moral digressions, and moral introduc-
tions and conclusions in the service of lessons on divine justice, the positive 
effects of mildness/kindness, and the evils of greed, luxury and cruelty.
Finally, as a check on the trustworthiness of this reconstruction, it is 
worth comparing the picture we get of Polybius from books 27–32.26 of 
the Bibliotheke with what remains of his Histories. On the basis purely 
of the Bibliotheke we should say that Polybius used a variety of moralis-
ing techniques, principally evaluative phrasing, moral digressions, moral 
introductions and conclusions, and moralising vignettes. This is confirmed 
when we look at the Histories. However, when we turn to moral lessons, 
the picture is less tidy: to judge from the Bibliotheke, Polybius mainly mor-
alised on the topics of divine justice, mildness/kindness, human inability to 
handle good fortune, and the dangers of greed. In fact, only the latter two 
lessons play a big part in the Histories. As for the former two, mildness is 
certainly a virtue, but is only part of what makes a good ruler. And it is 
true that historical characters in the Histories often get what they deserve, 
but this is by no means as universal as in the Bibliotheke, and it is always 
due to human causes rather than divine intervention. Overall, the picture 
we get of moralising in the Histories through the Bibliotheke is reasonably 
accurate, but skewed in at least one important way. This is worth remem-
bering when we try to imagine the moralising of Diodorus’ lost sources on 
the basis of his use of them.
Characteristics of Diodorus’ Moral Didacticism: 
Mildness and Divine Justice
In the overview of the moral lessons of parts of Diodorus’ work offered 
above, one thing is striking: the message that mildness and kindness lead 
to good results is ubiquitous. This may mean that this was a lesson pro-
pounded across the board by Diodorus’ various sources; but considering 
the more limited role that this theme plays in Polybius’ Histories, it is 
perhaps more likely that Diodorus has emphasised what was there already 
and drawn it into a unifying theme. The same may well be true for the 
lesson about divine justice, which is also near-ubiquitous in the Bibliotheke 
and which, revealingly, plays a large part in the books based on Polybius, 
from whose work we have seen that such a message is absent. These moral 
messages, then, are distinctive of Diodorus’ didactic programme.
3. Fragmentary Hellenistic 
Historiography
In this chapter, we shall examine the remnants of some of the most famous 
and influential works of history written in the Hellenistic period. These 
works have fared less well across the millennia than those of Polybius and 
Diodorus and only survive in fragmentary form, but it is important to 
remember that in their day they were as real, tangible and genre-defining 
as the works that have accidentally been transmitted in fuller form. If we 
want to understand moral didacticism in Hellenistic historiography, we 
have to examine these ‘fragments’ and try to catch as many glimpses a pos-
sible of the magnificent works they once were. In the previous chapter we 
saw how Diodorus’ moralising changes with his change of sources, but also 
how many of his moralising themes are present regardless of the identity of 
his source, although with different degrees of emphasis. I argued that this 
shows that not just moral didacticism but moralising on a specific set of 
themes was a ubiquitous feature of late Classical and Hellenistic historiog-
raphy, present in all the authors Diodorus used as sources. In this chapter 
we shall test that hypothesis against the evidence of the ‘fragments’ of some 
of his likely sources.
We know hundreds of names of authors who wrote history in this time 
period, and a selection has to be made somehow. The works examined 
in this chapter have been chosen on the basis of two criteria. The first 
criterion is their importance for the development of the genre of histo-
riography, to judge from the number and type of references to them in 
later authors including Polybius and Diodorus – except for Hieronymus 
of Cardia, who is included because of a twentieth-century scholarly obses-
sion with seeing his work as more ‘serious’, which at least partly equals 
‘non-moralising’, than those of his peers and close successors. The other 
criterion is genre: I have included only historians who wrote the same 
subgenre(s) of historiography as Polybius and Diodorus, namely ‘univer-
sal history’ or ‘continuous history’, rather than local history or mono-
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graphs about single wars or events.1 In practice, this means leaving out 
the Alexander historians (despite the fact that Diodorus certainly used one 
of them as his main source for book 17) as well as local historians includ-
ing the Atthidographers. As a result, this chapter will discuss Timaeus of 
Tauromenium, Duris of Samos, Phylarchus (of Athens?), Agatharchides of 
Cnidus and Posidonius of Apamea in chronological order, before devoting 
a brief and chronologically misplaced discussion to Hieronymus of Cardia. 
The reason for placing this discussion at the end of the chapter will become 
clear from its conclusion. The fragments of the fragmentary Classical his-
toriographers will be discussed in Chapter 7.
The ‘fragments’ we will be considering are, generally, not fragmen-
tary scraps of papyrus as one might think from the word, but references 
and paraphrases in later authors. These references and paraphrases were 
collected by Felix Jacoby in the late nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century in a monumental effort known as Die Fragmente der 
griechischen Historiker (FGrH) and left unfinished. It is currently being 
completed by a team of scholars under the leadership of Stefan Schorn. 
Alongside this effort, the passages collected by Jacoby, conventionally 
known as the fragments of Greek historiography, are being translated into 
English and provided with detailed scholarly commentaries in the online 
Brill’s New Jacoby (BNJ) under the directorship of Ian Worthington.2 This 
chapter is based on Jacoby’s text and makes liberal use of the BNJ com-
mentaries alongside Jacoby’s own original remarks.
Jacoby worked in a tradition of positivist Quellenforschung (even if his 
purpose was not so much to uncover the sources used by extant texts as to 
come to an understanding of those lost sources) which regularly ascribed 
long passages from later authors, especially Diodorus and Plutarch, ver-
batim to specific sources. Most scholars would now agree that such an 
approach is overoptimistic and distorts the picture of both fragmentary 
text and ‘covertext’, that is, the text that preserves the ‘fragment’.3 The 
problems haunting any work on fragmentary texts have received increasing 
1 As stated in the Introduction to this study, I do not wish to imply that these are terms of 
fixed genres; they are simply useful shorthand for modern-day scholars to use when thinking 
about the traditions in which the ancient historiographers saw themselves, and what prede-
cessors they imitated. For universal history see Alonso-Núñez (1990), Liddel (2010) with ref-
erences to older scholarship, and Marincola (2011). For continuous history see Tuplin (2011).
2 The BNJ entries have no publication dates and will be referred to in the footnotes in 
the format ‘Pownall (n.d.)’. The BNJ has links to Jacoby’s original commentary, but does 
not reproduce his section headings and marginalia, as Baron (2013: 10–11) warns.
3 I adopt the expression ‘covertext’ from Schepens (1997: 166–7 n. 66), who argues 
rightly that we need a shorthand term for ‘the author who quoted or summarized the frag-
mentary author’, and that ‘covertext’ is fitting because it ‘covers’ the fragment in three senses 
of the word: (1) it preserves and protects it, (2) it conceals it, and (3) it encloses it. The expres-
sion is also adopted by, among others, Walbank (2007) and Baron (2013).
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scholarly attention since a seminal article by Brunt in 1980.4 The primary 
problem, as illustrated by our discussion of Diodorus in the preceding 
chapter, is that of the faithfulness or otherwise of the covertext. It is nec-
essary repeatedly to ask to what extent this later author has reworked the 
text of his source. We must assume a priori that the wording of any given 
fragment has been composed by the author of the covertext and is, at the 
very least, a rephrasing of the original. More often, the ‘fragment’ is a 
summary or paraphrase of the source. Only very occasionally does a cover-
text imply or explicitly state that it is giving the exact words of its source.
Apart from paraphrasing, the covertext may well also have recast the 
passage appropriated from an earlier text and put it to a new use. Part of 
this problem is the habit of ancient authors of ascribing sentiments and 
opinions to each other which in the actual works are put into the mouth 
of a narrative character. Sometimes, the author of the covertext ignores an 
introductory ‘some say’ (τινες λέγουσιν) and ascribes a version of events to 
his source which in the original was specifically argued against by the nar-
rator. At other times, the covertext may even use a passage for a purpose 
almost diametrically opposite to the one for which it was intended.5 For 
this reason we cannot trust that any sentiment expressed in a fragment, 
moralising or otherwise, was actually in the original work, and, if it was, 
that it made the same point or was even equally explicit.6
This problem is perhaps particularly acute for the main covertext for 
Hellenistic historiography, the Deipnosophistae (‘Scholars at Dinner’) by 
the second-century ad author Athenaeus. This is a glorious display of 
learnedness and wit disguised as a symposiastic conversation, during which 
the various interlocutors quote, paraphrase and reference a vast number of 
literary works, both poetic and prose, and use them as examples of themes 
fit for the convivial setting: eating, drinking, sex, entertainment, funny 
stories and generally excessive lifestyles. Importantly, the original texts 
canvassed by the speakers do not always support the use to which they are 
put in their paraphrased form.7 This obviously makes it extremely difficult 
4 For good discussions of these issues see Brunt (1980), Schepens (1997), Lenfant (1999, 
2013), Pelling (2000), Yarrow (2006: 104–16, 2008, forthcoming), Berti (2013) and Baron 
(2011, 2013: 1–16). 
5 For examples of Athenaeus’ deliberate misrepresentation of his sources see Pelling 
(2000).
6 On this fundamental point see especially Brunt (1980). It is often repeated, but also 
often ignored. Bernhardt (2003: 199–247), for instance, uses the fragments of Hellenistic his-
toriography as evidence for Hellenistic attitudes to luxurious living without ever acknowl-
edging the problem of the considerably later covertexts.
7 On Athenaeus see Braund and Wilkins (2000). On the specific problem of interpreting 
the ‘fragments’ preserved by him, see especially Pelling (2000), Gorman and Gorman (2007) 
and the papers collected in Lenfant (2007).
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to interpret the tenor, moral or otherwise, of the original texts. The most 
obvious example of this problem is the term tryphe (τρυφή), which covers 
one of Athenaeus’ favourite subjects, namely luxurious and immoderate 
living. It has been argued in an important article by Gorman and Gorman 
that the fascination with tryphe belongs to Athenaeus and his time, not to 
his Hellenistic sources, who may have reported the details of such lifestyles 
but would not have condemned them.8 Gorman and Gorman are most 
probably right that tryphe is a term more in use in the time of Athenaeus 
than in that of the Hellenistic historiographers discussed here: on a TLG 
search we find that τρυφή and its cognates are used not at all by Herodotus 
or Thucydides, three times in all of Xenophon’s works, four times in the 
surviving parts of Polybius, and seventy-five times in the extant parts of 
Diodorus. This semantic group, then, is apparently only really coming 
into widespread use (at least by elite prose writers) in the late Hellenistic 
period;9 but it becomes extremely common in the second century ad, with 
140 instances across the literary output of Plutarch and no fewer than 
219 instances in the surviving volumes of Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae.10 
However, tryphe is a wide-ranging term that entails not just luxury and 
extravagance, but also immoderate eating and drinking, indolence, effemi-
nacy and sexual excesses, all vices in the moral-didactic systems of Polybius 
and Diodorus, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2. So, while the appella-
tion tryphe in the fragments preserved by Athenaeus is probably in most 
cases his own spin on the original text, it is unlikely that these Hellenistic 
historiographers differed so widely from their better-surviving peers as to 
recommend the kind of lifestyle that could fit that term.11
It is harder to argue against the other part of Gorman and Gorman’s 
argument, namely that the connection of tryphe with hybris and conse-
quent destruction which we see in some of the historiographical fragments 
preserved by Athenaeus became common only in the first to second century 
ad and was not a feature of Hellenistic historiography. They show convinc-
ingly that the expressions ‘to run aground on luxurious living’ (ἐξοκείλειν 
εἰς τρυφήν) and ‘to come/progress to such a degree of tryphe that . . .’, 
which we see repeatedly in the fragments of Hellenistic historiography, 
 8 Gorman and Gorman (2007).
 9 For the scarce use of τρυφή in the fifth century bc see Bernhardt (2003: 192–3).
10 For its use in the propaganda of the Ptolemaic court, see Heinen (1983) and Ager 
(2005). For its use in inscriptions, which may show a discrepancy between popular morality 
and the morality propounded by historiography, see Bernhardt (2003: 193–4).
11 Bernhardt (2003) traces criticism of luxurious living in Greek literature from Archaic 
through to Roman Imperial times and shows how such criticism was always part of Greek 
elite discourse, but began to be ‘systematised’ in the late fifth to early fourth century. His 
study of Hellenistic historiography is problematic, however, because he ignores the problem 
of distortion of fragments by the covertext. 
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were Athenaeus’ own phrases which he used to demonstrate a connec-
tion between tryphe and disaster. This must necessarily make us sceptical 
about the interpretation of those fragments as instances of moral causa-
tion. However, I shall argue that Gorman and Gorman go too far in their 
scepticism and that some fragments can be assumed to be remnants of such 
causation in the lost historiographies. Every passage needs to be treated 
on its own premises, and we shall discuss some important cases below in 
connection with both Timaeus and Phylarchus.
The second problem facing our investigation is the question to what 
degree the fragments of a given author are representative of his original work. 
This is essentially a question of the selectivity of the covertext. For example, 
references to a historiographer in the geographical lexicon of Stephanus 
of Byzantium are likely to be short notices on the topography or ethnic-
ity of a given city, but this does not mean that the historiographer named 
by Stephanus as his source was mainly interested in geography. Similarly, 
because of Athenaeus’ preoccupation with the theme of tryphe the number of 
historiographical fragments which moralise on this theme is almost certainly 
disproportionate to the space it occupied in his historiographical sources. 
On the other hand, the fact that Athenaeus was able to collect such a large 
number of passages on luxury and decadence shows that the theme was sig-
nificant to some extent in the historiographical tradition.12 It is unfortunate 
that Athenaeus was not equally interested in other moral-didactic topics.
The third and related problem is the uselessness of arguments e silentio. 
We can never be certain that a qualifying remark, a negation or a specific 
type of moralising was not in the original work of history just because no 
instance of it happens to be preserved.13
Such considerations may well make one hesitant even to approach the 
fragments, but if we want to gain some understanding of Greek histori-
ography as a genre, they are still our best evidence for vast stretches of it. 
Rather than throw up our hands in exasperation we shall therefore wade 
in bravely, at the risk of the occasional overinterpretation, and attempt to 
steer a course between naive trust in the covertext and fruitless agnosti-
cism. The method for every author discussed in this chapter has been first 
to read all the fragments collected by Jacoby, in order to see whether any 
seem to have a moral-didactic purpose, and then to read the fragments that 
seemed interesting for our purpose in their covertexts, in order to get a 
sense of how the purpose of the latter may have distorted the original shape 
and contents of the former.
12 Lenfant (1999) brilliantly shows how one would arrive at a distorted picture of 
Herodotus if we only had the ‘fragments’ of his History.
13 This is one of the main points of Brunt (1980).
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Timaeus of Tauromenium (FGrH 566)
The Sicelica (sometimes also called the History) of Timaeus of 
Tauromenium is the best-preserved fragmentary history of the period, with 
163 surviving fragments. Despite its title, it was not a work of local history, 
but a history of the western part of the Greek world to parallel the many 
Hellenica already in existence, beginning in mythical times and ending with 
the death of Agathocles of Syracuse.14 Timaeus was a prolific writer who 
composed several other works beside history. Champion’s description of 
him as ‘the most important Greek historian of the western Mediterranean 
before Polybius’ is no doubt correct.15 The Sicelica was widely read, as 
can be seen from the vast range of authors who refer to and polemicise 
against it,16 and it is a mark of the esteem in which Timaeus was held that 
it was his work which Polybius decided to continue, even if he criticised it 
harshly. Diodorus most probably used Timaeus as his primary source for 
the Sicilian and Italian history in books 13–14 and 20–1 and for some of his 
mythological material.
There is an unusually high degree of scholarly agreement about the 
character of Timaeus’ work, partly on the basis of the fragments, partly on 
more or less optimistic ideas about to what degree it can be reconstructed 
from Diodorus and from Polybius’ criticism:17 he was a passionate critic of 
all tyrants except Gelon, who was idolised because of his relative antiquity 
and his successes against the Carthaginians, whom Timaeus presented as 
vile barbarians; the equally successful Agathocles was violently criticised 
because Timaeus had been exiled by him and so was influenced by per-
sonal bias. Positive bias, on the other hand, characterised his portrayal 
of Timoleon, the liberator of Sicily. Moreover, Timaeus was useless as a 
military historian, but was among the first to offer a history of Rome; and 
his work was ‘rhetorical’, emotional and full of moralising.18 This picture 
14 For two of the more recent attempts at reconstructing the shape of Timaeus’ work see 
Vattuone (2002: 192–203) and Baron (2013: 28–38, 202–32).
15 Champion (n.d.).
16 FGrH 566 T 1, T 11, T 15a, T 15b, T 16, T 17, T 18, T 19, T 22, T 23, T 26, T 27, F 
28a.
17 Scholars who argue that Timaeus can to a large degree be reconstructed from 
Diodorus include Jacoby (1955), Laqueur (1936), Meister (1967) and Pearson (1984, 1986, 
1987). More sceptical voices are Sanders (1987), Rubincam (1990) and Baron (2013). For 
good discussions of Polybius’ criticism of Timaeus see Vattuone (2002) and Baron (2013: 
58–88).
18 The main works on Timaeus essentially agree on these points: Laqueur (1936), Jacoby 
(1955), Meister (1967), Pearson (1984, 1986, 1987), Sanders (1987) and Walbank (1989–90). 
Vattuone (2002) essentially agrees with this characterisation, but sensibly reinterprets it as a 
legitimate and philosophical type of post-Thucydidean history writing, which cannot simply 
be dismissed as ‘rhetorical’. Baron (2013) is more critical of the traditional characterisation.
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has more recently been challenged by Baron, who argues that Timaeus 
was less biased against both the Carthaginians and the Sicilian tyrants 
than is usually assumed, more competent as a historian, and an imitator of 
Herodotus in the range and structure of his work.19
Almost a third of the 163 Timaean fragments seem to refer to what in 
the original were moralising passages.20 This is a very large proportion 
of moralising, and it is no doubt partly due to the selectivity of his main 
covertexts: Athenaeus, who tends to extract passages dealing with luxury 
or flattery, and Plutarch, Polybius and Diodorus, who all have a moral-di-
dactic agenda. On the other hand, it is likely that Timaeus was a favourite 
source for these authors exactly because they found him a rich source of 
moral-didactic material.
No fewer than eleven of the collected fragments are Athenaean refer-
ences to Timaeus as a source for outrageous tales of tryphe.21 As discussed 
above, such cases call for special caution, and we cannot be sure that 
Athenaeus’ interpretation is also Timaeus’. No condemnation (or praise) 
by the Timaean narrator is preserved in any of these cases; the fragments 
consist simply of more or less detailed and scandalised descriptions of 
luxury. They range from brief remarks which must be references to longer 
treatments in Timaeus’ original (F 1a: the Etruscans make their slave girls 
serve naked) through humorous vignettes with speech (F 48 on the extreme 
indolence of the Sybarites) to lengthy ekphraseis on opulence (F 149 on the 
blasé attitude to wealth of drunken Acragan youths). An ekphrasis on the 
wealth of Acragas in Diodorus is also attributed to Timaeus’ eyewitness 
account (F 26a = Diod. Sic. 13.81.3–82.8). An added complication is that 
it is often impossible to see how much of the passage designated as a ‘frag-
ment’ actually comes from Timaeus; but the fact that he is repeatedly cited 
in connection with this theme – which, for instance, his contemporary and 
equally influential fellow-historian Hieronymus of Cardia is not (see later 
in this chapter) – suggests that extravagance and immoderate luxury had 
some part to play in his Sicelica.
The varied forms of the fragments seem to indicate that the theme 
appeared in both vignettes and ekphraseis. The longest fragment is F 50 
(= Ath. 12.519b–520c), the main part of which is an ekphrasis on extrava-
19 Baron (2013). The important part played by geography in his work is also discussed 
by Vattuone (2002: 222–4). 
20 F 1a, F 2, F 9, F 11a and b, F 22, F 24a, F 26a, F 29, F 31b, F 32, possibly F 35a and b, 
F 44, F 45, F 47, F 48, F 49, F 50, F 51, F 82, F 83, F 95, F 99, F 100a, b and c, F 102a and b, F 
105, F 106, F 111, F 116, F 118, F 119a, b and c, F 121, F 122, F 124a, b, c and d, F 134, F 139, 
F 148, F 149, F 150b, F 154, F 156, F 158a and b. I do not count F 159 because its derivation 
from Timaeus is extremely doubtful.
21 F 1a, F 9, F 11a and b, F 44, F 47, F 48, F 49, F 50, F 51, F 149.
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gant Sybarite customs, offering plenty of over-the-top details (such as the 
wealthy Sybarites having the roads leading from the city to their country 
estates covered with awnings so they do not get too hot on the road, and 
master chefs being crowned at public festivals). The fact that Timaeus 
is only mentioned by Athenaeus at the beginning of the long passage (in 
connection with the information that the Sybarites became friendly with 
the Miletans from wearing cloaks made from Milesian wool) prompts 
Gorman and Gorman to argue that the details of outrageous luxury are not 
based on his work, but are a hotchpotch of general ‘knowledge’ of Sybarite 
tryphe.22 Such an interpretation is possible, but perhaps overly sceptical: 
against Gorman and Gorman’s claim that no other Timaean fragment 
shows a similar credulity with regard to fantastical details I would put the 
evidence of F 150a, which gives Timaeus as the source for an argument to 
the effect that the goddess Artemis was present at the birth of Alexander 
the Great, and F 95, according to which the future tyrant Gelon was saved 
from an earthquake by a wolf (see below), both more fanciful to a modern 
mind than the decadence of the Sybarites.
The list of extravagances in F 50 ends with a narrative of how the destruc-
tion of Sybaris was foretold by an oracle, which warned the Sybarites about 
honouring human beings more than gods, and how such a fatal mistake 
occurred (by a runaway slave being whipped in a temple, then saving 
himself by fleeing to the tomb of his master’s father). If this passage does 
in fact go back to Timaeus, it shows that he made a connection between 
the Sybarites’ impious arrogance and their destruction, and perhaps that he 
made their arrogance arise from wealth and luxurious living. On the one 
hand, it is impossible to know whether Athenaeus was still using Timaeus 
at this point, as it is a full page since his name was mentioned; on the 
other hand, no other source has been mentioned in between.23 If Timaeus 
did create a causal link between the arrogance of the Sybarites and their 
destruction, this would put him in line with Polybius and Diodorus as a 
historian interested in human inability to handle good fortune.
A more certain indication that Timaeus did in some instances moralise 
on the difficulty of handling good fortune with moderation is F 100b (= 
Plut. Nic. 28.1–4). In this passage, a parallel narrative to Diodorus 13.19, 
22 Gorman and Gorman (2007: 52–3).
23 Gorman and Gorman (2007: 52–3) argue that Athenaeus was the one to make this 
causal connection and that he did not find it in any source. I find it unlikely that such a 
moral-didactic agenda should originate with Athenaeus, but it is entirely possible that he 
combined two different sources in the passage, which represented two different traditions: 
one where the Sybarites were destroyed because of their impiety and arrogance, and one 
where they were destroyed because of their tryphe. On Athenaeus’ practice of combining 
sources see Pelling (2000).
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the Sicilian statesman Hermocrates lectures his fellow-Syracusans after the 
victory over Athens in 413 bc on how to bear success with moderation, 
and the narrator states that the Syracusans ‘were already abusing their 
good fortune’ (ὑβρίζοντες ἤδη τοι̂ς εὐτυχήμασιν). It is difficult to be certain 
how much of this was in Timaeus, who is only mentioned in the next par-
agraph (ὡς δὲ Τίμαιός φησι), which deals with the Syracusans’ dislike of 
Gylippus.24 However, the dictum of Hermocrates about moderate behav-
iour in victory (ὅτι τοῦ νικᾶν κρεῖττόν ἐστι τὸ καλῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ νίκῃ) is 
very similar to a dictum spoken by Hermocrates in Diodorus during the 
course of the same debate: ὡς καλλιόν ἐστι τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ τὴν νίκην ἐνεγκεῖν 
ἀνθρωπίνως (Diod. Sic. 13.19.5; see p. 115). There can hardly be any doubt 
that these two expressions of the same doctrine at the same point in the 
story must come from the same source. It is, however, entirely possible 
that Plutarch was combining several different sources, or even added extra 
details from his own imagination.25 This would explain why the dema-
gogue who proposes the death sentence is in Diodorus called Diocles and 
in Plutarch Eurycles, and also why Gylippus in Diodorus gives a speech 
for the execution of the generals while in Plutarch he wants to take them 
back to Sparta alive. Timaeus can only with any certainty be credited with 
the details that Diodorus and Plutarch have in common, namely the fact 
that the Syracusans shouted down Hermocrates when he said that ‘nobler 
than victory itself is bearing victory with moderation’. Even on its own, 
however, this dictum and the Syracusan reaction make for a powerful 
moralising vignette on the inability of the successful to remain moderate.
This leads us to the question of what precepts for behaviour Timaeus 
may have offered. On the basis of the extant fragments we get a more 
rounded picture of his negative paradeigmata of villainy, Agathocles 
and other tyrants of Sicily, than of any of his positive exempla. This, 
however, probably says more about the covertexts, who were interested 
either in passing on salacious details (Athenaeus, Plutarch) or in criticis-
ing Timaeus for being tasteless and overly harsh in his blame passages 
(Polybius, Diodorus), than it does about Timaeus’ moral pedagogy. The 
bad Timaean leader seems to have been a tyrant, effeminate (F 111), sex-
ually depraved (F 122, F 124b), cowardly (F 124d) and impiously faithless 
(F 121).26 Such a leader has few friends, but many flatterers, who deserve 
24 See Meister (1967: 63–9) contra Jacoby (1955: 582–3), Pearson (1986: 357–8) and 
Stylianou (1998: 58–61), who all believe all of F 100b comes from Timaeus. 
25 This possibility is overlooked by Jacoby (1955: 582–3), Meister (1967: 63–9), Pearson 
(1986: 357–8) and Stylianou (1998: 58–61). See, however, Russell (1973: 42–62) and Pelling 
(2002) on Plutarch’s use of sources.
26 F 111 = Polyb. 12.24.3, F 122 = [Longinus], Subl. 4.5, F 124b = Polyb. 12.15.1–10, F 
124d = Diod. Sic. 21.17.1–3, F 121 = Diod. Sic. 20.89.4–6.
 Fragmentary Hellenistic Historiography 133
painful deaths for their obsequiousness.27 A further explicitly criticised 
characteristic, not attributed to any tyrant in the extant fragments, but 
only to the Spartan Gylippus, is greed (F 100a, b and c).28 In contrast, the 
philosopher Xenocrates receives praise by internal evaluation for display-
ing conspicuous lack of greed (F 158a and b).29
Otherwise, little survives to show what moral recommendations Timaeus 
gave. It is clear that he idolised Timoleon, the Corinthian who abolished 
tyranny in various Sicilian cities and defeated the Carthaginians (F 119a, b 
and c), but we cannot see what virtues Timaeus ascribed to him.30 It seems 
that Timaeus praised him for being an enemy of all tyrants (T 3b and T 
13) and even engineering the slaying of his own brother when the latter 
made himself tyrant of Corinth, although Timaeus’ version (F 116) seems 
to have differed from the one in Diodorus (Diod. Sic. 16.65) in having 
Timoleon cover his head and cry during the deed rather than committing 
it with his own hand.31 T 13 states that Timaeus praised Timoleon for his 
‘moderation’ (τοῦ μετρίου), albeit in the very specific sense of his sparing 
the life of Timaeus’ father, who was ruler (tyrant?) of Tauromenium. The 
philosopher Empedocles likewise seems to have been a positive paradeigma 
of hostility to tyranny,32 but was perhaps presented as less than perfect 
in his private life, where Diogenes Laertius uses the words ‘boastful’ and 
‘egocentric’ (ἀλαζόνα καὶ φίλαυτον) to summarise Timaeus’ description 
(F 2 = Diog. Laert. 8.66).
F 118 (= Plut. Quaest. conv. 5.3.2.676d) is interesting. It narrates how 
Timoleon’s troops get scared before a battle because some donkeys arrive 
carrying celery, which symbolises mourning, but how Timoleon then 
manages to turn their mood around by reminding them that celery is also 
used for victory wreaths in the Isthmian Games. This passage seems to 
show Timoleon as an eminently rational general capable of making the 
superstition of others work for him, along the lines of Polybius’ Scipios. 
It is unfortunately impossible to know whether Timaeus commented on 
the episode in his narratorial voice or in other ways indicated to the reader 
how to interpret it.33
27 F 115 = Plut. Dion 35.6–7 (Philistus), F 155a = Polyb. 12.12b.2–3 (Callisthenes), F 32 
= Ath. 6.250a–d (Democles).
28 F 100a and b = Plut. Nic. 19.5 and 28.1–4, F 100c = Plut. Tim. 41.4. 
29 F 158 a = Ath. 10.437.b, F 158b = Phld. Index academicorum philosophorum 
Herculanensis VIII (IV) pp. 138–9 (Dorandi).
30 F 119a = Polyb. 12.23.4–7, F 119b = Plut. Tim. 36.1–2, F 119c = Cic. Fam. 5.12.7.
31 T 3b = Plut. Tim. 10.6–8, T 13 = Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 27, F 116 = Plut. Tim. 4.5–8.
32 F 2 = Diog. Laert. 8.66, F 134 = Diog. Laert. 8.63–4.
33 In addition, Cornelius Nepos (Alc. 11.1–6 = FGrH 566 F 99) cites Timaeus as 
someone who praises Alcibiades and goes on to talk about the chameleon-like qualities of 
the Athenian statesman. However, as noted by Champion (n.d.: ad loc.), Nepos says that 
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Having examined the meagre evidence for the virtues and vices of 
Timaeus’ main characters, we now turn to the other important question 
for discerning his overall moral message(s): did he describe a world where 
virtue was rewarded and vice punished? F 50 on the fall of Sybaris, dis-
cussed above, may well show divine punishment of arrogance and impiety, 
and possibly also of extravagant living. The divine connection is not made 
explicit, however, and we cannot even be certain that this final part of the 
fragment is from Timaeus. We must therefore look elsewhere for clues to 
the extent of divine involvement in the world of the Sicelica.
Some fragments show that Timaeus portrayed a world where superhu-
man forces at least played a part. F 29 narrates a prophetic dream, F 95 
has a future good leader (Gelon of Syracuse) saved from an earthquake by 
a wolf,34 and, more concretely, F 155a quotes Timaeus’ statement that the 
execution of the historian Callisthenes by Alexander the Great was divine 
punishment for honouring a human being like a god.35 Intriguingly, two 
fragments indicate that Timaeus had a fondness for ironically apt punish-
ment of the kind we have seen Diodorus use to signal divine involvement: 
F 24 (= Ath. 13.588b–589a) tells of the death of Laïs the courtesan (at the 
end of a string of outrageous stories about her, which were probably, but 
not necessarily, also in Timaeus), who is beaten to death with wooden foot-
stools36 by jealous women in a sanctuary of Aphrodite, thus aptly dying in 
the house of the goddess of lust.37 Similarly, but more pointedly, F 102 (= 
Περὶ Ὕψους 4.3) interprets the Athenian defeat by Hermocrates (‘Power of 
Hermes’) son of Hermon as the city’s punishment (ἔδωκαν δίκην) for having 
mutilated the Herms.38 No divine power is mentioned, but the coincidence 
of crime and punishment – especially in the latter case – seems meant to indi-
cate something superhuman (and so signal that the punishment was just).
Timaeus and Thucydides agree in their praise of Alcibiades, despite the fact that Thucydides 
is in fact extremely ambivalent about him. That means that we cannot be sure how une-
quivocal Timaeus’ praise was, and makes it impossible to use the fragment as a basis for 
reconstructing Timaeus’ advice for good leadership.
34 F 29 = schol. on Aeschin. 2.10, F 95 = Tzetz. Chil. 4.132.269–81. It is hard to know how 
seriously to take the attribution of this latter story to Timaeus, as Tzetzes dismissively talks 
of ‘the Timaeuses, Dionysiuses, Diodoruses, Dion(s)’, but it does not seem to be out of place 
with the other fantastical stories told in some of the fragments. 
35 F 155a = Polyb. 12.12b: καί φησι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξίους γεγονέναι, διότι ταῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου 
τιμαῖς ταῖς ἰσοθέοις ἀντέλεγον, τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον αἰγίδα καὶ κεραυνὸν <περι>τιθέντα θνητῇ 
φύσει δικαίως αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετευχέναι τούτων ὧν ἔτυχεν.
36 ξυλίναις χελώναις, literally wooden tortoises. Most probably a type of footstool; cf. 
LSJ (ad χελώνα) and Pearson (1987: 150 n. 87).
37 Pearson (1987: 150) says that Timaeus relates her ‘tragic death’. I think he misses the 
moral point of Timaeus’ story.
38 Baron (2013: 192–4, 244–6) offers the tantalising suggestion that such wordplay in 
Timaeus was meant to provide a streak of humour in his narrative. If that is indeed the case, 
it is difficult to know how seriously to take it.
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This interest in coincidences of the details of a crime with its punishment 
was almost certainly part of a wider theme in Timaeus of coincidences 
of various types, particularly of dates, and especially when they could be 
construed to show the changeability of fortune.39 At 13.108.4, Diodorus 
cites him as his source (F 106) for the fact that on the same day and in the 
same hour as the Carthaginians had captured the Geloan colossal statue of 
Apollo, which they sent to Tyre, the same statue was later worshipped by 
the Greeks under Alexander the Great, who had on that day taken Tyre. 
This is a coincidence which shows how fortunes change and the arrogant 
victors become the humbled defeated. At the same time it functions as 
divine punishment of the Tyrians, who had committed sacrilege against 
the statue because they believed that Apollo was helping the Greeks in 
the siege. Coincidences are also the topic of F 60 (Rome and Carthage 
were founded on the same day),40 F 105 (Euripides died on the same day 
that Dionysius, the tragedy-loving tyrant, became ruler of Syracuse) and F 
150a, where Cicero states that Timaeus claimed that the temple of Artemis 
at Ephesus burned down on the same night as Alexander the Great was 
born.41 The point in Cicero’s summary is Timaeus’ explanation of the 
coincidence, namely that Artemis was away from Ephesus because she, as 
the goddess of childbirth, wanted to be present at Olympias’ labour. Cicero 
says that Timaeus added the explanation of the coincidence concinne, 
which perhaps indicates that he thought of it as a learned and poetic expla-
nation which was not to be taken literally. This would fit in with Pseudo-
Longinus’ criticism of Timaeus’ tendency to showcase his learnedness 
(F 102). However, even if such highlighting of their author’s learnedness 
was the meta-purpose of these coincidences, they nevertheless create a nar-
rative universe where some sort of superhuman power organises events and 
thereby plays a very real part. The impression we got from the Timaean 
parts of Diodorus’ Bibliotheke was of an author who moralises frequently 
on divine vengeance and uses the mirroring of punishment and crime as an 
indication of divine involvement. It is now tempting to think that this is an 
accurate reflection of a prominent feature of the Sicelica.
The other dominating characteristics of the moralising of Diodorus’ 
Timaean narrative are the theme of human inability to bear good fortune 
and several ekphraseis on wealth and luxury. The hypothesis that both 
of these were characteristics of Timaeus’ Sicelica is now supported by 
our examination of the Timaean ‘fragments’. However, in his ‘Timaean’ 
39 Meister (1967: 7–8) and Pearson (1987: 157–8).
40 Jacoby (1955: 536–7) has a good discussion of the implications of this synchronism 
for Timaeus’ conception of history.
41 F 60 = Dion. Hal. 1.6.1, F 105 = Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.1.1.717c, F 150a = Cic. Nat. 
D. 2.69.
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passages Diodorus also moralises frequently on piety and cruelty, topics 
which are not on display in the collected fragments. This could mean either 
that, by coincidence, none of Timaeus’ passages on piety and cruelty have 
been preserved in later authors, at least not with his name attached, or that 
Diodorus was responsible for adding moralising on those topics – clearly 
central to his own moral-didactic programme, as we saw in Chapter 2 – to 
the material he took over from Timaeus.
In terms of moralising techniques, the Timaean fragments are pleasingly 
varied. At the risk of assuming too much, they seem to show that Timaeus 
employed moralising vignettes (F 47, F 122, F 149), speeches (F 22, F 31), 
ekphraseis (F 26a, F 50), evaluative phrasing (F 100a, F 154a), internal 
evaluation (Hermocrates’ remark in F 100b; end of F 158a and b), fulfilled 
prophecies (F 29) and digressions (F 124a, b and c mention a lengthy con-
demnation of Agathocles towards the end of the work).42 Again, this fits 
with what we might assume on the basis of Diodorus, except that we might 
have expected also to see examples of moralising through pathos among 
the collected fragments, which we do not.
duris of samos (FGrH 76)
Just under a hundred fragments survive from the historical works of Duris 
of Samos. Like Timaeus, Duris was a prolific writer of works spanning 
several genres, and was widely read. The fragments of interest for us are 
not only the ones assumed to come from his Histories (sometimes called the 
Macedonica), but also the ones ascribed by ancient sources to his History 
of Agathocles, as Landucci Gattinoni has convincingly demonstrated that 
this was not a separate monograph, but was extracted from the Histories 
in Roman times.43 The work probably began with the death of Amyntas, 
father of Philip II of Macedon, and ended with the death of Pyrrhus. In 
an interesting contrast with most of the other historians discussed in this 
study, who composed their works in forced or voluntary exile, Duris prob-
ably wrote his while in a position of power, as tyrant of Samos.44
Considering the scanty remains, a surprisingly large amount of scholar-
42 F 47 = Ath. 1.34c, F 122 = [Longinus] 1.45, F 149 = Ath. 2.37b–d, F 22 = Polyb. 
12.25k.2–26.8, F 31 = Polyb. 12.26a.1–4, F 26a = Diod. Sic. 13.81.3–82.8, F 50 = Ath. 12.519b–
520c, F 100a = Plut. Nic. 19.5, F 154a = Plut. Dion 36.1–2, F 100b = Plut. Nic. 28.1–4, F 158a 
= Ath. 10.437b, F 158b = Phld. Index academicorum philosophorum Herculanensis VIII (IV) 
pp. 138–9 (Dorandi), F 29 = schol. on Aeschin. 2.10, F 124a = Polyb. 8.10.12, F 124b = Polyb. 
12.15.1–10, F 124c = Polyb. 15.35.2.
43 Landucci Gattinoni (1997: 133–48). Contra Kebric (1977) and Pédech (1989). This 
means leaving out Duris’ Horoi (Annals), on the basis that it was probably a work of local 
history; see Landucci Gattinoni (1997: 205–7) and Pownall (n.d.: ad F 22).
44 For a discussion of Duris’ biography see Pownall (n.d.) with bibliography.
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ship exists on Duris.45 Much of the discussion centres on Duris’ relationship 
with the Peripatetics and the question of ‘tragic history’.46 The concept of a 
Peripatetic school of ‘tragic history’, which allegedly valued vivid descrip-
tions full of pathetic details and aimed to create pity and fear in its readers, 
originated with Schwartz in the nineteenth century, inspired by Polybius’ 
criticism of Phylarchus (Polyb. 2.56–63), and held sway for half a century. 
It was refuted by Walbank (1955, 1960), who convincingly argued that both 
tragedy and historiography were inspired by epic, and that the elements 
often identified by modern scholars as typical of ‘tragic history’ are really 
traits which have always been part of Greek historiography. The argument 
against the concept has more recently been reframed by Marincola (2003), 
who shows that vividness and engagement of the reader’s emotions were 
part of Greek historiography from Herodotus onwards. I would add that 
both tragedy and historiography were concerned with moral didacticism 
and that the melodramatic descriptions of suffering associated with ‘tragic 
history’ are, in fact, an attempt to teach a reader about the wickedness of 
certain kinds of behaviour on an emotional rather than an intellectual level 
(see pp. 85 and 153).
Most scholars, however, still agree that Duris wrote ‘moralising history’, 
and that the disastrous consequences of luxury and extravagance were 
a prominent theme in his historical works.47 The problem is that despite 
the relatively large number of fragments it is hard to get a sense of Duris’ 
writing, because most of the fragments are in reality just brief references to 
events for which Duris is listed as the source, and often only as one source 
out of several. In such circumstances we cannot know how he narrated the 
episode or conveyed the piece of information for which he is cited, and so 
whether or not he used it for any moral-didactic purpose. We shall begin 
with the few characteristics of his work that can be discerned relatively 
securely, and move gradually on to thinner ice.
Like Timaeus, Duris owes his image as a historiographer obsessed with 
45 A representative selection is Schwartz (1905), Jacoby (1926b: 115–16), Kebric (1977), 
Gray (1987), Pédech (1989), Dalby (1991), Landucci Gattinoni (1997), Knoepfler (2000), 
Pownall(n.d.); but see additional bibliography in this last item.
46 It was once taken for granted that Duris was a pupil of Theophrastus (Kebric 1977, 
Gray 1987, Pédech 1989), but Dalby (1991) has shown that the evidence for the pupil–teacher 
relationship rests on a modern emendation of Athenaeus 4.128a (= T 1) which is unnec-
essary and indefensible. He has been followed by Landucci Gattinoni (1997) and Pownall 
(n.d.). Schwartz (1905) and Jacoby (1926b: 115–16) argue that Duris was influenced by the 
Peripatetics, without making him a pupil of Theophrastus. Knoepfler (2000) seems unaware 
of Dalby’s article. Gray (1987) provides a brilliant analysis of Duris’ use of the term mimesis, 
which has often been connected with ‘tragic history’.
47 Kebric (1977), Pédech (1989), Landucci Gattinoni (1997), Pownall (n.d.). Knoepfler 
(2000), radically, argues that Duris did not moralise, but merely described scandalous 
 behaviour in great detail for its entertainment value.
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the deleterious effects of luxury to his covertexts. About a fourth of the 
surviving fragments of his works are preserved by Athenaeus, most of 
them for their descriptions of extravagance, and eleven of the longer frag-
ments are found in Plutarch, who shares this interest to a lesser degree. 
We have to keep reminding ourselves that this percentage of text dealing 
with luxury and extravagance is disproportionate to the role played by this 
theme in Duris’ original works. However, as with Timaeus, we should also 
note that the theme was clearly present in Duris’ histories even if it played 
a smaller part than what is now apparent.
The two most conspicuous passages dealing with tryphe are F 10 on 
the luxurious lifestyle of Demetrius of Phalerum and F 14 on the extrav-
agant habits of Demetrius Poliorcetes.48 F 14 is presented as a verbatim 
quotation of Duris (‘Παυσανίας μέν’ φησίν ‘ὁ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλεὺς 
. . .’). The two passages are very similar in style: both are detailed descrip-
tions in a scandalised tone with some evaluative phrasing (τὴν ἔμφυτον 
ἀκρασίαν, ἠφάνιζεν: F 10), and both use rhetorical comparisons: F 10 states 
that Demetrius of Phalerum surpasses the Macedonians in the expense 
of his dinners, and the Cyprians and Phoenicians in the elegance of his 
attire;49 F 14 begins with brief statements about the descent into luxury of 
Pausanias, Dionysius I and Alexander the Great, and then makes the claim 
that Demetrius Poliorcetes trumped all of them. On this basis, even if F 10 
is not a verbatim quotation, it is perhaps legitimate to take it as a fairly 
close paraphrase of Duris. It is certainly tempting to think that a moralising 
juxtaposition in F 10 which comments scathingly on the hypocrisy of its 
protagonist was in Duris’ original.50 Such comparisons and juxtapositions 
are rhetorical techniques employed in the service of moralising by Polybius 
at his most ardent.
Other fragments on the topic of tryphe are mere references to passages 
at whose original form we can only guess (F 35, F 37a and b, F 49), and 
one seems to have been an explanatory digression on background history 
with some evaluative phrasing (F 4 = Ath. 4.167c–d).51 Two fragments 
are ambiguous in that they seem to be scandalised descriptions of extrav-
48 F 10 = Ath. 12.542b–e, F 14 = Ath. 12.535e–536a.
49 καὶ ταῖς μὲν δαπάναις ταῖς εἰς τὰ δεῖπνα τοὺς Μακεδόνας ὑπερέβαλε, τῇ δὲ καθαρειότητι 
Κυπρίους καὶ Φοίνικας: F 10; ‘Παυσανίας μέν’ φησίν ‘ὁ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλεὺς καταθέμενος 
τὸν πάτριον τρίβωνα τὴν Περσικὴν ἐνεδύετο στολήν. ὁ δὲ Σικελίας τύραννος Διονύσιος 
ξυστίδα καὶ χρυσοῦν στέφανον <ἔτι δ’> ἐπιπόρπημα μετελάμβανε τραγικόν. ᾽Αλέξανδρος δ᾽ 
ὡς τῆς ᾽Ασίας ἐκυρίευσεν Περσικαῖς ἐχρῆτο στολαῖς. Δημήτριος δὲ πάντας ὑπερέβαλεν’: F 14. 
For an analysis of the rhetorical effect of F 14 see Landucci Gattinoni (1997: 130).
50 ‘Demetrius who set down laws and ordered the lives of others made his own life 
completely lawless’ (καὶ ὁ τοῖς ἀλλοις τιθέμενος θεσμοὺς Δημήτριος καὶ τοὺς βίους τάττων 
ἀνομοθέτητον ἑαυτῷ τὸν βίον κατεσκεύαζεν: FGrH 76 F 10 = Ath. 12.542b–e).
51 F 35 = Ath. 12.532d–f, F 37a = Ath. 6.231b–c, F 37b = Ath. 4.155d, F 49 = Ath. 1.17f. 
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agance, but concern people whom one would expect Duris to treat posi-
tively: Alcibiades, his alleged ancestor, in F 70, and the Samians, his own 
people, in F 60.52 The former passage has been explained well by Landucci 
Gattinoni as a preparation for the peripeteia that is soon going to happen 
to Alcibiades and bring about his downfall, and it is certainly true that 
Alcibiades would be an illustrious ancestor even if his larger-than-life 
persona eventually destroyed his career and led to his death.53 F 60 cites 
some lines from the poet Asius about the richness of the annual procession 
of the Samians to the Heraeum, after stating that Duris uses this as evi-
dence for Samian custom. The appellation of this custom as tryphe is most 
likely to be Athenaeus’ interpretation of the custom described by Duris 
and Asius;54 Duris probably used it as a sign of the former wealth, magnifi-
cence and power of his country rather than of any untoward behaviour on 
the part of its citizens. This leaves only the two passages on Demetrius of 
Phalerum and Demetrius Poliorcetes, discussed above, as true moralising 
passages on decadence.
Nevertheless, Duris also seems to have moralised on the kind of immod-
eration that is an integral part of tryphe: heavy drinking (F 15), sexual 
transgressions (F 18) and effeminacy (F 12, F 42).55 F 42 even suggests that 
Duris, like Diodorus, drew a causal connection between the assassination 
of the Assyrian king Sardanapalus and his effeminacy, showing that vice 
can lead to disaster. On the positive side, F 50 (= Plut. Phoc. 4) ascribes an 
enthusiastic description of the extreme self-discipline of Phocion to Duris; 
it may well have formed part of an obituary, although Plutarch is unlikely 
to have taken it over verbatim. F 51 (= Plut. Phoc. 17) most probably 
refers to the same obituary when it cites Duris as evidence for Alexander 
the Great addressing Phocion more politely than anyone else in his letters, 
thus demonstrating that moral virtue can lead to positive results. The only 
other fragment that seems to refer to a positive evaluation of a historical 
character is F 53 (Plut. Eum. 1.1–3) on Eumenes of Cardia. Apparently 
Duris portrayed this Successor of Alexander as the son of a poor man 
risen to prominence through his good education (τραφῆναι δὲ ἐλευθερίως 
ἐν γράμμασι καὶ περὶ παλαίστραν), intelligence and courage (συνετὸν καὶ 
ἀνδρεῖον).
An intriguing issue in the light of the moral-didactic themes found in 
Polybius and Diodorus is whether Duris moralised on human inability to 
handle good fortune. No such moralising survives from his works, but F 66 
and F 67 certainly refer to scenes involving victors and their captors, which 
52 F 70 = Plut. Alc. 32, F 60 = Ath. 12.525e–f.
53 Landucci Gattinoni (1997: 239–46).
54 See Pownall (n.d.: ad loc.).
55 F 15 = Ath. 12.546c–d, F 18 = Ath. 13.605d–e, F 12 = Ath. 4.155c, F 42 = Ath. 12.529a. 
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is the most common situation for moralising on this theme in Polybius and 
Diodorus. F 66 (= Phot. Lexicon s.v. Σαμίων ὁ δῆμός) is a lexicon entry 
giving Duris as an authority for the Athenian practice of tattooing their 
Samian captives with the image of an owl (and probably for the corre-
sponding Samian practice of tattooing their Athenian prisoners with the 
image of a ship, although the text is uncertain), but gives no indication of 
how this information was conveyed in his narrative. In F 67 (= Plut. Per. 
28.1–3), on the other hand, Plutarch criticises Duris for ‘making a tragedy 
out of’ (ἐπιτραγῳδεῖ) events surrounding the Athenian victory over Samos 
in 441/0 bc. In Duris’ version, which Plutarch offers as an alternative to 
the one he considers the true version, the Athenians torture the captured 
Samian marines and trierarchs for ten days before executing them with 
wooden clubs. Presumably Plutarch’s accusation of ‘tragedising’ means 
that Duris’ narrative of these events was full of pathetic detail, much like 
some of the passages of Diodorus we saw in the previous chapter. Such 
details are not necessarily added for the sake of sensationalism, however: 
Duris presumably felt strongly about these events as they concerned the 
recent past of his own country, and may well have included them with the 
purpose of showing his readers the truth of what had happened, against 
the Athenophile versions of other historians such as Thucydides and 
Ephorus.56 If Duris had a moral-didactic agenda, this narrative may well 
have been an instance of using pathos to moralise on how to behave in 
victory, but unfortunately this cannot be known with any certainty.
Finally, the question remains whether there is any evidence for divine 
punishment of vice and rewarding of virtue in Duris.57 Only a single 
instance of divine punishment occurs in the fragments, and that is myth-
ological and so must have occurred either as part of a digression or in 
a speech delivered by a character. This makes it impossible to interpret 
outside of its context.58 If we look for punishment of human impiety, we 
are disappointed. Two fragments castigate people for celebrating a mortal 
like a god (Demetrius Poliorcetes F 13, Lysander F 71), but it is hard to see 
56 Plutarch probably also intends to imply that Duris has exaggerated or even added fic-
titious details. We cannot know whether Duris was guilty of doctoring the facts or Plutarch 
had been falsely persuaded by a dominant Athenocentric tradition. 
57 Schwartz (1905) argues that Duris was not a believer, but introduced gods and oracles 
for literary effect. Kebric (1977: 30–1), on the other hand, has argued, partly on the basis of 
Duris’ interest in Herodotus and Sophocles, partly by analogy with the Peripatetic Clearchus 
of Soli, whose fragments share some features with those of Duris, that the Samian historiog-
rapher was an adherent of a ‘traditional’ belief in divine punishment of hybris. In fact, the 
similarities between Duris and Clearchus are no greater than those that exist between Duris 
and the other Hellenistic historiographers, and the same caveats apply to interpreting the 
fragments of Clearchus – also primarily preserved by Athenaeus – as to those of the histori-
ans, so this evidence is inconclusive.
58 F 47 (= schol. in Ap. Rhod. II 1249).
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whether it is just the flattery that is being critisised or also the impiety, and 
there is no indication that the peoples in question suffer for their actions. 
F 35 (= Ath. 12.532d–f) mentions Duris as ‘narrating the same thing’ at 
the end of a brief story about how the Athenian general Chares was given 
money stolen from Delphi during the Sacred War and spent it on dinner 
parties. If Duris told this story in any detail, he may well have moralised 
on the impiety of the temple-robbery – or he may have stuck to criticising 
the extravagance of the dinners, or he may have kept off moralising all 
together. The ‘fragment’ is too short to be of much use.
The only indication that there may have been some divine involvement 
in the world of Duris’ Histories is three fragments which seem to show that 
momentous events could be foretold by oracles and omens: F 36 refers to 
omens foretelling the loss of Philip II’s eye, F 38 mentions an omen predict-
ing the Battle of Chaeronea, and F 84 an omen foretelling the mythical king-
ship of Aletes over Corinth.59 F 56b (= Tzetz. schol. on Lycophron 1378) 
cites Duris as one among other authorities for the story of the self-sacrifice 
of Decius Mus (or his father; see Pownall n.d: ad loc.) and may imply that 
the sacrifice resulted in Roman victory. In other words, superhuman causa-
tion may have played a part in the work, but little evidence remains, and it 
is impossible to see whether such powers enforced any kind of moral code.
The moralising techniques of Duris are equally hard to discern. It seems 
that he used detailed descriptions with evaluative phrasing, compari-
sons and juxtapositions. Beyond that, things get less certain. F 15 (= Ath. 
12.546c–d) has been taken to indicate that he could use Homeric references 
to back up moralising on contemporary issues,60 but it could equally well 
be a reference to a non-moralising erudite passage on changing customs. 
The fragments on Phocion discussed above seem to form part of an evalu-
ative digression, probably as part of an obituary. Eumenes may or may not 
have received similar treatment. Strangely, perhaps, there is no evidence of 
a use of moralising vignettes, but that is of course not proof that Duris did 
not use them.
Phylarchus (FGrH 81)
We know very little about Phylarchus, except that he wrote Histories in 
twenty-eight books and possibly several minor works which are now lost.61 
Polybius (2.56.1 = T 3) says that Phylarchus was a contemporary of Aratus 
59 F 36 = Didymus ad Dem. 12.50–62, F 38 = Plut. Dem. 19, F 84 = [Plut.] Proverbs of 
the Alexandrines 1.48.
60 See Pownall (n.d.: ad loc.).
61 Alternatively, as suggested by Africa (1961: 3–4), the works listed in the Suda were 
excerpts made from the Histories in Roman times.
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the Elder, who died in 213 bc. The Histories began at the death of Pyrrhus 
in 272 bc, which means that it continued from the point where the works of 
both Hieronymus and Duris left off, and it most probably ended in 220/19, 
at the death of Ptolemaeus Euergetes, his wife Berenice and Cleomenes III 
of Sparta.62 This terminal date was probably decided partly by the work’s 
bias in favour of Cleomenes, which is noted by Plutarch (Arat. 38.6 = F 
52).63 The Histories are the target of a vicious attack by Polybius (Polyb. 
2.56–63), which gave rise to the early twentieth-century theory of ‘tragic 
history’ (see above, pp. 85 and 137), and which shows that Phylarchus’ 
Histories was considered the authoritative account of his time period.64
Eighty-five fragments of Phylarchus are collected in FGrH; he is not yet 
included in the BNJ. All eighty-five fragments are believed to derive from 
the Histories. Of these, almost half (forty-one) are from Athenaeus, and 
Plutarch, the second most frequent covertext, preserves twelve. It is thus 
unsurprising that a large number of the fragments are moralising, and it 
is likely that the proportion of moralising in the fragments is larger than 
it was in the original work. At the same time, however, as in the cases of 
Timaeus and Duris, Athenaeus’ reason for using Phylarchus so extensively 
was probably precisely the large number of moral vignettes to be found in 
his work. Most scholars agree that Phylarchus’ narrative was moralising, 
but also that this moralising was implicit in the narrative’s display of uni-
versal justice rather than explicit. Schepens has argued that Phylarchus’ 
work was more serious and historically informative than the fragments 
show; this may well be true, but does not preclude that his work was also 
moral-didactic.65
Considering the large proportion of fragments preserved by Athenaeus, 
it is not surprising that there is an overweight of passages moralising on 
luxury and decadence and related topics.66 Intriguingly, three of these frag-
ments seem to indicate that Phylarchus propounded a causal connection 
leading from wealth and success to arrogance and then to disaster. The 
62 Kroymann (1956), Africa (1961), Pédech (1989).
63 This is well discussed by Africa (1961).
64 Marincola (2003) and Schepens (2005) offer good analyses of Polybius’ polemics 
against Phylarchus. For Phylarchus as an accepted authority see Schepens (2005: 141–3) with 
further bibliography in n. 5.
65 E.g. Africa (1961) and Pédech (1989). Kroymann (1956: 488) argues that the main 
message of Phylarchus’ work was the helplessness of man in the face of tyche. However, 
Kroymann bases this theory not on the attested fragments of Phylarchus, but on Plutarch’s 
Agis and Cleomenes, which he argues are based on Phylarchus’ Histories. The doctoral 
thesis by Sonia Stelluto, Filarco e la storiografia tragica (1997, University of Salerno), on 
which Schepens (2007) bases some of his arguments, has unfortunately been unavailable to 
me.
66 Luxury and decadence: F 7, F 20, F 40, F 41, F 44, F 45, F 66. Related topics: F 2, F 6, 
F 13, F 21.
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clearest instance is F 45 (= Ath. 12.521b–e). This passage begins with a 
summary of the sumptuary laws of Syracuse, attributed to Phylarchus, and 
then switches to the laws of the Sybarites, which aim to promote rather 
than curtail luxury. The switch is probably due to Athenaeus’ combining 
two different passages, but he indicates by a repeated φησίν that Phylarchus 
is also the source of the second passage. After the scandalised description 
of the tryphe-promoting laws follows a dramatic narrative of the downfall 
of the Sybarites, introduced with the statement that ‘having run aground 
on their arrogance’ (ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς ὕβριν) they killed ambassadors from 
Croton and threw their bodies out unburied – a clear instance of tryphe 
leading to arrogance and impiety, which then lead to disaster as dramatic 
omens immediately predict divine destruction. Gorman and Gorman have 
shown that the metaphor ‘to run aground on luxury/ arrogance’ is a favour-
ite expression of Athenaeus, and argue that it shows his interpretation 
of a given story and does not go back to any of his sources.67 In this 
case, it is probably Athenaeus’ way of abbreviating the narrative that took 
Phylarchus from the luxury laws to the murder of the envoys. However, if 
the murder of the ambassadors, the colourful omens and the subsequent 
destruction of Sybaris were part of Phylarchus’ Histories,68 the only possi-
ble interpretation is one of divine punishment for arrogant impiety regard-
less of how Athenaeus introduces his abbreviated version.
A similar problem attaches to F 40, another fragment dealing with the 
dangers of extravagance, which seems to be an abbreviated version of what 
was a full moralising vignette in Phylarchus:
ἐν δὲ τῇ δευτέρᾳ καὶ εἰκοστῇ ὁ αὐτὸς Πτολεμαῖόν φησι τὸν δεύτερον Αἰγύπτου 
βασιλεύσαντα, πάντων σεμνότατον γενόμενον τῶν δυναστῶν καὶ παιδείας εἴ 
τινα καὶ ἄλλον καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιμεληθέντα, οὕτως ἐξαπατηθῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν 
καὶ διαφθαρῆναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαίρου τρυφῆς ὥστε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὑπολαβεῖν 
βιώσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι μόνος εὕροι τὴν ἀθανασίαν. κατατεινόμενον οὖν 
ὑπὸ ποδάγρας πλείους ἡμέρας, ὥς ποτ’ οὖν ἐρράισεν καὶ κατεῖδεν διά τινων 
ὑπολαμπάδων τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἀριστοποιουμένους καὶ 
τὰ τυχόντα προσφερομένους ἐπί τε τῆς ἄμμου χύδην ἐρριμμένους, εἶπεν· ‘ὦ 
τάλας ἐγώ, τὸ μηδὲ τούτων ἕνα γενέσθαι’.
In his twenty-second book the same author says that Ptolemy II of Egypt, 
the most august of rulers and second to none in his care for education, was 
so mentally beguiled and corrupted by unreasonable luxury that he assumed 
67 Gorman and Gorman (2007).
68 The running-aground metaphor is often used by Athenaeus to introduce material 
taken from a new source, so it may mean that he got the omens of divine destruction from 
an unnamed author and not from Phylarchus. I would, however, choose to believe that he 
uses the metaphor in this case to introduce a later passage from Phylarchus rather than an 
entirely different source.
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that he would live forever and said that he alone had discovered immortal-
ity. So, being tortured by gout for many days, when he eventually recovered 
and saw through some openings in his colonnade the Egyptians breakfasting 
by the river, contributing whatever they happened to have, sprawled on 
the ground, he said: ‘Miserable wretch that I am to not be one of them!’ 
(Phylarchus, F 40 = Ath. 12.536e)
This vignette shows a powerful and arrogantly impious character whose 
suffering makes him realise his mistake and, perhaps, avoid downfall. This 
philosophical insight could be the reason why the king is described in 
extremely positive terms at the beginning of the fragment, or this praise 
may have been composed by Athenaeus. Either way, the message that 
even powerful human beings are not masters of their own fates is clear, 
as is the message that power and wealth are not enough to make a man 
happy. (This message is often called Herodotean, and we shall encounter it 
again in Chapter 4.) What is less clear is whether the connection between 
Ptolemy’s ‘undiluted luxury’ and his impiety was made by Phylarchus or 
by Athenaeus.
F 44, the third fragment relating to decadence and its consequences, 
seems to be a close paraphrase, if not a verbatim quotation, of Phylarchus 
by Athenaeus (Φύλαρχος γοῦν ἐν τῇ ε καὶ κ τῶν ἱστοριῶν τάδε γράφει). It 
compares the decadence of third-century Sparta with the moderation of 
a previous era. The mention of the habits of two men ‘who lived a short 
time before the reign of Cleomenes’ as the peak of degeneration perhaps 
points to a larger narrative arc in Phylarchus, whereby Cleomenes became 
the restorer of Spartan moderation and with it their fighting ability and 
general fortunes. Four further ‘fragments’ mention Phylarchus as a source 
for the luxurious or immoderate habits of historical characters (the 
Byzantines F 7, Isanthes of Thrace F 20, Alexander the Great and his com-
panions F 41, the Colophonians F 66), but are too brief for an analysis to 
be possible.
One enigmatic fragment, Polybius’ acidic criticism of Phylarchus’ treat-
ment of the fall of Mantinea (F 53 = Polyb. 2.56.6–7), shows that Phylarchus 
at least on one occasion narrated the fall of a city in dramatic detail. 
Considering the moralising use of such narratives in Diodorus and very 
probably also Timaeus, it is not unlikely that Phylarchus meant his nar-
rative to be understood as moralising through pathos; and taking our cue 
from Polybius’ statement that Phylarchus’ vivid narrative derived from a 
desire ‘to make crystal clear the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, 
and along with them of Aratus and the Achaeans’ (βουλόμενος δὴ διασαφεῖν 
τὴν ὠμότητα τὴν Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις τὴν Ἀράτου 
καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν) we may speculate that one of the moral messages was 
the typical abuse of good fortune by victorious troops and commanders. 
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Unfortunately, Polybius gives us so few details about what Phylarchus 
actually said that this must remain speculation.69
It remains to be asked what moral qualities Phylarchus promoted. From 
the surviving fragments, the negative paradeigmata are easier to discern, 
and predictable from Athenaeus’ prominence as covertext: the bad man 
lives in luxury, he is immoderate in drink and sexual appetites, and he 
treats his defeated enemies cruelly.70 The good man is presumably mod-
erate, although no one is credited with this virtue in the extant fragments. 
In addition, he is courageous and competent on the battlefield and shows 
steadfast endurance in the face of personal persecution.71 So far the vices 
and virtues are entirely traditional, if a little patchily covered due to the 
fragmentary nature of the evidence. One aspect of a leader’s personality, 
however, seems to have been of more interest to Phylarchus than to any 
of the other Hellenistic historiographers covered by this study: a sense of 
humour. No fewer than five fragments are vignettes that display a ruler’s 
wit: F 11 on Alexander (of Pherae or Epirus); F 12, F 19 and F 31 on 
Demetrius Poliorcetes, who is called ‘fond of a joke’ twice (φιλόγελως: 
F 12 and F 19); and F 37, which shows Philip II’s light-hearted reaction to 
a profession of undying hostility from an opponent.72 In this Phylarchus 
is more in line with the Classical Xenophon, as we shall see in Chapter 6, 
than with any of his Hellenistic peers. Phylarchus also seems to have had 
something to say about how to behave towards powerful rulers such as 
tyrants or Hellenistic kings. Three fragments concern flatterers (admittedly 
because they have been collected by Athenaeus for a passage of book 12 on 
flattery) and relate their ignominious behaviour in scornful detail, while 
other passages seem to give credit to subjects who behave with courage and 
parrhesia towards their rulers.73
An important question for Phylarchus as for the other fragmentary 
works of history is whether his moral code was enforced by divine inter-
vention.74 If the end of F 45 on the omens and destruction of the Sybarites 
69 On the allusiveness of Polybius’ criticism see Schepens (2005).
70 Drinking and sexual immoderation: F 6 = Ath. 10.438c–d, F 7 = Ath. 10.442c. Too 
keen interest in sex, too little in politics: F 21 = Ath. 13.609b–c. Cruelty to defeated enemies: 
F 53–4 = Polyb. 2.56–9.
71 Courage: F 59 = Plut. Cleom. 27–9; I assume that only the bare bones of this nar-
rative go back to Phylarchus. Endurance: F 67 = Diog. Laert. 9.12.115, which briefly gives 
Phylarchus as a source for the courage of Praÿlus of the Troad. 
72 F 11 = Ath. 6.58c, F 12 = Ath. 14.614d–615a, F 19 = Ath. 6.261b, F 31 = Ath. 6.261b, 
F 37 = Ath. 6.249c.
73 Flatterers: F 11= Ath. 6.58c, F 29 = Ath. 6.254f–255a, F 31 = Ath. 6.261b. Courageous 
subjects: F 22 = Phot. Lexicon s.v. tiara, F 37= Ath. 6.249c. Phylarchus also clearly had a 
fondness for stories about friendships between human beings and animals: man and dolphin 
F 26, Egyptians and asps F 27, man and horse F 49, boy and eagle F 61.
74 Africa (1960, 1961: 52–6) argues that Phylarchus does not display belief in any divine 
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does come from Phylarchus, this is clear evidence that divine punishment 
of impiety played a part in his work. One further fragment, F 70 (= Parth. 
Amat. narr. 25), certainly shows divine punishment of impiety. Here the 
mistress of one of the Phocian generals responsible for appropriating the 
Delphic treasure during the Sacred War asks for and receives Eriphyle’s 
necklace after the plundering of Delphi during the Sacred War. The end of 
the story is similar to the one related by Diodorus (see p. 90):
ἐπεὶ δὲ διεκομίσθη εἰς οἶκον τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, χρόνον μέν τινα ἐφόρει αὐτὸν ἡ 
γυνὴ μάλα περίπυστος οὖσα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραπλήσιον αὐτῇ πάθος συνέβη 
τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην γενομένων. ὁ γὰρ νεώτερος τῶν υἱῶν αὐτῆς μανεὶς 
τὴν οἰκίαν ὑφῆψε καὶ τήν τε μητέρα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κτημάτων κατέφλεξεν.
When the necklace was brought into the house of Ariston, the woman first 
wore it for a time and was highly celebrated; but then a disaster struck her 
much like those that had happened to Eriphyle. For the younger of her two 
sons went insane, set the house on fire, and burned his mother to death 
along with all their possessions. (Phylarchus, F 70 = Parth. Amat. narr. 25)
It is not explicitly said that being burned to death is punishment for the 
woman’s greed and impiety, or that the punishment is divinely sent. 
Nonetheless, superhuman causation is implied: firstly, the structure of 
the passage leads the reader to see a connection between the wearing of the 
necklace and the death caused by the son’s madness, indeed between the 
necklace and the son’s going mad in the first place, and that connection 
can hardly be human. Furthermore, the narrator is careful to point out that 
the fate which overtook Phaullus’ mistress was ‘much like those that had 
happened to Eriphyle’ (i.e. murder at the hands of her son). Such an ironi-
cal aptness of punishment is in Diodorus, and most probably in Timaeus, 
a sign of divine vengeance, and is likely to have been so also in Phylarchus. 
(It goes back to Herodotus, as we shall see in Chapter 4.) Unfortunately, 
we cannot be sure whether this was exactly how Phylarchus told the story: 
the reference to his Histories is given in a ‘manchette’, one of the mar-
ginal notes added to most of the stories told by Parthenius at the bottom 
of the page of the manuscript (in this case ἱστορεῖ Φύλαρχος, ‘Phylarchus 
says in his Histories’), which almost certainly go back not to the author, 
Parthenius, but to an ancient scribe or scholar. To what degree these man-
chettes signal correspondence between the story as told by Parthenius and 
the story as told by the work mentioned in the manchette is unclear, as all 
power, and that his general tendency to let the good be successful and the wicked suffer 
is a purely human mechanism. Contra Pédech (1989: 473), who argues that even though 
Phylarchus did not believe in the traditional Greek gods, he does show belief in a more 
general divine justice which rewards the good and punishes the wicked.
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of the works mentioned are now lost; they could essentially be references 
to places where the scholar has found similar but not identical versions of 
the same myth.75 However, since the other known versions of the story of 
the woman who received Eriphyle’s necklace all differ from the one told 
by Parthenius to some degree, it is tempting to believe that he reproduces 
Phylarchus’ version faithfully.76
Two further instances of divine punishment are found in fragments 
retelling obscure mythological stories, namely F 69 on Demiphon of 
Elaeusa, who sacrifices other men’s daughters to Apollo and is finally given 
the blood of his own daughters to drink, and F 71 on Dimoetes who causes 
his wife’s suicide and soon after falls in love with the dead body of another 
woman and kills himself. However, as Phylarchus’ Histories began in 272 
bc, these stories must have been told either in digressions or in speeches 
delivered by characters, which makes them impossible to interpret in their 
decontextualised and renarrated form.77 Nevertheless, they may be evi-
dence that divine justice played a part generally in the work.
It is difficult to say anything about the moralising techniques employed 
by Phylarchus on the basis of the fragments, as they have all been through 
some kind of adaptation process before being incorporated into the cov-
ertext. However, it is probably safe to assume that Phylarchus made use 
of moralising vignettes, often with speech, perhaps even soliloquies.78 It is 
possible that he resembled Xenophon in this regard, as in his enthusiasm 
for reproducing the wit of his characters; we shall see in Chapter 6 that 
Xenophon was fond of quoting witty or punchy sayings of characters 
about to die, and two of the Phylarchan fragments may well be remnants 
of such courageous-death vignettes (F 24 on Danae and F 67 on Praullus). 
On the testimony of Polybius (2.56 = F 53) and Plutarch (Them. 32.4 = F 
76), who both criticise Phylarchus for treating history like tragedy, we can 
assume that Phylarchus engaged in moralising through pathos, as we have 
seen that Diodorus and perhaps Timaeus and Duris did. From fragments 
such as F 41 on the extravagance of Alexander the Great and his compan-
ions it seems that Phylarchus also, like Diodorus and probably Timaeus 
and Duris, enjoyed detailed ekphraseis of luxury and decadence. A few 
75 For a discussion of ‘manchettes’ in Parthenius see Lightfoot (1999: ad loc., 246–56 
with bibliography).
76 Other versions: Diod. Sic. 16.64.2, Plut. Mor. 553e, Ath. 6.232d = FGrH 70 F 96, Ath. 
13.605a–d = FGrH 115 F 248.
77 F 69 = Hyg. Poet. astr. II 40, F 71 = Parth. Amat. narr. 31.
78 Pédech (1989: 460–2) notes that Phylarchus’ penchant for pathetic direct speech 
uttered by characters with no one to hear them, such as Ptolemy here and Danae in F 24, is 
a technique used in tragedy. This is true, if the utterances are indeed soliloquies: we cannot 
know for certain that the original vignettes did not feature an audience for and perhaps even 
respondents to the exclamations.
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fragments seem like moralising introductions (F 20) or conclusions (end 
of F 69), but it is impossible to be sure that these were employed in that 
capacity in the original Histories.
agaTharchides of cnidus (FGrH 86)
Agatharchides of Cnidus lived from c. 215 to some point after 145 bc and 
was thus a contemporary of Polybius. The fragments of his works have 
traditionally been thought to come from three different outputs: On Asia 
(Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν), On Europe (Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην) and On the Red 
Sea (Περὶ τὰς Ἐρύθρας Θαλάσσης), the former two histories, the last one 
either a geography or a history.79 Only twenty-two fragments, primarily 
preserved by Athenaeus, are said to come from On Asia and On Europe. 
On the Red Sea has fared rather better. Codex 250 of the Bibliotheke of the 
Byzantine patriarch Photius reproduces a long fragment (fifty-five pages in 
the Belles Lettres edition) partly of book 1, partly of book 5. The similarity 
between the extracts from book 5 and Diodorus 3.12–48 as well as Strabo 
16.4.5–20 makes it possible to identify Agatharchides as the source of these 
later works, although in the case of Strabo through an intermediary source, 
probably Artemidorus of Ephesus.80 Of these three covertexts, Photius is the 
one that stays the closest to the original: as long ago as 1955, Palm showed 
that Photius had copied long stretches of Agatharchides verbatim and had 
abbreviated the text by leaving out passages rather than by summarising.81 
Diodorus’ version is fuller, but has changed both the style and some of the 
emphasis of Agatharchides’ text. The fact that Strabo’s version is not based 
directly on Agatharchides makes it less useful for our purposes.82
The title On the Red Sea and, indeed, the contents of the long passage 
from book 5, which deals with the geography, flora, fauna and ethnog-
raphy of the regions on either side of the Red Sea, give the impression 
of a work of geography and ethnography rather than history. However, 
both Photius and Diodorus call Agatharchides a historian,83 and Burstein 
79 T 2 (= Phot. Bibl. cod. 213); for this traditional interpretation of Agatharchides’ 
outputs see Jacoby (1926b: 150–1), Fraser (1972: I, 516 with notes II, 744–5), Burstein (1989, 
n.d.), and Sacks (2003).
80 Schwartz (1893), Fraser (1972: I, 539 with II, 773 n. 160), Burstein (1989). This has 
made some scholars read and print Diod. Sic. 3.12–48 as Agatharchides (Müller 1855, Woelk 
1966) despite the fact that Diodorus clearly changed the style as well as some of the points of 
Agatharchides’ text; see Palm (1955) and Burstein (1989).
81 Palm (1955: 16–26).
82 For a fuller discussion of the difference between the three covertexts see Burstein 
(1989: 36–9).
83 ἀνεγνώσθη ᾽Αγαθαρχίδου ῾Ιστορικόν: Phot. Bibl. cod. 213, BNJ 86 T 2; ὥς φησιν 
‘Αγαθαρχίδης ὁ Κνίδιος ἱστοριογράφος: Diod. Sic. 3.18.4.
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and Marcotte have both argued convincingly that the work was primarily 
a work of history.84 Marcotte, followed by Ameling, has further argued 
that On the Red Sea was not a separate work at all, but that it formed the 
introductory books to On Asia, which in its turn formed the preamble to 
On Europe, constituting one overall work of forty-nine books.85 This is 
an attractive hypothesis, but ultimately we have too little evidence to be 
certain. For the purposes of the present study it is of no great consequence 
whether the remaining fragments come from one, two or three works, as 
long as we can assume that they were all works of history. In this respect 
it is telling that Photius, when praising Agatharchides for his grand and 
imaginative style, puts him on a par with Thucydides (T 1). Furthermore, 
the extant fragments of On the Red Sea would look perfectly congruous in 
a work of history, provided it included geography and ethnography on the 
scale of Herodotus and Diodorus. Jacoby, however, mainly relegated the 
long fragment of book 5 to his planned, but never realised, volume V about 
geography, and only printed twelve passages from it in his volume on uni-
versal history.
For the present study, the text has been accessed in the Belles Lettres 
edition of Photius and the Loeb edition of Diodorus. All numbers referring 
to the long Agatharchides fragment in Photius and Diodorus are the ones 
used by Burstein (1989), who helpfully prints the two texts side by side. 
They often correspond to the chapter numbers of Photius in the Belles 
Lettres edition; when they do not, this will be noted. When confusion is 
possible between the FGrH fragments and passages preserved in Photius 
and/or Diodorus, the former will be labelled ‘FGrH’, the latter ‘Bur.’.
Of the twenty-two fragments of On Asia and On Europe, it is striking 
that no fewer than twelve are explicitly moralising,86 of which eight are 
concerned with some form of tryphe or lack of moderation. This large 
proportion of moralising and the heavy emphasis on tryphe are no doubt 
due to the fact that thirteen of the twenty-two fragments are preserved 
by Athenaeus. However, in the continuous passage of On the Red Sea 
from Photius another seven instances of moralising are found on a variety 
of themes; some of these instances are lengthy, which shows that moral 
didacticism did play a part, perhaps even a central one, in Agatharchides’ 
84 Scholarship on Agatharchides is scarce. The best overall treatments are Woelk (1966), 
Fraser (1972: 539–50), Strasburger (1982 [1966]: 1006–10) and Burstein (1989, n.d.). Marcotte 
(2001) and Ameling (2008) provide an interesting and partially convincing corrective to the 
traditional understanding of his works, but Strasburger is the one whose reading comes the 
closest to my own, as shall become clear in the following.
85 Burstein (1989: 22–4), Marcotte (2001) and Ameling (2008).
86 F 2 = Ath. 4.155c–d, F 3 = Ath. 12.539b–d, F 6 = Ath. 12.527b–c, F 7 = Ath. 12.550b–
c, F 10 = Ath. 12.550c–d, F 11 = Ath. 12.550c–e, F 12 = Ath. 4.168d, F 13 = Ath. 6.251f, F 14 
= Ath. 12.528a, F 16 = Ath. 12.527f., F20a = Joseph, Ap.1.205–11 , F20b = Joseph, AJ 12.5.
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work.87 The unusual preservation of such a long passage of an otherwise 
lost work means that we have a better idea of Agatharchides’ style and the 
flavour of his work than is the case for the other historiographers treated 
in this chapter. Nonetheless, we shall begin with the fragments collected in 
the FGrH.
Let us begin with the tryphe passages. As with the tryphe fragments of 
Timaeus, Duris and Phylarchus, it is impossible to say with certainty how 
much comes from Agatharchides and how much is Athenaeus’ interpretation 
and rewriting. Thus F 2 and F 3 give Agatharchides’ On Asia as the source 
for information about the extravagant dining habits of Alexander’s com-
panions (or his Successors),88 labelling it ‘excessive luxury’ (ὑπερβαλλούσῃ 
τρυφῇ), a phrase no doubt attached by Athenaeus.89 However, the fact 
that these details – gold wrappers for dried fruit thrown away with the 
rubbish, gold studs on footwear, purple rugs for walk-and-talk meetings – 
were in Agatharchides’ work in the first place is interesting: although not 
impossible, it is hard to imagine that he reported them with approval; more 
probably they were either narrated in a scandalised tone of voice or had 
pejorative phrases attached, maybe even explicit moralising. In two cases a 
fragment shows disastrous consequences resulting from extravagant living: 
F 7 states that Magas, tyrant of Cyrene, died from obesity ‘because of 
bodily inactivity and the amount of food he ate’ (δι᾽ ἀργίαν σώματος καὶ 
τῷ προσφέρεσθαι πλῆθος τροφῆς); and F 14 gives Agatharchides as the 
authority for the fact that the inexperience of the Zacynthians in war 
(leading to their capture by Philip V)90 was due to their prosperity, wealth 
and luxurious living. Burstein argues that this causal connection was made 
by Athenaeus, not Agatharchides, which is possible, but it looks more as if 
Athenaeus is abbreviating a longer account in Agatharchides with the same 
moral point:
ἐν δὲ τῇ λ̄ᾱ Ζακυνθίους φησὶν ἀπείρους εἶναι πολέμου διὰ τὸ ἐν εὐπορίαι καὶ 
πλούτῳ τρυφῶντας ἐθίζεσθαι.
And he says in the thirty-first book that the Zacynthians were inexperienced 
in war because they were used to luxurious living in prosperity and wealth. 
(Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 14 = Ath. 12.528a)
Finally, F 16 purports to quote Agatharchides verbatim as saying 
that the Arycandeis of Lycia joined Antiochus III (or his general 
87 F 7 and F 11–18 from book 1; F 21, F 24–9, F 49, F 100a, F 103a from book 5.
88 See Burstein (n.d.: ad F 3).
89 As demonstrated by Gorman and Gorman (2007); see discussion above.
90 See Burstein (n.d.: ad loc.) for the probable historical context.
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Mithridates)91 against the Romans because they had been led into debt 
by ‘their profligate and extravagant lifestyle’ (τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσωτίαν 
καὶ πολυτέλειαν). In this last passage, the causal connection was certainly 
in Agatharchides, and we have a clear instance of morally evaluative 
vocabulary:
᾽Αγαθαρχίδης δ᾽ ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Εὐρωπιακῶν ‘᾽Αρυκανδεῖς’ 
φησί ‘Λυκίας ὅμοροι ὄντες Λιμυρεῦσι διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσωτίαν 
καὶ πολυτέλειαν κατάχρεοι γενόμενοι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀργίαν καὶ φιληδονίαν 
ἀδυνατοῦντες ἀποδοῦναι τὰ δάνεια προσέκλιναν ταῖς Μιθριδάτου ἐλπίσιν 
ἆθλον ἕξειν νομίσαντες χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς.’
Agatharchides says in the thirty-fifth book of his On Europe: ‘The 
Arycandeis of Lycia, who were neighbours of the Limyrians, had come into 
debt because of their profligate and extravagant lifestyle, and because of 
their indolence and addiction to pleasure they were unable to pay back their 
loans, so they joined in the hopes of Mithridates, thinking that they would 
win the cancellation of their debts as a prize.’ (Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 16 
= Ath. 12.35.527f)
A further two fragments refer to Agatharchides for information about the 
ignominy of being fat in Sparta (F 10 and F 11, the latter apparently from 
a speech), and one more mentions Spartan punishment for immoderation 
(ἀσωτία: F 12).92 Although all of these fragments are found in Athenaeus, 
whose interest in tryphe we have discussed above, the conclusion seems 
unavoidable that the theme of immoderation and its negative consequences 
played some part in Agatharchides.
This theory is supported by the fact that moderation and immoderation 
are also a theme in the long ethnographic passage from book 5 preserved 
by Photius and Diodorus. Here, the least civilised of all people, the ‘Fish-
eaters’ who do not use tools and do not have a language, are also lacking 
in civilised virtues such as moderation. Whenever they have food, they eat 
‘not according to any weight or measure, but only to each person’s desire 
and gratification’ (οὐ πρὸς μέτρον καὶ σταθμόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου 
βούλησιν καὶ χάριν: F 34a and very similar phrase in F 34b).93 And when the 
narrative reaches the wealthy Sabaeans of South Arabia, their extravagant 
riches are described in great detail, then rounded off with the devastatingly 
moralising conclusion:
Ει δὲ μὴ πόρρω διεστηκυῖαν τὴν οἴκησιν κατεῖχον τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τόπον 
τὰς δυνάμεις στρεφόντων, οἰκονόμοι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἂν ὑπῆρχον οἱ κύριοι 
91 See Burstein (n.d.: ad loc.) for the probable historical context.
92 F 10 = Ath. 12.550c–d, F 11 = Ath. 12.550c–e, F 12 = Ath. 4.168d.
93 F 34a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250.34 459a; F 34b = Diod. Sic. 3.16.1–4.
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τῶν ἰδίων ἄθλων, τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας ἀδυνατοῦσης τὸ ἐλεύθερον πλείω χρόνον 
διατηρεῖν.
If they did not have their home so far from those who deploy their forces 
into every area, those who are masters of their own prizes would be the 
stewards of others’ because laziness is unable to guard freedom for long. 
(Agatharchides, F 104a (Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 102 l. 42–5)
This is a message with which especially Polybius, but also Diodorus, would 
agree. Likewise, the generalising moral conclusion to F 101a and b might 
equally well have been phrased by either of these authors: ‘Thus, any 
natural advantage managed with moderation and order promotes life, 
but if deprived of due measure and proportion, it becomes a burdensome 
possession’ (Ούτως ἄπαν ἐπίτευγμα μεσότητι μὲν καὶ τάξει κυβερνώμενον 
παραπέμπει τὸν βίον, συμμετρίας δὲ καὶ καιροῦ στερηθὲν οὐκ ἔχει την κτῆσιν 
ὀνησιφόρον).94 In Agatharchides, however, this message of moderation is 
connected with another core message which is less conspicuous in Polybius 
and Diodorus, namely that of virtues arising from necessity: the nomadic 
Troglodytes, who fight fierce battles over pasture, and whose funeral rites 
are ‘intelligently’ (νουνεχῶς) conceived, are able to conquer the desire for 
sleep by practice out of necessity (τῆς μελέτης διὰ τἀναγκαῖον τὴν φύσιν 
νικώσης: F 64), some of the Fish-eaters have been taught how to make shel-
ters out of whale skeletons by ‘a need arising from nature’ (τῆς κατὰ φύσιν 
χρείας: F 43b), and the otherwise luxurious Sabaeans have been taught to 
make boats by the tide (διδασκούσης τὴν χρείαν τῆς ἀναπώτιδος καίπερ ἐν 
τρυφῇ καταγινομένους: F 103a).95
But we can go further. The long, ethnographic fragment preserved by 
Photius and Diodorus begins with the least civilised people of all, the 
Fish-eaters and other peoples who are barely more advanced than animals 
(they do not use fire and do not have a language), but who live in a state 
of peace with each other and harmony with nature, without knowledge 
of what is morally good or bad (F 30–52).96 It then proceeds through 
peoples of increased degrees of civilisation, who use increasingly complex 
tools and cooking methods and fight each other with weapons (F 53–64), 
through those who mine gemstones (F 84), until it gets to the extravagantly 
94 F 101a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 99 l. 37–9; F 101b = Diod. Sic. 3.47.3.
95 F 64a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 63 l. 17–18; F 64b = Diod. Sic. 3.32.2–6; F 43b = Diod. 
Sic. 3.19.1–9; F 103a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 101 l. 24–5. See also F 53b (end). The idea seems 
to come from or be shared with the Stoics.
96 For the ‘harmony with nature’ theme see especially F 38b = Diod. Sic. 3.17.-3–4, 
F 40b = Diod. Sic. 3.18.1–2 and F 49 = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 451b. Lack of knowledge of 
the morally good and bad: αἰσχρῶν δὲ καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἰσφερόμενοι ἔννοιαν 
(F 31a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 449b and F 31b = Diod. Sic. 3.15.1–2). Some of these ‘peoples’ 
are almost certainly apes (F 52).
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wealthy Sabaeans, whose civilisation has tipped over into degeneration 
(F 99–106).97 This structure seems to carry a moral-didactic message: in 
order to live like a good human being one needs a certain amount of civi-
lisation and a healthy dose of moderation and self-discipline, but not too 
much wealth, or slackness and effeminacy (F 103a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 
101) are bound to follow.
Another theme that runs through the long fragment of Agatharchides’ 
book 5 is suffering, human and animal. This was already singled out as a 
characteristic of his work by Strasburger, who emphasised Agatharchides’ 
broadening of the historiographical horizon to encompass the suffering 
of the unnamed and socially marginal alongside that of famous generals 
and well-known Greek peoples, and saw it as a positive development.98 
For most other scholars it has been a sign that Agatharchides was a dis-
reputable representative of the school of ‘tragic history’ influenced by the 
Peripatetics.99 We see this feature of On the Red Sea in the description of 
the conditions of the convicts working the gold mines of Nubia (F 22–9 
[Bur.]), but it is also a prominent theme of the long descriptions of ele-
phant hunting (F 54 [Bur.]), of dying from Guinea-worm infestation (F 59 
[Bur.])100 and of the dangers of sailing on board an elephant transport ship 
(F 85 [Bur.]).101 I would argue that these passages, like the pathetic narra-
tives of the fall of cities in Diodorus (and possibly Duris and Phylarchus), 
have a didactic point. Interestingly, the first few pages of Photius’ summary 
of On the Red Sea book 5 supports such an interpretation (F 21 [Bur.] = 
Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 21). Here, Agatharchides discusses exactly the appro-
priate way to talk about the destruction of a city. He criticises some spe-
cific expressions used by certain orators and historians as inappropriate 
because they are more concerned with creating a novel or clever turn of 
phrase than with how to describe the event in a vivid manner (διὰ τῆς 
ἐναργείας) or with pity for the sufferers (τοὺς οἴκτους). This focus on vivid-
ness in description (enargeia) and its relation to the provoking of pity in the 
 97 This structure has been demonstrated in detail by Ameling (2008), who argues that 
Agatharchides meant it as an analogy for the origins of mankind; I cannot see the evidence 
for this. Marcotte (2001: 425–35) argues in detail for a strictly geographical structure.
 98 Strasburger (1982 [1966]: 1006–10). 
 99 Schwartz (1893), Woelk (1966) (both without using this expression), and Fraser 
(1972: 539–50). Burstein (1989) agrees that Agatharchides was influenced by the Peripatetics, 
but does not discuss tragic history. Contra Santoni (2001), who argues that Agatharchides 
criticised this type of historiography. For the flawed concept of ‘tragic history’, see above, 
pp. 85 and 137.
100 For the identification of the affliction with Guinea-worm infestation see Burstein 
(1989: ad loc.).
101 F 22–9 = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 22–9 and Diod. Sic. 2.12.1–14.5; F 54a = Phot. Bibl. 
cod. 250 53; F 54b = Diod. Sic. 3.26.1–4; F 59a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 58; F 59b = Diod. Sic. 
3.29.1–7; F 85a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 83; F 85b = Diod. Sic. 3.40.1–9. 
154 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
reader is extremely  interesting, not least because it goes against Polybius’ 
guidelines for how to write good history (Polyb. 2.56–68), which are much 
better known and have long been considered to represent the general view 
of ‘good’ or ‘sober’ ancient historiographers. Although Marincola (2003) 
has clearly demonstrated that Polybius is not in this passage denying pity 
and anger a place in historiography (the historiographer simply has to 
make sure that they are felt by his readers for the right people), it is clear 
from Polybius’ contempt for Phylarchus’ pathetic narratives of suffering 
that the former believes such scenes have no place in historiography, and 
in fact (the extant parts of) his work contain(s) none.102 In contrast with 
Polybius, Agatharchides believes that the good historiographer has a duty 
to the victims to describe their sufferings in vivid detail; he just wants 
such descriptions to be respectfully centred on the victims and free of the 
kind of wordplay that draws more attention to the author than to his 
subject. This is clear from a passage a bit further on in the fragment where 
Agatharchides gives an example of what he considers the appropriate way 
of describing the sack of a city, from Demosthenes:
‘Τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐξώρυξεν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων, ὥστε μηδὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑστίαις 
καταλιπεῖν τὴν τέφραν, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν ἡγησαμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος 
ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διένειμε.’ Πικρῶς καὶ σαφῶς καὶ βραχέως 
ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν εἰληφὼς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὅμως τῆς διδασκούσης τὸ 
πρᾶγμα ἐναργείας οὐκ ἐπελάθετο.
‘He prised the city up from its foundations so as not to leave even ashes 
on the hearths, and he divided up the children and wives of those who 
had been the leaders of the Greeks among the tents of the barbarians.’ 
Although he sharply, clearly and concisely stripped each image of exagger-
ation, he did not forget the vividness that teaches the essence of the event. 
(Agatharchides, F 21(Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 21 l. 30–6; translation 
modified from Burstein)
The quoted description of the brutality of this sacking of a city103 is both 
vivid and pathetic, and contains an explicit reference to the sexual abuse 
of the captured women and children that is reminiscent of Diodorus’ 
descriptions of the taking of cities. Nevertheless, Agatharchides praises 
Demosthenes for speaking ‘sharply, clearly and concisely’, for not exagger-
ating, and for not forgetting ‘the vividness that teaches the essence of the 
event (τῆς διδασκούσης τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐναργείας). This final phrase is especially 
102 Polybius’ sneering criticism of narratives of pathetic suffering in historiography is at 
Polyb. 2.56.7–10.
103 The quotation is not from any of Demosthenes’ preserved speeches, so we cannot be 
certain what city he is talking about, but if Agatharchides is right that he is speaking about 
Alexander the Great, it must be Thebes. 
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interesting for the purposes of the present study: Agatharchides believes 
that the mimetic vividness of the description makes it didactic. So what is 
the reader supposed to learn from it?
In Chapter 2, I argued that Diodorus’ purpose with his pathetic descrip-
tions was to teach a lesson about the changeability of human fortunes and 
human vulnerability and thereby lead the reader to a recognition of his 
own frailty and propensity for suffering, which should in turn lead him 
to avoid cruelty against those in his power. In Agatharchides’ passages 
on human suffering the mutability of fortune does not play a prominent 
role: tyche is mentioned only once, and in the sense of the ‘allotted fate’ of 
the Nubian miners rather than a changeable force.104 It seems rather that 
Agatharchides skipped this step and portrayed human suffering as a purely 
human affair: caused by human beings, suffered by human beings. What 
seems to have been radically new in his work is his instalment in the reader 
of pity for marginalised groups such as primitive non-Greek peoples, con-
victed criminals, and various labourers in the service of the Ptolemies.
Finally, we need to ask the question we have asked of the other fragmen-
tary works of historiography: is there any sign of divine justice or other 
superhuman validation of a certain moral value-system? The short answer 
is no. Neither any of the fragments of On Europe and On Asia nor the 
sections from On the Red Sea found in Photius and Diodorus contain any 
examples of divine justice. The closest we get is the narrator expressing his 
satisfaction at pirates suffering their ‘deserved punishment’ (προσηκόντως 
ἐκολάσθησαν) in F 90b (Bur.),105 but this is nothing more than use of eval-
uative vocabulary and does not imply that a superhuman power inflicts the 
punishment. Furthermore, one set of fragments shows that Agatharchides 
was deeply critical of certain types of religious behaviour: in F 20a and b 
(FGrH), Josephus says that Agatharchides mocked Stratonice (daughter of 
Antiochus I of Syria, wife of Demetrius II of Macedon)106 for her supersti-
tion in obeying a dream that leads to her death, and then went on to ridi-
cule the Jews for not defending themselves when Jerusalem was attacked 
by Ptolemy on the Sabbath. Josephus quotes the conclusion that turns this 
criticism into an explicitly didactic paradeigma:
τὸ δὲ συμβὰν πλὴν ἐκείνων τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δεδίδαχε τηνικαῦτα φυγεῖν 
εἰς ἐνύπνια καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ νόμου παραδεδομένην ὑπόνοιαν, ἡνίκα ἂν τοῖς 
ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς περὶ τῶν διαπορουμένων ἐξασθενήσωσιν.
104 Οὗτοι πάντες οἱ τὸν εἰρημένον τῆς τύχης κλῆρον ὑπελθόντες ποθεινότερον ἔχουσι τοῦ 
βίου τὸν θάνατον (F 26b end [Bur.]).
105 = Diod. Sic. 3.43.5.
106 See Burstein (n.d.: ad loc.) for the historical context.
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This event has taught everyone except those people [i.e. the Jews] only to 
take refuge in dreams and inherited notions about [religious] law when 
human reasoning about situations of great uncertainty falls completely 
short. (Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 20a = Joseph Ap. 1.211)
This is tantalisingly similar to Polybius’ statement about when it is appro-
priate to pray to the gods for answers, and for the historian to fall back 
on tyche as an explanation of events (Polyb. 36.17.2–4). Although he and 
Agatharchides disagreed on the way to deal with human suffering in a 
historical narrative, they seem to have shared a certain rationalising narra-
torial persona, which rejects many traditional ways of engaging with reli-
gion and sees it only as a last resort. This fits nicely with F 7–8 of Photius’ 
extract from book 1 of On the Red Sea, which is a lengthy harangue against 
belief in traditional myths, based on rational arguments and kept in a sar-
castic tone. A small sample is enough to convey the point:
Τῶν δὲ μετηλλαχότων τὸν βίον ἐπὶ σχολῆς πρὸς Ὀδυσσέα διεξέρχεσθαι 
παντοδαπῆ ἀδολεσχίαν, ἐκ τῆς ἀμόρφου σκιᾶς τὸ τῆς ὄψεως γινώσκοντα 
ἰδίωμα, καὶ τοὺς μέν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν οὐ κοιλίας, οὐ βρόγχους ἔχοντας, 
ἑτέρους δὲ φοβεῖσθαι τὸν σίδηρον οὐκέτι δυναμένους τρωθῆναι, τινὰς δὲ 
πέτρον κυλίειν τῶν σωμάτων πάλαι κατακεκαυμένων, ἄλλους δὲ δικάζειν 
ἑτέροις τεθνηκόσιν ἀδικήματος οὐδενὸς ὑπάρχοντος·
Dead people leisurely carried on all sorts of silly conversations with 
Odysseus, who recognised individual shapes from the formless shadow; and 
some of them drank although they had no stomachs and gullets; and others 
feared his sword although they no longer could be wounded; and others 
were rolling a stone although their bodies long ago had been cremated; 
and others judged other dead persons although no crime had taken place. 
(Agatharchides, On the Red Sea F 7 = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 443b; translation 
modified from Burstein)
This is a ruthlessly logical approach to ancient myths, expressed in a 
manner designed to amuse and shock the reader in equal measure. It could 
not be more different from Diodorus’ pious narratives of gods and dem-
igods as culture heroes, and one suspects that it would be too coarse for 
Polybius’ sensibilities.107
If the gods are absent from Agatharchides’ narrative, it looks as though 
tyche may have played a part. It shows up five times as seemingly a histori-
cal agent: in F 41a and b of On the Red Sea the Fish-eaters ‘endure without 
complaint what fortune has assigned to them from the beginning’, and in 
F 103 of the same work the narrator comments on the fact that an Arabian 
people have no firewood, and so are compelled to burn expensive spices, 
107 For a discussion of this aspect of Agatharchides’ work see Santoni (2001).
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with the remark that ‘so unequally has tyche distributed her goods, giving 
to some a scarce amount of the good things and to others plenty’ (οὕτως 
ἀνίσως τὰ αὑτῆς ἡ τύχη μεμέρικε, τοῖς μὲν σπάνιν τῶν σπουδαίων τοῖς δὲ 
πλῆθος διδοῦσα = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 459a).108 F 17 (Bur.) of On the Red 
Sea is a third example of tyche as historical agent, but obviously comes 
from a speech, the context of which is now lost, which means that we 
cannot know how the reader was meant to respond to it.
The fourth passage that mentions tyche is F 100a of On the Red Sea, 
which describes a deadly snake found exclusively in the precious incense 
forests of Arabia Felix:
οἱονεὶ φθονούσης τοῖς ἁδροῖς ἐπιτεύγμασι τῆς τύχης καὶ παραπλεκούσης 
τἀγαθῷ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὅπως μηδεὶς εἰς τέλος ἐξυβρίζων τιτανῶδες καὶ 
κατεγνωκὸς τοῦ θείου τὸ φρόνημα λαμβάνῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐτυχούντων, 
παιδεύηται δὲ τῇ παραθέσει καὶ μνήμῃ τῶν ἐναντίων.
as if tyche was jealous of abundant prosperity and mixes the good with the 
harmful in order that no one should show complete insolence in a titanic 
manner and, disrespectful of the god, should become arrogant in their good 
fortune, but that they should be educated in the opposite of this behaviour 
by this juxtaposition and reminder. (Agatharchides, On the Red Sea F 100a 
(Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 98.458b)
The idea of a superhuman power jealous of human success is reminiscent 
of Archaic Greek thought as well as Herodotus, as we shall remind our-
selves in the next chapter; but the use of οἱονεὶ, ‘as if’, turns the whole 
statement into a simile, something that is typical of most of the colourful 
tyche passages in Polybius. It is hard to gauge how seriously to take the 
passage. On the one hand, οἱονεὶ creates distance, and the adverb τιτανῶδες 
(‘in a titanic manner’), used by the same narrator who has spent a large 
part of his introductory book ridiculing traditional mythology, can only 
be tongue in cheek. On the other hand, Agatharchides could only compose 
this simile because the presence of the snakes in the incense forests struck 
him as a paradoxical juxtaposition of good and evil, which he felt the need 
to comment on. It is safest to assume that he does not intend his reader 
here to understand tyche as a divine power, but that he does want us to 
notice the paradox and pause to realise that nothing in life is perfect; and 
this is a moral lesson on its own. This thought occurs also in F 91a, which 
deals with another area of Arabia which is infested with wild beasts.109 But 
108 Woelk (1966: 247) argues that Agatharchides has exaggerated the need to burn spices 
in order to create an example of tryphe.
109 Τούτοις δὲ τοῖς εὐκληρήμασιν ἀντικείμενον παραπέπλεκται κακόν (F 91a = Phot. Bibl. 
cod. 250 457b).
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however we interpret tyche in the passage, the message that one should stay 
humble in good fortune echoes Polybius and Diodorus.
The fact that fortune in Agatharchides seems to have been sometimes 
randomly unequal (F 103) and at other times consciously jealous (F 100a) 
points to an inconsistency in the use of the concept akin to the one found 
in Polybius.110 Ultimately, tyche, if it was presented as a real superhuman 
power and not simply used for rhetorical effect, does not seem to rule the 
world of Agatharchides, but rather to have sporadic influence.
In conclusion, Agatharchides seems to have promoted the staple virtues 
of moderation and self-discipline, but also less common ones such as pity 
and solidarity with suffering. We have no examples of what an exemplary 
good or bad man looked like in his work, but it does seem as if his narrative 
world was ruled by human rather than divine forces, perhaps with the dest-
abilising factor of tyche thrown in. As for moralising techniques, the long 
text preserved by Photius and Diodorus allows us to say for certain that 
Agatharchides used evaluative phrasing and moralising conclusions fre-
quently, but that his most striking technique is moralising through pathos.
Posidonius of aPamea (FGrH 87)
Posidonius lived c. 135–45 bc and so was Diodorus’ older contemporary. 
He was a renowned Stoic philosopher who taught Cicero, and an extremely 
prolific writer: more than thirty titles of works by him are known, in fields 
as diverse as astronomy, zoology, ethics and history. The Histories was 
in fifty-two books; it took over where Polybius had left off and covered 
the time from 146 bc to probably the mid-80s.111 It was probably a uni-
versal history and was in antiquity recognised as a work springing from 
Posidonius’ Stoic ethics, that is, a work of explicitly moral history.112 This 
understanding of the work was probably based on Posidonius’ now lost 
preface, and it is a great shame that we do not have an articulation of his 
moral-didactic programme in his own words.113 Scholars of the fragments 
generally agree that Posidonius regarded history as an auxiliary discipline 
to philosophy, and intended his Histories both to show the organic unity 
of the world and to present moral paradeigmata in accordance with his 
110 The fact that tyche in F 103 is said to act ‘unequally’ has led Fraser (1972: 539–50) to 
interpret it as the Peripatetic tyche. The interpretation offered in the present study is more in 
agreement with Burstein (1989: 51 n. 2). For tyche in Polybius see Hau (2011).
111 Malitz (1983: esp. 70–1), Kidd (1999, 2003), Dowden (n.d.). Jacoby (1926b: 156–7) 
and Laffranque (1964: 118–22) agree on the start date, but argue that the terminus for the 
work was the mid-90s.
112 Ath. 4.151e = T 12a.
113 See Kidd (1989: 39).
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Stoic teachings.114 It should be clear from our discussions of Polybius and 
the fragments of Posidonius’ other predecessors that this did not mean 
doing violence to the genre of historiography and bending it into a new 
and contorted shape; rather it meant continuing the tradition of already 
moral-didactic historiography, but with a more explicit commitment to 
one particular school of philosophy than had been the case in any of his 
predecessors.
The total number of fragments in FGrH (which includes both the frag-
ments assumed to come from the Histories and an ethnographical work, On 
the Ocean) is 123, in BNJ 124. Of these, the final sixteen were relegated to 
Jacoby’s Anhang as they do not mention Posidonius by name, and they will 
largely remain unmentioned here. Edelstein and Kidd, who have collected 
all the fragments of Posidonius across genres, include four historical frag-
ments which are not in FGrH or BNJ.115 One of these, labelled F 284, will 
be discussed below. By far the most prominent covertexts for Posidonius 
are Strabo (fifty fragments) and Athenaeus (thirty-nine fragments). Third 
is Plutarch with eight fragments. It is therefore not surprising that most of 
the moralising fragments of Posidonius are focused on the evils of wealth 
and luxurious living and the virtue of moderation. Clarke has argued con-
vincingly that Athenaeus and Posidonius shared many interests, including 
luxury and slavery, and that Athenaeus used references to Posidonius to 
make himself look like a more serious philosopher. It was therefore in 
Athenaeus’ best interest to make it look as if he and Posidonius agreed on 
such issues even if they did not.116 The upside of this is that Athenaeus often 
purports to quote Posidonius verbatim, and, if nothing else, these quota-
tions show that Posidonius was sharply critical of luxurious habits.117 An 
example is this passage relating to the outbreak of the Sicilian Slave Revolt:
Ποσειδώνιος δ΄ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Ἰστοριῶν περὶ Δαμοφίλου λέγων τοῦ 
Σικελιώτου, δι΄ ὅν ὁ δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεμος, ὅτι τρυφῆς ἦν οἰκεῖος, 
γράφει καὶ ταῦτα· τρυφῆς οὖν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ κακουργίας, διὰ μὲν τῆς χώρας 
τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας περιαγόμενος καὶ ἵππους καὶ θεράποντας ὡραίους καὶ 
παραδρομὴν ἀνάγωγον κολάκων τε καὶ παίδων στρατιωτικῶν. ὕστερον δὲ 
πανοικίᾳ ἐφυβρίστως κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν περιυβρισθείς.
114 Laffranque (1964), Malitz (1983), Kidd (1999, 2003), Dowden (n.d.). Contra Jacoby 
(1926b: 160–1), who argues obscurely that the work was full of ‘ethical reflections’ without 
being moralising in nature. Laffranque has argued that Posidonius’ moralising partly took 
place on the macro-level of the structure of the work, which she sees as a form of objectivity.
115 Edelstein and Kidd (1972). Their decision is explained on p. xxii with n. 2 and 3.
116 Clarke (2007).
117 Fragments on luxury and wealth: F 1, F 6, F 7, F 9a and b, F 10, F 11, F 13, F 14, F 18a, 
b and c, F 20, F 21a and b, F 25, F 26, F 27, F 36 (among other topics), F 47, F 51, F 68, F 108 
(among other topics). 
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Posidonius, speaking in the eighth book of his Histories about Damophilus 
the Sicilian, because of whom the slave war broke out, says that he was 
addicted to luxury and writes also this: ‘He was a slave to luxury and 
villainy, driving four-wheeled coaches through the land accompanied by 
horses and young, lovely servants, a swarm of flatterers and soldier-like 
slaves. But later, along with his whole family, he met an ignominious end 
abused by his household slaves.’ (Posidonius, F 7 = Ath. 12.542b)
This is a piece of moralising effected by evaluative phrasing of a particu-
larly scathing kind. Calling Damophilus a slave to decadence and vice is 
not just derogatory, but also darkly ironic in this narrative of the inception 
of the Sicilian Slave Revolt, particularly as his flatterers and the slaves who 
are going to rise up against him are called soldier-like. The concluding 
line reads like a compression of a longer Posidonian narrative, probably 
reproduced more or less closely by Diodorus 34/35.2.12–13 (F 108). The 
scornful description of Damophilus' elaborate travelling style will then 
have functioned in the original Histories as the depiction of success which 
preceded his peripeteia, and there was almost certainly a causal connection 
between his arrogance and his downfall (which were both symbolic of the 
condition and fate of his entire society, to judge from F 108 = Diod. Sic. 
34/35.2.12–13).
Numerous other fragments preserve only the detailed, and often derog-
atory, descriptions of extravagant lifestyles or parties, and may or may 
not originally have functioned as signals of impending disaster.118 Thus 
F 9a on the banquets of Antiochus VII Sidetes, F 10 on the public wealth 
of Syria, and F 21 a and b (= Ath. 12.540a–b and 5.210e) on the lavishness 
of Antiochus VIII Grypus’ entertainment together point to a discourse on 
the decadence of Syria in the second century bc, which may well have been 
connected with its loss of territory to the Parthians and descent into civil 
war.119 This interpretation is supported by F 11, which records a saying 
of Arsaces VI Mithridates of Parthia over the dead body of his enemy 
Antiochus Sidetes – no doubt originally part of a moralising vignette – 
attributing his military defeat to heavy drinking and overconfidence.120 It 
is also, perhaps, revealing that none of the Posidonian fragments betray 
118 In addition to those discussed in the main text: F 1 on the feasting habits of the 
Romans and Tyrrhenians (probably combined from two different passages in the Histories; 
see Kidd 1999: ad loc.); F 13 on the entertainment of Himerus, tyrant of Babylon and 
Seleucia, by Lysimachus the Babylonian (probably under duress; see Dowden n.d.: ad loc.); 
F 14 on the over-the-top funeral held by Harpalus for the hetaira Pythionice; F 25 on varieties 
of beautiful cups; and F 68 on the preferred wine of the Persian king.
119 F 9a = Ath. 12.540b–c, F 10 = Ath. 12.527e–f, F 21a = Ath. 12.540a–b, F 21b = Ath. 
5.210e. For the historical context see Dowden (n.d.: ad F 10).
120 ‘ἔσφηλέν σε, ᾽Αντίοχε, θάρσος καὶ μέθη· ἤλπιζες γὰρ ἐν μεγάλοις ποτηρίοις τὴν 
᾽Αρσάκου βασιλείαν ἐκπιεῖν’: F 11 = Ath. 10.439d–e.
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any admiration for a ruler’s – or any other party host’s – generosity despite 
detailed descriptions of lavish entertainment and take-home presents of 
considerable value.121 It is, of course, possible that such praise has been 
lost as Athenaeus focused on the extravagant details, but considering 
Posidonius’ Stoic credentials it is more likely that no praise was there to 
begin with because such extravagances were negative rather than positive 
paradeigmata.
Part of tryphe is immoderate eating and drinking, and some memora-
ble fragments of Posidonius deal with this theme. A good example is this 
description of Alexander, son of Ptolemaeus Physcon:
εἰς πάχος δ᾽ ἐπεδεδώκει καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ᾽Αλέξανδρος, ὁ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα 
ἀποκτείνας συμβασιλεύουσαν αὐτῷ. φησὶ γοῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ Ποσειδώνιος 
ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῇ τῶν ῾Ιστοριῶν οὕτως· ‘ὁ δὲ τῆς Αἰγύπτου 
δυνάστης μισούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχλων, κολακευόμενος δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ 
αὐτόν, ἐν πολλῇ δὲ τρυφῇ ζῶν, οὐδὲ <ἀπο>πατεῖν1 οἷός τε ἦν, εἰ μὴ δυσὶν 
ἐπαπερειδόμενος [ἐπορεύετο]2. εἰς δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ὀρχήσεις ἀπὸ 
μετεώρων κλινῶν καθαλλόμενος ἀνυπόδητος συντονωτέρας αὐτὰς τῶν 
ἠσκηκότων ἐποιεῖτο.
His (Ptolemaeus Physcon’s) son Alexander also gave himself up to obesity, 
the one who killed his own mother when she was his co-regent. At any rate, 
Posidonius in the forty-seventh book of his Histories says thus: ‘The king 
of Egypt hated by the masses, flattered by his entourage, and living in great 
luxury, was not even able to withdraw to relieve himself unless he leaned 
upon two [slaves]. But leaping into dances at the symposium from high 
couches he would perform them barefoot and more eagerly than the profes-
sionals.’ (Posidonius,F 26 = Ath. 12.550a–b)
Like the passage on Damophilus, igniter of the Sicilian Slave War, quoted 
above, this is a description dripping with moralistic venom. Alexander’s 
tryphe, the very thing on which he presumably prided himself,122 debilitates 
him to the degree that he cannot even go to the toilet without assistance.123 
This, however, does not prevent him from engaging in embarrassing and 
unkingly pursuits such as dancing. The fact that he, like any tyrant, is hated 
by his people and has flatterers instead of friends follows directly from his 
ignominious behaviour, rather than from, say, any cruelty or  tyrannical 
acts (although, of course, Posidonius may well have discussed such addi-
121 E.g. F 9a and b (= Ath. 12.540b–c and 5.210c–d) relate that Antiochus Sidetes held 
daily receptions in which he gave out whole cooked animals, honey-cakes and gold-threaded 
garlands, and F 21a and b (= Ath. 12.540a–b and 5.210d–e) that Antiochus Grypus during 
feasts gave out to participants whole joints of meat as well as live animals, gold and silver, 
and a camel and its groom per guest.
122 See the interesting discussions of the role of tryphe in Ptolemaic court propaganda in 
Heinen (1983) and Ager (2005: 22–8).
123 On the conjectures enabling this surely correct reading see Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.).
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tional vices in now lost passages). A very similar and equally morally 
disgusted passage deals with the obesity and consequent physical lack of 
ability of Alexander’s father, Ptolemaeus Physcon (F 6 = Ath. 12.549d–e).
At the opposite end of the scale, several fragments are concerned with 
positive paradeigmata of moderation. F 24 (= Ath. 4.153b–c) states that 
Heracleon, a general of Antiochus Grypus, made changes to the army’s 
regime by having them take simple meals on the ground; no praise for this 
is preserved, but it is obviously meant as a positive counter-example to the 
extravagances of Antiochus Grypus himself. F 59 (= Ath. 6.273a–275b) is 
a long passage on old Roman virtue, which references Posidonius three 
times. Although it is unlikely that the whole passage is reproduced from his 
Histories, the implication seems to be that the passage is in general agree-
ment with Posidonius’ work.124 This extract from the fragment is probably 
a paraphrase of Posidonius and perhaps uses some of his terminology:
πάτριος μὲν γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῖς, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος, καρτερία καὶ λιτὴ δίαιτα 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν ἀφελὴς καὶ ἀπερίεργος χρῆσις· ἔτι δὲ 
εὐσέβεια μὲν θαυμαστὴ περὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ πολλὴ τοῦ 
πλημμελεῖν εὐλάβεια πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους μετὰ τῆς κατὰ γεωργίαν 
ἀσκήσεως.
Their ancestral ways, as Posidonius says, consisted in endurance, frugal 
lifestyle, and, in other matters concerning possessions, simple and unelab-
orate practice – also, amazing piety concerning the divine, justice and a 
great awareness of trespassing against other men, together with discipline 
through farming. (Posidonius, F 59 = Ath. 6.107; translation modifed from 
Dowden n.d.)
Endurance, frugality, simple lifestyle, piety, justice and consideration are 
all virtues consistent with the moral outlook displayed by the fragments 
of Posidonius, as well as – except for piety – by all the other historiogra-
phers we have so far encountered in this and previous chapters. ‘Discipline 
through farming’, however, is a peculiarly Roman virtue, much propounded 
by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but not prominent in the Greek moralising 
tradition. If it accurately summarises what Posidonius described, his por-
trait of the Roman good old days must have been based on and influenced 
by Roman sources, perhaps Roman acquaintances. The other possibility is 
that Athenaeus, even in this short passage, has conflated several sources, at 
least one of them Roman.125
124 For various views on how much of F 59 comes from Posidonius see Malitz (1983: 
90–4), Kidd (1988: 913–14), Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.). All three mentions of Posidonius in this 
passage come at heavily moralising moments.
125 Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.) argues that the entirety of F 59 ultimately goes back to Fabius 
Pictor, but that Posidonius has developed it to fit in with ‘a neo-Polybian picture of the 
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The complete opposite to the degenerates Ptolemaeus Physcon and 
Alexander is the Ligurians, presented by F 57–8 as hardened by their rugged 
homeland and lack of commodities into a supremely strong and enduring 
people.126 F 58a and b are renderings of an exemplary story of a Ligurian 
woman who takes a break from her work to give birth and then returns to 
it, thus making her an example of the key qualities of her entire people in 
the same way that Damophilus the extravagant slave owner stands in for 
his whole decadent society.
The mention of Damophilus leads us to the moralising topic of how to 
treat one’s inferiors, that is, one’s subjects or slaves. The key passage(s) 
here is clearly F 108 (divided into 108a–w in the BNJ). This is in reality a 
collection of extracts from Diodorus’ Bibliotheke, the longest by Photius 
(= FGrH 87 F 108a), the rest out of the Constantinian compilations De 
Virtutibus et Vitiis and De Sententiis, all of them on the Sicilian Slave War, 
and presumed by most scholars to be a close approximation of what was 
in Diodorus’ source, Posidonius.127 The passage is a detailed account of the 
beginning of the Slave War, which is shown to arise because of the arro-
gance and extravagance of the slave owners and their inhumane treatment 
of their slaves. None of the extracts mention Posidonius by name, but the 
close similarity between Posidonius F 7 (= Ath. 12.542b) on Damophilus 
(quoted above) and Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.34 means that the identification of 
Posidonius as Diodorus’ source for the Sicilian Slave War is certain. How 
much Diodorus changed what he found in Posidonius is, as always, con-
tentious, and we cannot know for certain whether Posidonius ascribed 
the revolt only to the masters’ tryphe, or also to their mistreatment of the 
slaves.128 Equally frustratingly unclear is the short F 38 (= Ath. 6.266e–f), 
which gives Posidonius as the authority for the information that the Chians 
were enslaved by Mithridates and then handed over to their own slaves in 
fetters. It ends with a sentence which interprets this fate of the Chians as 
divine punishment for having been the first to use bought slaves at a time 
when most people did their own work, but it is impossible to see whether 
this sentence derives from Posidonius or is an interpretation by Athenaeus.
Finally, F 8 (= Ath. 6.263c–d) gives an indication that Posidonius also 
offered examples of ‘good’ master–slave relationships. In this passage 
Athenaeus states that Posidonius says that ‘many of those who are unable 
Romans, one that accords with his own philosophy and with the discourse of his Roman 
friends’, and that Athenaeus has it from Posidonius.
126 F 57a = Strabo 5.2.1, 218C; F 57b = Diod. Sic. 4.20.1; F 58a = Strabo 3.4.17, 165A–B; 
F 58b = Diod. Sic. 4.20.2–3.
127 The passage is Diod. Sic. 34/35.2 in the Loeb, 34.1–20 in the Belles Lettres edition. 
128 For different views on how close Diodorus’ account is to Posidonius’ original see 
Dowden (n.d.: ad F 108a) and Wozniczka (forthcoming). 
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to look after themselves because of their weakness of intellect’ (πολλούς 
τινας ἑαυτῶν οὐ δυναμένους προίστασθαι διὰ τὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀσθενὲς) of 
their own free will put themselves into the power of a more capable people 
in order to have their ‘needs’ (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) taken care of. He then offers 
as an example of this the Mariandynoi, who are said to have given them-
selves over to the Heracleians on the one condition that they could not be 
sold abroad. This second half of the passage, which may be a brief quota-
tion from Posidonius, is introduced by καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Μαριανδυνοὶ 
μὲν . . . , showing that it was only the first in a pair or series of exam-
ples of such mutually beneficial master–slave relationships.129 Apparently, 
Posidonius did not condemn slavery in itself, only, perhaps, mistreatment 
and exploitation of slaves. This ties in nicely with F 284 in Edelstein and 
Kidd (= Sen. Ep. 90.5–13),130 which tells of a Golden Age when people 
were ruled by philosopher kings. The subjects not only submitted to these 
philosophers voluntarily, but also refrained from wrongdoing entirely: 
cum bene imperanti bene pareretur (Sen. Ep. 90.5). Posidonius, then, like 
Polybius and Diodorus, propounded the moral-didactic theory that the 
behaviour of ruler and ruled were mutually dependent.131
The final question that needs to be asked of the Posidonius fragments 
is whether there is any evidence of divine justice enforcing morality. On 
the basis of Posidonius’ philosophical views it would be a natural assump-
tion that his Histories showed a world ruled by benevolent Providence. 
However, the only explicit reference to divine justice in the fragments is 
F 38 on the Chians, which has just been discussed. The comment in this 
fragment that the fate of the Chians was due to ‘the wrath of the divine’ 
(τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐμήνισε) may equally well be Athenaeus’ interpretation as 
Posidonius’.132 F 29 (= Ath. 8.333b–d), on how the army of the Syrian 
pretender Tryphon was overwhelmed by a tidal wave and drowned to a 
man, may narrate an instance of divine punishment, but does not explic-
129 The idea that some peoples are better off as slaves or subjects of others is often 
attributed to both Posidonius and Panaetius, his predecessor as leading Stoic, and assumed 
to have formed the basis of a justification of Roman Imperial power which they passed on 
to Cicero and other Romans. See Strasburger (1965: 40), Walbank (1965: 13–15), Franklin 
(2003: 104–6), Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.).
130 This fragment is not included in FGrH; Jacoby presumably believed that it came from 
one of Posidonius’ philosophical works rather than the Histories. Edelstein and Kidd (1972) 
include it under ‘History.’ It is mentioned by Dowden (n.d.: ad F 8).
131 The more philosophical version of this, which Posidonius most probably propounded 
and which is discernible in F 8, namely that the best constitution is the rule of the wise over 
the unwise, is not reflected in any of the other historians discussed in this study.
132 F 108w (= Diod. Sic. 34/35.9) ascribes the death of someone who had eaten sacred fish 
to to daimonion, but it does not mention Posidonius by name, and even if the passage goes 
back to him, divine punishment is such a key theme for Diodorus (as we have seen) that he 
may well have added or altered the interpretation. 
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itly ascribe the event to supernatural causes. F 104 (= Strabo, Geography 
7.3.1–5, 295a–298b) rationalises the Getan belief that their king communi-
cates with a god in a cave into a deliberate exploitation of popular gullibil-
ity for political purposes, but as we have seen in Polybius, such cynicism 
about popular superstition does not preclude religious belief and piety on 
the part of the author. On the basis of this evidence we have to accept that 
we cannot say anything certain about the role of the divine in Posidonius’ 
supposedly Stoic Histories.133
In conclusion, it seems likely that wealth fulfilled a similar function in 
the moral didacticism of Posidonius to military success in that of Polybius, 
as a dangerous trap which lures most men into arrogance. In Polybius the 
arrogance is primarily expressed through mistreatment of the defeated; 
in Posidonius it seems to have been overwhelmingly expressed through 
extravagant and immoderate lifestyles. In both authors, however, such 
arrogance most often leads to disaster. Dowden (n.d.) has recently offered 
a persuasive interpretation of the fragments as showing that Posidonius’ 
Histories were intended as a continuation of Polybius’ Histories not just 
chronologically, but also morally: where Polybius showed the rise of 
Rome, Posidonius showed the degeneration of Rome – as well as the rest of 
the world – due to wealth and extravagance, and Rome’s descent into civil 
war. This is a very attractive hypothesis, but keeping in mind the fact that 
Athenaeus was supremely interested in examples of luxury and decadence 
and much less in other moral issues such as cruelty and piety, we must not 
trust too much in such reconstructions. In fact, if we look at the picture we 
got of Posidonius’ work from Diodorus’ moralising in books 32.37–37.30, 
fragmentary though they are, it was of a work preoccupied with decadence, 
but equally so with greed and cruelty, and in which divine justice played an 
important part. It is possible that these themes were modified and amplified 
by Diodorus, but they are, I would claim, unlikely to have been added out 
of thin air. In other words, Posidonius supplied the basis for the moralis-
ing, even if he did not moralise explicitly on all of these topics himself.
What is clear, however, even without looking at the Bibliotheke, is that 
Posidonius’ Histories was a work of moral history, and that it often taught 
its lessons by means of evaluative phrasing combined with biting sarcasm, 
and by showing how morally corrupt behaviour would lead to disaster. A 
few examples of moralising vignettes are also preserved F 11, F 36, F 43), 
and possibly one of a moralising conclusion (F 38).
133 This is also noted by Malitz (1983: 418–22), who argues that Posidonius may have 
preferred a secular causality in his historiography. If this was the case, that would be an 
intriguing sign of the importance that genre, in the concrete shape of imitation of Polybius, 
held for Posidonius.
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hieronymus of cardia (FGrH 154)
Finally, we get to Hieronymus of Cardia (not yet on BNJ). Chronologically 
he lived and wrote earlier than Timaeus, but because of his apparent lack 
of moralising he has been relegated to the end of this chapter. Hieronymus 
wrote a history, the title of which is unknown, but which traced the events in 
the Greek world from the death of Alexander the Great to at least the death 
of Pyrrhus, much of it based on his own experiences on the staff of two of 
Alexander’s successors, Eumenes of Cardia and Antigonus Gonatas.134
This work was probably Diodorus’ main source (perhaps through an 
intermediary source) for the Greek narrative of books 18–20,135 and in the 
previous chapter we discussed the impression of this source text produced 
by an analysis of Diodorus’ moralising. This impression was of a text that 
moralised on cruelty, the changeability of fortune, and the positive effects 
of mildness/kindness by means of evaluative phrasing used sparingly, mor-
alising digressions and asides, and internal evaluation, in fact much like the 
impression produced of Ephorus’ History. This is interesting, since most 
scholars who assume that the character of Hieronymus’ work is discernible 
from the Bibliotheke tend to highlight, alongside Hieronymus’ reliability 
and general competence as a historian, his ‘seriousness’ or ‘sobriety’, by 
which they partly mean his avoidance of moralising.136 Scholars who want 
to stress Hieronymus’ non-moralising have to argue that Diodorus added 
a few passages of explicit moralising on the changeability of fortune and 
the abuse of good fortune to a text otherwise taken over from Hieronymus. 
As argued in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, I find it much more likely that this 
moralising was already in Hieronymus’ History in a very similar form.137
Any discussion of Hieronymus is hampered by the fact that only nine-
teen fragments of his work have been preserved in later authors. None of 
the fragments contain any moralising, but that is partly because most of 
them are bare mentions of Hieronymus’ name in connection with informa-
tion about topography or numbers of dead in a battle. It would be absurd 
to claim that these few references are in any way representative of his orig-
inal History. On the other hand, it may be significant that Athenaeus only 
refers to his work once (for a description of Alexander the Great’s funeral 
134 Jacoby (1913, 1930: 544), Hornblower (1981).
135 Meeus (2013) with references to earlier literature.
136 Jacoby (1913), Hornblower (1981), Knoepfler (2000). The main point of contention 
is his political bias: Brown (1947), followed by Knoepfler (2000), argues that Hieronymus 
was a biased court historian, but this is played down by Hornblower (1981), building on the 
arguments of Jacoby (1913: 1543–6). 
137 See Hadley (1996) with the counter-argument of Hau (2009: 180–1), as well as Diod. 
Sic. 19.11, discussed in Chapter 2.
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cart): perhaps Hieronymus’ work was less fertile ground for passages on 
luxury, flatterers and false philosophers than were those of Timaeus, Duris, 
Phylarchus, Agatharchides and Posidonius. That, again, would bring him 
in line with Ephorus, as a historiographer who moralised sparingly, and 
preferred other topics to those of interest to Athenaeus, as we shall see in 
Chapter 7.
The only fragment of Hieronymus’ History that may conceivably be a 
remnant of a once moralising passage is F 9 (= Paus. 1.9.8). Here Pausanias 
censures Hieronymus for saying, falsely in his opinion, that Lysimachus 
destroyed the royal tombs in Epirus in his war with Pyrrhus and cast out 
the bones.138 It is impossible to know what Hieronymus’ narrative of this 
incident looked like, but judging from Pausanias’ criticism it was probably 
more than a bare notice. It is tempting to hypothethise that Hieronymus 
either wrote a detailed scene to portray Lysimachus as the immoderate 
victor abusing his good fortune, or explicitly moralised on the wrongness 
of Lysimachus’ actions; but we cannot know.139
In conclusion, it seems unlikely that Hieronymus of Cardia was a lone 
non-moralising historiographer in Hellenistic Greece. Rather, his moralis-
ing has been lost because it happened sparingly, and because his didactic 
topics were not to the taste of Athenaeus. There is also the possibility that 
he moralised at the macro-level of structure, by means of narrative arcs, 
repetition, and patterning. This was done masterfully by the three surviv-
ing Classical historiographers as we shall see in Part II.
CONCLUSION
It is ultimately impossible to know what the now fragmentary works of 
Hellenistic historiography once looked like in all their glory. Hence we 
cannot know for certain whether or not they moralised, and much less 
whether they had explicitly moral-didactic agendas, and what their poten-
tial moralising looked like. Nonetheless, on the basis of such evidence as 
there is, this chapter has made the case that some of the moral messages 
we have encountered in Polybius and Diodorus, or moral messages very 
close to them, seem to have been propounded by the majority of the most 
 influential and best-preserved historiographies of the period.
138 For a discussion of which war the fragment relates to, see Jacoby (1930: 546–7) and 
Hornblower (1981: 247).
139 Hornblower (1981: 104) argues that the scene in Plut. Pyrrh. 34.4 which shows 
Antigonus Gonatas crying for the defeated Pyrrhus comes from Hieronymus and is the first 
instance of the topos of the victor crying for the vanquished. This is an attractive theory, but 
ultimately we cannot know whether Plutarch added this detail himself under the influence of 
the historical tradition of Polybius and Diodorus.
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The wrongness of immoderation in all its aspects seems to have been a 
theme of all the historiographers under consideration, apart perhaps from 
Hieronymus, even taking account of the skewed picture resulting from 
the dominance of Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae as a covertext. Phylarchus 
seems to have propounded a causal connection from luxurious living to 
arrogance and impiety and onwards to divine punishment. Posidonius 
most probably showed a similar connection from wealth to luxurious 
living and abuse of others and onwards to disaster, brought on either by 
purely human means or by some kind of divine justice, and it is possible 
that such a connection was also present in the work(s) of Agatharchides. 
Human inability to stay moderate in good fortune seems to have been a 
theme of at least Timaeus, Duris and Agatharchides, and perhaps also of 
Hieronymus. Agatharchides alone seems to have emphasised the suffering 
of the marginalised and nameless and encouraged the reader to feel pity 
and sympathy for them.
The image of the bad man or leader seems to have been similar in all of 
these historiographers: he is a tyrant, or like a tyrant, immoderate in his 
eating, drinking and sexual habits, cowardly and effeminate. Timaeus and 
Phylarchus add the vices of impiety and greed. Virtues clearly attracted less 
attention from potential covertext authors, but moderation and courage 
seem to have played a part in all of the works under discussion. Timaeus 
seems to have added lack of greed and a shrewd ability to interpret omens 
to one’s advantage; and Phylarchus admired wit. At least Timaeus and 
Phylarchus apparently showed that impiety would be punished by divine 
forces, and that such divine punishment often mirrored the crime in poign-
ant ways.
Moralising techniques are harder to discern from second-hand ref-
erences, but evaluative phrasing was almost certainly used by all, in 
Posidonius combined with biting sarcasm, in Duris with rhetorical com-
parisons and juxtaposition. Moralising conclusions were used at least 
by Agatharchides. Most of the historiographers seem also to have used 
moralising vignettes, and at least Duris, Phylarchus and Agatharchides to 
have moralised by means of pathos. Moralising digressions seem to have 
been used by at least Timaeus, Duris and Posidonius. From Timaeus and 
Agatharchides we have evidence of moralising speeches, and from Timaeus 
also of internal evaluation.
In other words, although we cannot arrive at a full understanding of 
Hellenistic historiography on the basis of the evidence, we can gain an 
impression, and the impression is of a genre that embraced moralising, 
most probably with a didactic aim. Moreover, when compared with our 
analysis of Polybius and Diodorus, we see that there is a kernel of moral 
messages and techniques which all the Hellenistic historiographers share.




It is a common statement that Hellenistic historiography is ‘moralising’. 
This is often combined with statements to the effect that Hellenistic histo-
riography is ‘rhetorical’ and less ‘serious’ or in some other way less worthy 
and less plain good than Classical historiography.1 That what makes his-
toriography ‘good’ is a matter of taste and changing values has been dis-
cussed in the Introduction to this book and will also be a topic for its 
Conclusion. In the present part we shall face the claim that ‘moralising’ 
is a phenomenon exclusively of Hellenistic historiography. Through an 
examination of the works of the three extant Classical historiographers – 
that is, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon – I shall demonstrate that 
moral didacticism was a central concern of each author, and that their 
histories do, in fact, moralise. We shall see how the Classical works show 
forerunners of the types of moralising we have become familiar with from 
the Hellenistic histories, but also how they employ different moralising 
techniques of their own. We shall also consider what messages their mor-
alising conveys. In the final chapter we shall then look at the fragments of 
three late Classical works of history, namely those of the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian, Ephorus and Theopompus, in order to get a sense of how the 
development from Classical to Hellenistic moral didacticism took place.
The three extant Classical historiographers will be discussed chronolog-
ically. In each chapter we begin with a look at the preface and program-
matic passages in order to see what they say about the purpose of the work; 
then we proceed to examine the moralising techniques used and then the 
moral lessons offered by the work. Chapter 7 discusses what can be sur-
mised about the moral didacticism of three late Classical historiographers 
from their preserved ‘fragments’ and what this might tell us about the 
development from Classical to Hellenistic moral didacticism.
No one could hope to take account of everything written about 
Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon in a single book, much less in a part 
of a book. I do not aim to give an overview of scholarship on any of these 
historiographers, or to reference every important or interesting monograph 
or article that discusses their works. I shall limit myself to referring, in the 
footnotes, to studies that have discussed in detail – but often under more 
reputable headings such as ‘philosophy’ or ‘political thought’ – some of the 
passages and phenomena that I identify as moral-didactic.
1 See e.g. Usher (1969), Walbank (1990), Meister (1990: esp. 80–1), Luce (1997: 108), 
Gehrke (2001: 299). Even Pownall (2004), whose study is dedicated to uncovering ‘the 
moral use of history in fourth-century prose’, considers moralising an impairment to good 
historiography.
4. Herodotus
The question of moral didacticism has in recent years increasingly become 
part of the discussion of Herodotus’ Histories. Scholars are largely divided 
into those who are content to see some moral aspect to the Histories, and 
those who apparently believe that admitting such an aspect to the work 
denies it the title of history.1 I hope to show in the following that the moral 
lessons are certainly there, but also that this places Herodotus completely 
in line with the genre of historiography that developed after him, rather 
than separating his work from it.
PREFACE
In the opening lines of the Histories, Herodotus states his name, the type of 
his work, and his purpose in committing it to writing:
Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ 
ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ 
μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ 
ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.
This is the presentation of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, 
in order that events that have occurred through human agency shall not 
become extinct because of the course of time and that the great and marvel-
lous deeds demonstrated by both the Greeks and the barbarians shall not 
lose their fame – and that goes both for their other actions and achievements 
and for the reason why they began to be at war with one another. (Hdt. 
1.1.1)
1 The main proponents of the theory that Herodotus’ purpose was at least partly mor-
al-didactic are Harrison (2000) and Fisher (2002). Waters (1971) and Shimron (1989) argue 
vehemently against the Histories being moralising in any way. Grethlein (2011) discusses 
‘exemplarity’ in Herodotus (and Thucydides), but limits himself to instances of characters 
learning from or failing to learn from the past.
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In this proem to the first extant work of historiography in Western civili-
sation, the purpose of history is set out purely as memorial with no hint of 
didacticism. It is followed by a whirlwind account of abductions of girls 
from the East by Greeks and from Greece by Eastern peoples, culminating 
in the ‘Second Preface’ or second first-person statement about the contents 
of the work:
ταῦτα μέν νυν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι· ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ 
ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς οὕτω ἢ ἄλλως κως ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον 
ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τοῦτον σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς 
τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών. 
τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ σμικρὰ αὐτῶν γέγονε· τὰ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ἦν 
μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὤν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην 
οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῷ μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως.
Now this is what the Persians and the Phoenicians say. I cannot say with 
regard to these events whether they happened like this or in some other way, 
but the man I know was the first to commit crimes against the Greeks I shall 
point out, and then proceed from that point to the subsequent narrative, 
talking about small and big cities of men alike. For those that were once big 
have for the most part become small, and those that were big in my time, 
were once small. Knowing that human happiness never stays long in the 
same place I shall mention both equally. (Hdt. 1.5.3–4)
The Second Preface, as has often been pointed out, reveals the narrative of 
the girl abductions to be a false start, a semi-mythological tit-for-tat expla-
nation of a great war that will not do on its own as a causal explanation in 
Herodotus’ more analytical inquiry.2 The basis for the Histories is rather 
going to be secure knowledge (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτός . . . ) located in historical, 
evidence-based time. Here the purpose of the work is presented partly as 
explaining the beginning of hostilities between Greeks and barbarians, 
partly as preserving the memory of deeds performed everywhere in the 
world, in both small and big cities. The last two sentences of the Second 
Preface set out the earliest indication of the prominent role the instability 
of human success is going to play in the work, but it does not indicate that 
the work is also going to be teaching its audience any lessons about how 
to handle this.
This absence of moral didacticism from the purpose statements certainly 
sets the Histories apart from the works of Polybius and Diodorus, which 
we discussed in Part I. However, it has often been observed that Herodotus’ 
prefaces are hugely inadequate as an indication of the actual contents of the 
Histories: the richness of the work, its large ethnographical component 
2 The best analysis of Herodotus’ two prefaces is still Moles (1993).
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and its wealth of digressions and colourful vignettes are only dimly hinted 
at in the vague expression ‘their other great deeds’ (τά τε ἄλλα). The fact 
that the Histories contains much material and many narrative threads not 
hinted at by the prefaces reveals these as the first baby-steps – wobbly, but 
impressive – of a nascent tradition of prose preface writing. This makes it 
legitimate to look for themes and messages in the work not signalled by the 
prefaces.
Moreover, we know from Diodorus’ Bibliotheke that the concept of his-
toriography as memorial can be closely intertwined with the idea of history 
as teacher, when readers follow the historiographical examples in order 
to be memorialised in their turn. Such a motivation for action is certainly 
seen in Herodotus’ Histories, most prominently in Leonidas’ reason for 
staying at Thermopylae (‘great fame would come to him if he stayed there’, 
μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο: Hdt. 7.220.2), and is often said to 
be inspired by a Homeric ethos. It is certainly true that both Herodotus 
and his characters are inspired by Homer in their attitude to kleos, but by 
expressing his wish to preserve kleos in his preface and then showing such 
kleos to be a motivation for noble actions, Herodotus comes very close to 
expressing a didactic purpose which becomes explicit only in Hellenistic 
historiography.
MORALISING TECHNIQUES
Moralising in Narrative Pauses
Herodotus’ Histories is a colourful tapestry of varied stories, woven 
together in a way that brings out contrasts, similarities and variations. 
Guiding statements (‘transitional sentences’) at the beginning and end of 
each episode tell the reader how it fits together with the episodes surround-
ing it and let the alert reader find his or her way through the wild-growing 
logoi (although there is also pleasure in allowing oneself to get lost in 
them and forget the connections for a while). Such an alert reader will 
also find narratorial guidance of another sort, in the shape of moralising 
introductions, conclusions and concomitant statements that tell them how 
to read some of the varied episodes, in the same way as in the narratives of 
Polybius and Diodorus.
A recurring feature of Herodotus’ style is a minimalist type of ring-com-
position which bookends an episode or digression with similar statements. 
For instance, Herodotus introduces the story of how Gyges goes from being 
commander of the king’s bodyguard to becoming king with ‘Here is how 
the kingdom passed from the Heraclidae, who had been the Lydian royal 
family, to Croesus’ family, who were called the Mermnadae’ (1.7.1), and 
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seven chapters later the story is rounded off by the very similar statement 
‘That is how the Mermnadae deprived the Heraclidae of the rulership of 
Lydia and gained it for themselves’ (1.14.1).3 These statements sometimes 
carry a moral evaluation, such as ‘A short while later, however, retribution 
for Polycrates’ death caught up with Oroetes’ (3.126.1), introducing a story 
which a few chapters later is concluded with the very similar statement 
‘And that is how retribution for the death of Polycrates of Samos caught up 
with Oroetes of Persia’ (3.128.5).4
There are also numerous instances of introductory, concluding and 
concomitant moralising in the work which are not picked up by correl-
ative statements, but work exactly like their Hellenistic counterparts. An 
example is this conclusion to the story of how Cyrus the Great becomes 
king of Persia:
Ἀστυάγης μέν νυν βασιλεύσας ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα πέντε καὶ τριήκοντα οὕτω τῆς 
βασιληίης κατεπαύσθη, Μῆδοι δὲ ὑπέκυψαν Πέρσῃσι διὰ τὴν τούτου 
πικρότητα, ἄρξαντες τῆς ἄνω Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ Ἀσίης ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα τριήκοντα καὶ 
ἑκατὸν δυῶν δέοντα, πάρεξ ἢ ὅσον οἱ Σκύθαι ἦρχον.
In this way, Astyages was deposed from power having been king for thir-
ty-five years, and the Medes came under the Persian yoke because of his 
harshness after having ruled Asia above the River Halys for 128 years 
(except for the time when the Scythians ruled). (Hdt. 1.130.1)
The story has ended with a defiant speech by the captive Astyages (1.129, 
in oratio obliqua) to the traitor Harpagus, which might well make a reader 
sympathetic to the fallen king. The moralising conclusion ensures a differ-
ent response: although Astyages may have a point in chiding his former 
right-hand man, the passing of power from the Medes to the Persians is still 
primarily his fault because he wielded power too harshly.5
Particular to Herodotus’ Histories is the use of a moralising conclusion 
to present the narrator’s own view on an episode, custom or cause after 
a summary of one or more views held by internal characters or exter-
nal groups of people. Examples are 2.64.2, where he expresses distaste 
at excuses offered by non-Greeks and non-Egyptians for having sex in 
temples, and 8.129.3, where he agrees with the Potidaeans that a tide that 
drowned Persian attackers was divine punishment for their desecration of 
a statue of Poseidon.
3 For a good discussion of these transitional sentences and their likely connection with 
oral story-telling see Lang (1984: 1–17).
4 Other examples of moralising bookending: 1.185.1 with 187.5 and 1.196.1 with 5. 
5 Other examples of guiding moralising: 1.34.1, 1.197.1, 1.199.1, 2.119.2, 2.126.1, 3.75, 
3.118.1, 4.164.4, 4.205, 5.124.1, 6.45.2, 6.72.1, 6.91.1, 6.138.4, 7.107.1, 8.13, 8.90.1, 8.106.4, 
8.116.1, 9.37.2, 9.78.1.
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Another Hellenistic type of moralising found in Herodotus is the moral 
digression. Herodotus is, of course, famed for his digressions, but most 
of them are of a different kind from the ones encountered in Polybius 
and Diodorus: most of Herodotus’ digressions are narrative in the sense 
that they either (analeptically) narrate events that have led to an event or 
situation that forms part of his main narrative or (proleptically) narrate 
events that happen later than those of his main narrative, and which will 
result from them. Some of these narrative digressions are provoked by 
moral concerns, such as 8.105–6, which begins with the moralising intro-
duction: ‘One of these Pedasians, Hermotimus, was the one to whom it 
happened to take the greatest revenge on someone who had wronged him 
of all the people we know of’ (ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν Πηδασέων ὁ Ἑρμότιμος ἦν 
τῷ μεγίστη τίσις ἤδη ἀδικηθέντι ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν: 8.105.1). 
After the story of the crime and the revenge, which is told with enough 
evaluative phrasing to make sure the reader knows where his loyalties 
should lie (ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων: 8.105.2), the digression is rounded off with 
the moralising conclusion: ‘So this is how vengeance and Hermotimus 
caught up with Panionius’ (Πανιώνιον μέν νυν οὕτω περιῆλθε ἥ τε τίσις 
καὶ Ἑρμότιμος [being picked up by a δέ in the next sentence continuing the 
main storyline]: 8.106.4).
Occasionally, Herodotus’ digressions constitute pauses in his narrative 
rather than glimpses backwards and forwards in time, and most of these 
have a moral bearing. Some of them discuss the causes behind events in 
moral terms (e.g. 3.38, arguing that Cambyses’ ridiculing the religious 
customs of others must have been caused by madness), some offer moral 
evaluations of specific actions (e.g. 9.71 on the greatest courage shown at 
Plataea), some follow associatively from the main narrative (e.g 5.78 on 
how democracy made the Athenians better fighters), and quite a few are 
included for reasons of polemic (e.g. 2.120 on the Trojan War as divine 
punishment for the violation of guest-friendship).6 All of these types of 
digressions – causal, evaluative, associative and polemical – are common 
in the Hellenistic historiographers, as we have seen. It is worth quoting a 
Herodotean moral digression in order to compare it with its Hellenistic 
counterpart:
εἰ μέν νυν Ξέρξης τε ἀπέπεμψε ταῦτα λέγοντα κήρυκα ἐς Ἄργος καὶ Ἀργείων 
ἄγγελοι ἀναβάντες ἐς Σοῦσα ἐπειρώτων Ἀρτοξέρξεα περὶ φιλίης, οὐκ ἔχω 
ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὐδέ τινα γνώμην περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφαίνομαι ἄλλην γε ἢ τήν 
περ αὐτοὶ Ἀργεῖοι λέγουσι· [2] ἐπίσταμαι δὲ τοσοῦτο ὅτι εἰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰ 
οἰκήια κακὰ ἐς μέσον συνενείκαιεν ἀλλάξασθαι βουλόμενοι τοῖσι πλησίοισι, 
6 Digressive moralising in Herodotus: 2.120, 3.33, 3.38, 3.108, 5.78, 6.21, 6.27, 6.84, 7.133, 
7.137, 7.139, 7.152, 7.190, 7.213, 8.20, 8.77, 9.65, 9.71, 9.100–1.
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ἐγκύψαντες ἂν ἐς τὰ τῶν πέλας κακὰ ἀσπασίως ἕκαστοι αὐτῶν ἀποφεροίατο 
ὀπίσω τὰ ἐσενεικαίατο. [3] οὕτω δὲ οὐδ᾽ Ἀργείοισι αἴσχιστα πεποίηται. ἐγὼ 
δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασι ὀφείλω, καί μοι 
τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα Ἀργεῖοι 
ἦσαν οἱ ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπειδή σφι πρὸς τοὺς 
Λακεδαιμονίους κακῶς ἡ αἰχμὴ ἑστήκεε, πᾶν δὴ βουλόμενοι σφίσι εἶναι πρὸ 
τῆς παρεούσης λύπης. τὰ μὲν περὶ Ἀργείων εἴρηται·
Now, if Xerxes did send a herald who said this to Argos and messengers 
from the Argives went up to Susa and asked Artoxerxes about an alliance, 
I cannot say with certainty, but I am not announcing any other opinion 
about them than what the Argives themselves are saying. (2) I believe that 
if all human beings brought their own individual evils to market wanting to 
exchange them with their neighbours, when they had looked closely at their 
neighbours’ evils, each of them would gladly take back what he had brought 
himself. (3) And so what the Argives did was not the most shameful thing in 
the world. I for my part have a duty to say what I have heard, but I do not 
have a duty to trust all of it, and let this statement hold true for my entire 
work – considering that it is also said that it was the Argives who called the 
Persians into Greece, because the war with the Lacedaemonians was going 
badly and they wanted anything rather than their present grief. So much for 
the story of the Argives. (Hdt. 7.152–3.1)
This digression follows the Polybian schema: it is tied to its surrounding 
narrative by its first and last sentence, but in the middle strays quite far 
away from the circumstances that sparked it in order to generalise about 
human behaviour and offer programmatic comments on the writing of 
history.7 The digression is part historiographical comment on the unrelia-
bility of sources, part moral comment on events narrated. In other words, 
it is at the same time evaluative and polemical. Significantly, however, the 
moral point is not as straightforward as is mostly the case in Polybian and 
Diodoran digressions: it does not just comment on the events, but also 
encourages the reader to question his own way of making moral judge-
ment by implying that some actions which seem inexcusable can, in effect, 
be excused if one knows the full circumstances.8 It is characteristic of 
Herodotus’ moral messages that they are complex and thought-provoking, 
as we shall see below.
7 Whether Herodotus’ statement here is, in fact, meant as programmatic for the 
Histories as a whole or is only meant to apply to this instance has been much discussed, 
but is of little consequence for the present study. For discussions see Lateiner (1989: 79–83), 
Thomas (2000: 188 with n. 47, 214), Baragwanath (2008: 122–59). 
8 Baragwanath (2008: 214–17) offers a brilliant analysis of Herodotus’ moral message 
in this passage (although she does not use that expression). 
178 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
Moralising Integrated into the Narrative of Events
The most pervasive method of moralising within the narrative of events 
in the Hellenistic historiographers is evaluative phrasing. This practice is 
also found in Herodotus. It is used more sparingly than in Polybius and 
Diodorus; often the moral stance is signalled by just one epithet (οὐκ ὅσια: 
3.16.2) or rhetorical technique, such as emphasis through negation (e.g. 
‘not having consulted the Delphic Oracle about where they should go 
to found the colony, or having followed any of the traditional customs’: 
5.42.2).9 Nevertheless, such expressions are an attempt at guiding the read-
er’s moral response to a narrated episode.10
Another type of Hellenistic moralising used by Herodotus is to signal 
a moral world-order by the correlations between actions and results. 
Sometimes this is done through straight statements of causal connections, 
such as ‘the goddess afflicted the Scythians who plundered her temple in 
Ascalon and all their descendants forever with hermaphroditism’ (τοῖσι 
δὲ τῶν Σκυθέων συλήσασι τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἐν Ἀσκάλωνι καὶ τοῖσι τούτων αἰεὶ 
ἐκγόνοισι ἐνέσκηψε ὁ θεὸς θήλεαν νοῦσον: 1.105.4).11 More often, the con-
nection is established obliquely, through the narrative, as in the Hellenistic 
historiographers. Thus the Spartan Dorieus’ colonisation attempt fails 
because he does not consult the Delphic Oracle (5.42, with emphasis 
through negation; see above), and Miltiades, victor of Marathon, dies 
from a wound received as he is trying to rob a Parian temple (6.134–6).12 
The message propounded by these causal connections is by no means as 
 9 οὔτε τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖσι χρηστηρίῳ χρησάμενος ἐς ἥντινα γῆν κτίσων ἴῃ, οὔτε ποιήσας 
οὐδὲν τῶν νομιζομένων.
10 Other examples of passages containing evaluative phrasing with a moral bearing: 
1.127.2 (θεοβλαβής), 2.124, 2.129, 2.151–2, 3.16.1–4, 3.25, 3.30–1, 3.34–7, 3.55, 3.67, 3.117, 
3.147, 3.149, 4.11 (ἀμείνω), 4.93, 4.106, 4.146 (οὐκ ὅσια), 6.15, 6.23–4, 6.31–2, 6.61, 6.96, 
6.101.3, 6.114, 7.35, 7.118–19, 7.164, 7.225–7, 7.229, 7.238, 8.72, 8.112, 8.113.3, 8.117, 9.1, 
9.64. 
11 Other examples of straight statements of causal connections with a moral bearing: 
1.106 (Scythians toppled because of oppressive rule), 1.66.1 (prosperity makes the Spartans 
warlike), 2.128 (hated kings are refused fame), 3.67 (Smerdis is generous and is loved), 4.149 
(the children of the Spartan clan of the Aegeidae always die young, until they build a temple), 
4.152 (the Samians help the Cretan guide left behind by the colonisers of Thera, and this 
becomes the beginning of a strong friendship between the Samians and the Therans), 7.231 
(Aristodemus is punished for cowardice).
12 Other examples: 5.85 (Athenians who try to carry off divine statues from Aegina are 
struck with madness and kill each other), 6.139–40 (the Pelasgians create their own oracle, 
which is later fulfilled), 6.66 (Cleomenes gets Cobon to bribe the Pythian priestess to deliver 
an oracle in his favour; Cobon and the priestess are found out and banished [and Cleomenes 
will suffer later]), 7.181 (Pytheas fights bravely and is honoured by his Persian captors), 
7.223.3–4 (high Persian casualties because of whip-wielding by officers), 7.233 (the Thebans 
who go over to the Persians end badly; emphasis by negation).
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uniform and easily decoded as the one established by similar means in 
Polybius’ Histories and Diodorus’ Bibliotheke (a problem we shall return 
to below), but the technique is certainly used.
Much more regularly than either of these types of moralising, 
Herodotus uses moralising vignettes, a technique widespread in both 
Polybius and Diodorus as well as apparently many of the now frag-
mentary Hellenistic histories. Herodotean vignettes are typically slightly 
longer than the ones found in Polybius and Diodorus, but they tend to 
follow the same pattern of scene-setting, the presence of often two and 
sometimes more characters, and direct or reported speech by at least one 
character. A good example is the negotiations between Aristagoras of 
Miletus and Cleomenes of Sparta, which are narrated over three chapters 
(5.49–51). It falls in two parts taking place at two different occasions 
over the space of three days. The first part consists of a brief scene- 
setting which introduces a map that Aristagoras has brought with him 
(5.49.1), followed by a speech by Aristagoras in oratio recta punctuated 
by the narratorial remark that ‘he said this pointing to the map’ (5.49.5), 
and ends with the information that Cleomenes asks for two days to 
think about Aristagoras’ proposal. The second part begins with a further 
scene-setting (5.50.1) and then combines indirect and direct speech in 
narrating a conversation between Aristagoras and Cleomenes, during 
which the distance from the Ionian coast to the palace of the Persian king 
becomes the reason why the Spartan rejects the proposal. Here, the nar-
rator describes Aristagoras’ efforts to persuade Cleomenes as διαβάλλων, 
‘intentionally misleading’ (5.50.2),13 the only evaluative word uttered in 
the narrator’s voice during the episode. Finally (5.51) the scene shifts 
to Cleomenes’ house, where Aristagoras follows him as a suppliant, 
and a third character is introduced: Cleomenes’ daughter Gorgo. The 
theme also shifts, from geography to money, as the narrator tells us that 
Aristagoras offers increasingly large bribes to Cleomenes until Gorgo 
speaks in oratio recta: ‘Father, the stranger will corrupt you if you do 
not remove yourself from his company’ (πάτερ, διαφθερέει σε ὁ ξεῖνος, 
ἢν μὴ ἀποστὰς ἴῃς: 5.51.2). The vignette ends with Cleomenes ‘being 
pleased with his daughter’s advice’ (ἡσθεὶς τοῦ παιδίου τῇ παραινέσι: 
5.51.3) and sending Aristagoras packing. There is no narratorial conclu-
sion. The moral is unmistakable, though: Aristagoras was intentionally 
misleading Cleomenes and trying to corrupt him, and the Spartan king 
was only saved by his uncorrupted child – a girl, even, demonstrating 
Spartan peculiarity in gender roles. Gorgo’s moral authority is reinforced 
by her statement being in oratio recta, and by internal approval by the 
13 For διαβάλλειν in Herodotus see Pelling (2007).
180 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
criticised character himself. The lack of narratorial conclusion is typical 
of moralising vignettes in Herodotus, as in many of those found in 
Diodorus.14
Closely related to moralising vignettes are moralising speeches. There 
are a few of these in Herodotus’ Histories, and, as with speeches in the 
Hellenistic historiographers, their moral lessons have to be discerned from 
their reception by their internal audience, the degree to which their moral 
points concur with the narrative, and the degree of moral authority held 
by the speaker. Thus, the reader is brought to take the dying speech of 
Cambyses seriously (3.65) because both its moral stance and its narrative 
of past events correspond to those of the narrator, and because the speech 
itself acts as an evaluation of Cambyses’ actions by an internal authority, 
namely Cambyses himself, who has now, on his death-bed, ‘become sensi-
ble’ (ἐσωφρόνησε: 3.64.5). Written letters in the Histories function in the 
same way.15
A particular kind of speech, which occurs in a particular kind of vignette 
in the Histories, is the speech of the wise adviser, also sometimes called 
the tragic warner, in the vignette of ruler and wise adviser.16 The first and 
programmatic such vignette is the encounter between Croesus and Solon in 
book 1 where Solon offers important moral advice (the details of which we 
shall return to below), which Croesus would have done well to heed. Later 
on, Croesus becomes the wise and equally ignored adviser first to Cyrus, 
then to Cambyses. In the last three books, the quintessential wise adviser is 
Artabanus, who repeatedly advises Xerxes, but to no avail. The common 
traits of these wise advisers are that (1) they argue their cases on a moral 
basis, (2) their advice is ignored, and (3) the neglect of their advice leads to 
disaster for the ruler. They function as moral authorities whose judgement 
the reader can trust and whose advice he might decide to follow in his own 
life as far as possible.
Moral judgements by internal authorities are widely used in Herodotus: 
Darius is judged greedy and, by implication, impious by an inscription in 
a tomb he opens (1.187); Persian popular wit designates Cyrus ‘father’, 
Cambyses ‘master’ and Darius ‘shopkeeper’ (3.89.3); and the Spartans 
14 Other moralising vignettes in Herodotus: 1.30–3, 1.43–4, 1.86–7, 1.88–90, 1.158–9, 
3.14–15, 3.21–4, 7.100–5, 7.135, 7.45–52, 8.26, 8.79, 9.16, 9.78–9, 9.82, 9.122.
15 Other moralising speeches in Herodotus: 1.71, 1.206, 1.207, 5.92, 6.86, 6.109; letters: 
1.212, 3.40.
16 The concept of the wise adviser in Herodotus was first explored by Lattimore (1939), 
who divides the stereotype into ‘the tragic warner’ and ‘the practical adviser’ and offers a long 
list of both types. In present-day Herodotus scholarship, however, it is the  tragic-warner type 
that has become universally recognised, and which is most often called the ‘wise adviser’. 
For more recent discussions see Stahl (1975), Dewald (1985), Flory (1987), Pelling (1991), 
Shapiro (1994).
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realise that the Athenians will become stronger than them by gaining 
democracy (5.91).17 The ultimate internal authority in the Histories is 
oracles, particularly the Delphic Oracle. When oracles predict punishment 
for an action (1.13) or command characters to atone for their actions, the 
reader has to understand that those actions were wrong – particularly as 
the atonement usually makes the unwanted consequences go away, thus 
proving them to have been brought on by the divine (e.g. 1.19 and 22).18
The dominant type of moralising in Herodotus’ Histories, however, is 
one that is not found in either Polybius or Diodorus, namely moralising 
by means of patterning and repetition. The fact that there is a pattern 
in Herodotus according to which a rich and powerful man is brought 
low by unpredictable and sudden disaster has long been recognised.19 For 
the purposes of the present study it is important to note that wealth and 
power, that is, supreme good fortune, tend to make Herodotean characters 
arrogant and overconfident, and that this is part of what leads to their 
downfall. This connection between good fortune, arrogance and downfall/
peripeteia points forward to some of the most dominant moralising themes 
in Polybius, Diodorus and the fragmentary Hellenistic historiographers, as 
we have seen in Part I.
Space restrictions prevent an overview of the variations of the pattern 
in all its instances throughout the Histories; the following offers an outline 
only, with references to further reading in the footnotes. The pattern is 
established in book 1, by the programmatic story of Croesus (Hdt. 1.26–56, 
1.69–91 and 1.206–14). At the beginning of this story, Croesus believes 
himself to be the happiest man in the world and wants the wise man Solon 
to confirm this. Instead he gets a speech about the uncertainty of human 
life and the malicious jealousy of the divine, during which Solon famously 
declares that no one should be called happy before he has died, but only 
‘favoured by fortune’ (πρὶν δ’ ἂν τελευτήσῃ, ἐπισχεῖν, μηδὲ καλέειν κω 
ὄλβιον ἀλλ’ εὐτυχέα: Hdt. 1.32). In the subsequent narrative Croesus first 
loses his only able-bodied son in a freak accident (1.35–44), then impiously 
tests the famous oracles (Hdt. 1.46–9), asks Delphi whether he should 
make war on Persia and receives misleading answers which lead him to go 
ahead, and finally loses his wealth and power – the two things that specif-
ically marked him out, in his own mind, as happy (ὄλβιος) – and is taken 
captive by King Cyrus of Persia (Hdt. 1.86). Cyrus decides to burn Croesus 
alive, and on the lit pyre Croesus shouts out the name of Solon. This is a 
17 Other examples of internal evaluation: 2.115, 3.30.1, 3.43, 3.64, 7.228.
18 Other examples of moral evaluations by oracles: 1.167, 1.174, 2.133, 5.114. For the 
narrative authority of the Delphic Oracle in Herodotus see Kindt (2006).
19 Major studies of this pattern are Immerwahr (1966), Fornara (1971), Lateiner (1989), 
Harrison (2000). 
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clear instance of judgement by internal authority and shows that we are 
meant to take Solon’s speech as a true insight: human life in the world of 
Herodotus’ Histories is, indeed, uncertain, and prosperity only temporary.
As the Histories progress, Croesus’ success and downfall are repeated, 
with variations, by each of the Persian kings: Cyrus is a good king in the 
beginning, but becomes overconfident and believes himself blessed by the 
gods (ἐμεῦ θεοὶ κήδονται καί μοι πάντα προδεικνύουσι τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα: 
1.209.4), which leads to him attacking the Massagetae and losing his life. 
Cambyses is bad (and mad) from the outset and commits numerous acts 
of both impiety (3.16, 25, 29) and cruelty (3.14, 27, 31–3). He finally dies 
from a self-inflicted wound after discovering that he has killed his brother 
needlessly and lost his throne to an impostor (3.64). Darius is an acceptable 
king to begin with, but then becomes increasingly overconfident (4.83, 
4.91) and cruel (4.84), leading up to his Scythian expedition, which ends 
in disaster (4.134–42).20 Finally, the biggest villain of them all, Xerxes, is 
led to invade Greece partly by his own ambition, partly by divine dreams 
playing on this ambition.21 He then commits transgressions and atrocities 
– from whipping the Hellespont (7.35) and being mistaken for Zeus (7.56) 
to cutting young men in half (7.39) and burying children alive (7.114) – and 
finally loses the war and his dignity (7.115–20). Other characters in the 
work display similar, albeit shorter, story arcs, such as the Egyptian king 
Apries (Hdt. 2.161–3 and 169) and Polycrates, tyrant of Samos (3.39–43 
and 120–5). The lessons to be learned from this pattern are not uncompli-
cated, and we shall return to them below.
A type of moralising related to the repetition of a pattern is moralising 
by means of a narrative juxtaposition. This can be done within a passage, 
as in 8.99, which begins with a description of celebrations in Susa because 
of Xerxes’ capture of Athens, marking it the first half of a pair with μέν, and 
then narrates the arrival of the message about the defeat at Salamis and the 
Persian reaction to it in the corresponding δέ-clause. Most often, however, 
20 Waters (1971: 62–3 with n. 44) argues that, as Darius survives his Scythian adventure, 
he cannot be said to meet divine vengeance. Waters uses this as an argument against moralis-
ing and patterns in Herodotus. However, Herodotus portrays Darius’ escape from Scythia as 
a very close call and hints that complete disaster would have followed if the Ionians guarding 
the bridge had not remained loyal, or if Darius had not left Scythia in time (Hdt. 4.134–42). 
The fact that Darius does see reason and retreats before it is too late means that he, in con-
trast to Cyrus, is saved by his own realisation of the limits set to his power (thus Gould 1989: 
105). It is also worth remembering that Herodotus was writing moral history, not fiction: 
the historical Darius did in fact escape from his Scythian adventure unscathed, so Herodotus 
could not very well let his narrative alter ego die on the campaign. He was, however, free to 
interpret Darius’ career as an example of arrogance and overconfidence checked at the last 
moment and of disaster being averted.
21 Baragwanath (2008: 242–53) offers a perceptive analysis of the interplay between the 
different factors influencing Xerxes’ decision-making.
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the contrast is played out over longer stretches of narrative, and the reader 
has to make the comparison without hints such as μέν–δέ constructions. 
Thus, Spartan courage, steadfastness and fighting ability at Thermopylae 
are contrasted with Persian uselessness in 7.208–12, and, more subtly, the 
hunger and desperation of Xerxes’ army on their flight to the Hellespont 
after Salamis (8.115–20) contrast with the exaggerated and overconfident 
splendour of the same army when it reached the Hellespont at the outset 
of the expedition (7.44–56), heightened by the moralising vignette of the 
conversation between Xerxes and Artabanus about the fragility of human 
life and success at 7.45–52.
Importantly, however, none of this is ever uncomplicated. Herodotus 
shows very clearly that not even Xerxes is all bad and that his down-
fall was not simply due to his transgressions. It is now time to explore 
what messages it may be possible to extract from the patterns and their 
complications.
MORAL LESSONS
The overall lesson of the Histories, as has been hinted above, is one about 
the relationship between human beings and the divine forces that rule the 
world. We begin with the programmatic story of Croesus, the rich and 
powerful Lydian king who becomes a slave of Cyrus the Great. Such a 
spectacular peripeteia forcefully conveys the message that human life is 
in the hands of superhuman powers and therefore uncertain. For didactic 
purposes, the crucial question is whether Croesus could have done any-
thing to avoid his fate, and, interestingly, the answer to this question seems 
deliberately to have been left ambiguous. In Solon’s speech there is no hint 
that human beings can influence their own fate. Human existence is ruled 
by τὸ θεῖον, τύχη and ὁ θεός, which appear to be either different aspects 
of the same force or different expressions for it.22 On the other hand, the 
narrator introduces the story of Croesus’ loss of his son by stating that ‘a 
big righteous retribution from the god (ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη) struck 
Croesus, as far as one can guess, because he thought himself to be the hap-
piest of all men’ (1.34.1).23 This amounts to saying that if Croesus had lis-
22 Harrison (2000: 158–79) has a good discussion of these concepts in Herodotus and 
concludes that it is impossible to distinguish rigidly between them. 
23 Waters (1971: 47) argues that Herodotus only introduced the idea of nemesis ‘to assist 
in presenting to his audience, mainly persons of little historical perceptiveness and obviously 
having no historical training at all, certain facts and features of the history he was recording’. 
To this it is necessary to ask (1) what ‘historical training’ did Herodotus himself have in an 
age before history was invented? And (2) if what he really meant was ‘some people say this 
was nemesis, but I do not believe in that’, why did he not write that when he elsewhere is not 
afraid to put forward unpopular ideas (e.g. 7.139)?
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tened to Solon and learned humility, his son would not have been killed.24 
However, when Cyrus has decided to spare Croesus and let him send to 
the Delphic Oracle to ask about its reasons for tricking him into invading 
Persia (1.90–1), it tells him that ‘the god’ was punishing him, not for his 
own arrogance, but for the misdemeanour of his ancestor Gyges. It also 
tells him that Apollo has postponed the destined disaster for three years, 
but that even the gods cannot alter fate (1.91.1–2).
Herodotus never attempts to explain the contradiction between these 
three different explanations for Croesus’ misfortune, and probably no 
logical explanation should be attempted: as Harrison has rightly and force-
fully argued, contradictions are common in all belief systems.25 Moreover, 
important events in the Histories are often overdetermined, that is, brought 
about by a number of different and sometimes logically mutually exclu-
sive causes such as predetermination, divine vengeance and purely human 
motivations.26 This overdetermination does not make the story of Croesus 
devoid of a moral, it just makes the moral less clear-cut: Croesus suffers 
partly because human life is inherently uncertain and subject to the will of 
jealous and incomprehensible divine powers, partly because he does not 
stay moderate and humble in his success,27 partly because one of his ances-
24 It has been pointed out (by e.g. Shimron 1989: 35) that the narrator ascribes only the 
loss of Croesus’ son and not his further fate to superhuman punishment. This is strictly true, 
but the fact that the idea of divine vengeance has been expressed in connection with Croesus’ 
overconfidence makes it easy for the reader to keep it in mind in the narrative, which shows 
him not learning from the loss of his son.
25 Various explanations have been attempted by scholars trying to make logical sense of 
the story. Shimron (1989: 42–9) argues that Herodotus himself did not believe in the Pythia’s 
explanation (or, indeed, any of the oracles given to Croesus), basing his argument on the 
λέγεται in 1.91.1. However, this λέγεται is not a distancing device; it simply shows that the 
narrator (and Herodotus) was not present when the Pythia gave its answer, but later had it 
reported to him. What Herodotus personally believed and did not believe is impossible to 
know, but it is clear that his narrator persona holds an inconsistent religious belief, and we 
can therefore assume that such an inconsistency was acceptable to both Herodotus himself 
and his intended audience. See Harrison (2000: passim) and Versnel (2011: 527–38). 
26 This feature of Herodotean causation has been recognised by many. See particularly 
Lateiner (1989: 196–210), Gould (1989: 61–9), Pelling (1991: 139–42). Herodotus’ narrative 
use of complex and multiple character motivations is explored by Baragwanath (2008). 
27 Waters (1971: 3, 45–7) argues that our general impression of Croesus is of a good 
and ‘pious but foolish person’, and uses this to argue against the episode forming a pattern 
with the narrative of Polycrates. Gould (1989: 125) and Harrison (2000: 42–3) also argue 
that Croesus is supposed to be a good man. This positive attitude to Croesus may have 
been influenced by his role in earlier Greek poetry (cf. Georges 1994: 169–76), but I do not 
believe that it is to be found in the Histories. Here Croesus is ‘the first to commit injustice 
against the Greeks’ (Hdt. 1.5), he is rude to Solon and loses his temper when he does not 
receive the answers he was hoping for, he shows arrogance in believing himself to be the 
happiest of all, and surely it is a sign of impiety to test the famous oracles before daring 
to trust them (see the words of the Croesus of the Cyropaedia 7.2.17). It is a modern mis-
conception that this shows positive ‘scientific research’ (Waters 1971: 45). Croesus only 
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tors committed regicide. Thus the main message of the story is descriptive 
and thought-directing: human life is uncertain because it is ruled by powers 
whose motives we cannot fathom. But from the realisation of this message 
it is a small step to interpreting it prescriptively: we should stay moderate 
and humble in our times of success because they may well change to dis-
aster in the blink of an eye. By avoiding arrogance we show proper under-
standing of the way the world works and our place in it as mere mortals, 
and this makes us more likely to avoid the jealousy of the mysterious god(s) 
and thus more likely to continue to prosper.
The same is true for the downfalls of overconfident and abusive men in 
power throughout the Histories: these seem to be brought about partly as 
divine punishment for crimes committed in the arrogance that inevitably 
follows great wealth and power, partly because the downfalls are either 
fated or simply necessitated by the inherent uncertainty of human life. The 
narrator never provides an explicit interpretation. Outside of the stories 
that conform to this pattern, however, disasters are sometimes ascribed by 
the narrator to divine vengeance. Such vengeance can punish individuals 
for their own transgressions (e.g. sacrilege, 8.129) or for those of an ances-
tor (e.g. 1.13 and 1.91), and the narrator will sometimes express doubt over 
which exact action led to the punishment (e.g. 6.75–84.1) or over whether it 
was a case of divine vengeance at all (e.g. 3.33).28 In cases of doubt, a pun-
ishment that somehow mirrors the crime seems to be an indicator of divine 
involvement (e.g. Cambyses wounding himself ‘in the same place where 
he himself had previously struck the Egyptian god Apis’: 3.64), pointing 
forward to the fascination with mirroring or ironic punishment seen in 
Diodorus, Timaeus and Phylarchus.29 A revealing passage is 7.133, where 
the narrator declares that he ‘cannot say what misfortune happened to the 
Athenians’ because they had killed Persian envoys.30 It shows that he fully 
expects some punishment to have struck the men responsible but that he 
simply cannot put his finger on the exact events that fulfilled that function. 
In Sparta, he goes on to explain, the divine punishment struck the sons 
of two heralds who had been sent to Persia to pay with their lives for the 
Spartan transgression, but been pardoned by Xerxes; and this coincidence 
shows that it was indeed divine punishment (‘that it fell on the sons of the 
becomes good, wise and pious from experiencing on his own body the truth of Solon’s 
words. 
28 Other examples of divine punishment: 1.105, 1.167, 2.120, 2.133, 3.128.5, 4.205, 5.85, 
6.72, 6.84.3, 6.91, 6.134–5 and 137, 6.139–40, 8.20, 8.105–6, 8.129, 9.64. 
29 See also 7.137.
30 ὅ τι δὲ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ταῦτα ποιήσασι τοὺς κήρυκας συνήνεικε ἀνεθέλητον γενέσθαι, 
οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαί τι, πλὴν ὅτι σφέων ἡ χώρη καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐδηιώθη. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐ διὰ ταύτην τὴν 
αἰτίην δοκέω γενέσθαι: Hdt. 7.133.
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men who had gone up to the king because of the wrath . . . makes it clear to 
me that it was a divine event because of the wrath’, τὸ δὲ συμπεσεῖν ἐς τοὺς 
παῖδας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων τῶν ἀναβάντων πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ τὴν μῆνιν, . . . 
δῆλον ὦν μοι ὅτι θεῖον ἐγένετο τὸ πρῆγμα ἐκ τῆς μήνιος: 7.137).
Sometimes divine destruction of human lives is rather less straight-
forward than simple punishment. Occasionally, the gods seem to be 
upholding some sort of law, according to which there need to be equal 
amounts of good and bad fortune in the life of each human being. This 
seems to be the case with Polycrates, who famously tries to safeguard 
his good fortune by inflicting grief on himself by throwing away a pre-
cious ring, only to get it back by a freak accident and then suffer death 
and crucifixion (3.39–43 and 3.120–5). Although Polycrates has certainly 
done enough to deserve divine punishment – killing and exiling his 
brothers, committing piracy (3.39) – the fact that the superhuman forces 
feel compelled to give him back his ring before punishing him points to 
some sort of balance to be upheld.31 A similar mechanism seems at work 
for Ameinocles, who is only mentioned once in the Histories, in order for 
the narrator to state that he paid for his sudden wealth by losing his child 
(ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν τἆλλα οὐκ εὐτυχέων εὑρήμασι μέγα πλούσιος ἐγένετο· ἦν γάρ 
τις καὶ τοῦτον ἄχαρις συμφορὴ λυπεῦσα παιδοφόνος: 7.190). At other 
times the actions of the divine forces seem incomprehensible,32 such as at 
7.12–19, where divine dreams bully Xerxes into invading Greece against 
his better judgment, and 9.93–4, where ‘the gods’ for no apparent reason 
send wolves against their own sacred flocks and then punish the town 
of Apollonia for punishing the sleeping shepherd. These divine actions 
are never explained. The reader is left with the impression that human 
life is uncertain because it is the subject of incomprehensible and ulti-
mately unknowable superhuman forces whose motives can at best be 
guessed at.
Moreover, Herodotus’ gods are a lot readier to deal out death and suf-
fering than long life and happiness. Very few cases of divine rewards are 
mentioned in the Histories apart from that of Cleobis and Biton, who are 
rewarded for an extraordinary display of filial piety with the dubious gift 
of instant death (1.31.1–3), and that of Croesus, having his dire fate post-
31 In this case the gods work through a human being, Oroetes. For a brilliant discus-
sion of the function of the alternative explanations of his motives see Baragwanath (2008: 
96–100). For a perceptive discussion of the Polycrates story which focuses on Polycrates’ 
transgressions rather than divine jealousy see van der Veen (1996: 6–22).
32 Shimron (1989) makes much of this and takes it to mean that Herodotus did not 
believe in oracles and miracles. I would still argue that we cannot know what Herodotus 
believed, but that his narrative shows repeated divine intervention, some of which happens 
to be incomprehensible by application of human logic.
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poned for three years by Apollo (1.91.2–3).33 Even in books 6–9, the nar-
rative of the Persian invasions of Greece, the gods’ siding with the Greeks 
seems to have more to do with the impieties and cruelties committed by 
the Persians than with a desire to reward the Greeks for good behaviour.34
The overall didactic lesson of the Histories, then, is not to feel too com-
fortable in success and not to let good fortune go to your head. This is 
strikingly similar to the dominant moral lesson of Polybius’ Histories and 
one of the main lessons of Diodorus’ Bibliotheke. In the works of these 
two Hellenistic authors, the lesson is often delivered in the context of a 
victorious general deciding how to treat the defeated and/or his captives. 
Such situations are also found in Herodotus. The most famous is the one 
between the victorious Cyrus and his captive Croesus, where Cyrus first 
tries to burn Croesus alive, but is then intrigued by Croesus’ calling out 
the name ‘Solon’ and decides to put out the flames (1.86). That this is the 
right decision and the one a reader should emulate is not stated explic-
itly, but signalled through various means. Firstly, the narrator expresses 
uncertainty about Cyrus’ motivation for burning Croesus and offers three 
different suggestions (sacrificial victim, votive offering or test of Croesus’ 
status with the gods: 1.86.2), demonstrating the strangeness and incompre-
hensibility of the decision. In contrast, when Cyrus then changes his mind 
and decides to spare Croesus, his motivation is expressed with complete 
certainty; now the narrator understands his reasoning (1.86.6; see below). 
Secondly, typically of this world of divine dominance and human power-
lessness, it is, in fact, not Cyrus who spares Croesus in the end, but Apollo, 
who makes it rain to put out the fire that has become too strong for human 
beings to control. This act of divine intervention makes Cyrus – and with 
him the reader – realise that ‘Croesus was dear to the gods and a good 
man’, and, by implication, that it was wrong to maltreat him (1.87.2).35 It 
is instructive to compare Cyrus’ reasons for not burning Croesus with the 
moralising statements we have seen in Hellenistic historiography:
καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀκούσαντα τῶν ἑρμηνέων τὰ Κροῖσος εἶπε, μεταγνόντα τε καὶ 
ἐννώσαντα ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον, γενόμενον ἑωυτοῦ 
εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐλάσσω, ζῶντα πυρὶ διδοίη, πρός τε τούτοισι δείσαντα τὴν 
τίσιν καὶ ἐπιλεξάμενον ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ἀσφαλέως ἔχον, 
κελεύειν σβεννύναι τὴν ταχίστην τὸ καιόμενον πῦρ καὶ καταβιβάζειν Κροῖσόν 
τε καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κροίσου.
When Cyrus had heard the explanation that Croesus gave, he changed his 
mind and realised that he himself was a human being and was about to burn 
33 Other divine rewards: 2.141 (divine help is sent in the form of an army of mice), 2.181 
(prayer to Aphrodite is answered).
34 Impieties and cruelties of the Persians: 7.32–3, 7.39, 7.53, 8.32–3, 8.35–9, 8.53.
35 The same points about this scene are made in more detail in Hau (2008: 123–5).
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alive another human being, who had been his equal in good fortune. And 
fearing the punishment for this action and considering that nothing is safe 
in human life, he ordered the burning fire put out as quickly as possible and 
told both Croesus and those with him to come down. (Hdt. 1.86.6)
The stress on being human, as opposed to divine, is recognisable from 
Diodoran moralising on human ability/inability to handle good fortune, 
as are the idea that mistreating someone in one’s power may well bring 
down (divine) punishment (τίσις in Herodotus, τιμωρία in Diodorus), 
and the stress on the shared humanity of the victim and the perpeprator, 
signalled here by ‘who had been his equal in good fortune’, γενόμενον 
ἑωυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐλάσσω. The uncertainty of human life and the 
risk that the victor may one day end up in the same situation as his captive, 
which are both also implied by this expression, are topoi in Polybius. 
Herodotus’ techniques to bring this message across are more subtle than 
those employed by the two Hellenistic historiographers, but the message is 
fundamentally the same.36
Apart from arrogant and immoderate behaviour in good fortune, 
Herodotean readers are taught to avoid impiety and cruelty. These two 
vices are often displayed together, most magnificently by Cambyses, son of 
Cyrus the Great. In the course of thirteen chapters he burns down a temple 
of Zeus and pushes his men so hard on a poorly planned desert crossing 
that they descend into cannibalism (3.25), kills Egyptian officials (3.28), 
whips Egyptian priests and tries to kill the sacred Apis bull (3.29), assassi-
nates his own brother (3.30) and kills his sister-wife in anger (3.32), shoots 
dead a young boy to prove his sanity, buries prominent Persians alive (3.35) 
and makes fun of a cult statue of Hephaestus (3.37). During this narrative, 
Cambyses’ madness is repeatedly stressed (ἐμμανής: 3.25.2; ὑπομαργότερος: 
3.29.1; οὐ φρενήρης: 3.30.1 and 3.35.4 ἐξεμάνη: 3.33.1 and 3.34.1) and his 
actions are labelled ‘crimes’ (ἀδίκημα: 3.30.1) and ‘evil deeds’ (τῶν κακῶν: 
3.31.1). The narrative is rounded off with a moralising digression, which 
states that ridiculing religious and other customs is a sign of madness 
(3.38).37 When Cambyses dies in 3.64–6, the statement that his self-inflicted 
wound is said to be in ‘exactly the same place where he had previously 
struck Apis the Egyptian god’ implies that his death is brought about by 
divine forces as punishment for his actions, but the connection is never 
made explicitly. This is typical of Herodotus’ moralising: characters who 
36 A similar moral of moderation in victory is propounded by 9.78–9, where Pausanias 
refuses to maltreat Mardonius’ dead body after his victory at Plataea, although here the 
contrast is between Greeks and barbarians rather than between human beings and immortal 
gods.
37 πανταχῇ ὦν μοι δῆλα ἐστὶ ὅτι ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἱροῖσί τε καὶ 
νομαίοισι ἐπεχείρησε καταγελᾶν: 3.38.1.
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commit impiety in the Histories tend to come to grief, but the connection 
between the crime and the punishment is made clear at most through juxta-
position of action and result, as, for instance, in the narrative of Miltiades, 
who is injured in the attempt to plunder a sanctuary and later dies from 
gangrene.38 Interestingly, cruelty can also be interpreted as impiety, as in 
the fate of Pheretime, who has taken an exaggerated revenge on her son’s 
murderers (thus also transgressing the bounds of reciprocity) and is eaten 
alive by worms ‘as if the gods are displeased by [lit. jealous at] too strong 
vengeance by human beings’ (ὡς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιμωρίαι 
πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται: 7.205).The impious deed does not have to be 
as spectacular as this, though: people who ignore oracles and bad omens, or 
misinterpret them, also fail in their projects and often come to sticky ends.39
Correspondingly, piety is an important virtue in the Histories. Characters 
who follow the – correctly understood – advice of oracles fare well (3.153, 
5.1, 5.114), and Pausanias’ steadfast waiting for favourable omens at the 
Battle of Plataea seems to earn the Greeks the support of the gods (9.61–2). 
Piety as recommended by Herodotus is not as straightforward as the piety 
propounded by Diodorus, however. It is complicated by the fact that the 
Herodotean gods can use trickery to get what they want, and that some 
clever human beings are occasionally able to manipulate the divine forces. 
Thus, the Cymeans ask the oracle at Branchidae what they should do about 
a suppliant who is putting them in danger. The oracle tells them to give him 
up. Suspicious of this answer, the Cymean Aristodicus goes to the oracle 
and manages to trick it into revealing its true intention: it gave them bad 
advice in order to bring them to destruction because they were even asking 
what to do with a suppliant. The Cymeans then hand over the hapless sup-
pliant to a third party and avoid disaster (1.158–9). Similarly, King Sabacus 
of Egypt dreams that he should cut all the priests in half, but he believes that 
the dream has been sent in order to drive him to sacrilege, which the gods 
could then punish, so instead of obeying it he leaves Egypt and goes into 
exile, apparently avoiding the catastrophe (2.139). Aristodicus and Sabacus 
are thus rewarded for their sagacity by averting the looming disaster, and 
the narrative seems to encourage the reader to admire them.40 Apparently, 
blind obedience to the gods is not always the same as true piety.
38 That makes Cambyses (3.64–6), Miltiades (6.134–5) and Cleomenes (6.72–86) three 
Herodotean characters who die of wounds received in odd ways as a consequence of commit-
ting impiety. Other characters commit impious deeds and suffer, either in the same episode 
or later: 1.105, 1.183.10, 5.42, 6.66, 6.91–2.1, 6.96, 6.101.3.
39 E.g. 1.55–6, 5.42, 6.76. Croesus’ testing of the famous oracles is another instance of 
impiety (1.46–8).
40 Another example of clever human beings tricking the divine or getting away with 
reinterpretations of its will are the Athenians and Themistocles (7.139.6–143).
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Alongside the unfathomable divine powers, another force rules the 
Herodotean world, more human, but no less powerful: the force of reci-
procity.41 In its simplest form reciprocity means returning good for good 
and evil for evil (not necessarily proportionately), and in this form it is 
seen repeatedly in the Histories: from the tit-for-tat of the girl abductions 
in 1.1–4, via Darius’ Greek campaign occasioned by Atossa’s promise to 
the doctor who cured her breast cancer (3.133–4), to the proleptic state-
ment about how the Spartans would later leave Decelea alone during the 
Peloponnesian War because the Deceleans had helped the Tyndaridae in 
mythical times (9.73), far-reaching political decisions in the Histories are 
made on the basis of personal or national reciprocity.42 On a smaller scale, 
characters in Herodotus’ world are generally punished for their evil deeds 
and often repaid or even rewarded for their good ones by their fellow- 
human beings.43 When reciprocity is breached, this earns harsh words from 
the narrator.44 The relationship between kings and their subjects is proba-
bly also to be considered on this model: kings who treat their subjects well 
win loyalty and posthumous fame;45 those who mistreat their subjects are 
deposed or at least defamed.46 This is not quite the iron law of power being 
secured by mild treatment of the ruled that we saw in Diodorus, but it is 
not a million miles away from it.
Beside the divine and reciprocity, a third force plays a part in the 
Herodotean universe, namely the mechanism that leads from wealth and/
or possession of a fertile land to luxurious living and from there to degen-
eration, softness and cowardice.47 We meet it already in the Croesus story, 
where Croesus after his capture saves the Lydians from enslavement by 
turning them from a constant threat to their new Persian masters into a 
docile and unwarlike people by forcing them to wear luxurious cloth-
ing and spend their time playing music (1.155–7). In the narrative of the 
Persian Wars, the mechanism takes on explanatory force, as a moralising 
vignette presenting the exiled Spartan king Demaratus in conversation with 
41 Reciprocity in Herodotus has often been discussed; see e.g. Gould (1991) and Braund 
(1998) with references to earlier scholarship.
42 Other examples are 3.1, 3.49, 4.152, 5.82–9, 5.99, 5.102 and 105, 6.108.
43 Human punishment: 2.100, 2.151–2, 3.49, 3.118–19, 4.202 and 4.205, 5.82–9, 5.102, 
8.90, 8.105–6; human rewards/repayments: 1.42, 3.129–32, 3.139–41, 4.152, 5.90, 6.108, 
7.181. 
44 See e.g. 3.120.1 (Oroetes committed a terrible crime by murdering Polycrates although 
he did not know him) and 6.87.1 (despite the fact that the Aeginetans still have not paid for 
a wrong they have done to Athens, they feel they are the injured party).
45 See e.g. 2.129 and 133, 2.161–2 and 169, 3.89.3.
46 See e.g. 1.130.1, 2.124 and 128.
47 This pattern and its significant variations have been discussed by, among others, 
Flory (1987: 81–118), Hartog (1988), Gould (1989: 86–109) and Pelling (1997). Thomas 
(2000: 28–74) connects it with the environmental determinism of the Hippocratics.
 Herodotus 191
Xerxes sets out a clear connection between Greek, and especially Spartan, 
poverty, freedom and courage in contrast with the luxury, slavery and cow-
ardice of the Persians, thus offering a moralistic model for understanding 
the ultimate Greek victory (7.100–5). This causal connection is reinforced 
in the final chapter of the work, where, in an analeptic digression, Cyrus 
the Great advises his contemporary Persians against giving up their rugged 
lifestyle for a life in luxury. Combined with the reader’s knowledge, largely 
from the Histories itself, of the luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by fifth-century 
Persians and the fact that they lost the war, this ending carries both great 
irony and great explanatory force. The fact that some important Persians 
(and Greeks) in the Histories subvert the stereotype compels a reader to 
engage actively in the narrative and ask himself at any given point whether 
environmental determinism is at work or not.48 Thus it is not an easy, 
catch-all causal explanation, but one moral-didactic strand among several. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that it is a moral message which continues to live 
on in Hellenistic historiography as late as Posidonius.
There are no digressions in the Histories condemning any particu-
lar inter-human vice in a way parallel to the digression on impiety and 
mocking of religion we saw above. Cruelty is a staple feature of the behav-
iour of kings and tyrants of all nationalities, often emphasised by evalua-
tive phraseology and not rarely punished by either divine or human forces 
(or a combination of the two: 8.106.4), but never discussed at length.49 
Actions born out of greed occasionally earn a negative epithet or are pre-
sented negatively through moralising vignettes or internal evaluation,50 but 
do not occupy much thematic space. Likewise, inter-human virtues do not 
hold a big place in the Histories. Justice51 and courage52 are praised occa-
sionally and are sometimes shown to lead to advantages. The reader can be 
in no doubt that these are virtues to strive for, and cruelty and greed vices 
to avoid, but their scattered appearances means that they simply cannot 
occupy the same amount of thematic space as the overarching message of 
humility in the face of the uncertainty of human life.
So, in terms of action-directing advice, what lessons might a reader learn 
from the Histories? In terms of positive recommendations of actions, the 
moral is vague and not foolproof: towards other human beings, one should 
return kindness for kindness and hurt for hurt; towards the gods, one 
48 Pelling (1997).
49 Moralising on cruelty in Herodotus: 2.119, 3.34.1, 3.147.2 and 149, 6.31–2, 6.91–2.1, 
6.101.3, 6.138, 7.39, 8.106.4, 8.116.1. 
50 Moralising on greed in Herodotus: 1.187, 2.126, 3.21, 5.51, 6.86, 8.112.
51 Moralising on justice in Herodotus: 1.96–8, 2.129 and 133, 4.106, 7.164.
52 Moralising on courage in Herodotus: 4.11, 5.119, 5.124.1, 7.100–5, 7.107, 7.135, 
7.139, 7.153.4, 7.208–12, 7.229, 7.231, 8.92, 9.37, 9.71.
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should show piety by performing the correct sacrifices and consulting the 
oracles about important decisions – but apparently one has to be careful 
about the types of questions asked, and if the answer seems unethical, one 
may well be better off not following the advice. The message is clearer 
on what actions to avoid: impiety towards the gods along with cruelty, 
greed and dependence on luxury in the human sphere; but above all one 
should avoid arrogance and complacent overconfidence when things go 
well. Keeping a humble and moderate state of mind should help one to 
treat mortals and immortals alike with the respect they deserve and is also 
the best guard against the uncertainty of life. Because the ways of the super-
human powers that rule the world are ultimately unknowable by human 
beings, the risk of superhumanly imposed disaster can never be nullified, 
but it can be reduced if one stays moderate in all things.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We can conclude that Herodotus does indeed moralise. We see forerunners 
of the Hellenistic techniques of guiding and digressive moralising as well 
as of the more subtle types of evaluative phrasing, vignettes, speeches and 
internal evaluation. Over and above these types of moralising, we have 
seen that Herodotus conveys a moral message by the forceful means of 
patterning and repetition. It is this macro-level moralising that gives the 
Histories its structure and makes it feel like a coherent whole despite the 
multiplicity of stories and characters. Without it, the Histories would be 
not just unintelligible, but meaningless. Immerwahr, in his famous study of 
the structure of Herodotus’ Histories, once stated that ‘the study of struc-
ture has the effect of isolating the purely historiographical aspects of the 
work, together with their philosophical foundations . . . it is significant that 
moral, religious, and anthropological ideas appear chiefly in the internal 
structure of individual logoi, whose external structure reveals the pattern 
of history’.53 I would argue that such a separation is impossible: the struc-
tural patterns which Immerwahr identify as ‘purely historiographical’ are, 
in fact, moral. The fact that morality is used in a causal manner to explain 
historical events such as the rise and fall of kings shows that Herodotus 
is writing Moral History, not, say, Economic History, or Environmental 
History. Moral didacticism forms the backbone of the work.
It is not only many of the moralising techniques that are recognisable 
from Hellenistic historiography; most of the moral lessons are too: every 
work of history we have looked at so far condemns cruelty, impiety and 
greed and points to a correlation between the way a ruler treats his subjects 
53 Immerwahr (1966: 308).
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and the success of his rule. The overarching message of Herodotus, that 
one should stay humble in success, is also a prominent message in Polybius 
and Diodorus. There are two important differences, though, between the 
moral messages of the Hellenistic historiographers and those of Herodotus. 
Firstly, Herodotus’ message is much more ambiguous: for every clear-
cut message (‘one should obey the gods’, ‘greed is bad’) there seems to 
be a counter-message (‘but sometimes the gods are trying to mislead 
you’, ‘sometimes people get away with it’), even if less strong. Things in 
Herodotus are never clear-cut, and this leads to the second important dif-
ference: Herodotus’ advice on how to behave in the world is necessarily 
vague. The Histories is not a handbook, for statesmen or anyone else; it 
shows how the world works (according to Herodotus) and tries to endow 
its reader with the mind-set necessary in order to cope with it.
5. Thucydides
Thucydides is generally considered the paragon of an amoral historiogra-
pher. Even if most scholars (classicists, at least, if not historians) nowadays 
agree that his History is not an ideal, objective account of events ‘just as 
they happened’, few are happy to talk about ‘moralising’ or even moral 
didacticism in the work.1 Rather than moralising, it is common to look for 
Thucydides’ political views, psychological insights, political theory or per-
sonal opinions, which are assumed to be more or less hidden in the text.2 I 
would argue that, like other Greek historiographers before and after him, 
Thucydides did not distinguish between moral and political opinions, or 
between moral and practical didacticism. In this chapter, we shall search 
Thucydides’ History, first for the types of moralising we have seen in 
Polybius and Diodorus, then for other ways of teaching moral lessons, and 
finally we shall ask what those moral lessons might be. At the end, I hope it 
will be clear that Thucydides is not a lone non-moralising historiographer, 
but that there are features of his moral didacticism that set him apart from 
his predecessor and successors.
1 The notable exception is Cornford (1907), who, breaking with the positivist concep-
tion of Thucydides, suggested that his History was a prose tragedy, the main character of 
which was Athens, and the theme of which was divine punishment of hybris provoked by 
unexpected good fortune. Another exception is Moles, who in his brilliant 1993 article states 
that ‘Thucydides would have been astonished by modern claims that he was not a moralist’ 
(1993: 114). Rutherford (1994) argues that Thucydides’ work is didactic, but intellectually, 
not morally. Hornblower (1987: 133) argues that Thucydides was almost alone among 
ancient historians in that he did not moralise. However, Hornblower later qualifies this view 
(1987: 184–92) and argues that Thucydides is not a morally neutral, or amoral, writer, but 
simply generally hides his own point of view from his readers.
2 See e.g. de Romilly (1963), Finley (1940, 1947), Hunter (1973), Macleod (1983a), 
Connor (1984), Hornblower (1987, 1991, 1994, 1996), Orwin (1994), Rutherford (1994), 
Crane (1998), Rood (1998), Kallet (2001), Stahl (2003).
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PREFACE
The introduction to Thucydides’ History is deliberately structured on the 
same framework as the introduction to Herodotus’ Histories: a brief proem 
presenting the author and his work (1.1) followed by a quick overview 
of ancient/mythological history (the Archaeologia, 1.2–19), followed by a 
second first-person statement setting out part of his methodology (1.21–2).3
An important purpose of the proem is to distinguish his work from 
that of Herodotus, without ever mentioning the latter’s name: the war 
(not even the account of it, but the actual war) is ‘written’ (συνέγραψε: 
1.1.1) rather than ‘a presentation’ (ἀπόδεξις), and the fact that the author 
himself lived through the war and experienced it is emphasised, whereas 
Thucydides insists that it is ‘impossible’ (ἀδύνατα: 1.1.3) to find reliable 
information to do what Herodotus did, namely write about earlier time 
periods.4 Moreover, Thucydides’ topic is the ‘greatest disturbance there 
has ever been for the Greeks and a part of the barbarians’ (τοῖς Ἕλλησιν 
καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων: 1.1.2), these latter surely being mentioned 
exclusively for the benefit of readers who might think that Herodotus’ 
topic was greater in geographical scope, at least, if not in importance.5 We 
shall soon see that Thucydides and Herodotus have more in common than 
Thucydides is letting on.
In the methodology chapters, this superiority to Herodotus, and others, 
is reiterated: the account offered in the Archaeologia is more reliable 
than the accounts of the poets, who exaggerate, and of the prose writers, 
who are more interested in entertainment than in truth, whose sources 
cannot be checked, and who deal with a time that is more or less myth-
ological (1.21.1).6 Then the greatness of the topic is repeated (1.21.2), 
before Thucydides offers some notoriously ambiguous information about 
his practice of reporting speeches (1.22.1). Returning to the difference 
between his approach and Herodotus’, Thucydides then claims not to have 
written down simply what he heard from ‘any random  passer-by’ (ἐκ τοῦ 
3 The similarity to the structure of Herodotus’ prefaces has also been discussed by 
Woodman (1988: 6–7), Moles (1993) and Stadter (2012). Thucydides’ ‘second preface’ at 
5.26–7, where he explains his decision to continue the work after the Peace of Nicias, is not 
concerned with the purpose of the History.
4 τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαίτερα σαφῶς μὲν εὑρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα 
ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω 
γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα: 1.1.3.
5 There is much scholarship on the relationship between Thucydides and Herodotus; 
see, for instance, the papers in Foster and Lateiner (2012). For an exploration of links 
between their prefaces see Moles (1993).
6 οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα 
ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα: 1.21.1.
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παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος: 1.22.2) or however he himself thought it had 
happened (ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει: 1.22.2), but to have constructed his account on 
the basis of a comparison of eyewitness accounts (1.22.3). Next, Thucydides 
offers a statement about the purpose of his work:
ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων 
ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα 
κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ 
παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.
It will be enough for me if it [my work] will be judged useful by those who 
will want to examine with perfect clarity both the events of the past and 
those of the same and similar kinds which will happen again at some point 
in the future according to the human condition. It exists as a valuable object 
for all time rather than as a competition piece for immediate consumption. 
(Thuc. 1.22.4)
Here, for the first time in extant Western historiography, the purposes of 
memorial and didacticism are explicitly connected: the History is going 
to be useful for those who want to understand both the past (memorial) 
and the future, that is, their own present (didacticism). This is what will 
give the work its value and make it last forevermore. It is impossible to see 
exactly how Thucydides expected events of the past to repeat themselves,7 
but there can be no doubt that a certain level of similarity is the premise 
on which his didacticism (like any historical didacticism) is based. More 
importantly for our purposes, it is not clear that Thucydides is talking 
about moral didacticism, or, indeed, didacticism with any other purpose 
than a purely intellectual one. To find out in what exact way he intended 
his work to be useful we must wait until we have followed his narrative 
further.
MORALISING TECHNIQUES
Despite Thucydides’ reputation as a non-moralising historiographer, many 
of the types of moralising encountered in Polybius and Diodorus can also 
be found in his History. The one he most commonly uses is even the most 
explicit type, namely digressive moralising. Some of his moralising digres-
sions are well known, but are usually discussed under different names; for 
instance, 2.65, the obituary of Pericles, which is a key passage for anyone 
7 This is an issue that has caused intense scholarly debate and many creative interpre-
tations of Thucydides’ words by historians uncomfortable with the idea that history can ever 
repeat itself or that their great predecessor might have believed that it did. See e.g. Gomme 
(1945: ad loc.). See Hornblower (1991: ad loc.) for references to scholars who accept the idea 
of repetition. 
 Thucydides 197
analysing Thucydides’ political views or attitude to Athens. The passage 
does, however, carry a moral message, along with a practical/political one: 
good leaders are authoritative, intelligent and incorruptible (τῷ τε ἀξιώματι 
καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος: 2.65.8) and 
do not abuse their power (μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν 
πρὸς ἡδονήν τι: 2.65.8). They lead the state moderately and safely (μετρίως 
καὶ ἀσφαλῶς: 2.65.5) with a strong hand (2.65.10). Bad leaders, on the 
other hand, want power for selfish reasons and care more about their own 
interests than about those of their city (2.65.10–12). This message is little 
different from Polybius’ moral-didactic messages about good leadership. 
We shall return to this comparison below; for now it is enough to note 
that the Thucydidean passage is, in fact, moralising. Other moralising 
digressions in the History are 3.82.1–2, on how war as a ‘brutal teacher’ 
(βίαιος διδάσκαλος: 3.82.2) de-civilises human beings (see below, p. 212); 
4.65.4, which establishes Athenian success-induced overconfidence as the 
cause of their actions; 6.54.2–7, arguing that Pisistratid tyranny was not 
an evil; 8.24.4–5, which takes Chios as an exception to the rule that most 
people(s) become overconfident in their good fortune; and 8.89.3, on how 
self-seeking and individual lust for power are the weakness of every oligar-
chy. These digressions can, indeed, be used to analyse Thucydides’ political 
views or ‘own opinion’ about various matters, but they can also be read as 
morally instructive.
Thucydides also employs most of the other types of Hellenistic moral-
ising, if only occasionally. His brief obituary of Nicias (7.86.5; see below, 
p. 212) is a clear example of a moralising conclusion; most of the narrative 
of the civil war in Corcyra is an instance of evaluative phrasing (3.82.3–
83);8 the attribution of Heraclea in Trachis’ lack of success to the harshness 
of its Spartan governors (3.93.2) shows correlation between conduct and 
result; and the vivid description of Athenian despair as they retreat from 
Syracuse (7.75.7) can be read as moralising through pathos, with the added 
finesse of punishment that mirrors the crime (see below, p. 203).
One type of moralising employed sparingly by Polybius and Diodorus is 
used much more extensively by Thucydides, namely speeches. Interpreting 
speeches in Thucydides, however, is trickier than in Polybius and Diodorus.9 
No speech is ever endorsed by the narrator, no speaking character except 
for Pericles is set up as a straightforward moral authority (see below, 
p. 213), and no speech completely echoes explicit narratorial moralising. 
The task is not impossible, however. By comparing a speech with the 
8 3.84 is probably spurious; see Hornblower (1991: ad loc.).
9 How to interpret Thucydides’ speeches has been one of the burning questions of 
scholarship on this author for more than a century. For good discussions with references to 
previous scholarship see ‘Speeches’ in Hornblower (1987), Garrity (1998) and Pelling (2009). 
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narrative surrounding it in order to judge its view of past events and pre-
dictions of future events against the narratorial presentation of both, the 
reader can usually get an idea of how to respond to the speech. Sometimes 
additional guidance is given in the shape of evaluative epithets attached to 
the speaker (Cleon: 3.36.6)10 or to the issues discussed (πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον: 
3.49.4), or the response to the speech (6.24), or by the speech being left 
unopposed (4.17–20, 4.59–64). We shall discuss one of the last type in more 
detail below.
Many speeches and speech-pairs are, however, left without a moral 
steer from the narrator. These instances often function as presentations 
of moral dilemmas. An example is the pair of speeches delivered by the 
Corcyraeans and Corinthians in Athens before the outbreak of the war. 
The Corcyraean speech argues that the Athenians should form an alli-
ance with them despite the fact that they have no grounds for gratitude 
or friendship, on the grounds that they will help Athens in the future 
(1.32–6). The Corinthians argue that the Athenians should support them 
because the Corcyraeans have broken the traditional bonds of obligation 
towards their mother-city out of arrogance induced by their great wealth, 
because a treaty of non- interference exists between Corinth and Athens, 
and because the Athenians owe the Corinthians a favour (1.37–43). It is for 
the reader to make up his mind about the situation: should the Athenians 
honour reciprocity and traditional ties, or secure allies for the war they 
think will come? Thucydides provides the problem, not the solution, and 
he does not add any words of evaluation to the Athenian decision, on 
the grounds of self-interest, to back Corcyra (1.44.2). Such a technique 
is not usually labelled ‘moralising’, but it is an effective way of present-
ing a moral dilemma to readers, who are encouraged to make up their 
own minds, perhaps influenced by the subsequent narrative of how the 
Athenians’ siding with Corcyra becomes a catalyst for the Peloponnesian 
War. In this way the technique is didactic. Thucydides could have told the 
story without the two speeches, and without telling the reader the reason 
for the Athenians’ decision; the fact that he includes this information forces 
the reader to consider the basis for Athenian decision-making and, by 
extension, political and personal  decision-making more generally, and its 
possible implications. This technique contrasts sharply with Polybius and 
Diodorus’ general practice of telling the reader exactly how to evaluate 
most actions and events, although Polybius’ juxtaposition of the four dif-
frent Greek views on the destruction of Carthage is similar (Polyb. 36.9; 
10 Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ 
ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, παρελθὼν αὖθις 
ἔλεγε τοιάδε: Thuc. 3.36.6.
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see above, p. 37). It is not uniquely Thucydidean, as we shall see in our dis-
cussion of Xenophon in Chapter 6. A more extreme version of letting the 
reader draw his own conclusions from a presentation of a moral dilemma 
is the Melian Dialogue. This passage is unique in Greek historiography for 
being a dramatic dialogue written out in lines as if for delivery, and without 
the scene-setting and visual details that would make it into a vignette. We 
shall return to the function of this dialogue below.
This implicit way of getting the reader to think about moral questions 
is symptomatic of most of Thucydides’ moral didacticism. A favourite 
method, not used by Polybius or Diodorus, is juxtaposition of information, 
as in the narratorial conclusion to the Spartan destruction of Plataea:
καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων 
ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.
And so Plataea perished in this way in the ninety-third year after she became 
the ally of Athens. (Thuc. 3.68.5)
The information about the length of the Plataea–Athens alliance is not 
there for chronographic reasons; Thucydides has already introduced his 
system of counting years from the beginning of the war and uses this to 
help the reader keep track of the timeframe. The information about the 
ninety-three years is there to alert the reader to the enormous failings of 
Athens as an ally, in that they did not come to the help of the Plataeans 
at any point during their ordeal and in the end let them be annihilated by 
their common enemy. It makes the reader think about the obligations of 
allies and the destructive force of ruthless self-centredness. Likewise these 
two narratorial remarks which frame the narrative of the savage civil war 
in Corcyra:
ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, 
Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον.
During the seven days that Eurymedon stayed there after arriving with his 
sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued to massacre those of their own cit-
izens whom they considered to be their enemies. (Thuc. 3.81.4; translation 
modified from Warner)
οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς 
ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς 
ναυσίν·
And so, throughout the city the Corcyraeans used such violent passion 
against each other for the first time, and Eurymedon and the Athenians 
sailed away with their ships. (Thuc. 3.85.1)
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The juxtaposition of the information about the Athenian general 
Eurymedon and his sixty ships with references to the savageness of the 
civil war is as good as a moralising conclusion saying ‘the Athenians had 
the power to stop the Corcyraeans massacring each other, and yet they 
did nothing’. The difference between Thucydidean narratorial conclusions 
and those encountered in Polybius and Diodorus is that the former lets the 
reader draw that inference for himself. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
readers like this. We dislike being told what to think and prefer to feel that 
we have detected the author’s hidden meaning in the text. In fact, however, 
the meaning is not very well hidden: Thucydides meant the reader to get 
it. Throughout his History he repeatedly and deliberately juxtaposes bits 
of information to make the reader think about the moral implications of 
what he is reading. This may not be moralising in the traditional sense of 
that word, but when read in the light of Thucydides’ claim for the eternal 
usefulness of his text, as ‘similar kinds [of events] will happen again at 
some point in the future according to the human condition’ (1.22.4, quoted 
above), it is moral didacticism.
A type of moralising unique to Thucydides is the abstract, or general-
ised, summary of events. An abstract summary is a narrative that narrates 
not individual events, but rather types of events or general trends. The 
two extended examples in the History are the narrative of the effects on 
Athenian society of the plague (2.51.4–53) and the narrative of the effect on 
general behaviour and linguistic usage of the civil war in Corcyra (3.82.3–
83 [84 is probably spurious]). These abstract summaries do not just use 
evaluative phrasing, but actually have moral issues as their main focus: the 
chapters of the plague narrative discuss the problem of people not daring 
to care for the sick for fear of contagion (2.51.4), the disregard of law and 
customs (2.52) and the complete breakdown of society (2.53); the Corcyra 
chapters focus on how morality and semantics alike change under the 
stress of civil war. This is not so much historiographical moralising as pure 
moral history: morality is the prime focus, and the author’s interest is in 
the history of morality, and not from a neutral standpoint: when reading 
these chapters there can be no doubt that Thucydides deplores the erosion 
of traditional morality11 to be replaced by this dog-eats-dog mentality. We 
shall return to this below.
Arching above all of these instances of micro-level moralising, 
Thucydides also imparts a moral message by means of the macro-level 
structure of his work. If one turns to Thucydides’ History immediately after 
reading Herodotus’ Histories, the narrative from book 1 to book 7 seems 
11 See particularly 3.83.1. This passage is the point of departure for the insightful dis-
cussion of Crane (1998).
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to follow the Herodotean pattern of success–overconfidence– disaster: The 
Athenians, whose rise to power and success is detailed early on in the 
Pentecontaëtia (1.89–117), become increasingly arrogant and overconfi-
dent throughout the narrative and ultimately suffer complete disaster in 
Sicily.12
We do not have the space here to trace every step of the Athenians from 
successful and confident to monstrously arrogant and overconfident, but 
key moments are: the first speech of any Athenian in the work (1.73–8), in 
which they are confident, but still try to dissuade the Spartans from war; 
the Mytilene Debate (3.36–50), which is our first extended encounter with 
their nasty side; their refusal of the Spartan peace offer after their initial 
successes in Pylos (4.17–21), which is generally recognised as a turning 
point in the narrative; their exiling of the generals who did not conquer 
all of Sicily on the first expedition there (4.65.4), a decision which the nar-
rator in his own voice puts down to overconfidence induced by success;13 
the Melian Dialogue (5.84–111; see below); and finally the extravagant 
and overconfident send-off of the fatal expedition to Sicily (6.31–2). The 
disaster follows in book 7. Book 8 seems to constitute a new beginning, 
but it is impossible to know where Thucydides would have taken it, had he 
completed the work.14
This is moralising by means of the repetition of a recognised pattern, 
but the Thucydidean manifestation of the pattern is intertextual: it is based 
on a template found in Herodotus’ Histories. The intertextuality works 
because Thucydides references Herodotus repeatedly, although implicitly, 
in his prefaces, as we have seen above, and because he shows, by including 
the Pentecontaëtia to bridge the chronological gap, that he considers his 
work a continuation of, as well as an improvement on, Herodotus’. Even 
a fifth-century reader not au fait with Herodotus would, however, have 
been likely to pick up the message: as Cornford demonstrated long ago, 
the Athenian trajectory follows a pattern recognisable from fifth-century 
tragedy, which also had a strong presence in lyric poetry.15 The  highlighting 
12 The History has often been read as a story of the deserved fall of Athens; see e.g. 
Cornford (1907), de Romilly (1963) (who ascribes the downfall to imperialistic ambi-
tion and hybris), Hunter (1973: passim, but esp. 134–5 n. 13), Rawlings (1981), Macleod 
(1983a), Connor (1984), Hornblower (1987: 172–3) (focusing on pleonexia, not overconfi-
dence), Rood (1998) and Kallet (2001). None of these scholars, however, talk of the theme as 
 moral-didactic in nature. 
13 αἰτία δ᾽ ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος: 
Thuc. 4.65.4.
14 I am, however, extremely tempted by the brilliant hypothesis of Rawlings (1981) that 
the History was meant to end with an ‘Athenian Dialogue’ mirroring the Melian Dialogue.
15 Cornford (1907). The theme of the inconstancy of human fortune and the dangers of 
becoming complacent when successful has been explored briefly across ancient Greek genres 
by Cairns (2014). 
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of Athenian overconfidence by the Spartan speaker at 4.17–20 and again 
by the narrator in 4.65.4 would have set alarm bells ringing in the mind of 
any ancient Greek.
MORAL LESSONS
The moral lessons of Thucydides are as complex as those of Herodotus. In 
the following, we shall try to unpick what he may have intended a reader 
to learn from his History.
How the World Works: Uncertainty and Misinterpretations
One overall lesson of the History, as we have already seen, is that success 
tends to lead to overconfidence, which leads to disaster. The first stage, 
that success leads to overconfidence, is expressed as a general truth in a 
digression at 8.24.4–5, which begins with the statement that ‘the Chians 
are the only people apart from the Spartans of whom I know who have 
been successful and moderate at the same time’ (Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ 
Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν). 
However, the whole chain reaction is most clearly expressed by the 
Spartan ambassadors to Athens in their speech for peace (4.17–20). The 
main theme of the speech is the uncertainty of human life and the fick-
leness of fortune. The Spartans argue that by making peace now, the 
Athenians would ‘handle their good fortune well’ (εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν 
καλῶς θέσθαι) and avoid ‘what usually happens to people who are unex-
pectedly successful’ (οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγαθὸν λαμβάνοντες), namely that they 
‘always hopefully reach for more because their present good fortune was 
unforeseen’ (ἀεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὁρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα 
ἀδοκήτως εὐτηχῆσαι: 4.17.4). The speaker proceeds to exemplify the 
changeability of fortune by Sparta’s recent defeat by Athens. Then he 
states that war is governed by fortune (αἱ τύχαι) and that good and mod-
erate people (σωφρόνων ἀνδρῶν) are able to stay moderate in both good 
and bad times because they know that their fortunes may change at any 
moment (4.18.4). He proceeds to apply the theory to Athens (4.18.5): they 
are now at the height of their good fortune and should conclude peace. If 
they do not, and then later are defeated (which could easily happen due to 
the changeability of fortune), they will be thought to have been successful 
only because of tyche (presumably because they will have shown that they 
do not possess wisdom).
After the end of the speech, several features point to its endorsement by 
the narrator. First of all, in contrast with the many speech-pairs in the work, 
it is a single speech with no counter-speech, leaving the Spartans’ argu-
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ments for peace unopposed.16 Secondly, the negative Athenian response to 
the speech is led by Cleon, who has earlier been stamped as the opposite 
of a moral authority by the epithet ‘most aggressive’ (βιαιότατος: 3.36.3). 
Thirdly, the narrator gives two reasons for the Athenians’ rejection of the 
peace offer: they have the captives on Sphacteria and so believe that it is 
up to them to make peace whenever they want – that is, overconfidence 
induced by success – and they ‘want more’ (τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο) – 
that is, they lust for power. This narratorial interpretation confirms what 
the Spartan speaker has just said, and the latter expression echoes the 
speech (4.17.4, quoted above). It is repeated by the narrator as an Athenian 
motivation for rejecting further Spartan overtures a few chapters later 
(οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους 
ἀπέπεμπον: 4.41.4).
The speaker’s claim that such success-induced overconfidence brings 
disaster on the overconfident is confirmed gradually in the subsequent nar-
rative, first when the Athenians are made despondent by difficulties at 
Sphacteria (4.27) and regret that they did not accept the offer of peace 
(4.27.2); again after the loss of Amphipolis, when they for a second time 
regret turning the offer down (5.14.1–2 and 15.2); and ultimately when the 
Sicilian Expedition suffers annihilation. At this point, Thucydides’ style 
becomes more vivid and laden with pathos than in any other part of the 
work. As the Athenians retreat from Syracuse, without provisions for 
the march, forced to leave behind the sick and wounded, and crying as they 
do so, the reader feels pity for them; but then comes the sting in the tail:
μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς 
ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ 
πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ᾽ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν 
τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι, πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν 
πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ.
For indeed this was the biggest change in circumstance for a Greek army. 
It happened that they, who had come to enslave others, instead went away 
fearing to suffer this fate themselves, and that, instead of the prayers and 
paeans with which they had sailed out, they started on their way back with 
words of ill omen, travelling as footsoldiers rather than marines, trusting to 
infantry rather than navy. (Thuc. 7.75.7)
In this brilliant piece of antithetical writing, the Athenian suffering is com-
pared both with their previous good fortune and with their crimes, namely 
their evil plans for Syracuse. The great emphasis on changed circumstances 
16 This is de Romilly’s (1963: 173) main reason for taking it to reveal Thucydides’ own 
opinion. Contra Rood (1998: 42–3).
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in the Greek is hard to convey in English, but I have underlined the six 
words in Greek which focus on this aspect of the Athenians’ situation. The 
mirroring of crime and punishment and of previous good fortune and high 
hopes with present suffering are characteristic features of both Herodotean 
and Hellenistic moralising, as we have seen. Thucydides’ way of doing it 
is more subtle than the one seen in Hellenistic historiography; here the, 
relatively brief, antithesis has the effect of drawing the reader’s attention 
to the previous success, the premature and cruel plans, and the present 
disaster at the same time without ever making the moral explicit. It is this 
absence of explicit narratorial evaluation that makes the passage moving 
to a  twentieth- and twenty-first-century audience, but the moral is nonethe-
less there, in the Athenian story arc, and in this specific passage: you should 
strive to avoid becoming overconfident in your success, because overconfi-
dence leads to wrongheaded treatment of other people and an overreaching 
of one’s own limits, and thereby to disaster.17
This mechanism of success-–overconfidence–disaster is only part of the 
larger uncertainty of human fortune, though. Throughout the History, the 
reader is frequently reminded of the precariousness of human life (by, for 
instance, the massacre of unsuspecting Mycalessians at 7.29, the phrasing 
of which clearly expresses the narrator’s disgust),18 the unpredictability 
of events (by, for instance, the narrative of the Pylos and Sphacteria cam-
paign at 4.1.14 and 29–40, with internal evaluation)19 and the infinitesi-
mally small margin by which human life and death are decided in war (e.g. 
‘so close did Syracuse come to disaster’, παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι 
ἦλθον κινδύνου: 7.2.4).20
The big difference between the uncertainty that rules the world of 
Thucydides and the one that governs the universe of Herodotus is that 
17 Stahl (2003) argues that Thucydides does not moralise in this passage, but that he 
recognises the universality of the Athenian mistake. I would agree that Thucydides probably 
considered the success–overconfidence–fall pattern universal, but would add that he con-
sciously directs the reader’s attention both to the nature of the Athenian mistake and to its 
cost, and in the light of 1.22.4 I find it unlikely that he did not hope his readers would learn 
from this.
18 On the moral bearing of the Mycalessus narrative see Kallet (2001: 140–6).
19 This narrative has been brilliantly analysed by Hunter (1973: 61–83), who has shown 
that Thucydides is taking pains to make the success of the Athenians look fortuitous rather 
than carefully planned. She argues convincingly that the purpose of this misrepresentation is 
to show Demosthenes, the man most responsible for the success at Pylos, as a paradeigma of 
the unexpected good fortune which would eventually destroy Athens by cementing Cleon’s 
power and the people’s pleonexia. Rood (1998: 24–39) modifies Hunter’s interpretation by 
correctly observing that the Pylos narrative is not about the ‘intervention of fortune’, but 
about the ‘role of the unexpected’, the most unexpected thing of all being the Spartan surren-
der. See also Connor (1984: 108–18) and Stahl (2003: 138–49). 
20 For a discussion of such side-shadows (i.e. hints at other possible outcomes) in 
Thucydides see Grethlein (2010) and Hau (2013).
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Thucydidean uncertainty has nothing to do with superhuman powers. The 
Thucydidean narrator never ascribes any events to an act of a god, the 
gods or the divine. Only twice does the narrator attribute events to tyche, 
both times pertaining to weather (Thuc. 3.49.4 and 4.3.1).21 Speakers in 
the History largely mention the gods for two reasons: either to call them to 
witness on the justice of their own course or the injustice of their enemies’ 
and to pray for their help, usually with no effect, or to claim that the 
gods are or will be on their side in a war or battle, in which they are 
proved wrong more often than not.22 Nine times in the History speakers 
use expressions with tyche to warn that plans might go wrong in the future, 
and, crucially, the peripeteia of which the speaker has warned always 
comes true.23 However, in every instance the narrative provides the reader 
with a different, and human, cause of this peripeteia. For example, Nicias 
warns the Athenians that, due to tyche, they may well be defeated in Sicily 
(6.23.5), and they spectacularly are, but the reader who has followed the 
story through the voice of the narrator knows that their defeat is, in fact, 
due to the desertion of Alcibiades, the timely arrival and great talents of 
Gylippus and the resourcefulness of the Syracusans, not to any intervention 
of superhuman forces.24 Likewise, two speakers in the History use tyche as 
an explanation for a previous defeat while the narrative of that defeat has 
shown it to be due to such human causes as lack of skill or planning.25
This discrepancy between the world as experienced by the characters 
inhabiting it and as described by the narrator is clearly intentional. The 
fifth-century reader is here faced with a world he knows and is presented 
with two different views of how it works: on the one hand the homochronic 
view of people heavily involved in historical events, on the other hand 
the retrospective view of a detached, analytic observer. The analysis of 
Thucydides (presented most often not as analysis, but as narrative) shows 
21 Discussed by Edmunds (1975: 176–7).
22 Speakers who invoke the gods: Athenians in Sparta 1.78.4, Plataeans before the 
Spartan siege 2.71.4, Archidamus before besieging Plataea 2.74.2, Plataeans after their sur-
render 3.58.1, 3.58.5 and 3.59.2, Brasidas at Acanthus 4.87.2, Boeotians at Delium 4.97.4, 
Athenians at Delium 4.98.6, Athenian spectators to the Battle in the Great Harbour 7.71.3. 
Speakers who claim the gods are on their side: Sthenelaidas 1.86.5, Corinthians in Sparta 
1.71.5, 1.123.1 and 2, Pagondas 4.92.7, Nicias 7.69.2, 7.77.2, 3 and 4. 
23 Thuc. 1.78.1, 1.84.3, 4.18.3–4, 4.62.3–4, 4.78.3, 5.102, twice in 5.104, 6.23.5. The 
instances have also been collected by Edmunds (1975: 181–2), who, however, substitutes 
4.64.1 for 4.62.3–4.
24 This is well discussed by Edmunds (1975: 182–9).
25 Peloponnesian generals at Thuc. 2.87.2–3 and Nicias at Thuc. 7.61.3. Hunter (1973: 
47–56, 107–13) has a good discussion of both as well as of the conclusions to be drawn from 
their similarities. Nicias’ reference to tyche is picked up by Gylippus at Thuc. 7.67.4 and, 
with a memorable metaphor, 7.68.1, in order to show his and the Syracusans’ superiority at 
this stage.
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the reader that events which are unforeseen and therefore seem incompre-
hensible when experienced first-hand really do have human causes when 
properly investigated and analysed. It demonstrates that the world can 
be understood without recourse to divine powers, but only in hindsight. 
When living through the events, it is impossible to foresee everything that is 
going to happen, and for that reason one should not become overconfident 
in success, but stay moderate and clear-headed.26
The discrepancy between the characters’ and the narrator’s worldview 
is shown nowhere more clearly than in the Melian Dialogue (Thuc. 5.84–
116).27 The dialogue is highly artificial, certainly unhistorical, and clearly 
composed by Thucydides in order to make a moral-didactic point.28 In it, 
the Athenians attempt to persuade the Melians to give up their neutrality 
and join the Athenian alliance, threatening them with destruction if they 
refuse, while the Melians argue that they should be allowed to keep their 
independence.29 Prevented from arguing on the grounds of justice by the 
rules set down at the outset by the Athenians (5.89–90), the Melians argue 
that they have to resist in order to preserve their honour (5.100); that 
fortune is changeable, so the struggle might equally well turn out in their 
favour (5.102); that the gods will be on their side because they are in the 
right (5.104); and that the Spartans will come to their aid because they are 
their colonists and because it is the honourable thing to do (5.104, 106, 
108). In other words they use arguments based on a traditional concept of 
honour, the notion that fortune is fickle, a belief in divine justice, and the 
bonds of kinship – all fixed features of the Herodotean world. The warning 
about the changeability of fortune (Thuc. 5.102) is essentially the same 
argument employed in Herodotus by Queen Tomyris when warning Cyrus 
not to invade the land of the Massagetae (Hdt. 1.206). The difference is that 
Tomyris is proved right by the subsequent narrative and gets her revenge, 
while the Melians are proved wrong and are defeated and annihilated. This 
difference is significant. In the world of Herodotus, a warning like the one 
given by Tomyris only occurs when the person warned is about to embark 
on an unjust war, and, when ignored by the person warned, signals to the 
reader with absolute certainty that that person will fail in his enterprise, 
26 The importance of the unforeseen in Thucydides has also been noted by Cornford 
(1907), Finley (1940) and Stahl (2003). It has been well discussed by Edmunds (1975). 
27 The Melian Dialogue is one of the most discussed passages in Thucydides. See e.g. 
Cornford (1907: 174–87), Wassermann (1947), de Romilly (1963), Stahl (2003), Macleod 
(1974), Bosworth (1993), Orwin (1994: 97–117), Crane (1998: 241–53), Williams (1998: 195–
205), Hornblower (2008: 216–25).
28 The dialogue’s fictitiousness was already recognised by Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
(Thuc. 41).
29 For a discussion of the historical reality of Melian neutrality see Hornblower (2008: 
ad 5.89).
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most probably with disastrous results. When the same type of warning is 
given in the world of Thucydides, in the same breath as a condemnation of 
the injustice of the aggression, it works on an intertextual level – not just 
with Herodotus, but with the traditional Greek worldview – to make the 
reader aware of the traditional pattern and the expected narrative result of 
the warning, but at the same time also acutely aware of the fact that in the 
‘real world’ portrayed in Thucydides’ History such causality does not exist, 
and the gods do not favour the righteous.
The Athenians, on their side of the dialogue, argue that might is right 
(5.89, 5.97);30 that it is dangerous to trust in hope, prophecies and oracles 
(5.103); that the gods favour the strong, not the just (5.105.1–2); that the 
Spartans only ever act out of self-interest (5.105.3, 107, 109); and that cling-
ing to one’s honour leads to disaster (5.111.3–4). Does the narrator agree 
with them? Much ink has been spilt on arguing about which side of the dia-
logue Thucydides favoured. The very fact that such uncertainty can exist 
surely shows that he did not mean to take sides: the purpose of the dialogue 
is to illustrate a clash of morals and worldviews which he saw in his own 
time, between a traditional, more or less ‘Herodotean’ attitude based on 
the notions of divine justice and reciprocity, and a new, Sophistic attitude 
based on self-interest and the rule of the stronger.31 The subsequent nar-
rative shows the shortcomings of both types of ideology: in the short term 
the Athenians certainly prove that the Melians should neither have cared 
about their honour nor have relied on hope, the gods and the Spartans. 
In a longer perspective, however, Athens suffers mightily for its overcon-
fidence. The peripeteia is initiated in 6.1, the very first chapter after the 
narrative of the destruction of Melos, with the Athenian decision to launch 
the Sicilian Expedition. The message seems to be that one should not trust 
in either kinship (no help comes from the Spartans) or the gods, but that 
those who take advantage of this realisation to become overconfident and 
overreaching will suffer disaster. The destructive force is not divine, but 
rather a force inherent in the very nature of overconfidence, perhaps in the 
very nature of human beings, helped on their way by the de-civilising force 
of war (see particularly 3.82.1–2).32
30 Hornblower (1987: 185–6) points out that the Athenians do not explicitly say ‘might 
is right’. This is true, but their statement in 5.105.2 comes very close to saying so, and they 
certainly act as if this is their belief. 
31 Crane (1998) argues cogently and lucidly for a tension in the History between a tra-
ditional attitude which was prevalent at the time and a ‘modern’ or ‘realist’ attitude, which 
Thucydides tried and failed to reconcile. I would argue that Thucydides left the tension in his 
narrative deliberately as a piece of descriptive moral didacticism.
32 Others have reached similar conclusions. Particularly enlightening are the analyses of 
de Romilly (1963: passim, but esp. 327–8), Stahl (2003: 159–72) and Orwin (1994: 97–117).
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How to Act in the World: Simplicity versus Self-Seeking
This leads us to the question of how to act in this world without gods. On 
this topic Thucydides’ guidance is rarely more than implicit. The History 
offers no moralising digressions on virtues or flaws and only one extended 
evaluation of a character (Pericles at 2.65; more about this below). 
Guidance is given throughout, however, in the form of correlation between 
behaviour and result, juxtaposition, speeches and the occasional evaluative 
phrasing.
Most of all, it is clear how one should not behave. Throughout the 
History, decisions made in an emotional state, because of anger, desire or 
fear, consistently lead to disaster. Thus, the Athenians make the decision 
to annihilate the Mytilenians ‘in anger’ (ὑπὸ ὀργῆς: 3.36.2),33 but then 
later realise that such an action would be ‘cruel and enormous’ (ὠμὸν τὸ 
βούλευμα καὶ μέγα: 3.36.4), and they decide on the Sicilian Expedition 
under the influence of strong, emotional desire, emphasised in the narra-
tive by a cluster of words denoting mindless passion (τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν: 6.24.2; 
ὥρμηντο: 6.24.2; ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι: 6.24.3; πόθῳ: 
6.24.3; τὴν ἄγαν ἐπιθυμίαν: 6.24.4). Fear is the reason for the witch-hunt 
following the mutilation of the Herms (6.53 and 60), and for the outbreak 
of the entire war (1.23.6). Another important vice in the world of the 
History is greed for power, territory and wealth, expressed by the noun 
πλεονεξία and the expression πλέονος ὀρέγειν. This is the force that drives 
the Athenians to reject the Spartan peace offer (4.17.4 and 4.21.3) and is 
also a powerful motivator for the expedition to Sicily, and it plays a vital 
part in the breakdown of morals during the civil war in Corcyra (3.82.6–8 
and 84.1).
The role of these three irrational emotions in Thucydides has been rec-
ognised by many.34 Less discussed is an emotion which is no less destruc-
tive in the History, namely despondency brought on by misfortune. This 
state of mind and its disastrous effects are demonstrated repeatedly by 
the Spartans, both individually and as a body. Thus, Alcidas, the Spartan 
general sent to the relief of Mytilene, loses courage completely when he 
learns that the Athenians have already taken the city, and is too despondent 
to listen to sensible advice from his Elean adviser which might have saved 
Mytilene after all (3.29–31); and after their defeat at Pylos, the whole city 
suffers from it:
33 De Romilly (1963: 158), Hornblower (1996: ad loc.). The narrator also signals his 
distaste for the original decision by the vivid and emotional description of the effort made by 
the trireme sent to annul that decision; see Connor (1984: 16–17).
34 For the negative role of emotions in Thucydides see Stahl (2012).
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καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς 
ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις ξυμφορά τις αὐτοῖς 
περιτύχῃ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ. ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι’ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας ἦσαν, 
καὶ πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον 
γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀηθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν.
At the same time, they were in shock over the many misfortunes that had 
happened to them in a short space of time unexpectedly, and they were 
afraid that some other disaster should strike them, like the one on the island. 
For this reason they had little heart for battle, and every move they made 
they believed would be a mistake because their morale had been under-
mined as they were not used to setbacks. (Thuc. 4.55.3–4)
This is clearly not a desirable state of mind for a city, and it allows the 
Athenians a free rein in their sea raids (4.56–7). In fact the Spartans remain 
in the grip of this despondency (it is referred to at 4.108.7 and 5.13) until 
the Battle of Mantinea, when their allies rejoice that ‘although depressed 
by fortune, they were still themselves in spirit’ (τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, 
κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες: 5.75.3). The one Spartan who 
does not suffer from this inability to act in difficult situations is Brasidas. 
His un-Spartan quality35 is made clear when the cities in the north are 
elated by his successes and believe that the Spartans are finally acting deci-
sively (4.108.6),36 but the narrator immediately lets the reader know that 
Sparta as a state does not want anything to do with Brasidas’ actions 
(4.108.7).37 It is clear that the decisiveness is all his and has nothing to 
do with his fellow-Spartans. The true destructive force of despondency 
is, however, brought out by the actions – and, above all, inaction – of an 
Athenian, namely Nicias. His setbacks in Sicily bring him to despair, clear 
and contagious in his letter to the Athenians (7.11–15). Later, after even 
more setbacks, he advises against leaving Sicily because he cannot make up 
his mind what to do (7.48.3).38 The result is a delay (ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις 
35 See Edmunds (1975) for Brasidas’ ‘Athenian’ characteristics.
36 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων 
ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι: 4.108.6.
37 οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, 
τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον 
καταλῦσαι: Thuc. 4.108.7.
38 ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ᾽ ἐμφανεῖ 
τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν. εὖ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ 
ἀποδέξονται, ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. ‘Nicias was aware of all this and, 
though in fact he held back because he still could not make up his mind what course to take 
and was still considering the question, in the speech which he delivered openly on this occa-
sion he refused to lead the army away. He was sure, he said, that the Athenians would not 
approve of the withdrawal, unless it had been voted for at Athens’ (7.48.3). Strangely, many 
scholars have taken his pretext – unwillingness to face the Athenian demos after a failed 
expedition – to be his real reason (e.g. Finley 1947: 240, Edmunds 1975: 134, Williams 1998: 
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ἐνεγένετο: 7.49.4) which means that the Athenians are still in Sicily to expe-
rience an eclipse of the moon (7.50), which results in their final, fatal delay.
This final delay is due to a characteristic which is a virtue in every single 
other Greek historiographer (perhaps with the exception of Agatharchides), 
but which comes very close to being a vice in Thucydides: piety. Piety does 
not play a big part in the world of the History. In striking contrast with his 
continuator Xenophon (as we shall see), Thucydides keeps silent about the 
large number of sacrifices that were routinely carried out by generals in the 
course of their duty.39 Only three times in the course of the History are we 
told that someone consulted an oracle before making an important deci-
sion; in two cases the answer received leads to disaster: the Epidamnians 
are told to hand their city over to Corinth for protection, which leads to 
war with Corcyra and the destruction of Epidamnus (1.25.2 and 1.29–30), 
and Cylon is told to go ahead with his attempted coup in Athens, which 
ends in the death of all his supporters (1.126). In the third case, during 
the narrative of the plague, the narrator simply states that consultation 
of oracles was ‘useless’ (ἀνωφελῆ: 2.47.4).40 Moreover, the narrator twice 
passes negative judgement on the practice of taking guidance from oracles 
and omens: at the end of the plague narrative he comments on the ret-
rospective interpretation of an oracular saying with the wry statement 
that ‘people were adapting their memory (of the saying) to be in line with 
what they had experienced’ (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην 
ἐποιοῦντο: 2.54.3); and when Nicias gives in to the demands by his troops 
to obey the omen of the lunar eclipse and so fatally delays the retreat from 
Syracuse, the narrator explains his decision by the remark that ‘he was a 
bit too dependent on superstition and this kind of thing’ (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν 
θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος: 7.50.4). This bit of narratorial 
moralising is not as negative as has sometimes been made out.41 The mod-
ification of ἄγαν effected by τι creates a cautious and almost polite expres-
sion; after all, Thucydides could easily have said that Nicias was ‘far too 
dependent’ or ‘excessively dependent’ on superstition. There is probably 
more than one reason why he did not condemn Nicias more severely for 
240, 243). However, the narrator explicitly states that this was only the reason which Nicias 
gave in public (τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ . . . τῷ δ᾽ ἐμφανεῖ, followed by the pretext in oratio obliqua), 
probably because he thought that that would resonate with Demosthenes and his other 
advisers.
39 The exception is 6.69.2, which is part of an unusually detailed battle description.
40 There are three instances in the History of people responding to oracular sayings 
from an earlier time period: 1.103.2, 2.17 and 2.54. These all seem to come true, in keeping 
with Thucydides’ remark about the retrospective interpretation of such sayings at 2.54.
41 Westlake (1968), Edmunds (1975), Connor (1984) and Kallet (2001) all argue that 
the remark shows Thucydides’ disapproval of Nicias. Contra Cornford (1907), Stahl (2003), 
Rood (1998), Williams (1998). 
 Thucydides 211
his response to the eclipse: partly such a response to an unusual natural 
phenomenon was normal and expected in the world that he and Nicias 
shared, and partly Thucydides appreciated Nicias’ adherence to traditional 
morality (as we shall see below), of which piety was an important part.
Another important vice in the History is self-seeking at the expense 
of one’s city. This is the major flaw of Alcibiades, who is described as a 
supremely capable politician and general (6.15), but who only ever acts 
with his own glory in mind: he sabotages the Peace of Nicias because 
he feels slighted by the fact that it had not been negotiated through him 
(5.43), he advocates the expedition to Sicily because he wants the glory 
of conquering not only Sicily but also Carthage (6.15), and he defects 
first to Sparta and then to Persia out of spite (6.92). The narrator does 
not comment on any of this beyond the inference of motives, but when 
Alcibiades finally does something right, as late in the narrative as book 8, 
he calls this his ‘first beneficial act for Athens’ (πρῶτον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι: 
8.86.4). Self-seeking and lack of patriotism are likewise among the flaws of 
Cleon (4.27.3–29.1), who is usually recognised as the most villainous char-
acter in the History. His other flaws are expressed by evaluative phrasing: 
brutality (3.36.6), inability to stay moderate in good fortune (5.7.3) and 
cowardice (5.10.9–10).42 Brutality is described in vivid detail and earns 
explicitly moralising comments in the description of the atrocities during 
the civil war in Corcyra (3.81.5 and 3.82.2) and in the short, sharp narrative 
of the massacre at Mycalessus (7.29.4–5).43 The inability to stay moderate 
in good fortune is demonstrated repeatedly by the Athenians and leads to 
their downfall (see above). Cowardice does not otherwise play a part in the 
History.
After this list of vices, it is time to look for virtue in the History. It says 
something about the bleakness of the work that this is rather harder to find. 
The clearest statement about moral virtue made in the narrator’s voice 
comes, strangely, in the course of the abstract summary of the civil war in 
Corcyra:
οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ 
τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ 
ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν.
42 It has been argued that this portrait of Cleon is unlikely to be historical, and that 
Thucydides presents him in a bad light out of personal hostility. The historicity of Cleon’s 
personality as presented in the History is not our focus here, but we might note that if 
Thucydides did invent some details of it, he chose to include some very traditional vices, 
perhaps to make sure that his readers got the message. 
43 On the moral bearing of the Mycalessus narrative see Kallet (2001: 140–6).
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Thus every form of evildoing was established during the civil wars in Greece, 
and simplicity, which is a large part of nobility of character, was ridi-
culed and disappeared, and a distrustful, battle-arrayed hostility in opinion 
largely prevailed. (Thuc. 3.83.1)
What exactly is this ‘simplicity’? We can get a sense of it from the abstract 
summary of events of which it forms part (Thuc. 3.82.3–83). This summary 
begins with the statement that ‘men assumed the right to reverse the usual 
values in the application of words to actions’ (καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν 
ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει),44 conditioning the reader 
to think about the new ‘values’ honoured by the Corcyraeans as vices and 
to go through his own mental process of reversal in order to think about 
the virtues thus destroyed. Going through the long list of honourable terms 
applied to despicable behaviour and imagining their opposites, we arrive 
at the following set of no-longer-existing virtues: moderation in/avoidance 
of violence (3.82.3), foresight and moderation (3.82.4), respect for kinship 
(3.81.5 and 82.6), loyalty, honesty and abiding by oaths (3.82.6–7 and 83.2–
3), lack of greed for money and power (3.82.8), justice (3.82.8) and will-
ingness to put city interests before self-interest (3.82.8).45 These qualities 
are very much in line with the virtues propounded by both Herodotus and 
the Hellenistic historiographers, and it is clear that the Thucydidean nar-
rator considers them virtues as well. Disturbingly, however, Thucydides 
does not present these virtues as straightforwardly worthy of emulation: 
in these chapters on civil war, these are exactly the qualities that lead 
people to their deaths. In fact, the overall point of 3.82.3–83.4 is that such 
virtues have become liabilities that will most probably get you killed. This 
is seen not just in the Corcyra narrative, but also in the Melian Dialogue, 
as we saw above, and, with greater emotional force, in the brief obituary 
of Nicias:
καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν 
τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ  ̔Ελλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς 
ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.
And he died for such a reason or something very close to it, he who least of 
the Greeks in my time deserved to come to such misfortune, because he had 
ordered his whole life towards moral virtue. (Thuc. 7.86.5)46
44 The translation offered here is the one by Mynott (2013).
45 Williams (1998) analyses the ‘ancient simplicity’ on this basis in more detail. 
46 The meaning of διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν is contentious. The 
discussion centres on whether νενομισμένην is to be understood with ἀρετὴν, giving ‘merely 
conventional virtue’ (among others, Rutherford 1994: 62 and Orwin 1994: 139 n. 41) or 
‘what was considered virtue’ (Connor 1984: 205 n. 53), or with ἐπιτήδευσιν, rendering ‘his 
lifestyle having been regulated’ (among others, Gomme et al. 1970: ad loc. and Rood 1998: 
184 n. 9). I follow the latter interpretation and also take πᾶσαν with ἐπιτήδευσιν.
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This explicitly moral evaluation set forth in the narrator’s own voice has 
caused much consternation in modern scholarship. Many scholars have 
found it incongruous that Thucydides could at the same time show Nicias 
to be partly responsible for the Athenian disaster in Sicily and praise him as 
a good man and lament his death.47 The explanation is surely that Nicias’ 
behaviour – moderate (6.8.4), minded for peace rather than war (5.16, 
6.8.4), cautious (5.16, 6.8.4), foreseeing (6.8.4–6.14), pious (7.50.5), unmo-
tivated by greed for either power or money (5.16, 6.8.4), loyal to Athens (he 
sails to Sicily despite his misgivings and remains in command even during 
illness and after having made it clear that he considers the campaign a 
disaster) – is the epitome of the ‘simplicity’, or traditional virtue,48 which 
Thucydides admired and wished to be central to the way the world works, 
but which he increasingly saw ridiculed, outmanoeuvred and destroyed. By 
turning the reader’s attention at this moment of grief and high drama to a 
picture of the world as it should have been, Thucydides makes the reader 
grieve not just for Nicias, but for himself as a creature of this world.49
If such traditional virtue is not recommended in practice, what behav-
iour does Thucydides advise his readers to emulate? Across the eight books 
of the History, there is only one positive and viable paradeigma for behav-
iour, and that is Pericles. Pericles’ virtues are extolled in his obituary, the 
only extended character evaluation in the work (2.65). This passage focuses 
on Pericles’ supreme ability as a leader: his power to rule the ungovernable 
demos (2.65.1–4 and 8–9), his moderation and foresight (2.65.5–7), his 
authority, intelligence, integrity and lack of power lust (2.65.8), and the 
fact that his successors destroyed Athens by lacking these virtues (2.65.7). 
These same virtues are demonstrated in the other passages where Pericles 
plays a part: his strong leadership (1.127, 1.139, 1.140–4, 2.21, 2.34), his 
foresight (2.13), his intelligence (2.34), his integrity (2.13, 2.60), his com-
mitment to putting the city before himself (2.13, 2.35–46, 2.60–4). No 
criticism of Pericles is ever voiced or implied by the narrator. The absence 
of criticism might be considered surprising given the fact that Pericles is 
47 For attempts to explain away this narratorial evaluation see Gomme et al. (1970: 
ad loc.), Edmunds (1975: 142) and Connor (1984: 205). Strangely, this is not discussed by 
Kallet (2001), although one of her main conclusions is that Thucydides blamed Nicias for the 
Sicilian disaster. Hornblower (1987: 168–9) argues convincingly that Thucydides was critical 
of Nicias as a general, but sympathetic towards him on a personal level. For a good defence 
of the sincerity of the remark see Williams (1998: 244–6).
48 Finley (1947: 245–6) comes close to saying this when explaining the remark by a 
 reference to Nicias’ ‘moderation and stability’.
49 Rood (1998: 198 with n. 72) observes that the primary function of the character of 
Nicias is to create pathos, and comments on the similarity between the phrasing of the 
Thucydidean obituary and Arist. Poet. 1453a4 on the evoking of pity in tragedy. Cornford 
(1907: 190) also labels the character Nicias ‘pathetic’.
214 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
the politician who leads Athens into the war. This is, however, presented 
not as a villainous act, but rather as something about which the Athenians 
in reality had no choice: Pericles twice states as much in speeches (1.140, 
2.61.1), and it is confirmed by the narratorial discussion of the causes of the 
war: the underlying reason which made the war necessary (ἀναγκάσαι) was 
the growth of Athens and the fear this caused in Sparta (1.23.6). Since war 
was inevitable, Pericles showed his quality in recognising this to be the case, 
in galvanising the Athenians to face it with courage, and in advising them 
against overreaching themselves in the course of it.50 Foster has demon-
strated how discrepancies between Thucydides’ narrative and Pericles’ 
speeches show Pericles’ enthusiasm for war and confidence in Athenian 
victory to be wrong, but it is significant that Thucydides does not mention 
these shortcomings in the character evaluation of 2.65: they are failings, 
but minor ones compared to Pericles’ virtues.51 Pericles, then, is a paradigm 
of great leadership. The History has nothing to say about his traits as a 
private individual, and in this Thucydides’ moral paradeigma differs from 
the ones seen in Herodotus and the Hellenistic historiographers.
Pericles dies in Thuc. 2.65. His moderation and foresight dominate only 
the very beginning of the war and are then countered by the self-seeking, 
overconfidence, power lust and greed of his successors. Pericles’ qualities 
are to a certain degree mirrored in Hermocrates of Syracuse (see especially 
6.72.1), and some of them in other Athenian leaders (moderation and fore-
sight in Nicias, strong leadership in Alcibiades), but no one else is pre-
sented as a paradeigma for emulation. This makes the world of the History 
a very bleak place: old-fashioned virtue is dying and being hunted down, 
and there is no contemporary virtue to displace it.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Thucydides’ History cannot be separated from its moral lessons. When 
Thucydides decided to write a true narrative of the Peloponnesian War, 
this narrative for him entailed showing the truth about the absence of 
divine justice and the dying out of simple morality in the world. In this 
50 τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι 
μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· 
Eckstein (2003: 763–4) is technically correct that this means not that war was objectively 
inevitable, i.e. forced upon both parties by some impersonal, superhuman force (such as 
international systems theory), but that the Athenians forced the Spartans to war by their 
growth and the fear it caused. The practical implication of this interpretation, however, is 
that the only way the Athenians could have avoided the war would have been by dissolving 
their empire. As that was never on the table, war was inevitable. 
51 Foster (2010). I am less convinced by the argument of Taylor (2010) that Thucydides 
intends to throw Pericles’ definition into doubt.
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way he intended to make his work useful for a reader who wanted to see 
the world ‘with perfect clarity’, and thus make it ‘a valuable object for all 
time’.
Thucydides’ moralising has escaped censure by modern scholars 
because of its minimalist subtlety. His minimalist moralising feels ironic, 
almost postmodern, and rewards the alert reader. His speeches and the 
Melian Dialogue leave the conclusion hanging and give the reader scope 
to think for himself. Both of these techniques are more to the twentieth- 
and  twenty-first-century taste than the explicit moralising of Polybius and 
Diodorus. Thucydides does, however, also moralise explicitly, using some 
of the techniques that we see in Hellenistic historiography. Moreover, 
he moralises on the macro-level, by means of a pattern of success– 
overconfidence–disaster that plays on intertextuality with Herodotus and 
contemporary performance literature, and by means of repeated contrasts 
between the interpretation of the world offered by the characters and by 
the narrator of the History.
Through these means, an ancient reader of Thucydides is presented with 
a picture of his own world that is as radical as it is bleak: it is a world with 
no gods, where virtue does not pay, and the wicked often come off better 
than the good. Is this, then, moral didacticism? If Thucydides was recom-
mending wicked behaviour as more advantageous and praiseworthy than 
virtuous behaviour, that would be anti-moral didacticism. He is, however, 
not doing that. It cannot be stated clearly enough that the narrator of the 
History presents the injustice of the world as a deplorable reality (espe-
cially in the narrative of the Corcyraean civil war and in the obituary of 
Nicias) and not as an opportunity to be grasped. He would prefer the 
traditional virtues to prevail, but has learned from experience that they 
do not. This means that he cannot strongly recommend any way to act 
in the world. Pericles’ moderation and selflessness combined with a great 
statesman’s skills are a shining example, but the fact that it is the only such 
example in the work and disappears early in the story shows how rare it is 
in reality. Rather, Thucydides’ didactic message is an intellectual one; he 
offers understanding of the world, of human motivation and interaction, 
and of military success and failure, but no very certain recipes for how to 
obtain it. This is the ‘clarity’ promised in his preface. If his work should 
inspire readers to begin to practise traditional virtue in an attempt to save 
it from extinction, he would no doubt consider that an added achievement, 
as long as they did so with intelligence, foresight and the understanding of 
the world gained from reading his History.
6. Xenophon, Hellenica
If Thucydides is often regarded as too good a historian to moralise, 
Xenophon is often regarded as too much of a moralist to be a good his-
torian. Scholarship in the nineteenth century regarded Xenophon as an 
incompetent historian who wanted to think and write like Thucydides, but 
was intellectually incapable of doing so.1 This trend persisted throughout 
much of the twentieth century;2 but at the same time a trickling stream of 
scholars began to study the Hellenica on its own terms and discuss what 
its purpose may have been.3 Such discussions have generally concluded 
that the work’s purpose was to a certain extent moral. Grayson (1975) has 
even argued that the Hellenica is not historiography at all, but is a purely 
moral treatise. It is part of the purpose of the present study to show that 
a work can comfortably be both at the same time, and even that this was, 
in fact, the norm for Greek historiography. In the following, we shall see 
how Xenophon’s Hellenica in many ways functions as the link between 
Classical and Hellenistic historiographical moralising.
There is general agreement that Xenophon wrote the Hellenica in (at least) 
two instalments, the first (1.1.1–2.3.10) as a continuation of Thucydides4 
probably shortly after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the second 
(2.3.11–end) some, perhaps many, years later in a style more his own.5 
Nevertheless, I shall treat the work as a unified whole, in the belief that 
1 Niebuhr (1828), Schwartz (1889).
2 Delebecque (1957), Finley (1959), Westlake (1966–7), Soulis (1972).
3 Breitenbach (1950), Henry (1967), Krafft (1967), Anderson (1974), Grayson (1975), 
Higgins (1977), Cawkwell (1979). For the decision to include the Hellenica but not the 
Anabasis in the present study, see the Introduction.
4 However he himself understood that; see Dover (1981: 444).
5 First posited by MacLaren (1934). See also Anderson (1974: 61–72), Cawkwell (1979), 
Krentz (1989: 5), Dillery (1995: 12–15). Contra Henry (1967) and Gray (1989), who believe 
that it was all written in one continuous effort. Henry has a good discussion of the arguments.
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Xenophon intended it to be read as such, regardless of how many years 
passed between his writing of the first and second part.
PROGRAMMATIC STATEMENTS
The Hellenica has no preface. The fact that the first and last lines of the 
work make it, in effect, a chapter in a continuous story says much about 
Xenophon’s view of history;6 but it does not provide any information 
about the content or purpose of the work. For such information we need to 
turn to four brief, programmatic narratorial statements within the narra-
tive. The first one concerns the last words of Theramenes, who pretended 
to play the drinking game kottabos with the last drops of his hemlock and 
toasted Critias, his former friend, now persecutor. After quoting the joke, 
the Xenophontic narrator comments:
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ 
κρίνω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαστόν, τὸ τοῦ θανάτου παρεστηκότος μήτε τὸ φρόνιμον 
μήτε τὸ παιγνιῶδες ἀπολιπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.
I know that these witticisms are not worthy of mention, but I judge that this 
was an admirable quality in the man that on the threshold of death neither 
reason nor a sense of humour left his mind. (Xen. Hell. 2.3.56)
The second programmatic statement comes when the narrative switches 
from the land war to the war at sea during the Corinthian War:
καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ κατὰ γῆν πόλεμος οὕτως ἐπολεμεῖτο. ἐν ᾧ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα 
ἐπράττετο, τὰ κατὰ θάλατταν αὖ καὶ τὰς πρὸς θαλάττῃ πόλεις γενόμενα 
διηγήσομαι, καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μὲν ἀξιομνημονεύτους γράψω, τὰς δὲ μὴ 
ἀξίας λόγου παρήσω.
The war on land, then, had been fought in this way. While all of this had 
been going on, events happened at sea and in the cities by the sea which 
I shall now narrate. I shall write about those actions that are worthy of 
remembrance and pass over those not worthy of mention. (Xen. Hell. 4.8.1)
The third one is a justification for the detailed account of the celebration of 
the Spartan general Teleutias by his enthusiastic troops:
γιγνώσκω μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις οὔτε δαπάνημα οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε μηχάνημα 
ἀξιόλογον οὐδὲν διηγοῦμαι· ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρὶ 
6 Opening words: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἦλθεν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν Θυμοχάρης 
(‘Then, not many days later, Thymochares came from Athens’). Closing words: ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ 
μέχρι τούτου γραφέσθω· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἴσως ἄλλῳ μελήσει (‘Let the events this far have 
been written by me. The later ones will perhaps be someone else’s task’).
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ἐννοεῖν, τί ποτε ποιῶν ὁ Τελευτίας οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς ἀρχομένους. τοῦτο γὰρ 
ἤδη πολλῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ κινδύνων ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον ἐστίν.
I know that in this passage I am not talking about any great expense or 
danger or stratagem worthy of mention; but, by Zeus, this seems to me 
worthy for a man to think about: what Teleutias had done to make his sol-
diers feel this way. For this is a job for a man that is much more worthy of 
mention than any expenses or dangers. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.4)
And the fourth explains the decision to narrate in detail the Phliasians’ 
steadfast resistance against Argive aggression for the sake of keeping their 
alliance with Sparta:
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων πόλεων, εἴ τι καλὸν ἔπραξαν, ἅπαντες οἱ 
συγγραφεῖς μέμνηνται· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴ τις μικρὰ πόλις οὖσα πολλὰ καὶ 
καλὰ ἔργα διαπέπρακται, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξιον εἶναι ἀποφαίνειν.
For if one of the big cities does something glorious, all the historiographers 
mention it; but it seems to me that also if some city, although being small, 
has accomplished many glorious deeds, it is even more worthwhile to give 
an account of it. (Xen. Hell. 7.2.1)
What these four brief remarks have in common is the fact that they all 
explain Xenophon’s decision to include certain historical details to the 
exclusion (we must assume) of others.7 The details he decided to include 
are the witticisms uttered by a man about to die for his commitment to 
moderate government over bloody tyranny (2.3.56); a narrative of naval 
warfare that focuses on the personalities and leadership styles of a string of 
commanders on both sides, rather than on any overall picture of strategies 
or objectives (4.8.1);8 the honours showered on a talented and likeable 
commander by his loyal troops (5.1.4); and an extended narrative of the 
trials and tribulations of a relatively unknown city in its quest to keep its 
treaty of friendship with a bigger power (7.2.1). These are all details with 
a moral-didactic bearing. We shall return to the lessons they teach below; 
here we shall just note that whenever the Xenophontic narrator turns aside 
from the narrative to comment on his selection methods, these methods 
turn out to rest on moral-didactic principles.
For placing the Hellenica in its generic context it is significant that in 
the quoted passages Xenophon repeatedly plays with the word ἀξιόλογος, 
7 The passages were first discussed side by side by Breitenbach (1950: 17–22) and have 
since often been discussed in the context of Xenophon’s purpose; see e.g. Rahn (1971), 
Grayson (1975), Tuplin (1993: 36–41), Pownall (2004: 76–83), and, most cogently, Gray 
(2010). 
8 For a good, brief analysis of the relevant chapters in this light see Pownall (2004: 
76–9).
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‘worthy of mention/noteworthy/important’, in order to show how in every 
instance he thinks details important which might not be thought so by 
others. It would be tempting to assume that the main target for his apolo-
getic polemics is Thucydides,9 but this is not an unproblematic assumption: 
it is true that the details whose inclusion he defends would not be out of 
place in Herodotus, so this predecessor is unlikely to be his target, but 
it is less clear that they would in fact fall outside of Thucydides’ remit: 
Thucydides narrates the deeds and sufferings of small cities when they are 
morally significant (e.g. the sack of Mycalessus, Thuc. 7.29; see p. 204), 
can include witticisms (e.g. the Athenian jibe at the captured Spartans and 
their very Spartan reply, Thuc. 4.40), and sometimes comments on the 
likeability of a commander and its practical results (e.g. Brasidas, Thuc. 
4.81). We have to remember that we have lost most of the histories that 
were written as continuations of Thucydides; one of these – perhaps the 
one now known as the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, which seems to have been 
less morally focused than Xenophon and Theopompus, as we shall see in 
Chapter 7 – may well have set out explicit rules for what did and did not 
belong in a proper work of history, inspired by Thucydides, but going 
beyond his practice.10
MORALISING TECHNIQUES
Some of the types of moralising employed in the Hellenica are types pio-
neered by Thucydides. Juxtaposition is used to great effect, for instance 
between the oath-breaking of Tissaphernes and the pious oath- keeping of 
Agesilaus (3.4.6 with 11), between the leadership qualities of the Athenian 
Iphicrates and the Spartan Mnasippus (6.2.27–32), and between the 
Spartans’ trumped-up accusations of Ismenias at 5.2.35–6 and the narra-
tive of their own previous shady actions.11 There is also an instance, and a 
very effective one, of moralising by abstract summary, namely the final two 
chapters of the work (7.5.26–7).
 9 As has been done by Breitenbach (1950: 17–22), Rahn (1971) and Grayson (1975). 
Breitenbach recognises that the juxtaposition of Xenophon and Thucydides is not 
straightforward.
10 Gray (2010) argues that Xenophon’s ‘interventions’ were not intended as polemics 
against any other historiographer, but were meant to address his readers’ expectations of 
the content and moral judgements of his work. She is no doubt right about their function as 
reader guidance, but he must have had some reason for thinking that his practice was diverg-
ing from reader expectations, and it is simplest to assume that this reason was its difference 
from one or more of his influential rivals.
11 See also the contrast between Agesilaus’ treatment of Lysander in 3.4.7–9 and 
Pharnabazus’ of Spithridates in 3.4.10 (see Krentz 1995: ad loc.), between the god-like 
honours awarded to a bellicose king at 3.3.1 and the ignominious death of a peace-loving 
king at 3.5.25, and between the Spartan and Theban cavalry at Leuctra (6.4.10–12).
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Most of the moralising in the Hellenica, however, points clearly 
towards the kind of moralising we see in Polybius and Diodorus. There 
are a number of moral-didactic digressions, such as 5.3.7 on the dangers 
of acting in anger and 6.1.2–3 on the upright character of Polydamas.12 
Likewise, there are numerous instances of both introductory and conclud-
ing moralising, such as 4.4.2, which tells the reader that the Corinthian 
revolutionary party ‘made the most unholy plan imaginable’ (τὸ πάντων 
ἀνοσιώτατον ἐβουλεύσαντο), and 7.3.1, which rounds off the story of the 
Phliasian resistance against Theban aggression with the statement that ‘I 
shall move on now from the story of the Phliasians, how loyal they were 
to their friends, how steadfast they remained in the war, and how despite 
lacking everything they maintained their alliance.’13 This guiding moralis-
ing works exactly like its Hellenistic counterpart in telling the reader how 
to read certain episodes in a moral way. In contrast with the guiding moral-
ising of Polybius and Diodorus, however, it is never prescriptively didactic; 
the reader of Xenophon has to make the leap from admiring the Phliasians 
to applying the same virtues in his own life without help from the narrator.
Moral asides, which are such a defining characteristic of the Bibliotheke 
of Diodorus, are also used by Xenophon, particularly as brief explanations 
of actions. Thus, Phoebidas decides to take the Cadmea because he is ‘more 
in love with the idea of doing something glorious than with life itself, but 
not considered particularly rational or sensible’ (καὶ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ λαμπρόν τι 
ποιῆσαι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ζῆν ἐραστής, οὐ μέντοι λογιστικός γε οὐδὲ πάνυ 
φρόνιμος ἐδόκει εἶναι: 5.2.28), and Stasippus does not pursue the routed 
enemy in a civil war battle because he is ‘the kind of man who does not 
like to kill his fellow-citizens’ (τοιοῦτος ὁ Στάσιππος ἦν οἷος μὴ βούλεσθαι 
πολλοὺς ἀποκτεινύναι τῶν πολιτῶν: 6.5.7).14
Of the more implicit types of moralising, evaluative phrasing is used in 
many passages of the Hellenica, although it is by no means universal in 
the work. Favourite techniques are counterfactual statements and empha-
sis through negation. Thus, at 5.3.20, Agesilaus ‘did not, as one might 
have thought, rejoice’ at the death of Agesipolis, but ‘cried and missed his 
12 Other moralising digressions in the Hellenica: 4.8.22, 5.1.4, 5.1.19–20, 5.1.36, 5.4.1, 
5.4.33, 6.2.32, 6.2.39, 6.5.51–2, 7.2.1, 7.5.8, 7.5.19–20.
13 περὶ μὲν δὴ Φλειασίων, ὡς καὶ πιστοὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐγένοντο καὶ ἄλκιμοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ 
διετέλεσαν, καὶ ὡς πάντων σπανίζοντες διέμενον ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ, εἴρηται: 7.3.1. Other mor-
alising introductions and conclusions in the Hellenica: 2.3.56 concluding, 3.4.18 concluding, 
4.20–1 introductory, 4.5.4 introductory, 4.8.31 obituary, 5.1.3 introductory, 5.2.6 conclud-
ing, 5.4.1 introductory, 5.4.51 introductory, 7.2.1 introductory, 7.3.12 concluding, 7.4.32 
concluding, 7.5.16 introductory.
14 Other examples of moral asides in the Hellenica are 5.4.65 (μάλα θρασὺν ἄνδρα), 6.4.3 
(ἤδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν) and 6.4.8 (ἐν δὲ τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ ὑποπινόντων καὶ τὸν 
οἶνον παροξῦναί τι αὐτοὺς ἔλεγον).
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company’; and at 5.4.64 Timotheus wins Corcyra for Athens by not enslav-
ing or killing anyone or changing their constitution.15
The fact that evaluative phrasing is only used in certain episodes makes 
these stand out noticeably as moralising narratives.16 These are the epi-
sodes that are chiefly responsible for Xenophon’s long-standing reputa-
tion as a strongly biased historian. Thus, the narrative of the civil war in 
Corinth and the attempt to unite Corinth and Argos (4.4.1–14) leaves the 
reader in no doubt about the contempt Xenophon felt for such revolution-
ary measures and the people responsible for them.17 Likewise, the narrative 
of Lycomedes’ efforts to form an Arcadian alliance outside the influence of 
both Thebes and Sparta (7.1.23–7) shows Xenophon’s aversion to this idea 
in no uncertain terms. However, to dismiss such passages as political bias 
is to see only half the picture. As argued in the Introduction, moral and 
political views are closely intertwined in Classical and Hellenistic thought. 
Xenophon despised the Corinthian revolutionaries because he saw them 
behaving in ways he considered impious and lawless (see especially 4.4.2–
3), and he considered the Arcadian attempt at hegemony an example of 
unfounded arrogance led by the selfish ambition of one man (see especially 
7.1.23). It is these moral messages that the passionate language of these two 
passages brings across with crystal clarity to the reader, not any political 
message about the wrongness of opposing Sparta, although that can be 
read between the lines by a reader who so wishes.18
Correlation between action and result is another common type of mor-
alising in the Hellenica, usually without explicit narratorial guidance. For 
instance, in the narrative of the Spartan campaign in Asia Minor, the 
general Dercylidas sacrifices with a view to attacking the fortress of Cebren 
(3.1.17). The sacrifices are unfavourable for four days, and for four days 
Dercylidas waits outside the fortress. One of his officers, Athenadas of 
Sicyon, thinking that Dercylidas is a fool to keep waiting (3.1.18), runs 
15 Other examples are 4.4.15 (the Spartans do not attempt to bring back the exiles to 
Phlius), 4.5.2 (Agesilaus does not pursue the Argives who were making Corinthian sacrifices, 
but stays and lets the Corinthians sacrifice), 5.4.55 (Agesilaus reconciles the two parties 
in Thespiae instead of letting his supporters kill the democrats), 7.1.27 (the Spartans and 
Thebans do not consult ‘the god’ about how to bring about peace). For Xenophon’s use of 
such sideshadows see Hau (2013).
16 Examples of passages with evaluative phrasing in the Hellenica: 1.1.29–31, 2.2.6, 
2.3.11–14, 2.4.1, 2.4.26, 3.3.1, 3.4.16–18, 3.5.24, 4.3.8, 4.3.12, 4.3.19, 4.4.6, 4.4.15, 4.5.2, 
4.5.11–15, 4.8.18–19, 4.8.36–8, 5.1.3, 5.3.10, 5.3.20, 5.3.21, 5.3.22, 5.4.11–12, 5.4.44, 5.4.55, 
5.4.57, 5.4.64, 6.5.12, 6.5.14, 6.2.15–19, 6.2.20–3, 6.2.27–32, 6.2.33–8, 6.4.28–32, 6.4.33–7, 
7.1.15–17, 7.1.23–6, 7.1.27, 7.1.46, 7.2, 7.4.3, 7.4.27, 7.4.33–9, 7.5.12–13, 7.5.16.
17 Gray (1989: 154–7) offers a masterly close reading of this passage, focusing on its 
literary artistry.
18 For readings of these two passages in terms of pro-Spartan bias see Cawkwell (1979: 
notes ad 4.4.4 and 6).
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forward with his men in order to cut off the water-supply of the besieged. 
The people in the city break out, wound him, kill two of his men and drive 
the rest back. In the next paragraph, Dercylidas is approached by messen-
gers from the city’s garrison, who offer to change sides, and – in a master-
ful use of delayed disclosure19 – we are suddenly told that his sacrifices on 
this day have been favourable; he leads his men towards the city, and the 
gates are opened to him. We must conclude, without being explicitly told, 
that piously waiting for the sacrifices to turn out favourably was the right 
decision.20
Moralising by internal evaluation is also common in the Hellenica. Thus 
the Athenians after Aegospotami are allowed to condemn themselves by 
expecting to be treated by the Spartans in the same way they have treated 
Melos and Scione (2.2.3 and 10), and the acquittal of Sphodrias is consid-
ered ‘by many’ the ‘most unjust decision ever reached by a Spartan court’ 
(πολλοῖς ἔδοξεν αὕτη δὴ ἀδικώτατα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἡ δίκη κριθῆναι: 5.4.24).21 
Many opinions with a moral bearing are also expressed in speeches. Their 
exact interpretation is often left as implicit as in Thucydides and has to be 
deciphered by the same means, namely the correspondence between speech 
and narrative. Sometimes, however, the reader is given a steer by the reac-
tion of the speech’s audience, in the same way as in Polybius and Diodorus. 
Thus, the speech by Callistratus for peace between Athens and Sparta on 
the basis of forgiveness for past wrongs (6.3.10–11), which demonstrates a 
learned lesson of humility in good fortune (6.3.11 and 16–17) and gratitude 
for past favours (6.3.13), gets the moral approval of its audience (δοξάντων 
δὲ τούτων καλῶς εἰπεῖν: 6.3.18) and results in a peace treaty – in contrast 
with the preceding speech of Autocles, which scolded the Spartans for 
always acting in their own interest under false pretences, and which was 
greeted with silence and non-effect (6.3.10).22
One type of moralising is more characteristic of Xenophon’s style than 
any other, and, by its prominence and distinct flavour, makes the moral-
ising of the Hellenica stand out from that of any other surviving work of 
19 For ‘delayed disclosure’ see Hornblower (1994).
20 Other examples of moralising by means of correlation between action and result in 
the Hellenica: 4.1.17–19 (overconfidence leads to death), 4.5.11–15 (overconfidence and ina-
bility to cope with setbacks lead to disaster), 4.8.18–19 (overconfidence and negligence lead 
to death and disaster), 4.8.36–8 (overconfidence leads to death and disaster), 5.4.64 (good 
treatment of the defeated leads to loyalty), 6.2.15–19 (bad treatment of subordinates leads 
to disloyalty and inefficiency), 7.1.32 (arrogance leads to disaffected allies), 7.4.10 (loyalty to 
allies is respected and rewarded even by enemies).
21 Other examples of internal evaluation in the Hellenica: 1.4.13–17, 4.4.3, 4.4.6, 4.4.19, 
4.5.10, 4.8.6, 5.2.37, 5.3.16, 6.4.14–15, 6.4.16.
22 Some other speeches with a moral message in the Hellenica (in both oratio recta and 
obliqua): 1.4.13–17, 2.3.15–23, 2.4.40–1, 5.1.13–18, 5.2.32, 6.1.4–16, 6.4.2–3, 6.4.22–3 (gains 
authority from echoing 6.3.16), 6.5.33–48.
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history: the moral vignette. Throughout the Hellenica, the discourse often 
slows down to real-time pace and broadens into scenes, usually with two or 
three speaking characters, whose utterances are rendered in direct speech, 
often at length.23 Some instances are shorter, with only one or two brief 
utterances,24 or with just one witty or punchy line.25 This practice is part of 
what earned Xenophon admiration for a ‘charming style’ (charis)26 among 
his ancient readers, but it has also been partly responsible for his  nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century reputation as ‘not a proper historian’. Gray has 
fittingly called this feature of Xenophon’s style ‘conversationalised narra-
tive’ and has correctly identified it as presenting moral and philosophical 
lessons (as well as offering variety and pleasure in reading).27 What exactly 
the lesson of each vignette is can be quite tricky to decipher, however, and 
for some of them different scholars have argued for diametrically opposed 
interpretations.28 Such ambiguity is surely no accident: Xenophon was a 
skilful writer and story-teller and could make his meaning plain without 
destroying a good story.29 When he chose not to, we must assume that he 
had his reasons. Apparently, like Thucydides with the Melian Dialogue, 
he sometimes wanted to present his readers with a moral dilemma without 
providing a solution. Showing that such dilemmas are part of human life 
and that they have no easy solutions is thought-directing didacticism. We 
shall examine some of Xenophon’s moral dilemmas below.
MORAL LESSONS
The Good Leader and His Men
Several scholars have observed that Xenophon’s Hellenica is primarily 
about how to be a good military leader, and this is certainly one of the 
major moral and practical lessons of the work.30 Many have taken Agesilaus 
23 Long moral vignettes in the Hellenica: 2.3.23–56, 3.1.10–15, 3.1.20–8, 3.4.7–9, 4.1.4–
15, 4.1.29–38, 5.4.25–33.
24 Short moral vignettes in the Hellenica: 4.1.39–40, 4.2.3–4, 4.8.38–9.
25 1.5.2–7, 2.1.31–2,1.6.32, 4.4.10.
26 Demetr. Eloc. 128–35.
27 Gray (1989: 11–78).
28 See e.g. Gray (1989: 52–8) and Krentz (1995: ad loc.) on the vignette of Agesilaus and 
Pharnabazus sitting in the grass discussing loyalty (4.1.29–38). 
29 See e.g. 5.1.3 with explicitly moralising introduction.
30 See e.g. Breitenbach (1950), Gray (1989), Pownall (2004), Tamiolaki (2012). Tuplin 
(1993: esp. 163–8) and Dillery (1995: esp. 241–9) have argued that the Hellenica has a 
 politico-moral message. Tuplin argues that its purpose is to show the moral evil and nec-
essary failure of every recent attempt at hegemony over the Greek world, as a warning to 
contemporary Athens not to commit the same mistakes. Dillery agrees, but detects also a 
positive message, namely that Athens and Sparta should put away their mutual enmity and 
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to be the ultimate paradeigma of a good commander in Xenophon, but 
this assumption is not straighforward: Xenophon’s portrayal of his friend 
in the Hellenica is complex and at times ambiguous. We shall return to 
Xenophon’s portrait of Agesilaus below; for now, in order to establish the 
virtues of the good commander which remain the same throughout the 
work, it is safer to start elsewhere.
The most important aspect of a commander’s virtue in the Hellenica 
is the correct way of treating his soldiers; this will make them loyal in the 
extreme and therefore efficient as a fighting force as long as the commander 
makes sound decisions. The most explicit paradeigma of a commander and 
his loyal soldiers is Agesilaus’ brother Teleutias, whose celebration by his 
men is described in detail at 5.1.3. The extended focus on this aspect of 
Teleutias’ generalship is then justified by the narratorial remark that ‘this 
seems to me worthy for a man to think about: what Teleutias had done to 
make his soldiers feel this way. For this is a job for a man that is much more 
worthy of mention than any expenses or dangers’ (5.1.4; the Greek has 
been quoted above). What exactly it was that Teleutias did is demonstrated 
more clearly at his next appearance (5.1.13–24). Here he is shown to be 
prepared to share hardship with his men (5.1.14–16), but also to make an 
effort to get them plentiful supplies, not in the form of gifts from Persia, but 
by plundering enemy territory (5.1.17) in raids of great daring (5.1.21–4) 
and, Xenophon is careful to point out, careful planning (5.1.19–20). In 
other words, the soldiers love him because he is a model of the behaviour 
he expects from them. (Teleutias will later be shown to suffer from one 
fatal character flaw, which we shall return to below.) Similar adoration 
of a commander is displayed by the troops of Hermocrates, because of 
his ‘consideration, ready kindness, and approachability’ (ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ 
προθυμίαν καὶ κοινότητα: 1.1.29–31). That is, they love him for being good 
to them rather than for being a good soldier. We should probably imagine 
that Teleutias treated his men well too, and that Hermocrates also set a 
good example on the battlefield, but this is not spelled out.
The correlation between consideration for troops, loyalty and success 
is exemplified in detail in an extended juxtaposition of the bad Spartan 
commander Mnasippus and the good Athenian commander Iphicrates, 
which shows how stinginess and brutality will result in defeat and death 
whereas proper consideration will bring loyalty and victory (6.2.15–39). 
Interestingly, however, the good commander Iphicrates (praised by the 
join in creating an empire ‘based not on force, but on a reputation for fairness and generos-
ity’ (1995: 248–9; this view originated with Schwartz 1889). It will be clear from the following 
that this interpretation of the Hellenica is perfectly compatible with the one offered here, 
proving that, as in all of the ancient historiographers, the moral and the political messages 
are closely intertwined.
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narrator at 6.5.51), whose troops show an ‘eagerness for battle well worth 
seeing’ (ἀξία θέας ἡ σπουδή: 6.2.35), is not noticeably kind to his men, 
although he does not display the disregard and brutality of Mnasippos. 
Rather, he works them hard to make sure that they are always ready for 
battle and always in peak physical condition. His training methods receive 
explicit narratorial praise (6.2.32), as does the training camp of Agesilaus 
at Ephesus in an almost lyrically descriptive passage at 3.4.15–18.31 What 
these two training regimes have in common, apart from their effectiveness, 
is the use of competition and the offering of prizes for performance. The 
reader is clearly meant to take away from the reading that this kind of 
incentivisation is the way to get the best out of soldiers.32
In his focus on the relationship between military commanders and their 
soldiers Xenophon is unique among the ancient Greek historiographers. 
In some other respects, however, his ideal commander is very similar to 
the paradigm offered by Polybius. Thus, intelligent courage is a major 
component of what makes a good general in the Hellenica. Courage is a 
generally praiseworthy quality in the work,33 but in military commanders 
it needs to be tempered with intelligence. This is seen most clearly when 
the narrator digresses from the narrative of Teleutias’ raid on the Piraeus 
in order to defend his plan against the imagined charge of idiocy (ἀφρόνως) 
by explaining how it rested on careful calculations (ἀναλογισμὸν: 5.1.19); 
and even Epaminondas, leading the hated Thebans against Sparta, receives 
grudging narratorial approval for his combination of foresight and cour-
age.34 By contrast, Agesilaus’ brave, but risky head-on attack on the Theban 
centre in the Battle of Coronea receives a ticking-off despite the fact that 
the Spartans were victorious (4.3.19),35 and defeat is in store for the exces-
sively daring Nicolochus (μάλα θρασὺν ἄνδρα: 5.4.65).
Like Polybius, however, Xenophon also has time for old-fashioned 
heroic courage: his implied criticism of Agesilaus’ risky frontal attack is 
31 On this passage and its implications for Xenophon’s portrayal of Agesilaus see Hau 
(2012: 598–601).
32 Prize competitions are also used by Dercylidas (3.2.10), another good commander in 
the Hellenica, as well as by the idealised Cyrus the Great in the Cyropaedia (Cyr. 2.1.22–3).
33 The vignette of the death of Theramenes is explicitly said to be included to show 
courage, along with a sense of humour, in the face of death (2.3.56). 7.5.15–17 is a beautiful 
piece of eulogistic writing showcasing the courage of Athenian soldiers, among whom was, 
according to Diogenes Laertius 2.54, Xenophon’s own son Gryllus. 
34 εὐτυχῆ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε φήσαιμι τὴν στρατηγίαν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι· ὅσα μέντοι 
προνοίας ἔργα καὶ τόλμης ἐστίν, οὐδέν μοι δοκεῖ ἁνὴρ ἐλλιπεῖν (‘I would deny that this cam-
paign was favoured by fortune; but as for deeds of foresight and courage, the man seems to 
me to have left nothing undone’) (7.5.8).
35 ἐνταῦθα δὴ Ἀγησίλαον ἀνδρεῖον μὲν ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν ἀναμφισβητήτως· οὐ μέντοι εἵλετό 
γε τὰ ἀσφαλέστατα (‘Then it can undoubtedly be said that Agesilaus was brave; he did not, 
however, choose the safest course’).
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also apologetically admiring (see above, n. 35), and when characters face 
death bravely, this is duly noted. Some courageous commanders go to their 
deaths with a witty and/or brave one-liner in a mini-vignette (Callicratidas 
1.6.32, Pasimachus 4.4.10); many others are simply noted to have ‘died 
fighting’ (μαχόμενος ἀπέθανε: Polycharmus 4.3.8, Pisander 4.3.12, 
Anaxibius 4.8.39, Teleutias 5.3.6, Phoebidas 5.4.45, Polytropus 6.5.14). 
These battlefield death narratives are clearly the forerunner of the heroic 
death narratives of Diodorus, although they are rather less standardised in 
Xenophon. In every case the commander’s death signals the defeat of his 
troops, for which he often bears a large part of the blame, but his heroic 
death ensures the preservation of his reputation. Contrast the ignominious 
death of Thibron, who is surprised while relaxing in the company of a 
flute-player and is not honoured with the epithet ‘fighting’ (4.8.18–19).
Good Xenophontic commanders also display a very un-Polybian virtue: 
piety. In the Hellenica, good military leaders always sacrifice before going 
into battle, crossing the border or completing any other important action. 
There are no fewer than thirteen instances of such sacrifices in the work, all 
performed by commanders who function as positive paradeigmata.36 The 
action of sacrificing is usually not emphasised, but simply mentioned as a 
matter of course, in the same way as the commander is said to collect his 
troops or order them to prepare to move out. The commander’s sacrifices 
are only emphasised twice. The first time is in the narrative of Dercylidas 
discussed above (3.1.17–19). The success of the pious commander con-
trasted with the fiasco of his less scrupulous subordinate leaves the reader in 
no doubt that sacrificial omens must be taken seriously, and, by extension, 
that commanders who abort their missions because of unfavourable omens 
are doing the right thing (Agesilaus 3.4.15, Agesipolis 4.7.7). The other 
instance of a commander’s sacrificing taking centre-stage is the launch of 
Agesilaus’ Asian campaign. First the king leaves Sparta ‘having performed 
all the necessary sacrifices, both the diabateria and the others’ (θυσάμενος 
ὅσα ἔδει καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ διαβατήρια: 3.4.3). By giving us the name of one 
particular type of sacrifice and implying that there were others which he 
could name if he wanted to,37 the narrator gives the impression of a very 
pious commander. Agesilaus then decides that he wants to go to Aulis to 
36 Agesilaus: 3.4.3–4, 3.4.15, 5.1.33, 6.5.17, 6.5.18; Dercylidas: 3.1.17, 3.1.23, 3.2.16; 
Agesipolis: 4.7.2, 4.7.7; Archidamus: 6.4.19; Herippidas: 4.1.22; Chares: 7.2.21. Other types 
of sacrifices also feature prominently: 1.6.37, 2.4.39, 3.2.26, 3.3.4, 4.5.1–2, 4.4.5. By contrast, 
Thucydides only mentions military sacrifices twice: in a report on Brasidas’ actions to Cleon 
(5.10.2) and at a point where they turn out so unfavourable that the Spartan army returns 
home without having crossed the border (5.54.2).
37 The word διαβατήρια is found only eleven times in Classical Greek literature: three in 
Thucydides and eight in Xenophon’s Hellenica. This is the only instance when it is coupled 
with other, unnamed sacrifices.
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sacrifice, ‘like Agamemnon’, an expression that has caused some scholarly 
debate. The easiest reading is to take it as a continuation of Agesilaus’ piety: 
Agamemnon, after all, was victorious in Asia, and no doubt Agesilaus is 
planning to be less extreme than the mythical king in his choice of sacrificial 
victim. The fact that the planned sacrifice is foiled by the Thebans (3.4.4) 
marks them as impious (and functions as a bad omen for Agesilaus’ cam-
paign), but it does not make the king’s plan to sacrifice any less pious.38
Beside sacrificing and obeying the sacrificial omens, a commander’s piety 
is demonstrated by his willingness to keep oaths scrupulously. This quality 
is also exemplified by Agesilaus in a deliberate contrast with the Persian 
satrap Tissaphernes. When Agesilaus arrives in Asia, the two exchange 
oaths on a truce until the satrap can receive orders from his king. Although 
Tissaphernes immediately proceeds to break his oath, Agesilaus continues 
to be true to his (̓3.4.6), and when hostilities begin, he informs Tissaphernes 
that ‘he was very grateful to him because by breaking his oath he himself 
had made the gods his enemies and allies of the Greeks’ (πολλὴν χάριν 
αὐτῳ̂ ἔχοι, ὅτι ἐπιορκήσας αὐτὸς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκτήσατο, τοι̂ς 
δ’ ̔Έλλησι συμμάχους ἐποίησεν: 3.4.11). This internal evaluation underlines 
the message, and when Tissaphernes is subsequently beheaded by his king 
for incompetence (3.4.25), it seems that the Spartan king’s confident words 
have come true.
When we turn to the flaws of the bad commander, some of them are 
simply the opposites of the virtues of the good one: poor treatment of subor-
dinates (Mnasippus), excessive daring (Nicolochus), impiety (Athenadas). 
The worst mistakes, however, seem to be committed under the influence of 
various strong emotions. Thus Phoebidas is ‘in love’ with the idea of doing 
some glorious deed, but is neither rational nor intelligent (καὶ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ 
λαμπρόν τι ποιῆσαι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ζῆν ἐραστής, οὐ μέντοι λογιστικός γε 
οὐδὲ πάνυ φρόνιμος ἐδόκει εἶναι: 5.2.28). His blind ambition is what leads 
him to commit the one most criticised act in all of the Hellenica, namely 
the occupation of the Theban Cadmea. And Teleutias falls from grace in 
his fourth and final appearance in the Hellenica by giving in to anger and 
launching a blind attack on Olynthus, only to get himself killed (5.3.3–6), 
sparking a moralising digression on how dangerous and wrong it is to do 
anything at all in anger (5.3.7). The vice that most often leads commanders 
to disaster in the Hellenica, however, is overconfidence and complacency. 
The danger is demonstrated by the dire fates of numerous bad commanders 
(unnamed polemarch 4.5.11–15,39 Thibron 4.8.18–19, Anaxibius 4.8.38–9, 
38 Contra Tuplin (1993: 56–7) and Krentz (1995: ad loc.).
39 This is the hapless Spartan who loses his entire regiment at Lechaeum. In addition 
to overconfidence he showcases the flaw of lack of resourcefulness and imagination: when 
things start to go wrong, all he can do is repeat the same ineffectual actions over and over, 
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Alcetas 5.4.57). Xenophon offers no explicit moralising in the manner of 
Polybius on the dangers of trusting good fortune to last, but the pattern is 
clear.40
Lessons of Phlius: Loyalty and Friendship
The longest explicit paradeigma in the Hellenica is the Phliasians’ resist-
ance against aggression in order to stay faithful to their alliance with Sparta 
(7.2). It is introduced by the justification that even small cities should rightly 
be praised for their ‘many glorious deeds’ (εἴ τις μικρὰ πόλις οὖσα πολλὰ 
καὶ καλὰ ἔργα διαπέπρακται: 7.2.1) and rounded off by a transitionary 
statement labelling it a narrative about ‘the Phliasians, how loyal they were 
to their friends, how steadfast they remained in the war, and how despite 
lacking everything they maintained their alliance’ (ὡς καὶ πιστοὶ τοῖς φίλοις 
ἐγένοντο καὶ ἄλκιμοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διετέλεσαν, καὶ ὡς πάντων σπανίζοντες 
διέμενον ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ: 7.3.1). These qualities are richly demonstrated in 
the narrative between the two bookends. Xenophon’s admiration seems to 
be inspired not primarily by the Phliasians’ plucky courage, although that 
clearly impressed him (7.2.4, 7.2.8), but by their ability to endure hardship 
(7.2.16, καρτερίας: 7.2.17) and for the right reasons: in order to keep faith 
with their allies, often designated by the more personal and emotional 
word ‘friends’ (φίλοι: 7.2.17, 7.3.1).
The passage has often been used to exemplify Xenophon’s pro-Spartan 
bias, but it might equally well be used to demonstrate his moral didac-
ticism: if he chose to give these events such extended treatment because 
Phlius remained loyal to Sparta in difficult times, we misread the passage 
if we focus only on Sparta and not on loyalty. The qualities of loyalty – 
to allies and to friends – self-discipline and courage were so important 
to Xenophon’s purpose with the Hellenica that he decided to compose a 
special chapter showcasing them. It is only natural that the paradeigma 
also corresponds to his political ideals; it would be a strange thing to 
choose as a model of morality a city, country or individual whose poli-
tics one profoundly disagrees with. The chapter becomes more didactic 
because the glorious deeds are performed not by one of the major players in 
Greek history, but by a comparatively small and unknown city. By stress-
ing this fact in the introduction to the narrative Xenophon makes it clear 
with disastrous results (ποιοῦντες δὲ καὶ πάσχοντες τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις καὶ αὖθις: 4.5.11–15), 
in deliberate contrast with Agesilaus’ resourcefulness and efficiency when he arrives on 
the scene (4.6.9–12). Cawkwell (1979: 38) argues convincingly that Xenophon knew the 
Spartan’s name but deliberately withheld it as a means of censure.
40 For a detailed examination of the dangers of overconfidence, complacency and arro-
gance in all of Xenophon’s works, see Hau (2012). 
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that loyalty, self-discipline and courage can be shown by anyone, no matter 
how insignificant, and that such qualities are always καλά.
The narrative of Phlius is contrasted with that of Euphron, tyrant of 
Sicyon. The contrast is signalled by a μέν–δέ construction which concludes 
the Phlius story and begins the narrative of Euphron’s assassination.41 The 
theme of the story of the end of Euphron is his disloyalty: he has previously 
betrayed Sicyon’s alliance with Sparta, but now, under the influence of 
fear, he pretends that he has, in fact, been a paragon of loyalty, using his 
tyrannical powers to exile anyone hostile to Sparta. The narrator com-
ments, with typical Xenophontic understated humour: ‘many people heard 
him say these things; it is less clear how many believed him’ (ἠκροῶντο μὲν 
δὴ πολλοὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα· ὁπόσοι δὲ ἐπείθοντο οὐ πάνυ κατάδηλον: 7.3.3). 
Beyond this, there is no narratorial comment on Euphron’s dishonesty and 
disloyalty; the point is made by the contrast with Phlius. There is also a 
lesson in the fact that the story ends with Euphron’s assassination (7.3.5), 
and the acquittal of his assassins by the Thebans, in whose city the murder 
has taken place (7.3.12).
So far, so simple. However, many passages in the Hellenica show a 
didactic interest in split loyalties. The most famous instance is a beau-
tifully written vignette in book 4 (4.1.29–38). Here Agesilaus meets the 
satrap Pharnabazus, whose country he has invaded, and they recline in the 
grass, Pharnabazus eschewing the ornate trappings of Oriental nobility 
to match the Spartan simplicity. The satrap then reproaches the Spartans 
for repaying his ‘friendship and alliance’ (φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος ἐγενόμην: 
4.1.32) in the Peloponnesian War not with gratitude, but with ravaging 
his land. The Spartans are ashamed at this (ἐπῃσχύνθησαν: 4.1.34), and 
Agesilaus has to explain that they are treating Pharnabazus as an enemy 
because he is a subject of the Persian king, with whom they are at war. 
He offers Pharnabazus an alliance if he will secede from the king, but 
when Pharnabazus refuses, Agesilaus praises him for his loyalty (4.1.38).42 
It is possible to read the episode as reflecting badly on Agesilaus for not 
reciprocating the favours Pharnabazus has done for Sparta,43 or to think 
Pharnabazus naive for expecting such reciprocation in a post-Thucydid-
ean world. Xenophon, however, does not take sides. Instead, the vignette 
41 περὶ μὲν δὴ Φλειασίων, ὡς καὶ πιστοὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐγένοντο καὶ ἄλκιμοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ 
διετέλεσαν, καὶ ὡς πάντων σπανίζοντες διέμενον ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ, εἴρηται. σχεδὸν δὲ περὶ 
τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον Αἰνέας Στυμφάλιος, στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀρκάδων γεγενημένος, νομίσας οὐκ 
ἀνεκτῶς ἔχειν τὰ ἐν τῷ Σικυῶνι, ἀναβὰς σὺν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ στρατεύματι εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν 
συγκαλεῖ τῶν Σικυωνίων τῶν τε ἔνδον ὄντων τοὺς κρατίστους καὶ τοὺς ἄνευ δόγματος 
ἐκπεπτωκότας μετεπέμπετο: Xen. Hell. 7.3.1.
42 Similarly, Corinthian ambassadors are admired by Thebans for showing loyalty to 
Sparta and refusing to join Thebes against them (7.4.10).
43 So e.g. Krentz (1995: ad loc.).
230 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
foregrounds the civilised and eloquent conversation, the mutual sympathy 
between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus, and the impossibility of overcoming 
the hostility between their two countries.44
The repeated application – in the Hellenica and in much of Greek 
 literature – of the terminology of friendship to the topic of alliances makes 
it natural to think about personal friendship in much the same way as 
about political alliance.45 Here too, loyalty is a complex issue. Thus, in 
an extended vignette, Sphodrias, a Spartan who was bribed by Thebans 
to invade Attica in order to provoke war between Athens and Sparta, is 
tried in Sparta and acquitted because of the love between his son and the 
son of Agesilaus (5.4.25–33). The focus of the vignette is on Agesilaus’ 
son Archidamus, his love for the beautiful Cleonymus, his commendable 
shyness and respect for his father, and his mixture of grief and pride when 
Cleonymus eventually repays his favour by dying heroically at Leuctra. The 
episode presents a moral dilemma between loyalty to friends, family and 
lovers and the demands of international politics.46 And again Xenophon 
does not take sides: the love and friendship between Archidamus and 
Cleonymus are portrayed in a rosy light (5.4.25 and 33), and Cleonymus’ 
heroic death in battle adds the ultimate validation; but the vignette is 
framed by a statement about the perceived injustice of the acquittal (5.4.24) 
and a brief narrative of how it resulted in Athens joining the Thebans 
against Sparta (5.4.34). The didactic point is not the solution, but the 
dilemma, much as in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue.
Friendship as a theme figures much more prominently in the Hellenica 
than in any of the other extant Greek works of historiography, Classical 
or Hellenistic. The ability to make friends is presented as a positive trait: 
the statement, with emphasis through negation, that Agesilaus did not 
rejoice at the death of Agesipolis, his rival, but missed his friendship 
(5.3.20, quoted above) is surely meant to reflect positively on Agesilaus. 
Likewise, the brief narrative of the impulsively formed guest-friendship 
between Pharnabazus’ son and Agesilaus and the way the latter honoured 
44 The dialogue fulfils much the same function as the coffee-shop conversation between 
Al Pacino’s hardened cop and Robert de Niro’s career criminal in Michael Mann’s 1995 film 
Heat: the charmingly unexpected setting (grass, coffee shop); the eloquent, philosophical 
dialogue; the wistfulness of two sympathetic protagonists who feel mutual sympathy, but 
have to return to being enemies after this peaceful interlude.
45 Indeed, Gray (1989: 52–8) interprets the scene between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus 
as an example of Agesilaus as a friend, along with 4.1.3–15 and 3.4.7–10. Her analysis is 
pertinent and exellently brings out the qualities the reader is supposed to admire in both 
protagonists.
46 It has been interpreted in diametrically opposite ways as a statement about the impor-
tance of helping friends (Gray 1989: 59–63) and as a satirical glimpse into Spartan corruption 
(Tuplin 1993: 126–8). 
 Xenophon, Hellenica 231
it functions as a contrasting vignette at the end of Agesilaus’ conversation 
with Pharnabazus, demonstrating the way friendship can work straight-
forwardly if there are no political obstacles (4.1.39–40). That a sociable 
personality can also be useful for the military commander is shown by the 
brief vignette of Lysander dining with Cyrus and obtaining by means of 
friendly banter what impersonal diplomacy could not (1.5.2–7), as well as 
by the much more detailed scene in which Agesilaus arranges a marriage 
connection between two friends/allies (4.1.4–15). This latter vignette has 
been interpreted variously as showing Agesilaus as a true friend and as a 
selfish manipulator.47 I would argue that the point is exactly the combina-
tion: like Lysander with Cyrus, Agesilaus uses his likeable personality and 
social skills to make friends and benefit Sparta at one stroke. In a military 
commander, such a combination of patriotism and friendliness is meant to 
be a quality worthy of emulation.
In didactic terms, then, the Hellenica demonstrates the universality and 
importance of friendship, both personal and political. It sets up those char-
acters who are good at making friends as positive paradeigmata, but it 
also shows that friendship is not uncomplicated, and that it can lead to 
situations of split loyalties.48 The moralising is purely descriptive; there 
is no solution offered, but the reader is taught to be aware of the possible 
dangers and be ready to make his own moral choices.
Agesilaus and Jason: The Ideal Hero and the Ideal Villain?
It used to be considered a self-evident truth that the Agesilaus of the 
Hellenica was meant to represent the epitome of ideal leadership: in real 
life he had been a personal friend of Xenophon’s, and he was the protago-
nist of Xenophon’s encomium, the Agesilaus. More recently, some scholars 
have claimed to see subversive strands in Xenophon’s representation of 
Agesilaus, not just in the Hellenica, but even in the encomium.49 The enco-
mium does not concern us here, but in order to uncover the moral-didactic 
lessons of the Hellenica it is necessary to come to a decision about the 
character who functions as the main protagonist of this latter work from 
3.3.1 onwards.
47 Gray (1989: 49–52) versus Krentz (1995: ad loc.).
48 The universal need for friendship and the challenges this poses for the great and 
powerful are also a major theme of Xenophon’s philosophical dialogue Hiero. The issue was 
clearly close to his heart.
49 The traditional view of Xenophon as an unquestioning admirer of Agesilaus is well 
represented by Anderson (1974). A more recent and better-founded version of this view is 
Schepens (2005). For a good uncovering of much of the ambiguity of the portrait of Agesilaus 
in the Hellenica see Tuplin (1993) and Krentz (1995: passim). Harman (2013) reads even the 
encomium Agesilaus as subversive.
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Let it first be stated clearly that Agesilaus is primarily intended as a 
positive paradeigma: he is considerate towards his soldiers (4.5.4) and gets 
the best out of them (3.4.15–18), he is brave (4.3.19), resourceful and effi-
cient as a commander (4.6.9–12), but also intelligent (3.4.7–9, 4.1.4–15) 
and sociable (4.1.39–40, 5.3.20), and he piously obeys omens (3.4.15) and 
keeps oaths (3.4.6 and 11). To deny any of this or the fact that such behav-
iour is supposed to encourage emulation is to read the Hellenica against 
the grain in a way that would have been entirely foreign to Xenophon’s 
intended readers. Having said that, Agesilaus (like his brother Teleutias) is 
not flawless, and there are times when the reader is encouraged to question 
his behaviour.
Thus, several vignettes show him in situations of moral dilemma, as 
we have seen above, and leave it open for the reader to decide whether 
Agesilaus is prioritising correctly. Implied criticism is offered in the state-
ment that Agesilaus’ frontal attack at Coronea was undoubtedly brave, but 
not very safe (4.3.19 discussed above). More critical is a vignette that uses 
Agesilaus to demonstrate the folly of acting arrogantly in success. Here, 
the satisfaction of having won a military victory makes the Spartan king 
treat envoys from the defeated with disdainful arrogance, which is rup-
tured when a messenger arrives to tell him that an entire Spartan regiment 
has been wiped out at Lechaeum.50 Finally, Agesilaus’ speech in defence 
of Phoebidas after the latter’s unauthorised occupation of the Theban 
Cadmea directly contradicts the Xenophontic narrator’s stand on the issue: 
Agesilaus claims that the question boils down to whether Phoebidas has 
done ‘good or bad deeds’ (ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ) for Sparta, using moral vocabu-
lary to designate political interest (5.2.32), whereas the narrator has used 
the occupation as an example of impious deeds (τω̂ν ἀσεβούντων, τω̂ν 
ἀνόσια ποιούντων: 5.4.1) and presented it as the transgression that brought 
divine vengeance on Sparta in the form of defeat at Leuctra (5.4.1). In none 
of these cases is the criticism or the moralising explicit, but they are there 
by contrast and by correlation between action and result. By these means 
Xenophon juggles his own split loyalties between friendship and moral-di-
dactic history writing.51
50 For a detailed analysis of this passage see Gray (1989: 157–60) and Hau (2008: 128–9). 
Breitenback (1950: 4) uses it as an example of the absence of moralising in the Hellenica, but 
this relies on a definition of moralising as explicit statements in the narratorial voice.
51 The brief account of Agesilaus’ Sardis campaign in the Hellenica has been adduced 
as evidence of Xenophon’s critical attitude to the Spartan king (e.g. Tuplin 1993: 56–60). 
Xenophon’s narrative treats the potentially glorious details perfunctorily (3.4.12 and 3.4.20–
4) and dwells instead on a dearly bought victory against Pharnabazus (3.4.13–14) and the fact 
that a sinister sacrificial omen makes Agesilaus turn back before any significant victory could 
be achieved (3.4.15). Xenophon’s motivation for this negative treatment has been much dis-
cussed. I would venture the explanation of his personal disappointment both that the magnif-
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Only slightly less than Agesilaus, the role of Jason of Pherae in the 
Hellenica has divided scholars. On the one hand he seems to be presented 
as the ideal commander in terms of his relationship with his soldiers and 
his ability to endure harsh conditions, on the other hand he can be consid-
ered a tyrant who gets his comeuppance.52 I would come down firmly on 
the side of the latter interpretation. When Jason’s magnificent leadership 
abilities are described by Polydamas of Pharsalus, a character who seems 
to have been included in the narrative for the sole purpose of introduc-
ing the Thessalian warlord, the purpose is to place his power, resources 
and physical and mental abilities firmly and vividly in the reader’s mind. 
The speech (6.1.4–16), in its terrified admiration of Jason, functions as an 
elaborate description of his potential for destruction. Offering the descrip-
tion as internal evaluation in direct speech allows Xenophon to express 
urgency and terror much more acutely than if he had described Jason’s 
power in his narrator’s voice.53 It is true that the qualities attributed to 
Jason by Polydamas are qualities which characterise the good leaders of 
the Hellenica – endurance, ability to get the best out of soldiers (6.1.6 and 
15), efficiency and resourcefulness (6.1.15), self-discipline (6.1.16) – but any 
outstanding ability which can be used for good can also be used for evil; 
this is what makes the description of Jason so terrifying.54 That we are not 
supposed to be fooled into thinking Jason a hero is shown by the fact that 
the description of his magnificent abilities frames a conversation between 
him and Polydamas, which Polydamas claims to quote word for word. In 
this conversation Jason boasts of his power (6.1.5 and 7), predicts that it 
will soon become greater still (6.1.9–12) and threatens Polydamas with 
taking over his city by force if they do not yield voluntarily (6.1.5 and 7). 
These threats show up Jason’s imperialistic ambition;55 and  overconfident 
icent preparations at Ephesus did not lead to more in terms of conquest, and, above all, that 
the liberation of the Asian Greeks was ultimately given up; cf. Dillery (1995: 114). Contra 
Gray (1979), who argues that the passage shows Agesilaus as the good commander, and 
Pownall (2004: 83–4), who argues that the victory is meant to be the crowning achievement 
of Agesilaus’ pious campaign, and that it is narrated so summarily because the preparations 
are more important than the battle from a moral point of view. The latter is true, but surely it 
is no coincidence that the outcome is shown to fall so far short of the morally and practically 
magnificent preparations. See also below, p. 242.
52 Many scholars have remarked that Jason seems to possess the same qualities as 
Xenophon’s ‘ideal leader’: Breitenbach (1950), Krafft (1967), Westlake (1966–7), Soulis 
(1972). Pownall (2004: 100–1) even argues that Jason should be seen as a ‘moral leader’ and 
a good man according to Xenophon’s standards until the point when he commits impiety. 
53 His reasons for conveying much of the information about Jason in this speech instead 
of in the narrative have been much discussed, e.g. Westlake (1966–7), Soulis (1972: 182–5).
54 Cf. Sallust’s description of Catiline (Cat. 5.1–8) and Livy’s of Hannibal (21.4.2–9) as 
well as Tacitus’ of Poppaea Sabina (13.45).
55 Tuplin (1993) has shown that all imperialistic plans in the Hellenica fail.
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 boasting is always a dangerous activity in the works of Xenophon.56 
Polydamas is also careful to point out that Jason’s subjects are loyal to 
him out of fear and would revolt if they had Spartan support (1.6.14) – and 
ruling by fear is, of course, the hallmark of a tyrant. Moreover, there is one 
important quality of the good commander which Jason does not possess: 
piety. This absence contributes in no small way to his downfall.
The downfall comes a few chapters later (6.4.28–32), in an impressively 
structured narrative which perfectly balances a description of Jason’s over-
confidence and his punishment.57 In the first paragraph, 28, the greatness of 
Jason is stressed in a tricolon stating first that he was a great man (μέγας), 
then that he became even greater (μείζων) and thirdly that he was the 
greatest man of his time (μέγιστος δ’ ἦν τω̂ν καθ’ αὑτὸν). In paragraph 29, 
the greatness of Jason is shown visually by the impressive number of sac-
rificial animals he is able to produce from his subject cities for the Pythian 
festival and the lavishness of his offered prizes. Then, in paragraph 30, 
the narrator slips subtly from the description of the festival processions 
to the subject of Jason and the Delphic Oracle. We are told that there 
were rumours (ὡς ἔφασαν) that Jason was planning to make himself head 
of the Amphictyonic Council and the Pythian games, and ‘what he was 
contemplating about the Delphic treasure is still to this day unclear’ (περὶ 
μέντοι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων ὅπως μὲν διενοεῖτο ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἄδηλον). ‘It is 
said’ (λέγεται), the narrator continues in unusually Herodotean style, that 
when asked about Jason, Apollo claimed to be able to take care of himself 
(ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὅτι αὐτῷ μελήσει). Considering the ostensible lack 
of reliable information on this subject it is remarkable that Xenophon has 
decided to mention it at all: the Xenophontic narrator, as opposed to the 
Herodotean one, is usually not keen to reproduce rumours. We shall return 
to this point shortly.
The structure of the sentence that tells of the murder is designed to bring 
out the paradox of Jason’s peripeteia from the height of power to ignomin-
ious death in a split second: first Jason is described emphatically as ἀνὴρ 
τηλικοῦτος ὢν καὶ τοσαυ̂τα καὶ τοιαυ̂τα διανοούμενος (‘being so great a man 
and making plans of such a magnitude and quality’); secondly we are told 
56 See Hau (2013).
57 Pownall (2004: 102–3) argues that Xenophon shows Jason as having changed from a 
‘good moral leader’ in Polydamas’ description to being now ‘corrupt with power’. She sees 
the change mainly in the difference between Jason’s ‘humane’ treatment of Polydamas, as 
reported in the speech, and his cynical playing off of the Thebans and the Spartans against 
each other in 6.4.22–5. However, Jason’s behaviour towards Polydamas and towards the 
Thebans and Spartans is equally cynical, in that it springs from the same knack for diplo-
matic manipulation and in both cases furthers his own interests without regard for those 
of others. The only vice he does not already show when he puts pressure on Polydamas is 
impiety.
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that he was in the process of passing judgement in judicial questions among 
his subjects, an activity which places him in the position of a king or tyrant; 
thirdly the murderers are introduced, not named but called simply and 
dismissively νεανίσκοι (youths); and only then, in the very last words of 
this for Xenophon very long sentence, is it revealed that they killed him.58 
Explicit moralising would have ruined the effect, and there is none.
What moral lessons is the reader supposed to extract from the death of 
Jason? The fact that there is no moralising conclusion to tell us what the 
narrator considers to be the reason for his death allows for at least three 
interpretations, all encouraged by the text. Firstly, the structure of the nar-
rative of the murder brings out the shock of Jason’s sudden fall and reminds 
us of the instability of human success and power and the importance of not 
becoming overconfident. This message has been signalled on a smaller scale 
by the string of military commanders who come to grief through overconfi-
dence (see above), but here it is writ large. Secondly, Jason was a tyrant, and 
an imperialistic one, as demonstrated by Polydamas’ speech and by Jason’s 
actions between the end of the speech and the beginning of the narrative of 
his death. Tyrants generally come to bad ends in the Hellenica, as evidenced 
by the bloody fates of Jason’s successors, related in the two paragraphs 
immediately following upon his murder (6.4.33–5), and by the murder of 
Mania of Aeolis by her son-in-law (3.1.14) as well as Pharnabazus’ sworn 
revenge on the latter (3.1.15).59 Thirdly, Jason may have been planning to 
commit an act of gross impiety. The narrator remains uncommitted to the 
truth of this rumour, but the fact that Xenophon reports it must mean that 
he wants it to stick in the reader’s mind. Apollo said that he could look after 
himself, and so he did – perhaps. In the assassination of Jason Xenophon 
has created a story with Herodotean elements, including overdetermination 
of causes.60 Perhaps the fate of Jason seemed to him to follow so closely 
the Herodotean success–overconfidence– disaster pattern that a Herodotean 
presentation felt natural.61
58 For an analysis of this passage as a peripeteia, but centring on its prose rhythm, see 
Gray (1989: 163–5).
59 Higgins (1977: 110–11) and Dillery (1995: 171ff.) have argued that Jason’s death in 
the Hellenica is meant to show that autocratic rulers always come to bad ends. However, 
the Cyropaedia shows that Xenophon was not opposed to autocratic rule per se, but thought 
it could work with the right person in charge. Furthermore, nothing in the Hellenica shows 
hatred of autocratic rulers as such: Pharnabazus is treated as a sympathetic character (cf. 
1.1.6, 1.1.24, 1.4.6–7, 4.1.30–8), and Mania is described very positively, her murder reflecting 
badly only on her murderer. Jason’s crime (apart from impiety) is that he rules tyrannically, 
i.e. by fear, and that he wants to conquer the rest of Greece. 
60 Cf. Tuplin (1993: 119–21), who notes that ‘the impression one is left with in the end 
is that it is the sum total of Jason’s achievements and aspirations which caused his downfall’.
61 See also the parallels between Apollo’s assertion that he can look after himself and 
Hdt. 8.37–8.
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How the World Works: Divine Justice and Changeable Fortune
This leads us finally to the question of the role of divine justice and change-
able fortune in the Hellenica. At 5.4.1 this world-defining piece of introduc-
tory moralising occurs:
πολλὰ μὲν οὐ̂ν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν καὶ  ῾Ελληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικά, 
ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε 
μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους 
ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων 
τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων 
κρατηθέντες, τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς 
καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις δουλεύειν τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν, 
τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι. ὡς δὲ τοῦτ’ 
ἐγένετο διηγήσομαι.
One might adduce many examples, both Greek and barbarian, as evidence 
that gods are not indifferent to those who commit impious deeds, and I shall 
now mention the instance that lies before me in my chain of events. The 
Spartans who had occupied the Theban acropolis despite having sworn to 
leave the cities autonomous were punished by the very people alone who 
they had wronged, being defeated for the first time in history. And those cit-
izens [of Thebes] who had led them into the acropolis and had plotted with 
the Spartans to enslave their own city so that they should become tyrants, 
their rule it only took seven exiles to shatter. How this came to pass I shall 
explain. (Xen. Hell. 5.4.1)
This is the introduction to the narrative of the revolution in Thebes that 
brought the Cadmea back into Theban hands and toppled the Sparta-
collaborating oligarchs. The narrator says explicitly that this will be an 
example of the fact that ‘gods’ (θεοί) punish impious actions. There is no 
definite article, let alone indication of personality. This makes the expres-
sion very impersonal and probably the equivalent of τὸ θεῖον, another 
common denominator of divine power in the Hellenica. The actions pun-
ished are described in religiously charged vocabulary (ἀσεβούντων, ἀνόσια), 
which fits both Spartan oath-breaking and the Theban conspirators’ crime 
of letting an enemy into the most sacred place in their city.
The punishment for the Spartans is the Battle of Leuctra. In the build-up 
to the battle, the narrator is careful to remind the reader that it will be 
decided by divine intervention: the Spartans ‘seem already to be led to their 
wrong decisions by a divine force’ (ἤδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν: 
6.4.3),62 and the Thebans are supported by tyche (6.4.7–8). He ignores any 
62 This clearly refers back to 5.4.1, as noted by Tuplin (1993: 134) and Pownall (1998: 
256–7). Contra Bowden (2004: 243–4), who argues that it is a ‘hint of divine involvement,’ 
but not a suggestion that the Spartans were being punished for earlier crimes.
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military explanation for the Spartan defeat, with the effect that the battle 
seems to be decided purely by divine favour or disfavour.63 There is no 
doubt that the hour of reckoning has come for the Spartans.
The punishment for the Theban oligarchs is the counter-revolution. 
Xenophon’s narrative of this has often been criticised as historically inept, 
but can be explained by his desire to drive home the unexpectedness and 
unlikelihood of the liberation: he focuses on the secretary of the Theban 
polemarchs, Phillidas, to the extent of almost excluding the other conspira-
tors, thus crafting a story of how one man overthrew the Spartan-imposed 
tyranny: divine intervention indeed.64 Two features of this narrative are 
interesting for our purposes.65 The first is the nature of the crime of the 
polemarchs. As we saw above, the crime of the Thebans has so far been 
described in exclusively religious vocabulary; now, however, when we meet 
them in person, their wrongdoing is entirely secular: we see them celebrat-
ing a festival and getting drunk, and then expecting their secretary to bring 
them the ‘most respected and beautiful’ (σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας: 5.4.4) 
women in the city for their pleasure. While getting drunk is not always a 
crime in Xenophon’s universe (see e.g. Xen. An. 7.3.26–33), the fact that it 
is in this case accompanied by the desire to debauch citizen women brands 
the polemarchs as true tyrants, unable and unwilling to keep their sexual 
desires under control.66 The narrator makes this clear by his acid comment 
‘for they were that sort of men’ (οἱ δὲ ἦσαν γὰρ τοιοῦτοι:5.4.4). When they 
are killed by men disguised as the women they coveted, they are punished 
not just for the religious crime of letting the enemy into the sacred Cadmea, 
but also for the moral crime of intended abuse of free people.
The second interesting feature of the story is the obvious Herodotean 
imitation. The narrative of the counter-revolution is introduced by the 
sentence ‘There was a certain Phillidas, who was a secretary for Archias 
and the polemarchs’ (ἦν τις Φιλλίδας, ὃς ἐγραμμάτευε τοῖς περὶ Ἀρχίαν 
63 Cf. Pownall (2004: 90). Contra Tuplin (1993: 138), who argues on the basis of the καὶ in 
τοι̂ς δὲ πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τη̂ς τύχης κατωρθου̂ντο that Xenophon’s narrative of the battle shows 
the victory to be due to a combination of tyche and the skill of the Theban commanders. This 
is strictly true, but the lack of detail in the battle description and the absence of any mention 
of Pelopidas and Epaminondas do not invite the reader to contemplate Theban tactical skill.
64 The narrative and its focus on Phillidas have been well analysed by Gray (1989: 
65–70). Tuplin (1993: 147–8) argues convincingly that Xenophon consciously differs from 
the tradition preserved by Plutarch, Diodorus and Nepos, and that the effect of the version 
in the Hellenica is to avoid putting any of the human agents in a positive light while showing 
the events to be divinely ordained.
65 I leave undiscussed the question of why Xenophon makes no mention of either 
Pelopidas or Epaminondas, the traditional heroes of the story. For a brief discussion see 
Tuplin (1993: 147–8).
66 Lack of control of one’s sexual appetites is the hallmark of a tyrant; see Dunkle (1967) 
and Rosivach (1988) with references.
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πολεμάρχοις: 5.4.2), echoing Herodotus’ introduction of Themistocles and 
other protagonists of individual logoi.67 Moreover, there are close parallels 
between Xenophon’s story and the one told by Herodotus of the Persians 
murdered by men disguised as women after having demanded the company 
of the female relatives of King Amyntas of Macedon. Xenophon even offers 
an alternative version (the assassins were masquerading as revellers, not 
women), a practice extremely rare for him, but ubiquitous in Herodotus. 
The purpose of the Herodotean ‘feel’ of this narrative is surely to alert the 
reader to the similarities, at this point especially, between the world of his 
Hellenica and that of the Histories: in both worlds impiety is punished 
by superhuman powers, and transgressions against one’s  fellow-human 
beings are more often than not punished by divine powers working through 
human agents.68
Another throwback to the world of Herodotus is the fact that oracles 
and omens in the Hellenica are generally fulfilled. This is most spectac-
ularly true for the prophecy of the seer before the Battle of Munychia 
(2.4.18–19) and the good omens observed in Thebes before the Battle of 
Leuctra (6.4.7–8), but already in 5.4.17–18 Spartans being forced to leave 
their shields behind because of a violent storm is interpreted as an omen 
for the future.
Interestingly, however, divine punishment for wrongdoing is much more 
consistent in the world of the Hellenica than in the world of Herodotus’ 
Histories. In all of the Hellenica only two instances of impiety and one 
unjust murder are not said or shown to lead to disaster for the perpe-
trators. In two of the cases this narratorial silence can be put down to 
Xenophon subsequently focusing on a different storyline and not following 
the future fate of the impious.69 Thus, we hear no more of the Thebans 
who desecrate Agesilaus’ sacrifice at Aulis (3.4.4) because Xenophon is 
67 Themistocles; Hdt. 7.143.1. See also Hdt. 3.4.1. Xenophon famously uses the expres-
sion to introduce himself in the Anabasis (Xen. An. 3.1.4).
68 Gray (1989: 66–7) draws out the Herodotean parallels nicely, but then argues that 
Xenophon’s story carries a different message from the one of Herodotus: Herodotus’ message 
is that ‘custom is king’ (the Persians were breaking Macedonian custom by demanding the 
company of women at dinner), and Xenophon’s is that it only took a few men to overthrow 
the Theban tyranny. Dillery (1995: 229–30) also analyses the parallels, but argues that, rather 
than imitating Herodotus, Xenophon was ‘trying to claim the authority of a historian telling 
a story with a moral’. I obviously agree that the story has a moral, but I find it unlikely that 
Xenophon did not intend the reader to notice the Herodotean ‘feel’ of the story and to be led 
to more or less conscious conclusions from it. 
69 Pownall (1998) examines in detail every instance of impiety in the Hellenica and con-
cludes that only the Theban desecration of Agesilaus’ sacrifice (3.4.4) and the Tegean stoning 
of people hiding in a temple (6.5.6–9) go unpunished. She argues that Xenophon in these 
cases believed that divine punishment would eventually strike the offenders, even if delayed, 
but this does not explain why he did not state this explicitly.
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too interested in following a different narrative thread, namely Agesilaus’ 
reaction to the Theban provocation and his subsequent campaign in 
Asia. Likewise, nothing is said about what happened later to the Theban 
counter- revolutionaries who killed the children of the toppled oligarchs 
(5.4.12) because Xenophon is only interested in Theban affairs until the 
counter-revolution is complete, and then reverts to his focus on Sparta.70 In 
the third instance of impiety unpunished, which concerns Tegeans stoning 
their political opponents with tiles from the roof of the temple in which 
they have sought refuge (6.5.6–9), the episode seems to hold special interest 
for Xenophon.71 Here his reticence about divine punishment of the perpe-
trators is harder to explain. Perhaps it is due to historical scruple: perhaps 
Xenophon did not know what happened to the Tegeans afterwards, or 
perhaps he knew that they got away scot-free and did not want to put this 
in his history. All sixteen other instances of impiety in the Hellenica are 
punished.72
In several cases the divine punishment involves a dramatic fall from 
power and success, thus corresponding to Herodotus’ pattern of success–
overconfidence–disaster. This is true of Sparta, whose great power is 
described and stressed in the chapter immediately before the peripeteia 
is signalled (παντάπασιν ἤδη καλω̂ς καὶ ἀσφαλω̂ς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐδόκει αὐτοι̂ς 
κατεσκευάσθαι: 5.3.27), and of Jason of Pherae (see above). It is also the 
case for Euphron, the tyrant of Sicyon (7.3.1–5; see above), and Lycomedes, 
the Arcadian almost-tyrant (7.4.3). The consistency of the punishment of 
the impious along with the absence of generational punishment, jealous 
gods and predetermined fate make the world of the Hellenica less of an 
incomprehensible wilderness than the world of Herodotus’ Histories. The 
bleakness of the ending shows, however, that lasting human happiness is 
still elusive.
70 Pownall (1998: 258) argues that the killing of those Thebans ‘who had been freed 
from the prison’ by the troops of Cleombrotus at 5.4.14 is meant to be understood as pun-
ishment for the massacre. It is not clear, however, that the children of the oligarchs were 
murdered specifically by those newly freed from prison; the massacre seems rather to be 
committed by the Theban ‘cavalry and hoplites’ who join the counter-revolution at 5.4.9.
71 Ultimately the story serves only as the reason for a Spartan campaign against Tegea 
and Mantinea, so the circumstantial details seem to signal a special interest of Xenophon’s 
in the events (Pownall 1998).
72 List of instances modified from Pownall’s appendix (Pownall 1998: 276–7): 
oath-breaking: 3.4.6 and 11, 5.4.1, 5.4.11–12, 6.4.2–3, 7.4.36; violation of sanctuary: 4.4.3, 
7.2.6; violation of festival: 4.4.2, 5.2.29; negligence in religious ritual: 3.1.18, 3.2.22, 4.8.36, 
7.1.27; temple-robbery: 6.4.30, 7.1.46, 7.4.33. 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Moral didacticism is central to the Hellenica. It informs Xenophon’s selec-
tion of material, overall narrative structure and crafting of individual epi-
sodes. The work is, however, not a ‘purely moral tract’ (Grayson 1975), 
but a work of historiography: it aims to present a true narrative of histori-
cal events from a moral angle.
In the Hellenica, it is easy to spot early versions of the types of moral-
ising that become widespread in Hellenistic historiography. Conversely, 
 macro-level moralising and moralising by patterning are a lot less dominant 
than in Herodotus and Thucydides. Overall, the moralising of Xenophon 
is more explicit than that of his two famous Classical predecessors, point-
ing towards Hellenistic moral didacticism. Neither the explicitness nor the 
transitory nature of the moral didacticism should be exaggerated, however: 
Xenophon’s moral vignettes are entirely implicit in their didacticism and 
have consequently been interpreted in diametrically opposite ways by dif-
ferent readers, and his divinely ruled world in which impiety is always 
punished may foreshadow Diodorus, but it also harks back to Herodotus 
and has as little resonance with Polybius as with Thucydides. Likewise, 
Xenophon’s focus on friendship and loyalty is more of an individual quirk 
than an evolutionary link between one era of historiography and the next.
The most noticeable difference between the moral messages of the 
Hellenica and its surviving predecessors is the degree of practicality. 
Whereas the messages of Herodotus and Thucydides are largely intellec-
tual and advocate a certain state of mind based on a proper understanding 
of the world obtained through reading their works, Xenophon offers prac-
tical advice on how to live in the world he describes. Although the ending 
shows that peace and happiness are elusive, the rest of the narrative teaches 
the reader that by being pious, brave, self-disciplined, a good friend and a 
good leader of men, you have a fair chance not only of being celebrated by 
both your contemporaries and history, but also of achieving real, practical 
success. In this Xenophon stands a step closer to Hellenistic historiography 
than his two famous predecessors.
Comparison of Moral Didacticism in the Xenophontic Corpus
Xenophon is the only one of the authors considered in this study by whom 
other works than his historiographical one(s) have survived. This gives us 
a unique chance to compare moral didacticism between genres, which we 
shall grasp even if we do not here have the space to develop the comparison 
in much detail.
All of Xenophon’s works are moral-didactic, and they all use some 
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of the moralising techniques we have seen in the Hellenica. Even techni-
cal treatises such as The Cavalry Commander (Hipparchicus) or Ways 
and Means (Poroi) have moralising introductions and conclusions and are 
sprinkled with explicit narratorial moralising throughout. The dialogues 
Hiero, Oeconomicus and Symposium revolve at least partly around moral 
themes and the Memorabilia (Memories of Socrates) is entirely moral-di-
dactic. Moreover, the same moral lessons we have seen in the Hellenica are 
propounded in the other works: divine justice,73 the importance of piety,74 
the qualities of the good commander and the relationship between a com-
mander and his men,75 which seems to be a subcategory of the good ruler 
and the value of a relationship with subjects based on love and respect,76 
friendship as a virtue and a complication,77 moderation and self-control,78 
and the importance of wit, charm and a sense of humour.79 In addition, 
some of the other works include paradeigmata of moral topics which 
do not receive much space in the Hellenica, such as education and grat-
itude, both important virtues in the Cyropaedia (Education of Cyrus). 
Throughout all of Xenophon’s works it is common for the good to thrive 
and the wicked to come to grief (with a few exceptions, the most important 
one being Socrates).
Three of Xenophon’s works are especially interesting to compare with 
the Hellenica because they belong to neighbouring genres: the Anabasis, 
the Agesilaus and the Cyropaedia. To begin with the Anabasis, this is the 
work that most resembles the Hellenica in terms of moralising, just as it 
is the one closest to it in genre. Like the Hellenica, it mostly engages in 
implicit moralising by means of evaluative vocabulary and a correlation 
between behaviour and result (e.g. An. 4.4.14). Its only explicit moralising 
takes place in digressions focused on the characters of individuals (Cyrus 
1.9, Clearchus 2.6.1–15, Proxenus 2.6.16–20, Menon 2.6.21–9). The differ-
ences which make the Anabasis and the Hellenica such different reading 
experiences are not in the moralising, but in the scope and focalisation of 
the narrative.
The encomium Agesilaus is moralising from cover to cover, and the 
treatise on kingship, the Cyropaedia, is permeated with moralising. In 
comparison with these two latter works, the Hellenica and Anabasis are 
73 E.g. Eq. mag. 9.8–9.
74 E.g. Eq. mag. 1.1 and 9.8; Cyr. 1.6.44–6; Ages. 1.27–8, 3.2; Mem. 1.3.1–4, 1.1.6–9, 
4.4.19; Lac. 8.5; Poroi 6.2–3.
75 E.g. Eq. mag. 6; Cyr. 4.2.9–11, 8.1.3; Mem. 3.1–4, 3.5.21–4; Ages. 1.38.
76 Cyr. and Hier. in their entirety; Mem. 1.2.10–11, 1.2.32; Oec. 11.2–12
77 E.g. Ages. 1.17–10; Mem. 1.2.51–5; Cyr. 7.1.30, 8.3.3; Ap. 5; Mem. 2.4–6.
78 E.g. Cyr. 4.5.1–4 and 7–8, 7.5.78–85, 8.1.30–2; Ages 5.1–2, 5.6, 8.6–8; Mem. 1.2.14–23, 
1.3.5–7, 3.13.2–3; Hier. 4.6–11.
79 E.g. Ages. 7.3.2, 11.11; Cyr. 1.3.4–12, 2.2.1–16; Symp. 1.1.
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quite restrained in their expressions of moral didacticism. They offer moral 
lessons, but they have another purpose beside, namely to narrate factual 
events in a truthful (if selective) manner. In doing this, these historiograph-
ical works have a special relationship with historical truth, with the events 
that actually happened, which the Cyropaedia and even the Agesilaus do 
not.80 Thus, for instance, the Agesilaus is able to claim that Agesilaus was 
chosen as king over Leotychidas ‘because of his birth and his virtue’ (τῷ 
γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ: Ages. 1.5), while the Hellenica offers the more detailed 
and less morally satisfying narrative of Lysander’s reinterpretation of an 
oracular warning to ‘beware the lame kingship’ to refer not to Agesilaus, 
although he had a limp, but to Leotychidas, whose parentage was thus 
thrown into doubt (Hell. 3.3.1–4). Similarly, the Agesilaus has Agesilaus 
reach and burn down the outskirts of Sardis in his Asian campaign and 
then concludes in a tone as moralising as it is triumphalist:
ἐπεὶ μέντοι οὐδεὶς ἀντεξῄει, ἀδεῶς δὴ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐστρατεύετο, τοὺς μὲν 
πρόσθεν προσκυνεῖν Ἕλληνας ἀναγκαζομένους ὁρῶν τιμωμένους ὑφ᾽ ὧν 
ὑβρίζοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀξιοῦντας καὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς καρποῦσθαι, τούτους 
ποιήσας μηδ᾽ ἀντιβλέπειν τοῖς Ἕλλησι δύνασθαι, καὶ τὴν μὲν τῶν φίλων 
χώραν ἀδῄωτον παρέχων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων οὕτω καρπούμενος ὥστε ἐν 
δυοῖν ἐτοῖν πλέον τῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντων τῷ θεῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς δεκάτην ἀποθῦσαι.
When no one came out to meet him in battle, however, he continued his 
campaign fearlessly. Thus he saw the Greeks who had before been forced to 
make servile obeisance now being honoured by those who had abused them; 
he made those who thought themselves worthy to enjoy divine honours 
unable to look the Greeks in the eye; he made the land of his friends unrav-
aged, and he enjoyed the fruits of his enemy’s land to such a degree that he 
was able to dedicate in the space of two years more than a hundred talents 
to the god at Delphi as tithe. (Xen. Ages. 1.34)
Here, then, the arrogant Persians get their punishment for abusing the 
Greeks. In the Hellenica, however, Agesilaus does not reach the suburbs of 
Sardis, but strikes a deal with the Persian satrap Tithraustes and marches 
towards Phrygia instead (Hell. 3.25–6). There is no moralising conclusion. 
The possible reasons for the discrepancy between the narrative of the Sardis 
campaign in these two works by the same author, who most probably had 
himself taken part in it, have been much discussed.81 I would venture a 
solution based on genre: in the encomium, Xenophon offers an account 
‘with amplification’; in the Hellenica, he gives an account that is ‘true 
80 For the different relationships of encomia and historiographies with truth see Polyb. 
10.21. For an overview of scholarship on this see Farrington (2011).
81 See e.g. Anderson (1974), Cawkwell (1979: 38), Gray (1981), Krentz (1995: 188–92) 
and Dillery (1995: 110–14).
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and demonstrates the reasoning accompanying each action’.82 Moralising 
is important for both genres, but supports two different goals: persua-
sion in the encomium (of the fact that its protagonist was the epitome of 
virtue) and didacticism in historiogrpahy. This is why the Hellenica and 
the Anabasis often offer moral dilemmas for the reader’s contemplation 
and the Agesilaus does not.
The Cyropaedia shares the didactic goal of the Hellenica and the 
Anabasis, but as historico-philosophical fiction it is even further removed 
from obligations to the truth than the Agesilaus and is thus free to present 
fully invented moralising paradeigmata for the reader’s edification. The 
moralising techniques it uses are largely the same as those employed in the 
Hellenica and Anabasis, including moral dilemmas, just as its narrative 
form is modelled on historiography, but, crucially, it lacks the commentary 
track that characterises historiography (see above, pp. 9–10), and for that 
reason lacks moralising digressions.
On the basis of this whirlwind tour of Xenophon’s literary output, we 
can conclude that historiography is not unique in either its moralising 
techniques or its moral lessons. What makes historiography unique is that 
it is at the same time committed to offering what the author considers a 
truthful account of the past and to presenting this past in a way that will be 
morally useful to the reader.
CONCLUSION: MORAL DIDACTICISM IN CLASSICAL 
HISTORIOGRAPHY
We can conclude not just that the three surviving Classical historiographies 
do indeed moralise, but that moral didacticism is part of their raison d’être, 
and has informed every level of their works from the choice of words to the 
macro-structure. Each of the three works would have looked dramatically 
different if the author had not had complex moral lessons to deliver, and I 
would venture the claim that were it not for those lessons, they would not 
have been written at all.
Most of the types of moralising that characterise the Hellenistic histo-
riographers are found also in the Classical ones, sometimes in embryonic 
form, sometimes fully developed, but less frequently used. The difference 
is one of degree, not of kind. In addition, the Classical historiographers use 
different types of moralising: minimalist moralising and macro-level mor-
alising. Because of the fragmented nature of what is extant of Hellenistic 
82 ὑπάρχων ἐγκωμιαστικός, ἀπῄτει τὸν κεφαλαιώδη καὶ μετ᾽ αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων 
ἀπολογισμόν, οὕτως ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας, κοινὸς ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου, ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν 
μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἑκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμῶν (Polyb. 10.21.8).The distinc-
tion is Polybius’, but it works well for Xenophon.
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historiography it is impossible to see whether macro-level moralising 
remained a feature of the genre. On the one hand, some authors such as 
Diodorus may not have expected their readers to read their work from 
beginning to end and so may not have thought it worthwhile to impose a 
moralising superstructure on it. On the other hand, Polybius’ theory of the 
cycle of constitutions may indicate a desire to show the history of Rome 
as conforming to a preconceived pattern to some extent based on moral 
premises.
In terms of the behaviour advocated, it is striking how similar Classical 
moral didacticism is to its Hellenistic counterpart: the instability of human 
happiness and the dangers of overconfidence, the virtues of courage, intelli-
gence, justice and fair treatment of subjects and subordinates, and the vices 
of cruelty, injustice and self-interest are universal across both time periods. 
There are differences, of course. Herodotus, Xenophon and Diodorus 
present divine justice as a historical force and, correspondingly, have piety 
as a cardinal virtue whereas Thucydides and Polybius do not. The reci-
procity that is a driving force in the Histories of Herodotus becomes an 
issue of euergetism and appropriate gratitude in the Hellenistic historiog-
raphers. Xenophon’s good leader is a lot more sociable than Thucydides’ 
or Polybius’. Overall, however, Thucydides is the truly odd one out: only 
in his work does a dissonance exist between the admirable virtues and the 
results they bring. However, considering that we are looking at a period 
of 400 years, the similarities in moral messages are more striking than the 
differences.
7. Fragmentary Classical 
Historiography
In Chapters 1–3 we examined the form and content of moral didacticism 
in what remains of Hellenistic historiography until Diodorus Siculus. In 
Chapters 4–6 we have seen that the three extant Classical historiographers 
also moralised, and we have traced many of the moralising techniques of 
Hellenistic historiography back to them. However, it has also become clear 
that the Classical historiographers’ primary means of moral didacticism 
were different from those of their Hellenistic successors in that the moralis-
ing took place partly on the macro-level of structure, partly in a less explicit 
form than what is mostly seen in Hellenistic historiography. In this final 
chapter we shall examine the fragmentary remains of three famous works 
of the late Classical period and ask how this development from Classical to 
Hellenistic moralising happened. We have already seen that the moralising 
of Xenophon in some ways points towards the works of Hellenistic histori-
ography; now we shall see whether the trend continues throughout the late 
Classical period or the development is less straightforward.
Three once famous universal and/or continuous histories from the fourth 
century survive only in fragments: those of the so-called Oxyrhynchus 
Historian, Ephorus of Cyme and Theopompus. We shall look at the 
remaining evidence of their works in turn. The methodological issues 
involved in interpreting fragments which were discussed in the introduc-
tion to Chapter 3 are equally relevant for the fragments of Classical histo-
riography, but will not be repeated here.
The oxyrhynchus hisTorian
The Oxyrhynchus Historian (also known as P) was probably contemporary 
with Xenophon, although we cannot know for certain. His work is known 
from three papyrus fragments named after the places where they are kept: 
the London fragment (POxy 842, published in 1909 by Grenfell and Hunt), 
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the Florence fragment (PSI 1304, published in 1949 by Bartoletti) and the 
Cairo fragment (published in 1976 by Koenen). This makes the text of 
the Oxyrhynchus Historian especially interesting because, unlike the other 
fragments of historiography looked at in this study, it represents the actual 
text written by the author (as closely as any second-century papyrus can be 
said to represent the exact words of a fourth-century writer) rather than a 
string of quotations, paraphrases and references by later authors.
Scholars have argued for the identification of the Oxyrhynchus Historian 
with one or other of the historians whose names we know, the preferred 
candidates being Theopompus (the papyrus would then be a piece of his 
otherwise all but lost Hellenica) and Cratippus.1 As the question of author-
ship is not of great importance for this study, we shall not enter into the dis-
cussion, except to note that, in terms of moral didacticism, what remains 
of the Oxyrhynchus Historian bears little resemblance to the glimpses we 
get of Theopompus’ work through its fragments in covertexts, as will 
become clear from this chapter. In fact, in contrast with the fragments of 
Theopompus’ Philippica, the narrative of the Oxyrhynchus Historian seems 
bland. This has made scholars claim that the Oxyrhynchus Historian does 
not moralise, and to line him up along with Thucydides against the more 
obviously moralising Xenophon. However, we have seen that Thucydides 
does offer moral lessons in his History, and we shall soon see that the same 
may well have been true of the Oxyrhynchus Historian.
The most explicit instant of moralising in the papyri is a heavily frag-
mented passage which seems to have formed part of a positively phrased 
character sketch:
ἄριστα τ[οῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται] κεχρημέν[ος·] οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ο[ἱ πλεῖστοι 
τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυ-] ναστευόντω[ν] ὥρμησεν ἐ?[πὶ τὰς τῶν χρημάτων ἁρπα] γάς, 
καὶ δη[μο]τικώτα?[τ]ο?ς? τ?[..............
[He showed himself] to be the best at handling [affairs]. For he was not, 
like [most of the other r]ulers [before him], eager to st[eal other people’s 
money], but most public[-minded] . . . (Hell. Oxy. London fragment C2 
column 10)2
1 Both suggested by Grenfell and Hunt (1909). The case for both candidates is lucidly 
argued by McKechnie and Kern (1988: 8–16), who come out on the side of Theopompus. 
So also Laqueur (1934: 2193–203) and Bleckmann (2005). Advocates for Cratippus include 
Shrimpton (1991: appendix I), Meister (2003) and Schepens (2001). Bruce (1967: 22–7) and 
Behrwald (2005: 9–13) reach an agnostic conclusion. In earlier discussions Ephorus had 
been put forward (Walker 1913), and Jacoby (1926b: 2–20) idiosyncratically argued for 
Daimachus of Plataea. The modern discussions of the Oxyrhynchus Historian have, apart 
from the question of authorship, centred on the truth-value of his narrative, especially as 
contrasted with that of Xenophon. For the main arguments in this debate see Anderson 
(1974), Gray (1979), McKechnie and Kern (1988), Behrwald (2005) and Bleckmann 2005.
2 This corresponds to XIV.2 in McKechnie and Kern, 27.2 in Behrwald.
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The passage is too fragmentary for us to be able to tell whom it describes,3 
but there can be little doubt that – even if we disregard the restorations – 
it compares one ruler favourably against someone else, using the moral 
adverb ἄριστα; and if we accept the restorations, the passage makes a 
moral generalisation about rulers, who are said normally to be eager to 
appropriate the wealth of others, and the person in question is praised for 
being an exception. Another, slightly less fragmentary, passage is an eval-
uative conclusion to a narrative of how Conon quells a mutiny in the city 
of Caunus:
τὸ μὲν οὖν βασιλικὸν στρατό[πεδον οὕτ]ως εἰς μέγαν κίνδυνον προελθὸν διὰ 
Κόνων[α καὶ] τὴν ἐκείνου προθυμίαν ἐπαύσατο τῆς ταραχῆ[ς.
[Th]us, when the king’s arm[y] had come into great danger, it ceased from 
confusion because of Conon and his zeal. (Hell. Oxy. London fragment D 
column 20)4
This is the kind of minimalist evaluation we find in Thucydides. From the 
context it seems that we are supposed to admire and potentially emulate 
Conon in his zeal (προθυμία); but it would also be possible to read the 
statement ironically, as a criticism of the Athenian Conon for working 
with the Persian army. Then the conclusion would be a sharp reminder of 
the political realities after the rousing narrative of Conon’s efforts against 
the mutineers, a kind of sting in the tail known from both Thucydides and 
Xenophon.
Beside these two instances of moral evaluation, the narrative of the 
Oxyrhynchus Historian often uses restrained evaluative phrasing. Positive 
vocabulary is used, for instance, in an interesting narrative about how the 
Athenian Council secretly sends a messenger to Conon. We are told that 
the ‘well-born and well-bred’ ([ὅσοι γνώ]ριμ[οι κ]αὶ χαρίεντες ἦσαν) disap-
proved, two positively loaded terms for what was essentially the social elite. 
Negative vocabulary is used most prominently to call political murders in 
Rhodes ‘slaughter’ (τὴν σφαγήν), and to label one side in the Theban civil 
war as ‘ready to do evil’ (κακῶς ποιεῖν ἑτοίμους).5
3 Jacoby (1926b: 14), Bruce (1967: 93–5), McKechnie and Kern (1988: ad loc.), Behrwald 
(2005: 118). Jacoby argues that we cannot know who the protagonist of the passage is; but 
Bruce and McKechnie and Kern make good cases for either Agesilaus or Cyrus the Younger. 
Earlier suggestions have been Euagoras and Dionysius I (Bruce 1967: 93). Behrwald (2005), 
interestingly, suggests Tissaphernes.
4 This corresponds to XX.6 in McKechnie and Kern, 23 in Behrwald.
5 The three passages are: London fragment A column 1 (= McKechnie and Kern VI.2 
and Behrwald 9.2), London fragment D column 11 (= McKechnie and Kern XV.2 and 
Behrwald 18.3) and London fragment D column 13 (= McKechnie and Kern XVII.1 and 
Behrwald 20.1).
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This is the kind of subtle moralising employed by Thucydides and 
Xenophon, who were probably close contemporaries of the author of this 
text. As with Thucydides and Xenophon, such cases of evaluative phrasing 
in the Oxyrhynchus Historian are usually discussed only in the context of 
the author’s political bias; but, as we have seen in the other historiographers 
of this study, political opinion and moral conviction go hand in hand. The 
Oxyrhynchus Historian is giving the reader moral guidance and a political 
steer at the same time. With the text in this fragmentary state it is impossible 
to know whether its moral didacticism overall was as subtle as these exam-
ples suggest, or whether there were occasional bursts of moralising passion 
as in Thucydides, Xenophon and most probably the otherwise ‘sober’ 
Hieronymus, just as we cannot know whether he engaged in macro-level 
moralising, but it seems clear that the moralising of the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian resembled that of his Classical near-contemporaries.
ePhorus of cyme (FGrH 70)
Perhaps the most famous Classical historian whose work has not survived 
down to our time is Ephorus (FGrH 70), who was Xenophon’s younger 
contemporary (c. 405–330 bc). He wrote several works, including a treatise 
on style and a local history of his native city of Cyme, all of which are now 
lost. His History (or Histories; both the singular and plural are attested 
in the tradition) is praised by both Polybius (5.33.2) and Diodorus (5.1.4) 
as the first work of universal history, and was used as a source by both 
of these historiographers.6 Diod. Sic. 5.1.4 (= T 11) states that Ephorus 
organised his material in books kata genos. Much discussion surrounds 
the exact meaning of this phrase, but the most likely interpretation is that 
he focused on one event at the time, for instance one war, rather than pro-
ceeding annalistically and cutting up series of events in order to preserve 
a strict chronological framework.7 Ephorus also seems to have been the 
6 Diodorus is often assumed to have taken over large stretches of Ephorus’ work with very 
little editing (see e.g. Stylianou 1998, Parker n.d.). It is certainly true that Diodorus stuck very 
close to his sources when writing his Bibliotheke, but the sheer length of Ephorus’ Hellenica 
compared with the space into which Diodorus compressed it necessitates a certain amount of 
selection and pruning. For this reason, in addition to the ones stated in Chapter 2, I treat as 
Ephorus fragments only those passages of Diodorus which explicitly mention him as a source 
(discounting passages where he compares numbers given by Ephorus and Timaeus, which can 
be shown to depend on the latter; see Parker n.d.: ad F 201). For a good and detailed argument 
against reading Diodorus as if it were Ephorus, see Parmeggiani (2011: 357–90).
7 The most important studies of Ephorus are: Jacoby (1926b: 22–35), Schwartz (1907), 
Laqueur (1911), Barber (1993), Meister (1967), Stylianou (1998), Pownall (2004), Parker 
(n.d.) and Parmeggiani (2011). For good, more recent discussions of the meaning of kata 
genos with references to older scholarship see Parker (n.d.: ad T 11) and Parmeggiani (2011: 
156–64) (who are unfortunately not aware of each other).
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first historiographer to divide his work into books and preface each with a 
proem, which may or may not have been moralising.8
Ephorus is particularly interesting for our project because it has long 
been common for scholars of Greek historiography to consider him the first 
moralising historian, who, under the influence of his teacher Isocrates, set 
history on its downward-spiralling path towards degenerate Hellenism.9 
Even after it has become common to distrust the evidence for the relation-
ship with Isocrates, his reputation as the ‘first moralising historian’ still 
stands.10 It rests largely on a brief passage in Polybius:
ὁ γὰρ ̓́ Εφορος παρ᾽ ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν θαυμάσιος ὢν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φράσιν 
καὶ κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν λημμάτων, δεινότατός 
ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς παρεκβάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ γνωμολογίαις, καὶ συλλήβδην 
ὅταν που τὸν ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον διατίθηται . . .
For Ephorus is marvellous throughout his work with regard to expression, 
management of material, and acuity of argument, but he is most power-
ful in his digressions and in the maxims expressing his own opinion; in 
short whenever he composes something additional to the narrative. (Polyb. 
12.28.10 = Ephorus T 23)
This has since Schwartz’s 1907 RE article been interpreted as admiration 
for Ephorus’ moralising despite the fact that Polybius seems to be praising 
Ephorus for all manner of narratorial interventions, not just for ‘expressing 
maxims’.11 The idea that Ephorus was the one to introduce moralising into 
historiography for pedagogical reasons has often been coupled with the 
notion that he preferred praise to criticism, a notion which is based partly 
on Isocrates’ practice, partly on a remark in Strabo 7.3.9 (= Ephorus F 42).12 
 8 The evidence for this is Diod. Sic. 16.76.5 (= T 10). Ephorus’ proems have mainly been 
discussed by scholars who believe that Diodorus took them over more or less wholesale 
and glued them on to his own narrative; see Laqueur (1911), Kunz (1935), Barber (1993), 
Stylianou (1998) and, with more nuance, Parker (n.d.: ad T 11) contra Sacks (1990) and 
Parmeggiani (2011: 148). 
 9 On Ephorus as representative of ‘rhetorical’ and therefore inferior post-Thucydid-
ean historiography, see Schwartz (1907), Laqueur (1911), Jacoby (1926b: 23 and ad T 
11) and Meister (1990: 85–9), with the strong defence of Parmeggiani (2011: 9–80). For a 
 re-evaluation of the evidence for Isocrates’ influence on history writing see Marincola (2014).
10 That Ephorus was a pupil of Isocrates is stated by the Suda (s.v. ‘Ephorus’), but was 
first doubted by Schwartz (1907) and Jacoby (1926b: 22–3). Their arguments have been taken 
up by Flower (1994), Stylianou (1998) and, more forcefully, Parmeggiani (2011: 34–66). 
Contra Laqueur (1911), Barber (1993). The arguments are helpfully reviewed by Parker (n.d.: 
ad Ephorus T 1). Ephorus as the originator of moralising historiography, with no mention 
of Isocrates: Meister (1990: 85–9).
11 Interpreting the passage as solely about moralising: Schwartz (1907: 7–8), Jacoby 
1926b: ad loc.), Schepens (1977), Meister (1990: 87), Parker (n.d.: ad loc.).
12 E.g. by Sacks (1990: 27–9). Contra Pownall (2004: 128).
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However, Strabo quotes Ephorus as saying about other accounts of the 
Scythians that ‘they speak only of those of their customs that are barbaric, 
seeing only what is striking, marvellous, and shocking; but one should also 
tell about the opposite and provide paradeigmata’ (τὰ περὶ τῆς ὠμότητος 
αὐτῶν λέγουσιν, εἰδότες τὸ δεινὸν [δὲ] καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐκπληκτικὸν ὄν· 
δεῖν δὲ τἀναντία καὶ λέγειν καὶ παραδείγματα ποιεῖσθαι) – which surely does 
not mean that Ephorus generally prefers praise to criticism, only that he 
thinks a historiographer ought to offer a balanced account. It does show, 
however, that he thought in terms of moral paradeigmata and that he 
believed he had a duty to provide these in his work. Indeed, this is the first 
time in extant works of historiography that we see the idea that the histori-
ographer has a moral-didactic duty (δεῖν). It has been thought that Ephorus 
got this idea from Isocrates, but, having examined the moral didacticism 
of his predecessors within his own genre, it now seems more likely that he 
simply made explicit a function of historiography which was already gen-
erally accepted. We would know more about how he conceived of this duty 
if we had his preface, but we do not.
No fewer than 238 fragments of Ephorus’ History were collected by 
Jacoby. Of these, fifty-five come from Stephanus of Byzantium, forty-two 
from Strabo. Thus it is unsurprising that seventy-six of the extant frag-
ments are nothing more than brief notices about names or locations of 
cities or topographical features, and that many more are concerned with 
geography in some form. However, even from a reading of the remaining 
162 fragments the idea that Ephorus was supremely concerned with moral-
ising is not borne out. There is very little explicit moralising in them, and 
only sparing use of evaluative phrasing.
If we begin by looking for explicit praise and blame, the kind of passages 
which scholars generally believe that Ephorus was famous for, we find only 
a few indications. The clearest one is F 42, the Strabo passage referred to 
above, about the importance of offering both criticism and praise. Strabo 
goes on to say:
εἶτ᾽ αἰτιολογεῖ, διότι ταῖς διαίταις εὐτελεῖς ὄντες καὶ οὐ χρηματισταὶ πρός τε 
ἀλλήλους εὐνομοῦνται, κοινὰ πάντα ἔχοντες τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ 
τέκνα καὶ τὴν ὅλην συγγένειαν, πρός τε τοὺς ἐκτὸς ἄμαχοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνίκητοι, 
οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ὑπὲρ οὗ δουλεύσουσι.
Then he [Ephorus] explains that it is because they are simple in their lifestyle 
and not fixated on money (as they have everything in common including 
their wives and children and the whole extended family), that they both 
have good laws governing their internal relationships with each other and 
are unwarlike towards and unconquered by the outside world because they 
have nothing for the sake of which they might be enslaved. (Ephorus F 42 
= Strabo 7.3.9)
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Praiseworthy characteristics, according to Ephorus, then, are a simple life-
style, lack of greed, and a self-sufficiency that leads to security from attack. 
Similarly, in F 122a Strabo gives Ephorus as his source for the fact that the 
Aetolians have never been conquered ‘because of the ruggedess of their 
land and their training in warfare’ (διά τε τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων καὶ διὰ 
τὴν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄσκησιν). It is tempting to assume that Ephorus made 
a causal connection between the ruggedness of Aetolia and the warlikeness 
of its inhabitants in the vein of Herodotus and, later, Posidonius. This ideal 
of the simple life is also seen in F 149, which is Strabo’s summary of what 
Ephorus had to say – probably at much greater length – about the Cretan 
constitution, and which states that civil harmony is achieved by citizens 
‘living in a simple way’ (λιτῶς ζῶσιν) because in this way they avoid the 
‘envy, arrogant abuse, and hatred’ (οὐτε φθόνον οὐθ᾽ ὕβριν οὐτε μῖσος) 
caused by ‘greed and luxurious living’ (πλεονεξίαν καὶ τρυφήν). The use of 
the word tryphe, which only became common in the first and second cen-
turies ad (see Chapter 3), makes it likely that the phrasing here is Strabo’s, 
but he seems to be crediting Ephorus with the thought behind it.
Correspondingly, F 183 from Athenaeus gives Ephorus as the source for 
the information that the Milesians were formidable before they became 
subject to luxurious living (ἕως μὲν οὐκ ἐτρύφων), but again the expression 
with tryphe makes it likely that the wording is Athenaeus’, and in this case 
we cannot be sure that Ephorus made the connection between luxurious 
living and martial degeneration explicit.13 Similarly, in F 131a Strabo offers 
Ephorus as the source for an Iberian habit of punishing people for getting 
fat, but again we cannot see whether Ephorus approved or condemned this 
or simply reported it. It does seem, then, that Ephorus didactically pro-
moted the simple life over a life in luxury, but along a more Herodotean 
line of argument than the kind of scandalised tryphe ekphraseis that we 
have seen in the Hellenistic fragments of historiography preserved by 
Athenaeus. This difference in focus is probably why Athenaeus did not use 
him a lot: a mere twelve fragments of Ephorus are preserved by Athenaeus 
against twenty-five of Timaeus, forty-one of Phylarchus and eighty-three 
of Theopompus.
Interestingly, another fragment shows that a simple and rugged lifestyle 
is not always all that is needed for a strong state in Ephorus’ didacticism. 
This is F 198, which seems to be a summary of a much longer passage by 
Ephorus about Boeotia. Here Strabo states that Ephorus ‘praised’ Boeotia 
for its fertile land and said that it was ‘by nature well suited for hegemony’ 
13 For the problem with Athenaeus and tryphe, see Chapter 3. Parmeggiani (2011: 233–4) 
argues that these passages show a Hippocratic streak in Ephorus; I would argue that it might 
equally well be Herodotean.
252 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
(πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν), but that it had only held such power for 
a short period of time because its people did not engage in ‘training and 
education’ (ἀγωγῇ δὲ καὶ παιδείᾳ), but rather neglected ‘letters and civilised 
socialising’ (τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους). It seems that in 
order not just to stay unconquered, but to exercise hegemony, a certain 
level of civilisation is needed.
Another quality apparently promoted by Ephorus is justice: F 139 (= 
Strabo 6.1.8) states that he ‘praises’ (ἐπαινεῖ) the lawgiver Zaleucus for 
this. A third seems to have been courage: at least, it is tempting to connect 
F 220 (Plut. Dion 36.1), which says that Ephorus ‘lauded’ (ἐγκωμιάζων) 
the Sicilian historiographer and adviser to the tyrant Dionysius, Philistus, 
with F 229 (Steph. Byz. s.v. ᾽Ακραιφία), which gives Ephorus as the evi-
dence for Philistus comitting suicide rather than being captured alive by his 
enemies.14 It is also possible that F 85, in which Diogenes Laertius credits 
Ephorus with a story of the death of Xenophon’s son Gryllus, is a reference 
to a heroic battle-death narrative (ἰσχυρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος ἐτελεύτησεν, ὥς 
φησιν ῎Εφορος) like the ones that we have seen are characteristic of the 
‘Ephoran’ books of Diodorus.15 However, all of these references are too 
brief to be conclusive evidence.
The one historical character who is most obviously criticised in the 
Ephoran fragments is the Spartan general Dercyllidas (F 71).16 Athenaeus 
purports to quote Ephorus to the effect that Dercyllidas ‘did not have any-
thing Spartan or straightforward in his character, but had an unscrupulous 
and savage streak’ (οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ 
πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες). This is an extraordinary description 
of a character who seems to be admired by Xenophon, and it is hard to 
know whether Athenaeus is really quoting Ephorus. In any case there is 
no context preserved for the evaluation, so we cannot know exactly what 
it was Dercyllidas did to earn such condemnation. Perhaps it is simply 
his lack of adherence to the Spartan ethos and his propensity for trickery, 
which earned him the nickname Sisyphus (same fragment, and Xen. Hell. 
3.1.8).
Other behaviours possibly criticised by Ephorus are tyrannical behaviour 
(F 178 and 179, both about Periander of Corinth), and political corruption 
and starting a war to cover it up (F 196 on Pericles).17 In neither instance, 
however, is any actual moralising – even in the form of evaluative phrasing 
– preserved, and it is impossible to see whether Ephorus merely reported 
these behaviours without guiding the reader’s evaluation of them. A similar 
14 This is the suggestion of Pownall (2004). 
15 F 85 = Diog. Laert. 2.53.
16 F 71 = Ath. 11.500c.
17 F 178 = Diog. Laert. 1.96, F 179 = Diog. Laert. 1.98, F 196 = Diod. Sic. 12.38.1–41.1.
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instance is F 206, from Plutarch, which relates Lysander’s attempts to bribe 
various oracles, but here the moralising comes in the form of an internal 
evaluation, in direct speech by the priests of Ammon when they refuse 
the bribe.18 It is impossible to see whether Ephorus disapproved of such 
behaviour on religious grounds, like Diodorus, or on social grounds, like 
Polybius.
An important question is whether or not Ephorus showed that morally 
good behaviour would generally lead to success. If we look for evidence 
of specifically divine justice in the collected fragments of Ephorus, there 
is obvious evidence of it in F 96, which, however, comes from book 30 of 
the History, which was completed by Ephorus’ son Demophilus after his 
father’s death. The fragment describes divine punishment of the Phocian 
‘temple-robbers’ after the end of the Sacred War and has elements of mir-
roring or ironically apt punishment, but the fact that this passage was not 
written by Ephorus himself begs the question whether his son made an 
effort to keep to the overall tenor of the work in terms of moral and divine 
justice. Since this question cannot be answered, it is safest to leave the 
fragment out of our analysis of Ephorus’ work. Nonetheless, it is powerful 
evidence that some historiographers writing as early as the time of Ephorus 
were happy to include explicit instances of divine punishment of impiety.
There is some evidence among the fragments that Ephorus portrayed 
oracles in a respectful way. F 16 shows an oracle coming true, and in 
F 31b, Strabo quotes Ephorus’ statement that ‘it is inappropriate if we 
follow this sort of a method in regard to other matters, but when speak-
ing of the oracle, which is the most truthful thing of all, we use such 
untrustworthy and false tales’ (περὶ δὲ τοῦ μαντείου λέγοντες, ὃ πάντων 
ἐστὶν ἀψευδέστατον, τοῖς οὕτως ἀπίστοις καὶ ψευδέσι χρησόμεθα λόγοις).19 
This fragment then continues with portraying Apollo as a rationalised 
culture hero, who kills a violent man named ‘Python’ and brings civilisa-
tion to Greece. In F 174 Clement of Alexandria cites Ephorus (with Plato 
and Aristotle) as an authority for the fact that Minos learned his laws 
from Zeus, Lycurgus his from Apollo. This points to a work marked by 
a mixture of piety and euhemeristic rationalising, which may or may not 
have contained an element of divine justice.20
18 F 206 = Plut. Lys. 25.3.
19 F 16 = schol. on Pind. Pyth. 5.101b, F 31b = Strabo 9.3.11–12.
20 Such rationalising is also seen in F 34 (following on from F 31a) and F 147. Pownall 
(2004: 123) argues that F 34 is moralising in that Heracles is victorious over the Giants 
because they are impious, but this is a misreading: Theon says that the victory was thought 
to be divine because Heracles had conquered many with few, and the many were impious 
(οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν πάλαι μὲν Φλέγραν, νῦν δὲ Παλλήνην ὀνομαζομένην κατοικοῦντες ἦσαν 
ἄνθρωποι ὠμοὶ καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγοι, οἱ καλούμενοι Γίγαντες, οὓς ῾Ηρακλῆς 
λέγεται χειρώσασθαι τὴν Τροίαν ἑλών· καὶ διὰ τὸ κρατῆσαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν ῾Ηρακλέα ὀλίγους 
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Pownall has argued that Ephorus portrayed the world as a just place 
where the wicked come to bad ends, though not necessarily by means 
of divine punishment.21 One of the fragments she adduces as evidence 
is F 19. Here a scholiast of Plato explains the expression Διὸς Κόρινθος, 
used of pompous people who get their comeuppance, by means of a 
story about Corinthian ambassdors to their colony Megara, which has 
revolted, who keep referring in a pompous manner to their own city as 
‘Zeus’ Corinth’. In the end they are stoned out of the asssembly by the 
Megarians, and later a battle takes place in which the Megarians defeat 
the Corinthians, encouraging each other to ‘strike Zeus’ Corinth’ as they 
kill the fleeing. Thus it seems that the Megarians get their revenge while 
the arrogant and pompous Corinthians are punished. However, there 
are problems with the interpretation of the fragment. Firstly, as Jacoby 
already pointed out, we cannot see whether Ephorus actually told this 
story or just referred to the proverb.22 The scholiast refers to four differ-
ent sources:
μέμνηται δὲ ταύτης Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν τοῖς Βατράχοις . . . καὶ ἐν Ταγηνισταῖς, 
καὶ Ἔφορος ἐν πρώτωι Ἱστοριῶν, καὶ Πλάτων Εὐθυδήμωι. ἄλλοι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τέλει ἀπειλούντων φασὶν εἰρῆσθαι τὴν παροιμίαν. · Μεγαρεῦσι γὰρ 
ὡρμημένοις ἀφίστασθαι ἐπιλέγειν τὸν Κορίνθιον ῾οὐκ ἀνέξεται ταῦτα ὁ Διὸς 
Κορίνθος᾽. μέμνηται ταύτης καὶ Πίνδαρος.
This expression is mentioned by Aristophanes in the Frogs . . . and in the 
Broilers, as well as Ephorus in book 1 of the Histories, and Plato in the 
Euthydemus. But others say that the expression is used of people who make 
idle threats . . . For the Corinthian told the Megarians, who were about to 
revolt, ‘Zeus’ Corinth will not abide these things’. Pindar uses the expres-
sion too. (Ephorus F 19 = schol. Pl. Euthyd. 292e; translation modified from 
BNJ)
However, both Aristophanes’ Frogs and Plato in the passage which the 
scholiast is explaining use the expression ‘Zeus’ Corinth’ without explain-
ing it.23 It is tempting, then, to hypothesise that the scholiast must have 
found the story in Ephorus since he did not find it in any of his other named 
sources, but it is entirely possible that he knew it from somewhere else – the 
expression is also used by Pindar (Nem. 5, 105) and by Aristophanes again 
ὄντας τῶν Γιγάντων πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀσεβῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἅπασιν ἐδόκει γεγονέναι τὸ περὶ 
τὴν μάχην). For an interesting discussion of what role mythological narratives may have 
played in Ephorus see Luraghi (2014).
21 Pownall (2004: 113–42).
22 Jacoby (1930: 46). See also Parker (n.d.: ad loc.).
23 Ar. Ran. 439; Pl. Euthyd. 292e. Aristophanes Tagenistae is lost except for fragments, 
and the Platonic scholiast’s words are our only testimony of what it may have said about 
Διὸς Κόρινθος.
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in Ecclesiazusae 828 – and referred to Ephorus, as to Aristophanes, simply 
because the expression was mentioned in his work.
If we do accept that Ephorus told the story, it would show that at 
least in this instance he implied that the arrogant got their comeuppance. 
Pownall further adduces as evidence of such universal justice the end of F 
118 (= Strabo 8.5.5). Here, Ephorus is given as the source for the fact that 
Lycurgus is honoured in Sparta because he gave just laws, and Agis and 
Eurypon because they ruled justly (δικαίως), but not the two founders, 
Procles and Eurysthenes, because they did not. One gets the impression 
that Ephorus here worked back from the honours he saw bestowed on 
these Spartan heroes and the curious fact that the founders were not among 
them and inferred their respective moral and immoral behaviour from 
that.24 If so, that would demonstrate a commitment to viewing the world as 
a place where the good (rulers, at least) are honoured after their death and 
the bad (rulers) forgotten. F 58a–d show that worse things could happen to 
the afterlife of a villain: here, Eurybatus betrays Croesus to Cyrus, with the 
result that Eurybatus’ name becomes proverbial for traitors.25 One further 
fragment shows punishment for morally bad behaviour during the villain’s 
lifetime, namely F 60a, a scholion on Apollonius Rhodius, where Ephorus 
is given as the source for the fact that the Amazons killed their husbands 
because they had been mistreated (ὑβριζομένας) by them.26
One fragment, nonetheless, shows that people in Ephorus did not 
always get what they deserved. F 191 is a damaged piece of a papyrus 
which has often been thought to come from a copy of Ephorus’ History. It 
is, however, more likely to come from an epitome of Ephorus and so does 
not necessarily reproduce his writing style.27 It is a brisk summary of events 
from the end of the Persian Wars to the murder of Xerxes in 465 bc, kept in 
plain language with hardly any evaluative vocabulary, as befits an epitome. 
The only passage of this text which demonstrates moral evaluation is frag-
ments 3–5, which concern Themistocles:
Fr. 3: .] ε[..]ω[..] ἐκ[εῖνον] | μ̣ὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλε[ως] | ἠτιμασμένον, τ[ὴν] | δὲ 
πόλιν διὰ τ[ὰ]ς̣ ἐ|κείνου πράξε̣[ι]ς τῆς μεγίστης τιμῆς ὑπὸ | τῶν ῾Ελλήνων 
ἀξι||ωθεῖσαν· ἣ μεγάλην | [ἡγεμονί]αν(?) οἷον τ̣.
Fr. 4–5: ..... σο]φ̣[ωτάτην καὶ] | [δικαι]οτ̣ά̣[την(?) ...|....]τα[τ]η[ν] κ̣[αὶ || χαλεπ]
ωτάτην [γενο|μένη]ν̣ πρὸς ἐκε[ῖνον.
24 For the likely historical truth behind all of this see Parker (n.d.: ad loc.). 
25 F 58a = Harpocration, s.v. Εὐρύβατον; F 58b = schol. on Hermogenes 63.140.2; F 58c 
= Suda, s.v. Εὐρύβατος; F 58d = Diod. Sic. 9.32.
26 F 60a = schol. on Ap. Rhod. Argon. 2.965.
27 For a brief overview of the case for attributing the papyrus to Ephorus see Parker (n.d.: 
ad loc). For the compelling counter-arguments and the case for an epitome of Ephorus see 
Parmeggiani (2011: 376–8 with n. 150 and 155).
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Fr. 3: . . . that h[e had been] deprived of honour by the city, t[he] city which 
had been deemed worthy of the highest honour by the Greeks because of h[i]
s deeds: it [had obtained?] great [international po]wer like . . .
Fr. 4–5: . . . that [the w]i[sest and most j]ust .............. [had becom]e the [mo]
s t...... a[nd harsh]est towards him. (Ephorus F 191 = POxy. 13.1610.1–16)
Even without looking at the restored bits, there is a clear rhetorical antith-
esis between ἠτιμασμένον (‘having been deprived of honour/disfranchised’) 
and τῆς μεγίστης τιμῆς . . . ἀξι||ωθεῖσαν (‘having been deemed worthy of 
the greatest honour’). The word polis is also clearly readable twice in this 
sentence, and since the text has just been talking about Themistocles, it 
makes sense to assume that it is here contrasting the honour and glory 
that he brought on Athens with the dishonour bestowed on him by the 
city when it sent him into exile. The heavy restoration of fragments 4 and 
5 is based on the text of Diod. Sic. 11.56, which can be seen to follow the 
papyrus closely and must have used the same source, namely Ephorus. 
Here again we see an antithesis, this time between the reputation of Athens 
and the city’s treatment of Themistocles. The adjectives used are morally 
evaluative: ‘wisest’, ‘most just’, ‘harshest’. This looks like an abbreviation 
of a longer passage of narratorial moralising, which indeed the correspond-
ing passage in Diodorus is. The fact that most of the passage appears to be 
indirect discourse need not trouble us: it may well have been dependent, 
in the unfragmented epitome, on a statement such as ‘the well-educated 
and sensible people thought that’ as an instance of internal evaluation, or 
even on an expression such as ‘one might reasonably say that’ or ‘I believe 
that’, thus forming part of a narratorial moralising evaluation. In any case, 
the juxtaposition of Themistocles’ contribution to the glory of Athens and 
his disfranchisement by the city deliberately underlines the injustice of his 
fate and shows that not everyone in Ephorus’ History got the rewards their 
conduct deserved.
A similar message can perhaps be drawn from F 175, where Aelian says 
that Lycurgus received ‘an inglorious reward’ (οὐ καλοὺς τοὺς μισθόυς) 
when he had his eye knocked out. He finishes the story with the statement 
that ‘Ephorus, at any rate, says that Lycurgus died in exile, having patiently 
endured hunger’ (λέγει δὲ Ἔφορος αὐτὸν λιμῷ διακαρτερήσαντα ἐν φυγῇ 
ἀποθανεῖν).28 If this passage was indeed in Ephorus, it would be interesting 
that he stressed the injustice of Lycurgus’ ‘reward’. However, the phrasing 
is almost certainly Aelian’s own, and we cannot even be certain how much 
of the content he found in Ephorus, as he only gives him as the source for 
the information that Lycurgus starved himself to death. Most probably, 
this sentence is an extreme compression of what Ephorus spent at least a 
28 Ephorus F 175 = Ael. VH 13.23.
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passage or a chapter narrating in much greater detail. This means that we 
cannot know how Ephorus constructed his narrative of Lycurgus’ death, or 
whether he moralised on it.29 In short, there is evidence that some morally 
bad characters came to bad ends in Ephorus, and an indication that he may 
have deplored Themistocles’ and Lycurgus’ undeserved fates, but there is 
not enough for us to draw a firm conclusion about the presence or absence 
of general moral justice in his narrative.
If we compare this image of Ephorus’ moral lessons with the impres-
sion produced by our analysis in Chapter 2 of Diodorus’ moralising in the 
books of the Bibliotheke based on Ephorus, we see that they only partly 
correspond: both Diodorus’ ‘Ephoran’ text and references to Ephorus in 
other later authors indicate that Ephorus moralised on courage and justice, 
but the moralising on the positive effects of mildness and kindness which 
we saw in Diodorus is absent from the fragments. This means either that it 
was in Ephorus’ original, but has been lost, or that it was Diodorus’ own 
addition to what he found in Ephorus. By contrast, moralising on the con-
nection between inhabiting a fertile land, living an easy life and becoming 
soft and easy to conquer seems from the fragments to have been part of 
Ephorus’ History, but plays no prominent part in Diodorus’ ‘Ephoran’ 
narrative.
Before leaving Ephorus behind, we need to ask what can be deduced 
about his moralising techniques from the fragments. This is a tricky ques-
tion to answer in his case because most of the fragments are not verbatim 
quotation, but summaries, paraphrases and more or less vague references. 
However, we can tentatively suggest that he seems to have used evalua-
tive phrasing, juxtaposition of information, and evaluation by an internal 
audience – although sparingly, to judge from the papyrus fragment. He 
also seems to have shown that morally bad deeds can lead to disastrous 
results, although his narrative world does not seem to have been a univer-
sally just place and there is no evidence of divine justice. Finally, accord-
ing to Polybius, he was exceptionally good at expressing his opinion in 
digressions and maxims, but no actual evidence of this exists among the 
fragments. This corresponds well with the picture that emerged from the 
analysis of Diodorus’ moralising: according to this, Ephorus made sparing 
use of evaluative vocabulary, but also engaged in moral digressions, moral-
ising asides and moralising introductions and conclusions.
In conclusion, there is nothing to suggest that Ephorus was the first 
moralising historiographer. Rather, it looks as if he picked up the style 
29 Pownall (2004: 140) argues that the moral, λέγεται δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλα <μὲν> 
θελήσαντας ἄλλων δὲ τυχόντας, is taken over from Ephorus; but even if that were true, it 
would not be evidence that he moralised on the injustice of Lycurgus’ fate. 
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of Xenophon, including that author’s techniques of moralising by infre-
quent use of morally evaluative phrasing and subtle juxtaposition, pos-
sibly as well as moralising digressions. In other words, subtle moralising 
was already present in Xenophon, and Ephorus only developed it further. 
How much further is impossible to say from the scant evidence, but it cer-
tainly seems that he was less explicitly moralising than Theopompus, his 
younger contemporary, to whom we turn next. In fact, it looks as if the 
development from subtle to explicit moralising in Greek historiography 
was gradual rather than sudden, and that Ephorus was just one step along 
the way. Pownall has argued that Ephorus ‘was willing to stray from his 
stated historical principles and, what is more, that at times he did so on 
purpose, to make a moral point’.30 I would argue that Ephorus most prob-
ably did not consider himself as straying from any principles when he told 
what we consider to be mythological stories, but that he believed that he 
was able to get to their core of truth by rationalising them. And moralising 
was not something he engaged in only when ‘straying’ from his principles; 
rather it was an integral part of what he thought a historiographer should 
do in order to make his work useful and relevant to his readers. In this 
Ephorus was in line with both his Classical predecessors and his Hellenistic 
successors.
TheoPomPus of chios (FGrH 115)
Theopompus of Chios was Ephorus’ contemporary and probably lived 
c. 403–320 bc.31 Ancient tradition has it that they were both pupils of 
Isocrates, and ancient authors often compare them.32 As with Ephorus, 
it is impossible now to know for certain whether the relationship with 
Isocrates was real or a later fabrication, but with Theopompus it is at 
least obvious why his historical works might be associated with Isocrates’ 
teachings of rhetoric and moral didacticism.33 He wrote several works, 
including a Hellenica in twelve books, which picked up where Thucydides 
left off and ended with the Battle of Cnidus in 394 bc, and a Philippica in 
fifty-eight books, from the accession of Philip II to the throne of Macedon 
in 360/59 bc to his assassination in 336 bc. This latter work was not so 
much a history of Philip as a Greek history, including the history of Sicily, 
30 Pownall (2004: 128–9).
31 For a discussion of Theopompus’ dates see Flower (1994: 11–17) and Morison (n.d.: 
ad T 1 and T 2, ‘Biographical Essay’).
32 See e.g. FGrH 115 T 1, T 6b; T 20a; T 24; T 37; T 39a; T 39b; T 39c. 
33 The connection with Isocrates goes back at least to the Suda (T 1). It has been dis-
puted by Schwartz (1907), whose views are revived by Flower (1994). Contra Laqueur (1934), 
Pédech (1989), Shrimpton (1991) and Morison (n.d.: ‘Biographical Essay’).
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structured on the framework of the reign of Philip with numerous lengthy 
digressions.34 That is clear from the varied fragments as well as from testi-
monia, especially Photius (Bibl. cod. 176.121a35 = T 31), which states that 
the material about Philip II, when excerpted on the orders of Philip V, ran 
to no more than sixteen books. For this reason both of these works must 
be included in our study. Theopompus’ separate work on the Sacred War, 
however, provocatively entitled On the Funds Stolen from Delphi, was 
clearly a shorter treatise with a political purpose, and so the fragments pre-
served from this (F 248–9) cannot contribute to an understanding of moral 
didacticism in universal or continuous histories. Neither can the fragments 
of his speeches or his letters to Philip II and Alexander the Great (F 250–9).
Theopompus is among the best-attested of the fragmentary historiog-
raphers, with 413 fragments collected by Jacoby (411 in BNJ). Of the 
ones that preserve the title of their work, thirteen come from speeches, 
letters and pamphlets (F 247–59), five from his epitome of Herodotus (F 
1–5), eighteen from the Hellenica (F 6–23) and a staggering 231 from the 
Philippica (F 24–254), showing that this was by far his most-read work. In 
terms of covertext, 107 fragments are preserved by Stephanus of Byzantium 
and consist of short, geographical notices, and thirty-three in Harpocration 
are mainly brief lexicographical entries. However, an impressive eighty-
three fragments are preserved by Athenaeus and twenty-four by Plutarch, 
all of which are longer and often moralising passages. Of the rest, forty 
fragments come from various scholiasts, thirteen from Strabo, and the 
remaining 113 from a wide variety of later authors, who are each responsi-
ble for fewer than ten fragments and often no more than one or two. The 
wide spread in covertexts and the large number of fragments perhaps mean 
that what is left is more representative of the original works than is the 
case for most other fragmentary historiographers, but it is risky to make 
assumptions. Even though use of Theopompus by Athenaeus and Plutarch 
shows that they found his work a rich quarry of moral anecdotes, it also 
means that the extant fragments are likely to contain a larger proportion of 
moralising than the original works.
Scholarship on Theopompus is quite extensive.35 Everyone agrees that 
Theopompus was a moralising historian, who propounded traditional 
moral values, first and foremost moderation and sobriety, and who blamed 
more than he praised. He is generally considered a pessimist who depicted 
his historical characters in the worst light possible, although he may have 
34 For a detailed discussion of the likely contents of the Sicilian digressions of the 
Philippica see Occhipinti (2013).
35 Main works are: Laqueur (1934), Westlake (1954), Connor (1967, 1968), Pédech 
(1989), Shrimpton (1991), Flower (1994), Pownall (2004) and Morison (n.d.). Jacoby (1930), 
strangely, does not give Theopompus’ FGrH entry his usual introduction.
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made a few exceptions.36 It is also common to consider his works part 
of the rhetorical/moralising decline of post-Thucydidean historiography.37 
An interesting question is Theopompus’ attitude to Philip, after whom he 
named his greatest work of history: did he admire or despise him?38 We 
shall return to these issues below.
The fragments of Theopompus contain a large number of explicitly 
moralising passages, mainly from Athenaeus. Most of these are negative 
paradeigmata, some are positive, two are combinations of praise and crit-
icism.39 The most revealing evidence of his moralising style is a set of 
fragments found in Athenaeus and Polybius, who both claim to be quoting 
Theopompus verbatim. The fragments overlap (with minor differences) 
and are obviously from the same passage, an extended and passionate 
lecture on the moral failings of Philip II. The text quoted below is from 
Polybius, but overlaps with Athenaeus (and Pseudo-Demetrius, On Style) 
at several points:40
εἰ δέ τις ἀναγνῶναι βουληθείη τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ τετταρακοστῆς αὐτῷ 
βύβλου, παντάπασιν ἂν θαυμάσαι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ συγγραφέως, ὅς γε χωρὶς 
τῶν ἄλλων τετόλμηκε καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν—αὐταῖς γὰρ λέξεσιν αἷς ἐκεῖνος 
κέχρηται κατατετάχαμεν· ‘εἰ γάρ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς ̔́ Ελλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις’ φησί 
‘λάσταυρος ἢ θρασὺς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι πάντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀθροιζόμενοι 
πρὸς Φίλιππον ἑταῖροι τοῦ βασιλέως προσηγορεύοντο. καθόλου γὰρ ὁ 
Φίλιππος τοὺς μὲν κοσμίους τοῖς ἤθεσι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων βίων ἐπιμελουμένους 
ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τοὺς δὲ πολυτελεῖς καὶ ζῶντας ἐν μέθαις καὶ κύβοις ἐτίμα καὶ 
προῆγεν. τοιγαρ<οῦν> οὐ μόνον ταῦτ᾽ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς παρεσκεύαζεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
36 The idea of Theopompus as a harsh judge of character goes back to ancient critics; 
see e.g. Polyb. 8.8.7–11.6 (= Theopomp. T 19), Dion. Hal. Pomp. 6 (= Theopomp. T 20a) 
and Luc. Hist. conscr. 59.59 (= Theopomp. T 25a). Pessimist: Pédech (1989); misanthrope: 
Laqueur (1934). Connor (1967) famously says that Theopompus’ work depicted no heroes, 
only villains. Westlake (1954) argues that Theopompus made an exception for Timoleon and 
portrayed him as a good man, Morison (n.d.) that he did this with Lysander and Agesilaus; 
Shrimpton (1991) argues that Theopompus did not paint all his characters in black, but some 
in ‘shades of grey’, and that these are his heroes. Shrimpton (1991) and Pownall (2004) argue 
for a distinction between two types of villains: those who are merely corrupted and slaves to 
their own pleasure, and those who are contagiously villainous and corrupt others.
37 E.g. Lane Fox (1984: 116–18), Meister (1990: 90–4).
38 Some scholars argue that Theopompus despised Philip for his immorality and used 
his narrative to show that Philip’s success was due to luck (Connor 1967, Pownall 2004) or 
to the prevailing moral corruption of Greece (Connor 1967, 1968, Shrimpton 1991, Flower 
1994). Others argue that Theopompus admired Philip’s political and military achievements 
despite being critical of his personal life (Pédech 1989, Westlake 1992).
39 Negative: F 36, F 39, F 49, F 62, F 81, F 100, F 105, F 114, F 117, F 121, F 124, F 143, 
F 162, F 163, F 192, F 204, F 213, F 224, F 236, F 281, F 282, F 290, F 291; positive: F 8, F 18, 
F 20, F 139, F 289, F 321, F 333; mixed: F 97 and F 99. For a good discussion of these two 
‘mixed’ passages see Flower (1994: 72–3).
40 For a good overview of the overlapping fragments see Morison (n.d.: ad F 224–5c) 
and Flower (1994: 105–6). 
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τῆς ἄλλης ἀδικίας καὶ βδελυρίας ἀθλητὰς ἐποίησεν. τί γὰρ τῶν αἰσχρῶν 
ἢ δεινῶν αὐτοῖς οὐ προσῆν, ἢ τί τῶν καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων οὐκ ἀπῆν; ὧν 
οἱ μὲν ξυρόμενοι καὶ λεαινόμενοι διετέλουν ἄνδρες ὄντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἀλλήλοις 
ἐτόλμων ἐπανίστασθαι πώγωνας ἔχουσι. καὶ περιήγοντο μὲν δύο καὶ τρεῖς 
τοὺς ἑταιρευομένους, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐκείνοις χρήσεις ἑτέροις παρείχοντο. 
ὅθεν καὶ δικαίως ἄν τις αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἑταίρους ἀλλ᾽ ἑταίρας ὑπελάμβανεν [εἶναι] 
οὐδὲ στρατιώτας ἀλλὰ χαμαιτύπους προσηγόρευσεν· ἀνδροφόνοι γὰρ τὴν 
φύσιν ὄντες ἀνδρόπορνοι τὸν τρόπον ἦσαν. ἁπλῶς δ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα παύσωμαι’ 
φησί ‘μακρολογῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσούτων μοι πραγμάτων ἐπικεχυμένων, 
ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα θηρία γεγονέναι καὶ τοιούτους τὸν τρόπον τοὺς φίλους καὶ 
τοὺς ἑταίρους Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας οἵους οὐτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς 
τὸ Πήλιον κατασχόντας οὐτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς τὸ Λεοντίνων πεδίον 
οἰκήσαντας οὐτ᾽ ἄλλους οὐδ᾽ ὁποίους.’
If someone should wish to read the beginning of his [i.e. Theopompus’] 
 forty-ninth book, he would be completely amazed at the absurdity of the 
historiographer, who apart from the other things has dared to say also this 
– for I have set down the very words which he has used: ‘For if someone 
among the Greeks or the non-Greeks’, he says, ‘was a hairy predator or 
brazen in character, these were all gathered together to Macedon and Philip 
and became known as the king’s companions. For, in short, Philip rejected 
those who were orderly in character and managed their own lives with care 
while honouring and promoting those who were extravagant and lived a life 
of drink and dice. Accordingly he not only made sure that they had these 
things, but also made them masters of the other unjust and perverse behav-
iours. For what shameful or awful thing was not present for them, and what 
honourable and good thing was not absent? Some of them lived their lives 
shaved and smoothed although they were men, others dared to have sex with 
each other although they had beards. They also led around with them two 
or three of those who prostituted themselves, and they themselves offered 
the same use of those to others. For this reason someone might justly assume 
that they were not companions (hetairous) but prostitutes (hetairas) and call 
them not soldiers but streetwalkers. For though man-killers (androphonoi) 
by nature, they were man-whores (andropornoi) by character.41 To cut a 
long story short’, he says, ‘especially as I am drowning in such great events, 
I believe that those who have become known as the friends and companions 
of Philip have in character become beasts of a kind and magnitude such as 
neither the Centaurs at Pelion nor the Laestrygones living in the Leontinian 
Plain nor any others can match.’ (Polyb. 8.9.5–13 = FGrH 115 F 224–5c)
Polybius is shocked at Theopompus’ style, and he is certainly right that it 
is unusual for its genre: the coarse language and the dirty puns are closer in 
style to Aristophanes than to anything we see elsewhere in historiography. 
It is also this ‘low’ style that causes Pseudo-Demetrius to take issue with 
the passage, and it is no doubt also the reason why Athenaeus decided to 
41 The translations of these terms are taken from BNJ.
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quote it verbatim.42 We shall return to the techniques of moralising below; 
for now the focus will remain on the moral lessons. What Theopompus 
criticises about Philip and his companions here is their lifestyle: drinking, 
gambling, hard partying, sexual intemperance. Secondarily, he alludes to 
their injustice and dishonesty, but these – one might think more historically 
significant – vices are not the focus of the passage. The sexual immodera-
tion criticised here is unregulated homosexuality (i.e. between grown men 
rather than between a grown man and a youth), but other fragments show 
that Theopompus was also critical of deviant heterosexual sex, that is, sex 
with prostitutes and adultery with free women.43 All of these behaviours 
are criticised repeatedly in the Theopompan fragments, often in combina-
tion. Heavy drinking is the most frequent vice, closely followed by hard 
partying and gambling.44 Sometimes extravagant eating, over-the-top dress 
and equipment, and effeminacy are thrown into the mix.45 Theopompus 
also seems to have singled out lavish and thoughtless spending as a par-
ticular vice.46
Such behaviours are all part of what Athenaeus calls tryphe, and indeed 
most of the fragments on these topics are found in the Deipnosophistae 
(forty-six fragments). However, there are enough fragments with similar 
contents from other covertexts to make it clear that this was, indeed, an 
important feature of Theopompus’ Philippica, and no doubt that was why 
he was a favourite of Athenaeus’.47 They are also typical behaviours to 
criticise, both for Theopompus’ Classical predecessors and particularly for 
his Hellenistic successors. What seems to have singled Theopompus out is 
his style of moralising, which we shall return to below, and his insistence 
on the presence of these vices more or less across the board. They are 
central in his characterisation of Philip and his companions, as we have 
seen;48 they play an important part in his description of various peoples 
and ethnic groups (Illyrians F 39, Chalchidians F 139, Thessalians F 162, 
Tarentines F 233), they characterise tyrants (Dionysius F 134, Apollocrates 
F 185, Hipparinus F 186, Timolaus F 210), but they also attach to leaders 
of oligarchies (F 121) and democracies (Chares of Athens F 213). In fact, 
in one fragment Theopompus seems to have argued that democracy in 
42 F 225c = Ps.-Dem. 27, F 224 = Ath. 4.166f–7c, F 225b = Ath. 6.260d–1a.
43 See F 121, F 143, F 187, F 213, F 227.
44 Drinking: F 27, F 39, F 121, F 134, F 139, F 143, F 162, F 185, F 186, F 210, F 233, F 282, 
F 283a; partying: F 27, F 31, F 162, F 213, F 233, F 236; gambling: F 121, F 134, F 228.
45 Eating: F 40, F 57, F 113, F 179, F 187; dress and equipment: F 187, F 188; effeminacy: 
F 132, F 232.
46 See especially F 224 and F 227.
47 F 99 from Harpocration, F 283b from Aelian, F 107 and F 333 from Plutarch, F 27 and 
F 225a from Polybius.
48 F 27, F 224, F 225a–c, F 236, F 282.
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particular led to such dissolute behaviour, not only in the leaders, but in 
the whole people (F 62).49 In tyrants, and people behaving like tyrants, the 
extravagant lifestyle is combined with a violent temperament and actions 
of cruelty.50 Other traits criticised intermittently in the fragments are cor-
ruption (repeatedly designated ‘thieving’), dishonesty, injustice, flattery, 
fickleness and impiety.
Positive paradeigmata seem to have been rather thinner on the ground in 
Theopompus’ works than the by all accounts frequent negative exempla. 
Partly for that reason they carried greater weight with some readers, as we 
can see from Plutarch’s remark that we should trust Theopompus more 
when he praises than when he blames because he enjoys blaming more 
(ψέγει γὰρ ἥδιον ἢ ἐπαινεῖ: F 333 = Plut. Lys. 30.2–3), and from the testi-
mony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (T 20a = Dion. Hal. Pomp. 6) that 
Theopompus reflected on ‘justice, piety, and the other virtues’ (δικαιοσύνης 
καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν) throughout his work.51 Revealingly, 
positive role-models in the Hellenica and Philippica seem always to have 
belonged to the previous generation: the only four fragments that say 
something unambiguously positive about a historical character concern 
Lysander (F 20 and F 333) and Agesilaus (F 22 and F 107), and a possible 
fifth deals with Alcibiades (F 288). The passages on Lysander both extol his 
lack of greed, but one of them goes further and praises him for moderation 
in every aspect of his life. Athenaeus purports to quote verbatim from the 
Hellenica:
Παυσανίαν δὲ καὶ Λύσανδρον ἐπὶ τρυφῇ διαβοήτους γενέσθαι σχεδὸν πάντες 
ἱστοροῦσιν. . . . Θεόπομπος δὲ ἐν τῇ δεκάτῃ τῶν ῾Ελληνικῶν τἀναντία 
φησὶ περὶ τοῦ Λυσάνδρου, ὅτι ‘φιλόπονός τε ἦν καὶ θεραπεύειν δυνάμενος 
καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ βασιλεῖς, σώφρων ὢν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἁπασῶν κρείττων. 
γενόμενος γοῦν τῆς ῾Ελλάδος σχεδὸν ἁπάσης κύριος ἐν οὐδεμιᾶι φανήσεται 
τῶν πόλεων οὐτε πρὸς τὰς ἀφροδισίους ἡδονὰς ὁρμήσας οὐτε μέθαις καὶ 
πότοις ἀκαίροις χρησάμενος’.
Almost all historiographers say that Pausanias and Lysander were famous 
for their extravagant lifestyles. . . . But Theopompus in the tenth book of his 
Hellenica says the opposite about Lysander, namely that ‘he was hardwork-
ing and able to help both private people and kings, being temperate and 
indifferent to all pleasures. And so, although he became master of almost 
all of Greece, he will be seen in none of the cities to have been eager either 
for sexual pleasures or for those related to carousals or to drinking at odd 
times’. (Theopomp. F 20 = Ath. 12.543b–c)
49 For a good discussion of Theopompus’ views on luxury see Flower (1994: 71–83). 
Pédech (1989: 226–30) has a good discussion of the different terms used by Theopompus in 
this context.
50 F 31 Cotys, F 181a and b Clearchus, F 187 Nysaeus, F 291 Hermeias.
51 See Flower (1994: 69–71).
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‘Hard-working’ (φιλόπονός), ‘temperate’ (σώφρων), ‘indifferent to all pleas-
ures’ (τῶν ἡδονῶν ἁπασῶν κρείττων), with no weakness for sex or drinking 
Lysander seems to be the very opposite of Philip and all the other corrupt 
characters of his time. In the other fragment, Plutarch gives Theopompus’ 
Philippica as his source for the fact that Lysander was so scrupulous in 
money matters that although he had held so much power during his life-
time, he died in poverty, again the antithesis of the lavish spenders that seem 
to have populated most of the two works. Similarly, the two fragments on 
Agesilaus, one from the Hellenica (F 22 from Athenaeus) and one from the 
Philippica (F 107 from Plutarch), both present the same moralising vignette: 
Agesilaus is sent delicacies as presents, but gives them to the helots so he and 
the Spartans will not get corrupted. Finally, in F 321 Plutarch claims that 
‘even’ Theopompus says that Agesilaus was the greatest and most famous 
of all of his contemporaries (μέγιστος μὲν ἦν ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τῶν τότε 
ζώντων ἐπιφανέστατος, ὡς εἴρηκέ που καὶ Θεόπομπος). The uncertainty 
signalled by που makes this unlikely to be a verbatim quotation, but the fact 
that Theopompus had something positive to say about anyone apparently 
stuck in Plutarch’s mind. It seems that Theopompus’ moral lesson was 
consistent: just as he poured scorn on intemperance in all areas of life, he 
praised self-control and moderation. In this he is in line with the rest of the 
Greek historiographical tradition, as we have seen; what is unusual is his 
apparent focus on this one moral lesson to the exclusion of others.
For that reason it is worth spending a little time on the two other possible 
praise passages among the Theopompan fragments in order to see whether 
there were in fact other character traits and behaviours that he actively 
recommended in his historical works. One of these fragments comes from 
Cornelius Nepos, who claims that Theopompus, along with Timaeus 
and Thucydides, ‘praised’ Alcibiades (summis laudibus extulerunt: F 288) 
because he was able to adapt to any culture and outdo the Athenians 
in brilliance, the Thebans in strength, the Spartans in self- discipline and 
endurance, the Thracians in drinking and sex, and the Persians in hunting 
and luxurious living. After having read through all the other fragments of 
Theopompus, it is a priori unlikely that he would, straight-faced, praise 
Alcibiades for such a frivolous talent. Furthermore, the pairing with 
Thucydides does not inspire confidence: Thucydides does praise Alcibiades 
briefly, but only for his intelligence and ability, in order then to show how 
his personal life is contributing to the downfall of Athens (Thuc. 6.14), 
and he certainly does not describe Alcibiades as a cultural chameleon as 
explicitly as Nepos makes out. Surely it is possible, then, that Nepos missed 
similar nuances in Theopompus, who may well have described Alcibiades 
in such terms only then to make it clear by some acerbic remark in the next 
paragraph that such a lack of personal integrity was not to be admired.
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The other fragment that might be construed as praise passage is F 328, 
where Plutarch gives Theopompus as his source for the galvanising effect 
of Demosthenes’ speech to the Thebans:
ἡ δὲ τοῦ ῥήτορος δύναμις, ὥς φησι Θεόπομπος, ἐκριπίζουσα τὸν θυμὸν αὐτῶν 
καὶ διακαίουσα τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐπεσκότησε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, ὥστε καὶ 
φόβον καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ χάριν ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας . . .
But the power of the orator, as Theopompus says, roused their spirit and set 
alight their ambition. It cast everything else into darkness so that they threw 
away fear, reason, and gratitude under its influence. (Theopomp. F 328 = 
Plut. Dem. 18.1–3)
This is strong praise of Demosthenes’ oratorical power (δύναμις), but 
it has immoral consequences: reason and gratitude should surely not be 
given up on the basis of a speech, and ἐπισκοτέω, ‘cast into darkness’, 
sounds decidedly ominous. Further on in the same passage Plutarch dis-
agrees with Theopompus’ judgement that Demosthenes’ position among 
the Athenians and Thebans was obtained ‘unjustly and beyond his merit’ 
(ἀδίκως, παρ᾽ ἀξίαν). Another fragment shows that Theopompus had 
called Demosthenes’ political manoeuvring ‘fickle’ (ἀβέβαιον: F 326). 
While Demosthenes’ oratorical skill may have been presented as worth 
emulating, then, it is unlikely that he was represented as a morally good 
person. It does seem, in fact, that the only positive role-models provided 
by Theopompus were the ascetic and disciplined Spartans of the previous 
generation, whom he presented as foils for the unscrupulous, decadent and 
debauched kings and politicians of his own time.
The question of Theopompus’ portrayal of Philip II needs to be faced. 
It seems clear from the fragments that he was presented as a thoroughly 
negative paradeigma: immoderate in his personal life, corrupting in his 
friendship, treacherous and brutal in international relations. But how did a 
moralist such as Theopompus square that with Philip’s undeniable success? 
On the basis of a brief passage from Athenaeus, it has been argued that 
Theopompus showed Philip’s success to be due to tyche, luck or fortune, 
rather than to any personal qualities: 52
ὁ Θεόπομπος δὲ ἐν τῇ πεντηκοστῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν κατὰ τὴν Φιλίππου 
φησὶν ἀρχὴν περὶ τὴν Βισαλτίαν καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Γραιστωνίαν τῆς 
Μακεδονίας ἔαρος μεσοῦντος τὰς μὲν συκᾶς σῦκα, τὰς δ’ ἀμπέλους βότρυς, 
τὰς δ’ ἐλαίας ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ βρύειν εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὰς ἐλαίας ἐνεγκεῖν, καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι 
πάντα Φίλιππον.
52 Pownall (2004: 174–5) building on the arguments of Connor (1967). Contra Jacoby 
(1930: 389), who sees the passage as encomiastic of Philip.
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Theopompus says in the fifty-fourth book of his Histories with regard 
to Philip’s rule in the region of Bisaltia, Amphipolis, and Graestonia in 
Macedon that in mid-spring the fig trees produced figs, the vines produced 
grapes, and the olive trees – at the time when it was reasonable for them 
to come into bloom – produced olives, and that Philip was fortunate in all 
things. (Theopomp. F 237a = Ath. 3.77d–e)
This is a tempting conclusion, but hardly permissible on the basis of this 
fragment alone, which is the only reference in the fragments to Philip’s 
luck or fortune. If Theopompus had developed a theory on the reasons 
for Philip’s success to the effect that it was due to fortune rather than to 
the king’s own qualities, I find it hard to believe, in view of the interest of 
later authors in both Theopompus and Philip, that no source would have 
referred to it. It is more likely that the reference is to a speech delivered or 
a view expressed by a character in the Philippica in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Chaeronea, perhaps Demosthenes, who says something similar 
in his speech On the Crown.53 It has also been argued that Theopompus 
was critical of Philip’s personal life, but admired his military and political 
achievements.54 Nothing in the fragments points to this: rather, Philip’s 
politics and wars seem as morally flawed as his companion-keeping (e.g. 
F 162, F 209, F 236). The explanation best supported by the fragments is 
that Theopompus showed Philip to be degenerate and debauched, but also 
calculating and clever. All those around Philip, from his companions to the 
rulers of barbarian peoples and Athenian democrats, were equally degen-
erate and were so busy wallowing in their own sordid luxury that they 
were unable to form an efficient defence against Philip.55 The only remedy 
against this contemporary weakness and degeneracy would be to emulate 
the Spartans of the past: refuse pleasure and embrace hard work in order to 
gain military and moral strength.
To a modern mind it would perhaps seem logical for such a negative por-
trayal of contemporary history also to be void of divine justice. However, 
such an assumption would be jumping to conclusions. Three fragments 
from the Philippica clearly narrate instances of superhuman punishment. 
The most obvious one is F 31. The story as told by Athenaeus runs like 
this: Cotys was the most decadent of all the Thracian kings. He travelled 
around his country and designated all the loveliest places as banquetting 
halls. He also used to sacrifice regularly to the gods and so was happy and 
prosperous (εὐδαίμων καὶ μακαριστὸς ὢν) until he committed impiety and 
53 Dem. De cor. 18.300: οὐδέ γ᾽ ἡττήθην ἐγὼ τοῖς λογισμοῖς Φιλίππου, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, 
οὐδὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τῶν συμμάχων στρατηγοὶ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις τῇ τύχῃ.
54 Pédech (1989), Westlake (1992).
55 Thus, more or less, Connor (1967, 1968), Shrimpton (1991), Flower (1994).
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blasphemy against Athena (εἰς τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν βλασφημεῖν καὶ πλημμελεῖν). 
The narrative of the impiety, where Athenaeus seems to be paraphrasing 
Theopompus, deserves to be quoted in full:
διηγεῖταί τε ἑξῆς ὁ συγγραφεὺς ὅτι δεῖπνον κατεσκεύασεν ὁ Κότυς ὡς 
γαμουμένης αὐτῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ θάλαμον κατασκευάσας ἀνέμενεν μεθύων 
τὴν θεόν. ἤδη δ’ ἔκφρων γενόμενος ἔπεμπέ τινα τῶν δορυφόρων ὀψόμενον 
εἰ παραγέγονεν ἡ θεὸς εἰς τὸν θάλαμον· ἀφικομένου δ’ ἐκείνου καὶ εἰπόντος 
μηδένα εἶναι ἐν τῷ θαλάμῳ, τοξεύσας τοῦτον ἀπέκτεινεν καὶ ἄλλον δεύτερον 
ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἕως ὁ τρίτος συνεὶς παραγενομένην ἔφη πάλαι τὴν θεὸν αὐτὸν 
ἀναμένειν. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς οὗτός ποτε καὶ ζηλοτυπήσας τὴν αὑτοῦ γυναῖκα ταῖς 
αὑτοῦ χερσὶν ἀνέτεμε τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἀπὸ τῶν αἰδοίων ἀρξάμενος.
The historiographer narrates subsequently that Cotys prepared a meal as if 
he was going to marry Athena. He prepared a bed-chamber and sat down 
to drink while he waited for the goddess. Since he had already gone out of 
his mind, he sent one of his bodyguards to see if the goddess had come into 
the chamber. When he had come back and reported that there was no one in 
the chamber, Cotys shot and killed him and sent a second guard in with the 
same purpose, until the third, having understood the situation, said that the 
goodess had been there for a long time and was waiting for him. This king 
was also once struck with jealousy of his own wife and cut the woman up 
with his own hands beginning from her private parts. (Theopomp. F 31 = 
Ath. 12.531e–532a)
The interesting thing here is the expression ‘already gone out of his mind’ 
(ἤδη δ’ ἔκφρων γενόμενος). ἔκφρων is a word used of frenzied bacchants 
and inspired poets. It is only used in one other passage by Athenaeus 
(Timaeus F 149), so it is very tempting to believe that he took it over 
from Theopompus.The sense seems to be that Cotys has been struck by 
madness for his impiety and that this madness is driving him on to still 
more crimes, that is, killing off his bodyguards as they one by one come to 
tell him that the goddess is not in the bridal chamber. The end of the story 
in Athenaeus is abrupt; we are not told what Cotys did when he was finally 
told that Athena was waiting for him. From the skip to the information 
that he ‘also once’ (ποτε καί) killed his wife out of jealousy it is perhaps 
not too far-fetched to assume that Theopompus connected the two events 
and made the murder a result of the divinely sent madness. Thus, we find 
in Theopompus a narrative world where the gods can punish impiety by 
madness, something which we have seen clearly in Herodotus and which 
was implied in Thucydides’ description of the Athenians rushing towards 
the Sicilian Expedition.
A slightly more ambiguous fragment is F 232 (= Ath. 12.536c–d), where 
Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, is said to have turned from the traditional 
Spartan values to live ‘in a non-Spartan and soft way’ (ξενικῶς καὶ μαλακῶς) 
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and, when he dies a mercenary in a foreign land, is not even deemed worthy 
of a proper funeral (οὐδὲ ταφῆς κατηξιώθη). On the one hand, no superhu-
man force is mentioned in the fragment. On the other, the enemies’ refusal 
to give back Archidamus’ body is hardly provoked by his deviation from 
Spartan moderation. If a connection is supposed to be seen between the 
two things – and Athenaeus clearly intends this, which makes it likely, 
but not inevitable, that his source also did – one must assume that some 
superhuman power had engineered Archidamus’ dire fate as punishment 
for his lack of moderation. This is supported by F 312, where the same 
story is told by Pausanias, who adds that Archidamus was unburied ‘with 
Apollo standing in the way’ (ἐμποδὼν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ̓ Απόλλωνος). Regardless of 
whether Pausanias took this interpretation from Theopompus or inferred 
it, it must surely be the one Theopompus intended.56
One intriguing fragment implies the existence of a divine power which 
not only punishes the wicked, but also if not rewards, then at least notices, 
piety. This is F 344 (Porph. Abst. II.16),57 which tells the story of a wealthy 
man who has always offered splendid sacrifices. He travels to Delphi to 
ask who honours the gods best, in the hope that he himself will be named. 
To his disappointment, he is told the name of another man. When he goes 
to find him, he sees that the other is a poor man who never sacrifices lav-
ishly, but is always careful to give the gods the best of what he has (there 
are clear parallels to Herodotus’ narrative of Croesus and Solon). Such a 
story serves as a comment on one of Theopompus’ favourite moral sub-
jects, namely extravagant spending, but it also conveys the message that 
the world is ruled by the gods, and that they appreciate – and so perhaps 
reward – piety. A final indication that Theopompus promoted traditional 
piety is his fantasy of two cities, Wartown and Saintsburg (Μάχιμος and 
Εὐσεβεῖα: F 75a–e; the translations are offered by Shrimpton). This seems 
to be Theopompus’ addition to an older myth and tells the story of a 
supremely warlike people who spend their lives in misery and a supremely 
peaceful and pious people who live completely happy lives.58
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Theopompus is frequently referenced 
by various covertexts as evidence for oracles and divine portents:59 such 
stories belong in a narrative world ruled by divine forces, not in one gov-
erned only by human causation. Theopompus, then, may well have been 
a pessimist with regard to human nature, but it seems that he was not as 
56 F 312 = Paus. 3.10.3.
57 In a clear example of covertext authors appropriating an earlier text for their own 
purposes, Porphyry uses the anecdote to argue against sacrificing and eating meat.
58 For good discussions of this digression with references to earlier literature see 
Shrimpton (1991: 143–4), Pownall (2004: 154–5) and Morison (n.d.: ad F 75c).
59 F 316, F 331, F 336, F 343, F 392.
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much of a pessimist as Thucydides:60 he apparently did believe in a super-
human force which, at least sometimes, punishes evil and rewards virtue.
It has been argued that Theopompus portrayed a world where another 
kind of universal justice is at work, by means of which good rulers thrive 
and harsh rulers fail. This may well have been the case, but the arguments 
are not compelling. One rests on a statement in F 256 which connects 
Philip’s ‘behaviour’ or ‘habits’ (ἐπιτηδεύμασιν) with his ability to extend 
his rule across Europe; but the verb tenses of the sentence show that it 
must come from a speech delivered by a character in the Philippica.61 The 
second argument on which rests the theory that Theopompus demon-
strated a causal relationship between the way a ruler treats his subjects 
and his success is based on F 185–8 and F 283a and b, which criticise a 
series of Syracusan tyrants for their decadent living, especially their drink-
ing habits.62 As these fragments most probably come from Theopompus’ 
Sicilian digression (see F 184 = Diod. Sic. 16.71.3), it has been argued that 
Theopompus showed the decline and fall of the Syracusan tyrants to have 
been caused by their decadent lifestyle.63 However, it is impossible to see 
from the brief fragments whether Theopompus made such a causal con-
nection, and there is no mention in any of the fragments of the tyrants’ 
behaviour towards their subjects.
One further fragment may point to a moralising connection between 
the way a ruler or hegemonic power treats his or its subjects and his or its 
success. This is Theopompus F 103, the table of contents for book 12 of the 
Philippica, which is preserved by Photius. Number 7 of Photius’ entries is:
καὶ ὡς Ἀθηναίων ἡ πόλις ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα συνθήκαις ἐπειρᾶτο ἐμμένειν, 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες παρέβαινον τὰς συνθήκας·
And that the city of the Athenians tried to keep to their treaty with the king, 
but the Lacedaemonians transgressed the treaty in their excessive arrogance. 
(Theopomp. F 103 = Phot. Bibl. 120a)
If the phrase ‘in their excessive arrogance’ (ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες) was in 
Theopompus’ text, he must have criticised the Spartans for being arrogant 
60 Contra Pédech (1989: 249–51). 
61 Aelius Theon (Progymnasmata 2.110.27–32) says that the sentence comes from an 
encomium of Philip by Theopompus, and many scholars have speculated about the date and 
purpose of this work (e.g. Jacoby 1930: 354, Laqueur 1934: 2206, Connor 1967, Shrimpton 
1991). However, as Flower (1994: 38–9, 102) has argued, the fact that the conditional sen-
tence is a mixture of present unreal and future potential means that it could only have been 
spoken while Philip was still alive, which would be an extremely unusual situation for an 
encomium. It is therefore more likely to come from a speech of the Philippica which was later 
extracted as an encomium of Philip. 
62 F 283a = Ath. 10.453d, F 283b = Ael. VH 6.12).
63 Westlake (1954: 295–7), Pownall (2004: 164–6).
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in the time after the King’s Peace, a point of view which was shared by 
Xenophon, as we have seen. Taking it a step further, we can hypothe-
sise that Theopompus, like Xenophon, interpreted the defeat at Leuctra 
as the punishment for Sparta’s arrogance and crimes against their allies. 
However, we cannot know whether the phrase was in Theopompus at all, 
or whether it merely expresses Photius’ interpretation of Theopompus’ 
text, perhaps influenced by the patriarch’s reading of Xenophon. All we 
can say for certain is that Photius found the phrase ‘in their excessive 
arrogance’ apt to describe the Spartan behaviour after the King’s Peace as 
depicted by Theopompus. In short, the evidence is insufficient to support 
an argument that good rulers were rewarded with success and bad rulers 
were punished with failure in Theopompus’ historical works.
Finally, we turn to Theopompus’ moralising techniques. The fact that 
his words are so often quoted verbatim makes this a more rewarding 
exercise than for many of his equally fragmentary peers. From these quo-
tations, Theopompus seems to have used the full toolbox of moralising 
techniques: from evaluative phrasing (e.g. F 13, F 81 and F 97) via speeches 
(e.g. F 166–7, F 256, F 380) to moralising vignettes (e.g. F 21 and F 280), 
moral causation (Philip conquering Greece because of its degeneration) 
and moralising digressions (e.g. F 225a and b). Perhaps he even cast his 
ethnography in a moralising light (e.g. F 39, F 139, F 162, F 233) and told 
a moralising utopian myth of his own invention (F 75). What seems to 
have been unique to Theopompus is both his amount of moralising and 
its rhetorical shape: in all of his different types of moralising he seems to 
have made frequent use of sarcasm, puns, antitheses and similes, to a much 
greater extent than any of the other historiographers examined in this 
study, perhaps apart from Posidonius.64
CONCLUSION: FROM MACRO AND MINIMALIST 
MORALISING TO EXPLICIT PARADEIGMATA
Moral didacticism does seem to come into its own in the fourth century 
bc, but the innovator was not Ephorus; it was Theopompus. Both the 
Oxyrhynchus Historian and Ephorus seem to have engaged in the kind 
of moralising already displayed by their predecessors. The Oxyrhynchus 
Historian seems to have played safe and stuck close to the minimalist 
moralising of Thucydides and stretches of Xenophon’s Hellenica. Ephorus 
64 Flower (1994: 184–7) argues convincingly that Theopompus only used the highly 
rhetorical style seen in the preserved quotations in passages of special passion and that his 
style was otherwise more like Isocrates’, which is indeed what Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
says (Pomp. 6.9–10 = T 20a). It seems likely that most or all of these passionate passages 
were moralising.
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innovated by writing a much longer work than any of his predecessors and 
so, of necessity, introduced a new principle of organisation, kata genos, 
and prefaced each book with a proem. Whether or not these proems were 
moral-didactic we cannot now know. What we can see from his fragments 
and discern from Diodorus’ use of his work suggests that his style of mor-
alising was close to that of Xenophon, even if Ephorus had more frequent 
moralising digressions and expressed narratorial judgement more often. 
Theopompus, on the other hand, seems to have created a work of history 
that was radically new: guided by the principle of moral condemnation of 
his own generation against the backdrop of a nobler past, it emplotted con-
temporary history as a satire, combining entertainment with moral outrage 
and plenty of examples of how not to behave. No later historiographer had 
the temperament to imitate this approach exactly (although Posidonius 
may have gone some way towards it), but it did pave the way for centuries 
of more explicit moralising where the narrator’s overt moral judgements 
were considered necessary to guide the reader.
Conclusion
This study has explored moral didacticism in the best-preserved works of 
history from the beginnings of the genre in the fifth century bc to the time 
when it began to merge with the Roman tradition in the first century bc. 
It has shown, I hope, that moral didacticism was an integral and indispen-
sable part of the historiography of these four formative centuries. In the 
works of Polybius and Diodorus moralising is ubiquitous, and the reader is 
repeatedly and explicitly told to take it to heart in his own life. We misread 
these authors if we do not take that seriously. This seems also to have 
been the case in most of the Hellenistic works of history which now exist 
only in very fragmented states. In Herodotus and Thucydides, the moral-
ising is a lot more subtle, and the moral lessons are more intellectual and 
thought- directing, but both the lessons and the didactic intention are cer-
tainly there. The historiographers of the fourth century, the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian, Xenophon, Ephorus and Theopompus, seem to constitute a 
bridge between the subtle Classical moralising and the explicit Hellenistic 
moralising, with Theopompus being the innovator who made explicit mor-
alising a frequent and striking feature of his work.
I shall not here reiterate all the conclusions drawn in individual chapters, 
but simply wish to dwell for a moment on what strikes me as the most sur-
prising finding of this study: these differences between early Classical, late 
Classical and Hellenistic historiographical moralising exist on the formal 
plane; they are differences in technique and intensity of moralising, as 
we have explored in detail in the preceding chapters. In terms of moral 
lessons, by contrast, the picture is remarkably constant. The message that 
human success is unstable and that we should remain moderate in times of 
good fortune runs like a red thread from Herodotus through Thucydides 
and Xenophon to Polybius and Diodorus via the now fragmentary works 
of history. It has variations between authors – for some the fall of the 
arrogant is linked with divine punishment, for others it is a purely human 
 Conclusion 273
mechanism – but the central action-directing message of the importance 
of moderation, especially in times of good fortune, remains unchanged. 
Similarly, in all of the historiographers examined apart from Thucydides 
(more about him below), being good is likely to stand you in better stead 
than being immoral. The virtues and vices are also remarkably consistent. 
Virtues are moderation, kindness towards those in one’s power, piety, 
lack of greed, and courage. Vices are greed for power or money, impiety, 
cruelty and an immoderate lifestyle. There are variations, of course: piety 
and cruelty play a smaller part in Polybius than in any of the other well- 
preserved historiographers, and kindness towards those in your power is 
more important in Diodorus than in any of the others. In Xenophon, more 
than in any of the other historiographers, the complications of friendship 
are a burning issue.
Herodotus stands slightly apart from the genre he initiated by offering 
less clear-cut messages than any of his successors. His picture of how 
the world works offers patterns and chains of causation, but they are 
always problematised and produce the overall impression that the ways 
of the world are unpredictable. Consequently, his lessons about how to 
act in the world are more a form of thought-directing guidelines than any 
prescriptive advice. Nonetheless, his main moral guidance for the reader 
corresponds to the moral messages offered by those who come after him 
in advocating humility, mildness towards those in one’s power and an 
avoidance of greed and cruelty. Thucydides is the odd one out for another 
reason: firstly, he has a slightly different palette of virtues and vices from 
the others. The vices are greed for power, strong emotion, indecisiveness 
and self- seeking, surely vices in the other historiographers as well, but not 
major ones (apart from anger, which is a major vice in Xenophon). Cruelty/
brutality is the only major vice in Thucydides which is also a major vice in 
most of the other historiographers. Virtues in Thucydides’ History are few 
and far between, but those that can be discerned correspond more closely 
to those propounded by other historiographers – moderation, avoidance 
of violence, foresight, loyalty, honesty, abiding by oaths, lack of greed 
for money and power, justice, and willingness to put city interests before 
self-interest. None of these virtues, however, relate to the private individ-
ual: in contrast with the historiographers who came before and after him 
(perhaps with the exception of the Oxyrhynchus Historian), Thucydides 
was uninterested in the dining habits and private conversations of the men 
who influenced history. What sets him apart the most, however, is the fact 
that being moral does not give a character a better chance of success or even 
survival in his narrative world than being immoral. In this, Thucydides 
differs dramatically from the other authors of his genre.
Even with these divergences in the two originators of the genre, 
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Herodotus and Thucydides, the similarity of the moral lessons offered 
over the course of these 400 years is remarkable. Not only is it mostly 
the same virtues that are held up for emulation and the same vices that 
are criticised, but many moralising topoi are common across time. The 
topos of the victorious commander who either mistreats his prisoners/
the defeated or passes the test of success and refrains from abuse is seen 
in Herodotus, Xenophon, Polybius and Diodorus, as well as very pos-
sibly Timaeus, Duris, Phylarchus and Hieronymus.1 The topos of the 
wicked suffering a punishment that somehow echoes their crime is seen in 
Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Diodorus, Phylarchus and very possibly 
Timaeus and Theopompus. It is easy to forget how extraordinary this 
agreement about morality is: if we were to compare the work of a histo-
rian writing today with that of, say, Voltaire writing three hundred years 
ago, we would be unlikely to find such constancy of values, not to mention 
such a uniform presentation of them. The fact that Herodotus, writing in a 
Greece populated with city-states still flush with their victory over Persia, 
and Diodorus, writing in a Rome ravaged by civil war, largely agree on the 
main lesson to be learned from history (do not become arrogant in your 
good fortune) testifies to the  tradition-bound nature of Greek popular 
morality. It supports the argument that the ancient Greeks thought of the 
present and the past as a timeless continuum in which human psychology 
and motivation – and, we should add, human virtues and vices – as well as 
the social and cultural parameters within which they functioned, remained 
more or less constant.2 However, it also shows the power of topoi and imi-
tatio in making a literary work recognisable as historiography.
An unavoidable question is how the realisation that all the works of 
Greek historiography from the fifth to the first century bc engage in moral 
didacticism should influence our use of these works as historical sources. 
Can we still trust them? My answer would be that the jumble of random 
events that is the past is always turned into historiography (and, indeed, 
history) by a process of narrativisation and emplotment. White has argued, 
as we saw in the Introduction, that this process is always driven by a desire 
to moralise (a ‘moralising impulse’), and that is certainly the case of the 
historiographers we have examined.3 They looked at the past through a 
moralistic lens, and it influenced their selection and organisation of events 
as well as their emplotment of (some of) those events – as a series of 
moral paradeigmata or a recurring pattern – and, especially in the cases 
of Polybius, Diodorus, Theopompus and probably also some of the other 
1 See Hau (2008) for a diachronic exploration of this topos.
2 Koselleck (2004), Marincola (2009), Grethlein (2011).
3 White (1980).
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now fragmentary Hellenistic historiographers, the tone of their narrative. 
In this, historiography with a moralising agenda is no different from history 
with a Marxist, feminist, international relations or economic agenda: it 
just uses a different lens.
But is moral didacticism always just a lens – or does it sometimes drive 
the historiographer to invent details, or even events? The problem with 
asking this question about ancient historiography is that in many cases 
we simply cannot tell. It is perfectly possible that Scipio cried and quoted 
Homer while watching Carthage burn – he was keen on Greek literature 
and had had Polybius as mentor for twenty years, so knew what was 
expected of him; moreover, he knew that Polybius was going to record 
the scene in his Histories. However, it is also possible that Scipio was too 
exhausted and preoccupied to think of such self-staging at that moment 
and that he watched the flames in stone-faced silence. Then, perhaps, later 
over dinner and wine, he expressed his sentiment about the changeability 
of fortune to Polybius, prompted or not, and quoted Homer. Or Scipio 
expressed the sentiment, and Polybius added the Homer quotation when 
writing up the episode. There is no way now to be able to tell which of 
these scenarios (if any) really took place. But if one of the latter two did, 
then Polybius engaged in a minor type of invention, which we might call 
poetic licence – or moralising licence. By doing it, he made the scene mem-
orable and famous and also crafted a powerful moral exemplum. Instead 
of the factual truth he has then given us a more symbolic truth that distils 
Scipio’s character and the moral lessons inherent in the moment into some-
thing more pertinent.
A more extreme example can be taken from Thucydides. Apart from 
Thucydides’ well-known selectivity in choice of events to record, and apart 
from his doubtless partly invented speeches, the Melian Dialogue stands 
out as a flagrant invention. The Athenians and Melians held discussions 
in the council chamber behind closed doors. In those days no one took 
minutes. Later, perhaps, at most, Thucydides was able to meet with one or 
more of the delegates on one or both sides and get a brief of what had been 
said. But when he sat down to write it up, he did not give his reader such a 
vague impression of a diplomatic negotiation, but instead composed a full-
scale dramatic dialogue like something out of a contemporary tragedy for 
the stage. Dionysius of Halicarnassus already recognised its fictitiousness. 
Thucydides’ purpose with this fiction, I have argued, was to present to his 
reader two different worldviews and sets of rules for behaviour which he 
saw repeatedly clashing in the world around him. The Dialogue presents 
them in a riveting way, making the reader emotionally as well as intellec-
tually involved in a way a report of a council meeting could never do. It 
is brilliant literature, but also brilliant historiography, despite employing 
276 Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus
poetic and moralising licence. It may not represent the truth of what was 
actually said that day, but it presents the more profound truth of the 
assumptions and worldviews on which those utterances and the actions 
that followed were based. This is Moral History in the hands of a master: 
it does not offer prescriptions for behaviour, it does not even offer a guide-
line for which behaviour is right and which wrong; it simply offers an 
exploration of a complex moral issue. Herodotus does something similar 
in his Constitutional Debate and Xenophon in his vignette of Agesilaus and 
Pharnabazus reclining in the grass. Polybius may well have done it with 
scenes involving one or both Scipios, and Diodorus with the speeches at 
Syracuse about the fate of the Athenian prisoners. In this the ancient Greek 
historiographers differ from most modern history writing, regardless of its 
agenda or ideology: although many historians working today are happy 
enough to hypothesise about what their long-dead subjects thought and 
felt, few are willing to make up scenes like these.4
Nonetheless, Moral History is still history. If we compare ancient Greek 
historiography with other ancient genres that have a partly or wholly 
moral-didactic purpose (as we have done briefly in the Introduction and 
in Chapter 6), we notice a crucial difference: moral historiography, as 
opposed to lyric poetry, tragedy, encomium and philosophical narrative, is 
committed to telling if not the truth about the past, then a truth about the 
past, at the same time as presenting this past in a way that will be morally 
useful to the reader. Most of the time these twin purposes can coexist 
peacefully, but sometimes they come into conflict. At those times the reso-
lution can go either way: the historiographer can decide to go with factual 
truth to the detriment of moral didacticism, like Xenophon in the narrative 
of Agesilaus’ Sardis campaign in the Hellenica, or he can decide to teach 
a moral lesson to the detriment of factual truth, like Thucydides in the 
Melian Dialogue. This, I would argue, does not make Moral History poor 
historiography. Rather, it displays a tension that exists in all (good) history 
writing, modern as well as ancient, between telling a particular story and 
making general points about history and the world.5 When the historian 
decides to aim for the general level, he has the opportunity to point at more 
universal truths than he could if he stuck to the simple facts, and so to 
make his history more relevant, more important, or true on a higher plane. 
This is harder to do for a present-day historiographer, working within the 
established limits of his discipline, than it was for the ancient trailblazers 
who invented it, but if we were to try to learn from it, we might be able to 
4 Although there is a small movement within the present discipline of history which 
experiments with the use of creative writing techniques. See some of the papers in five special 
issues of Rethinking History (2010–14).
5 As observed by Moles (1993).
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write works of history that would last through the ages rather than being 
read only by our academic peers.
In a postmodern world where objectivity is recognised as impossible 
and the past – or the present – can never be fully known, teaching readers 
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